Uncertain States: Irregular Migrant Labour and the Question of Law by Tataryn, Anastasia
 1 
UNCERTAIN STATES: IRREGULAR MIGRANT 
LABOUR AND THE QUESTION OF LAW 
 
 
 
Anastasia Tataryn 
School of Law, Birkbeck College 
University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2015 
   
 2 
Declaration 
I, Anastasia Tataryn, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 
Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been 
indicated in this thesis. 
 
 
Anastasia Tataryn 
  
 3 
Abstract 
In this thesis, I explore the phenomenon of irregular migrant labour in the 
United Kingdom (UK). My particular methodology examines political and juridical 
attention to so-called irregular labour migration including proposed remedies. My 
focus is not on the individual situations of persons (‘migrants’) identified as irregular. 
The diversity of these situations and experiences, illustrated in numerous quantitative, 
qualitative and ethnographic studies, immediately problematises the assumption that a 
cohesive demographic of ‘irregular migrants’ exists. Any shared experience would be 
the consequence of subjection to the normative, dominant paradigm that creates the 
‘irregularity’, not an inherent ‘migrant’ quality. Rather than delve into these important 
debates and analyses, the bulk of my study interrogates the underlying 
presuppositions of legal categories, including conceptualisations of citizenship, labour 
and legal subjectivity that condition how persons moving and working are identified 
and subjected as ‘irregular’. I employ a three-fold methodology that is political, 
juridical and, with the help of Susan Marks’ notion of false contingency, incorporates 
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s fundamental ‘ontological’ questioning via attention to 
ecotechnics.1  
Through this methodology I contend that the phenomenon of IML is 
symptomatic of the limits of legal categories based on predetermined frames of 
recognition that restrict and condition legal subjectivity. My work does not end there, 
however. Not only are the existing legal categories in immigration and labour law 
limited in their ability to address what is identified as ‘irregular migrant labour’, but 
the limit of the legal framework obscures the processes of neoliberalisation that 
maintain an economic market system dependent on persons in ‘irregular’ situations. A 
critique that stops at identifying the limit of law and legal categories is insufficient to 
address what is happening in the circulation of capital, production and reproduction. 
For this reason, I explore Jean-Luc Nancy’s work, in particular his term ecotechnics, 
in an attempt to bring attention, within discussion of legal categorical limits, to what 
is on-going, circulating, and happening in labour migration law. 
                                                
1 Appendix A Explanation of terms: ecotechnics, bodily ontology; false contingency. 
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Introduction 
In any given day, at least over the past five years, media in the United 
Kingdom report stories indicating a crisis of immigration. In 2014/2015, debates over 
immigration sparked new political trajectories for the ruling Conservative party and 
opposition Labour party.2  Underlying political reactions and media attention to 
immigration is an economic narrative of work and employment. Are immigrants 
stealing British jobs? Are foreign workers causing a downward pressure on wages and 
creating conditions of precarious employment for British citizens? Both policy and 
legal measures, unable to capture a demographic of workers accused of adversely 
affecting the British labour market for citizens, assign excessive situations to the 
broad and ambiguous labels of irregular migrant and irregular migrant labour. The 
‘irregular’ eludes definition and evades clear jurisdictional solutions and existing 
legal frameworks.3 The nature of migration is such that persons are migrating 
alongside national territorial and economic priorities that reaffirm the sovereignty of 
the nation-state whilst profiting from a globalised economic system reliant on global 
supply chains of precarious labour and production. The term ‘irregular’ enables policy 
makers as well as political (and advocacy) responses to migration to evade legal 
frameworks whilst bolstering them as the only conditions of possibility to respond to 
tragedy and crisis. Nevertheless, in UK and international policy (international labour 
organisation; international organisation for migration) the presumption that such a 
demographic exists, persists. My use of ‘irregular migrant labour’ recognises it as a 
                                                
2 In response to the rising prominence in 2014 of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). 
3 Franck Duvell, ‘Irregular Migration to the UK: 10 questions answered’ British Politics and Policy, London 
School of Economics. Accessed 20 May, 2015 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/irregular-migration-10-
questions-answered/ ; Boat Migrants: the term ‘irregular migrants’ is commonly used in place of ‘illegal’ 
migration. See, European Commission, ‘Irregular Migration & Return’ 22.04.2015 Accessed on May 20 2015 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/index_en.htm. Eva-
Maria Poptcheva, ‘EU legal framework on asylum and irregular immigration’ European Parliamentary Research 
Service, European Parliament Briefing March 2015.  Whereas the UNHCR uses the terms ‘mixed migration’ to 
identify that persons migrating include ‘both migrants and refugees.’ However, refugee is a legally determined 
status based on the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention definition (United Nations 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees). Whether someone is forced to flee their country according to 
terms recognised by the UN Convention, or choose to leave where their flight is not recognised as fleeing 
persecution, or ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ of the standard to constitute the status of ‘refugee’ can be a 
contentious distinction: what is choice in the face of extreme poverty, political violence, homelessness?  UNHCR: 
Asylum and Migration, ‘All in the Same Boat’ Accessed on 20 May, 2015 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html . Moreover, this is not a new concern in 2015: See Phillippe De 
Bruycker, Anna Di Bartolomeo, Philippe Fargues, ‘Migrants smuggled by sea to the EU: facts, laws and policy 
options’ Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, 2013.  
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label encompassing an amorphous and ambiguous phenomenon that begs 
interrogation.  
Immigration laws and national security legislation are drawn on to respond to 
crises in migration within discourses imbued with ideals of sovereignty and regulation 
on the one hand (‘protecting and controlling borders’4; enforcing quotas of migrants 
and asylum claims; the UK’s new offence of illegal work5), and universalising claims 
of human rights and protections on the other (‘humanitarian crisis’; the EU’s 
collective response to ‘save lives’ and to ‘target criminal smuggling networks’6). 
Responses to immigration, however, increasingly are administrative, about 
management, and seldom is law itself the focus of inquiry and attention. Yet, who is it 
that determines ‘irregular’ migration as opposed to ‘regular’ migration? Why is it that 
migration is now deemed ‘irregular’, when the frequency of discussion and events 
would indicate that it is in fact a ‘regular’ occurrence? In order to understand the 
phenomenon of irregular migration it must be analysed alongside an exposition of the 
legal regimes, and their underlying contingencies that claim to ground responses to 
migration in sovereign or humanitarian ideals. I understand IML as symptomatic of 
the impossibility for existing legal frames, which use as their reference point a notion 
of what is 'regular' and what is ‘legal’, to encompass the presence and experience of 
persons who do not fit into pre-determined frameworks of legal subjectivity. The legal 
gaps that reinforce migration situations considered ‘irregular’ reveal that the 
categories of migration law exist for a limited recognition of a particular conforming 
legal subject. If one is not recognised as within this legal subjectivity, one is 
‘irregular’. Yet legal subjectivity itself is not natural. It is a construct of a particular 
modern legal system. The ideology behind this particular system is historically 
specific. Consequently, legal subjectivity is a form of recognition within a specific 
system that can be withheld or denied,7 in spite of the dominant governance (political, 
                                                
4 UK Government, ‘2010 to 2015 government policy: immigration and borders’ Policy Paper, gov.uk 07.05.2015.  
5  UK Government, ‘David Cameron’s speech on immigration’ Accessed 21 May 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-immigration 
6  EU Commission, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ 13.05.2015, pg 3. Accessed 21 May 2015 
http://ec.europa.eu/ Laurence Peter, ‘Will EU Commission’s quota plan for migrants work?’ BBC News 13 May 
2015. 
7 Legal subjects are recognised under the law, yet if the law is understood in a particular way, under a particular 
system, then recognition comes from within this specific frame. According to Judith Butler, ‘non-compliance calls 
into question the viability of one’s life, the ontological conditions of one’s persistence. We think of subjects as the 
kind of beings who ask for recognition in the law or in political life; but perhaps the more important issue is how 
the terms of recognition—and here was can include a number of gender and sexual norms—condition in advance 
Introduction 
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juridical, economic) structure’s claim to universal applicability and recognition of all 
human rights.8 
The term, IML, homogenises an elusive and largely un-identifiable, 
undoubtedly diverse, demographic. Moreover this ostensible demographic is only a 
‘demographic’ because it has been labelled one by the dominant framework that 
claims authorship and authority over the ‘regular’ ‘non-migrant’ identity. While my 
very usage of IML may be accused of reinforcing a reductive social classification, I 
focus on this label to examine not only how but why this term is relevant to current 
issues in migration and labour. I interrogate not only what the term signifies, but also 
what it serves to obscure. Irregular, migrant, and labour are three words that carry 
immense significance. The first two, reify the opposite meaning; the 'regular' and the 
'non-migrant' accrue a legitimacy associated with the 'citizen' or 'national'. The third, 
‘labour’, evokes traditional labour categories that are often conflated with more 
current and in practice, restrictive definitions of employment and ‘employee’. The 
popular usage of the term, IML, in policy and academic work to encompass persons 
crossing territorial boundaries and working in precarious employment situations, 
obscures the ideologies upheld by the normative regular, non-migrant legal subject. 
Moreover that these persons, amassed as IML, are ‘labouring’ serves an ideology 
privileging productivity and capital circulation.  
On the one hand, problematically, the label IML works to suspend the 
diversity and heterogeneity of all bodies living and working within a particular space. 
The precarious, non-regular working bodies categorised as 'irregular' implies that a) 
there is a common experience of all persons who are not accepted and recognised as 
‘regular’ ‘citizens’ and b) the 'regular' 'non-migrant' is immune to the precariousness 
embodied in the 'irregular' 'migrant'. On the other hand, the label IML serves as an 
empty container for the excess of existing legal categories, which serve to allocate 
legal statuses to those recognised as legal subjects. That the blanket term persists and 
is maintained through the ‘gaps’ of immigration and labour law (as will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters) is a curious phenomenon that has compelled my work. I 
                                                                                                                                      
who will count as a subject, and who will not.’ Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and 
Violence. (London, New York: Verso, 2004), iv.   
8 Hans Lindahl ed., A Right to Inclusion and Exclusion? Normative Thought Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Oxford: Hart Publishers, (2009), 118-135. 
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organise my study of irregular migrant labour and the underlying intersections of 
migration, citizenship, labour, market economic priorities and neoliberalisations 
through questioning how we might think about law and legal categories differently. I 
examine UK immigration law and labour law for its ‘gaps’ and grey areas that 
continue processes of ‘irregularisation’ for individuals whose presence transgresses 
norms of the nation-state and citizenship.   
I detail the problematic of IML in chapter one. Migrants, employers, and 
nation-states participate in shifting relationships, as economic priorities and needs 
alter.  Labour migration involves identities and statuses that are continuously in flux, 
in contrast to the force of normative categories that define legal statuses within the 
nation-state. The control of the law is in the hands of economically powerful states 
and economic market priorities, where transnational capital and trade influence policy 
decisions. State borders and state laws maintain their practical and ideological 
importance as fixed boundaries. Meanwhile, in practice, the idea of the nation-state is 
potent when membership is mediated through belonging in what Bridget Anderson 
calls the ‘community of value’.9 The community of value supports exclusionary 
participation and reinforces situations of sub-citizenship from within a liberal 
democratic nation-state. Persons relegated to sub-citizenship, particularly when their 
immigration status is insecure, can seem to be justifiably excluded from the 
community of value because their belonging is within a proto-political community. A 
proto-political community presupposes the bounded political of the nation-state and 
membership identified through citizenship. This proto-political community reflects a 
tendency towards universal thinking embedded within conceptualisations of pre-
determined community belonging. The ostensible existence of a proto-political 
community justifies exclusive nation-state membership mediated through a shared 
community of value: those excluded belong elsewhere in a broader, proto-political 
universal. Nevertheless, this lack of belonging does not preclude persons continuing 
to work in de-valued, denigrated and dangerous labour situations without the 
protection or regulation proffered by national labour legislation and international 
labour regulations. This proto-political community is one that is malleable to global 
capital demands, while the community of value under the nation-state refers to a 
                                                
9 Bridget Anderson, Us & Them: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 4.  
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bounded national membership.10  These discussions and critiques of community, 
membership and citizenship under the nation-state expose citizenship as being in 
reality a highly contested concept. It is from within contestations of citizenship and 
lived experiences of ‘sub-citizenship’ that I begin my examination of the label, IML. 
 Chapter two develops my political-juridical-ecotechnical methodology. This 
methodology draws on Susan Marks’ notion of false contingency and Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s philosophy. I briefly outline this methodological approach below in this 
introduction. However, chapter two is dedicated to detail the efficacy of using 
Marks’s critique of false contingency as opening a space for Nancy’s work in 
application to the concerns raised by IML. Also in chapter two, I explain the terms 
particular to Nancy’s work: sense, ecotechnics, inscription, exscription and law. 
Chapters three and four apply the political-juridical-ecotechnical methodology to UK 
immigration law and contemporary questions concerning UK labour law in the 
twenty-first century. In chapter five, after illustrating the limitations of current legal 
frameworks, I consider how we might think differently about IML through a bodily 
ontology, again according to Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical thought. In this chapter 
my attention turns to a preliminary case study of care and the marketisation of care 
work as an instance where a research approach unconventionally developed via 
Nancy’s bodily ontology may resonate with material experiences, happening, but that 
are unrecognisable in standard legal frameworks. Care work, while often associated 
with a migrant labour force in irregular and precarious situations, is not limited to this 
(elusive) demographic.  
Collectively, the question posed within each chapter of this thesis is: what are 
the blockages preventing change and remedy to the political and legal concerns of 
IML? Secondly, how might the false contingency present in immigration and labour 
law be symptomatic of the limits of our dominant Western liberal philosophical 
framework, the market economic system and regimes of governance? In conclusion, I 
suggest that a remedy to the precarious situation experienced by persons with so-
called irregular immigration and labour status cannot come from within the existing 
                                                
10 For example Carolina Moulin Aguiar, “(In)hospitable Border Zones: Situating Bolivian Migrants’ Presence at 
Brazilian Crossroads” In Elspeth Guild and Sandra Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration 
(London: Ashgate, 2011), 39-64. Moulin Aguiar argues that the notion of citizen and border is flexible, yet status 
exists under, and is determined by, an apparatus of control.  
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political-juridical-philosophical framework. Nancy’s work, speaking to and against a 
philosophical tradition itself, is not immune to potentially reaffirming its own false 
contingency, especially when ‘applied’ or brought into conversation with immigration 
and labour law. Nevertheless, the concluding chapter six closes with a reflection on 
the contribution that a theoretical framework that brings attention to the political-
juridical-ecotechical circulation of meaning, production and reproduction can make to 
the study of immigration and labour law (labour migration law) and critical legal 
theory. I draw on the spirit of Nancy’s thought that impels towards re-thinking how 
we understand the basic fundamental originary sociality of being.11 The plurality of 
singular beings form a sociality, but when it is not pre-determined by limited 
contingencies then this sociality is original, originary, every time. The legal and 
economic and political circulations, systems and structures follow, rather than pre-
empt, sociality.  
A three-fold (political-juridical-ecotechnical) methodological approach allows 
me to investigate intersecting political discourses, legislation and practices of UK 
immigration law and labour law. A theoretical exploration of what is at play in the 
term IML, implying as it does an ‘irregular’ function within the political, juridical and 
economic system, leads me to question the relation between law and Being. However, 
such an ontological investigation is only possible after identifying the multiple 
interests steering what is in recent years emerging as a unique field of labour 
migration law. This illumination is facilitated by Susan Marks's critique of false 
contingency. False contingency refers to the normative conditions of possibility that 
                                                
11 Nancy writes of the ‘originary sociality’ in the The Inoperative Community 1991, 28. Originary sociality is 
similar to Derrida’s originary sociability. Sociability, in Derrida’s originary sociability is ‘prior to all determined 
law, qua natural law or positive law, but not prior to law in general’ Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship 
(London, New York: Verso, 2006), 231. This ‘law in general’, has been understood by Peter Fitzpatrick to be a 
form empty of universal claim. It is preceded by a sense of ‘pre-legal’ justice. According to Peter Fitzpatrick, law 
depends on ‘what is excluded from it for its determinate content.’ In William Conklin, ‘Derrida’s Territorial 
Knowledge of Justice’ in Reading Modern Law 102-129 (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 122. In other words, the 
community that is the originary sociability, ‘as a continuate being-with cannot be contained within any existent 
realisation of it [determined law] ... it must ever extend receptively beyond present existence, otherwise it will not 
be able to continue “in being”’ Peter Fitzpatrick, Law as Resistance: Modernism, Imperialism, Legalism 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 289. Thus law is both determinate and responsive, meaning that it has the capacity-
within law-to be something other than what it purports to ‘be’. The question that is debated and discussed about 
Derrida’s writing on law via Fitzpatrick’s work concerns how to understand the exteriority of law and the 
boundaries or limits of sociability as a negative/negated law. This particular discussion of Fitzpatrick’s work is 
beyond the focus of my thesis, nevertheless the concerns about law as both a limit and extending beyond a 
prescribed, determined limit are relevant. In my work, rather than discuss Derrida and Fitzpatrick’s work, I refer to 
Nancy’s reference to ‘originary sociality’ in order to discuss the exscription and inscription as the sense that is the 
world. This differs from Fitzpatrick’s work and Derrida because my analysis is not focused primarily on the 
quality or ‘being’ of law, rather it is concerned more with how the exscription and inscription is manifest onto IN? 
legally-reinforced practices of citizenship and subjectivity in IML.   
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found what is considered to be contingent possibilities. According to Marks, legal 
categories and frameworks not only function as if the normative paradigm of 
establishing legal subjectivity were natural and necessary, but these frameworks 
themselves are built on predetermined contingencies. Their predetermination limits 
what is imagined as possible in order to explain, understand and remedy a particular 
situation. In contrast, contingencies that would be, for lack of a better word, more 
‘honest’ would be produced in and by the experience or encounter—what I refer to as 
the happening. To understand what these possibilities might be as well as their 
articulation, I turn to Nancy and the discussion in chapter two of sense and 
ecotechnics. False contingencies are not 'false' against some hidden truth, but they are 
false representations of 'contingency' because they are based on limited conditions of 
possibility of legal recognition for the experiences and encounters begging to be 
identified by legal frameworks.  
Marks's critique of false contingency opens up a foundational question of how 
we think beyond existing, predetermined contingencies. Nancy's work steps into this 
opening, beginning with Nancy’s own question of what the blockages are that prevent 
simple (‘originary’) sociality (in Nancy’s words, the ‘coming together of people in 
[forming a] common’)? 12 I do not claim that Nancy's work exhausts this question, or 
that Nancy’s perspective offers an alternative pure of false contingencies. Indeed such 
a thing is impossible, if even desirable. The force of Nancy's work, however, is in its 
challenge to think through the foundational constructions of being (foundational 
ontological questioning), in order to think of what is happening in material, lived, felt, 
experience. At every instance, Nancy struggles against linear, deterministic assertions 
or frameworks.13 Nancy's ontology cannot be taken as a ground. Nothing is static; 
thus the pursuit of thought and exploration of legal categories and the phenomenon 
                                                
12 This may similarly be framed as a question of what limits the possibility of the encounter or relationality to 
occur as a foundation for law, legal categories, economic exchanges and circulation. Here I am thinking of 
Althusser – the materialism of the encounter – see Louis Althusser, ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism 
of the Encounter’ Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-87 edited by Francois Matheron and Oliver 
Corpet (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 163-207. It could also be framed, with different language, as a 
Lacanian analysis – the search for the subject see Maria Aristodemou, Law, Psychoanalysis, Society: Taking the 
Unconscious Seriously (Oxon: Routledge, 2014). 
13 For instance, Ian James in Being Social: Ontology, Law, Politics edited by Daniel Matthews and Tara Mulqueen 
(Counterpress, 2015), 22: Nancy has no determinate image of the human but still understands the immanence of 
the social being. Understanding what Nancy is pushing at is only possible with a suspension of 'philosophy's 
legislative power'  James, 28. I believe this is evident in the suspension of legislative and legal potential to address 
and remedy the situation of irregularity. Crucial to understanding Nancy’s work is to see that he bases his thinking 
in the absence of the determined condition (ground). This, for Nancy, is freedom.  
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they produce must always be in motion, in movement—not least because we, as 
sociality, as social beings (constituted by the singular plural) are in constant 
movement. From the cellular composition of our physical bodies to our physical 
migrations, shifting (political) identities, our thoughts, ideas, perceptions, senses—the 
world is motion.  
Nancy, through the various terms and thoughts he plays with, brings attention 
to what is, but is not 'seen' or 'inscribed' into the legal frameworks that we rely on for 
order and recognition: in other words, what we in our modern liberal paradigm 
believe is necessary for things to ‘make sense’. IML is a provocative phenomenon to 
scrutinize in light of Nancy’s work because the 'irregular' does not 'make sense'. Yet 
the use of this blanket category is ‘made to make sense’, albeit without, as will be 
detailed in the first chapter, any coherence or consistency of what it is that is ‘made to 
make sense’.  Moreover, the ‘irregular migrant’ does not fit into standard legal 
frameworks but for being identified as an excessive, and thereby necessarily 
homogenised, Other. And yet, as the following chapters will aim to demonstrate, the 
movement that is 'irregular' may be the only thing that is sense. As will be explained 
further throughout the chapters, this sense that Nancy brings attention to is lived, it is 
happening as a material, sensual experience—not predetermined, and not necessarily 
intelligible or recognisable in legal frameworks. Because Nancy’s lexis often diverges 
from common understanding but is integral to the concepts under study here, I have 
included a Glossary Of Terms (Appendix A). 
Drawing heavily as I do on Nancy’s thought may be constraining insofar as 
Nancy is enmeshed within the canon of post-structuralist philosophy. However, in 
spite of this thesis not being a direct intervention in existing debates in post-
structuralist theory and critical legal studies, I contend that Nancy’s work provides an 
unconventional and effective invitation to think about the material experience that 
happens within/in spite of/beyond/after categories.  When calling attention back to the 
material experience, theory becomes indispensible to illuminate the practical, political 
gridlock encountered by those in precarious situations identified as 'irregular' and 
'migrant' labourers. I refer to Nancy as a thinker who confronts the false contingency 
of philosophical questions, as in chapters three and four where I address the false 
contingency of immigration and labour law. In both arenas, Nancy brings our 
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attention to the gestures that happen, that are ‘made to make sense’ as something 
‘intelligible’ (inscribed) and what remains ‘unintelligible’ (exscribed) but 
nevertheless felt, or sensed.  
Another question that cannot be answered within the scope of this thesis arises 
from this notion of sense: can the experiences and multiple forms of discrimination 
and marginalisation (gender, sex, race, nationality, ability) that render persons as 
‘irregular’ ‘migrants’ ever be transformed to enable persons to have equal recognition 
in the normative paradigm? For instance, in spite of enabling citizenship or regular 
status through regularisation programmes or citizenship laws, contested citizenship 
remains, and, as I explain later in this chapter, demonstrates the exclusionary power 
of the normative legal citizen-subject as an eco-technical tool. Multiple interests, 
economic and philosophical, rely on the suspension of regular subjectivity: the 
‘irregular’ serves a purpose in maintaining the modern philosophical tradition as well 
as the functioning of the neoliberal economic market system.    
An analysis of the term and interests contained within IML could no doubt be 
carried out in various ways. An intersectionality approach would consider the various 
gender, racial, nationalist, ableist discriminations that place persons into categories as 
'irregular', all against a normative white, male, legal citizen-subject. My work is 
indebted to research that has raised these points of identification and discrimination 
with attention to interlocking systems of subjugation built into the institutions of 
modern politics and law. However, notwithstanding the intersectional discriminations 
constituting IML, I offer a different perspective to existing literature on labour 
migration and IML. Delving deeply into the foundational constructions of law, being 
and plurality involves a thought experiment that brings us 'pre' society, only to return, 
vitally and urgently, to the current circulation of capital, labour and bodies that 'are' 
society—as will be discussed below—this is the originary meeting, relation or 
encounter that forms a social. Intersectional systems of oppression, discrimination and 
marginalisation create and maintain precarious recognition, precarious legal 
subjectivity and experiences of sub-citizenship. When approached with an intent to 
think through the creation of these categories of difference differently, I suggest that 
if we wish to affect change in the persistent interlocking systems of marginalisation, 
and challenge their force, it is necessary to think not only how, but also why, 
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categories of recognition, existing restrictive legal frameworks, and the 'regular' 
persist.   
Predetermined and legally embedded categories purport to include or exclude 
persons within territorially defined national borders. Yet this inclusion and exclusion 
is more complicated than borders and border controls suggest. Inclusion and 
membership in the nation-state is not decided clearly at the border by formal legal 
recognition. Formal recognition could include citizenship status, immigration 
permission to remain, or temporary legal status to reside and work. Rather, those who 
are living, working and participating in an economy may have differential 
membership and experiences of inclusion and exclusion based on individuals’ 
conformity with socially and morally established behaviour, enshrined in the culture 
of the nation-state. The nation-state, as a political governing structure and 
bureaucracy does not alone determine the limits of acceptable behaviour. Neither do 
the legal system, legislation and its application. Social, historically specific values, 
enshrined within philosophical notions of the individual being, as well as economic 
market measures and progress, bolster a regulatory community of value. The 
community of value elusively regulates membership based on ideal conditions of 
desirability to a social norm established by those in positions of power and 
authorship.  
My political-juridical-ecotechnical approach brings into relief the work of the 
community of value as well as the persistent false contingency in immigration law 
and labour law. This is a challenge for us to think beyond preconditioned categories, 
however this beyond is not utopic. For this reason, I draw on Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
notion of ecotechnics, to bring attention to both techniques of practice and ecologies 
of circulation—this is the happening that is beyond legal categories, but also a 
happening that feeds processes of neoliberalisation, flexibility and precariousness, 
affecting persons considered to be ‘irregular migrant labourers’ and those outside this 
particular problematic label. Moreover, Nancy’s ‘bodily ontology’14, discussed in the 
fifth chapter, disrupts traditional Western philosophical thinking and, I suggest, might 
                                                
14 Ian James, The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 91. 
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offer a way to think not of alternatives for IML, but an alternative thinking of 
alternatives.15 
 A political-juridical-ecotechnical approach critiques the order and system of 
bio-political governance that has created, and is dependent on, an ambiguous category 
of workers: IML. The categorisation of low-waged, low-skilled, non-national foreign 
workers as IML is rooted in historically specific power relations and hierarchies that 
espouse a particular understanding of being from a nexus of 
citizenship/subject/community/sovereignty. The excess of recognised participation in 
this nexus of legal and political nation-state-centred categories are grouped together 
as IML. Thus, through the label of IML—with emphasis on the ‘irregular’—the 
experiences of individuals that do not fit into pre-established frames are inscribed16, 
or written into, the dominant ideology. Yet IML is only ‘included’ (written, inscribed) 
as ‘excluded’, as ‘irregular’.17 The inscription of IML is only possible because it is 
exscribed18—written out of—the dominant, acceptable, legal, framework. Meanwhile 
regular citizen labour, the reverse of IML, is recognised as belonging to the shared 
values in the community of value. In the community of value, the dominant 
citizenship/subject/community/sovereignty nexus is the point of reference that is not 
only unquestioned but made to seem as if they were necessary and natural.19 These 
reference points are the product of historically specific tropes, namely the nation-state 
and market economic system. The nation-state and the market seem to be necessary 
and natural forms of order, recognition and value. As a consequence of being assumed 
as natural and necessary, they create false contingency.20  
                                                
15 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South" Africa Development 37:1 (2012): 
43-67. 
16 Nancy, ‘inscription’ one part of the inscription and exscription that is the sense of the world. Jean-Luc Nancy, 
The Birth to Presence trans., Brian Holmes and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 338. 
17 Hans Lindahl discusses the ‘included-as-excluded’, and ‘included as excluded’. Hans Lindahl, "In Between: 
Immigration, Distributive Justice, and Political Dialogue," Contemporary Political Theory 8: 4 (2009): 415-434, 
423. 
18 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence trans., Brian Holmes and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 338. 
19 False necessity: what is made to seem natural and necessary, but based on a historically specific ideology. 
Roberto Unger, discussed in the context that I am referring to in Susan Marks, "False Contingency" Current Legal 
Problems 62 (2009): 1-21, 4-5. 
20 Susan Marks, "False Contingency" Current Legal Problems 62 (2009): 1-21, 10. I will discuss this in more 
detail in chapter two.  
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I draw on Nancy’s work, the starting point being a fundamental ontological 
questioning, to continue working after discussing the operation of false contingency 
in supporting and reinforcing existing categories and frameworks.21 I agree with 
Nancy’s attention to bodies. Nancy asks us to consider what is happening in the basic 
coming together of bodies, forming economies of production and reproduction within 
and across nation-state borders. Moreover, his ‘bodily ontology’ involves bodies not 
only in their physical embodiment, but bodies of thought and knowledge.22 The 
amassing, coming together of bodies is not neutral, nor necessarily positive. It is also 
not a ready solution to current situations of exploitation, where legal grey areas permit 
the abuse of precarious migrants and labourers. However the coming together of what 
forms law, makes law, is before predetermined contingencies, which are false because 
they do not come out of experiences but pre-empt them. Nancy’s work guides us 
towards a re-cognition of the dominant interpretation of migration and labour. This 
dominant framework determines political and legal approaches to labour and 
migration that create IML, as a label recognisable only through its homogenizing of 
the mass of persons that do not fit existing categories, but whose ‘not fitting’ serves a 
purpose in the economic market. I identify an imperative to think differently in order 
to effectively address the experiences of marginalisation in work and citizenship.23 As 
mentioned above, these experiences are riddled by interlocking systems of 
oppression24 and rendered to the margins of immigration and employment law. Their 
                                                
21 Jean-Luc Nancy’s work, according to Ian James, is a fundamental ontological questioning. James, The 
Fragmentary Demand, 4. 
22 See Appendix A Explanation of terms: ‘bodily ontology’.  
23 The liberal democratic nation has been identified as ‘the dominant form of the modern state.’ David Held, 
Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 51. Citizenship is a key feature of the nation-state, in addition to fundamental principles 
such as constitutionalism, private property, competitive market economy and a (patriarchal) family. Citizenship, 
under a liberal democratic nation, is believed to enable autonomous individuals to participate in democratic 
systems and establishes ‘rights and duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities.’ Held, 66. These 
in turn grant legitimacy to government and legal systems through representative democracy and the modern 
capitalist economy. Held, 70. Yet it is the citizenry of a nation-state who give form to the organisation of their 
capitalist economy. The state is ‘supposed to service the matrix for the obligations and prerogatives of citizenship. 
It is that which forms the conditions under which we are juridically bound.’ Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State? (New York, London, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2010), 3. The right to limit the 
boundary of a nation-state by mediating a population and citizenry has been prevalent within theories of justice; 
for example, the work of John Locke and his notion of the Social Contract (Hegel 1896) and contemporarily J. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice Rev edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) and Joseph Carens, 
Culture, Citizenship, and Community: Contextual Political Theory and Justice 2000. The right of a nation-state to 
enforce boundaries has clear implications for the constitution of the political. This is discussed by various 
theorists, including Hannah Arendt in her concept of the bounded political. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958) and contemporarily Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, 
Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
24 Sharene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 
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marginalisation is a consequence of firmly entrenched hierarchies distinguishing race, 
sex, class, (dis)ability, manifest through discrimination based on language 
proficiency, nationality, ethnicity, physical and mental ability, education and labour 
skills. I take as my point of departure that, as many multi-disciplinary studies of 
migration and labour have demonstrated, the situation of marginalisation and 
vulnerability of persons considered as IML is exacerbated based on discrimination 
and intersectionalities that affect individual’s subjectivity – social, economic and legal 
participation. From here, the political-juridical-ecotechnical approach carries analysis 
away from particular struggles for recognition, to deeply question what underlies 
categorisations and how experiences and practices can be re-thought towards 
epistemological and ontological difference.  
 
The	  political-­‐juridical-­‐ecotechnical	  methodology	  explained	  
My methodology is political where I consider the political discourses that use 
the label, IML. Public policy debates, politicians and popular media that discuss 
migration and labour migrants reveal contemporary meanings and significance of 
citizenship. The politics of IML impart practises of contested citizenship where 
immigration, labour and market economics interplay in processes similar to what 
Nancy describes as a politics of the (k)not.25 Pursuing a politics of the (k)not, as will 
be explained in chapter two, means that the aim of the political approach in the 
political-juridical-ecotechnical methodology is itself political in that there is no 
prescriptive end or solution. I engage critical theory in order to think of migration and 
labour from the point of view of alternative thinking, a shifted paradigm, which in 
other words shares a perspective akin to thinking of ‘radical change’.26  
Secondly, my methodology is juridical in that I question the application of 
legal frameworks and legal regulations as well as protections for persons considered 
IML. Furthermore, law, as a practice and a frame of recognition affirms and re-
affirms recognition as legal subjectivity. The subjection of persons as legal subjects is 
troubled when persons are identified as being in the shadow of the law; are they legal 
                                                
25 Jean-Luc Nancy, Sense of the World (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 2008).  
26 Costas Douzinas, "Oubliez Critique." Law and Critique 14, no. 1 (2005): 47-69, 66. 
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subjects? Are they ignored by, or excluded from, the law? With a juridical approach, I 
question what is the law that casts its shadow over those identified as ‘irregular’. 
Nancy speaks of law as both juridical and existential. Law can be identified as a tool 
of the nation-state, where law is embedded in a market economic ideology, and 
consequently law maintains persons in legal grey areas as irregular. However, 
immigration law and labour law enact both juridical and existential law, by what 
Nancy refers to as the inscription and exscription of being. Immigration and labour 
law write into the law and legal categories (inscribe) a particular juridical 
framework—a legal border, so to speak—meanwhile immigration and labour law 
also, in the practices of law and in the hopeful pursuit of reforming the law, write out 
of the legal categories and labels (exscribe) the experiences that both form and inform 
the law. Thus, the law is neither a clear exclusionary nor inclusive thing. In fact, the 
law is not a tangible ‘thing’ and does not clearly mandate or refuse subjectivity. A 
juridical approach considers the legislative approaches to migration and labour, whilst 
simultaneously questioning the construction and re-constructions of law and legal 
categories in practice.  
Finally, my approach is ecotechnical. For Nancy, this term refers to the 
circulation of meaning and practice in the material experiences of the world. Eco-
technics links the eco, home, household (from οικος, meaning ‘house’, and used in 
eco-nomic, eco-logy, but connects also the body, the biology), with technē (from 
τέχνη, meaning ‘craft’ or ‘art’), the technical structure that orders and ‘makes sense 
of’ the interruptive, incoherent and incommensurable (often ‘law’ refers to this 
technical practice, technique of order). J. Hillis Miller explains, ‘“Eco” as in 
“economy,” or “ecology,” or “ecotechnology” refers to the house in the extended 
sense of “environment.”’27 Eco-technics assumes both nature and technology when it 
refers to the capital circulation in the world that effects the circulation of sense.28 I 
will explain these terms in more detail in chapter two and five, however, their role in 
the methodology is to provide a vocabulary for thinking of the materiality and excess 
of the political and juridical approaches to migration and labour. As well, eco-
                                                
27 ‘“Eco” comes from the Greek word oikos, the house or home. The prefix “eco-” is used more broadly now to 
refer to the total environment within which one or another “living” creature “dwells”’ J. Hillis Miller ‘Ecotechnics 
Ecotechnological Odradek’ In Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 1 ed., Tom Cohen. (Ann 
Arbor: Open Humanities Press, University of Michigan Library, 2012). 
28 Benjamin Hutchens, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy (McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 
141. 
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technics provides for what vitally upholds a circulation of neoliberalisation, including 
current key market values such as flexibility, casualization and mobility. The creation 
and persistence of the label, IML, serves market economic priorities that allow for the 
circulation of capital in the ostensibly global economic market system. Persons 
maintained in the shadow of the law may be obscured by legal categories, but are not 
obscure when it comes to the modes of production and functioning of labour markets. 
Their technical presence affirms the ecology of the market. However, the market is 
itself a construct and its primacy based on false contingency.  
An ecotechnical approach attempts to think through false contingency towards 
what is happening, on the ground, in spite of legal categories, labels and pre-existing 
frames.  A political-juridical-ecotechnical approach to IML involves thinking of both 
the technical circulation of capital and exchange known through the market economy, 
and the intersections of beings—people, bodies, interacting and forming labour or 
community relationships—in the ‘eco’ beyond predetermined categories, but part of 
the circulation of bodies that is known, experienced and shared.  This circulation is at 
once the capital circulation that informs the processes of neoliberalisation and the 
circulation that is, and is therefore not captured, is ‘sense’29 and is not ‘signified’ 
within the language and systems of capital and market-orientation of 
(neo)liberalism.30  
 
The	  Research	  Question	  
Post-structuralist thinkers have identified that what we write, whatever we 
wish to express and represent, is rooted in particular historical contingencies.31 
                                                
29 Jean-Luc Nancy, Sense of the World. 
30 For a discussion of the different between ‘sense’ and ‘signification’, see Ignaas Devisch and Peiter Meurs, ‘The 
Meaning of Sense’ in Being Social: Ontology, Law, Politics edited by Dan Matthews and Tara Mulqueen (London: 
Counterpress, 2015).  
31 Notably, Jacques Derrida’s work, see Spectres of Marx translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York, London: 
Routledge, 1994); Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Literary Communism’ in Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, Peter 
Connor eds., (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Enrique Dussel writes even more specifically a 
critique of the historical (colonial) foundations of modern thought, see Enrique Dussel, ‘Anti-Cartesian 
Meditations: On The Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity’ Journal for Culture and Religious 
Theory 13:1 Winter 2014. p. 11-52. Judith Butler, very powerfully, writes of the ‘contingent foundations’ of 
thought (constructing ‘the subject’, ‘gender’, ‘sexuality’) and the claims, or task, of postmodernist and 
poststructuralist thought. See Judith Butler, ‘Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the question of 
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Indeed, the attempt to ‘thinking differently’ is one that has plagued thinkers and 
philosophers extensively. One can truly be lost, spinning in the endless repetition of 
limits, frameworks and reaffirming what one is critical of. For this reason, it is crucial 
to ask why we do want to think differently. What is the purpose or intended goal of 
the pursuit? For this thesis, the need to think differently arose from consistent 
dissatisfaction with the debates and discussions surrounding migration, in particular 
labour migration of persons in low-waged, ‘low-skilled’ labour. Why, with the 
proliferation of political and legal attention to ‘illegal migration’, ‘irregular migration’ 
and ‘precarious employment’, is there still a lasting, perhaps even growing, concern 
for irregular migration and persons identified as irregular migrant labourers? There 
seems to be a disconnect between legal instruments aimed to curb migration rendered 
to legal grey areas, and labour that is ‘illegal’ and outside the scope of labour 
regulation. This disconnect does not make sense in light of political and popular 
attention to migration and labour. If law makers, policy makers, politicians and legal 
practitioners are aware of the problem, how and why does it persist? Or rather, what, 
as a remedy or alternative, might make more sense? The material reality of persons 
migrating, with different immigration statuses and nationalities, across territorial 
borders to work in low-waged, low-skilled, low-regulated labour sectors continues 
and begs a re-thought approach and analysis. Citizenship, employment, temporary 
work permits – these existing categories and frameworks fall short of providing a 
satisfactory explanation for the intersecting interests and processes at play in labour 
migration and precarious work.  
This is where, on the one hand, political projects may seek to instrumentalise 
legal categories to extend to those previously deemed ‘irregular’ or marginalised. 
However, as the chapters of this thesis demonstrate, extending categories is not 
always a guarantee of improved subjectivity and status. Thus, Nancy’s sobering 
reflection considers, what if there is no sense to be found? Madness ensues, but we 
know that madness itself is also a contingent foundation. Through Nancy’s work then 
we return to thinking what is it that is ‘going on’. What is happening in the 
production, circulation, reproduction, of legal categories, political interests and 
economic concerns, including labour market demands? This is the very mundane, 
                                                                                                                                      
‘postmodernism’’ In Feminist Theorise the Political edited by Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (New York, 
London: Routledge, 1992), 3-21.  
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daily circulation of capital and of sense, much in the same way that concerns for 
migrant labourers in ‘irregular’ situations has perhaps become a very mundane 
situation.32 The political-juridical-ecotechnical approach of this thesis attempts to 
open this field of questioning by linking theory with labour migration issues and UK 
laws.  The thesis is not a direct intervention in post-structuralist philosophical debates 
or critical legal studies about particular formulations of Being or the Encounter. But 
these elements are important in their construction of the social, which is key to 
understanding Nancy’s work. The social is a locus of labour migration because within 
the ‘social sphere’—be it politics, law, economics—for many individuals, their banal, 
daily situations of work and life are considered ‘irregular’ in spite of their labour 
being demanded and exploited. Existing remedies are ineffective. Nancy’s work, 
beginning with the question of what in material real experiences forms the social, is 
therefore in conversation with the realities of labour migration not as an abstract 
exercise. Rather these foundational questions and de-constructions are necessary 
precisely because what exists as the legal manifestation of the social—the bodies at 
work in a given territorial space—is not representative of the bodies actually present, 
but represents the juridical power of normative categories that deems some bodies 
present as lesser subjects.  
                                                
32  In a critique of international law’s response to irregular migration, Juan Amaya-Castro suggests that 
international law is able to respond to crisis and thus to the situation of temporary refugee status, but does little to 
address what he refers to as the mundane realities of irregular migration. Amaya-Castro contends that international 
law fails to regulate irregular migration because it is not a ‘crisis’. Whereas refugee status, for instance, is a 
temporary status whilst one either waits for permanent leave to remain, citizenship or is returned to their country 
of citizenship. Juan Amaya Castro, ‘International Refugees and Irregular Migrants: Caught in the Mundane 
Shadow of Crisis’ Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2013. 
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Chapter 1. The Irregular Migrant 
Labourer, Constructing a Category 
 
In this first chapter, I introduce the political configuration of attention to 
labour migration that I identify as contributing to the use of the term, and significance 
of, irregular migrant labour (IML). Further, I discuss the implications an excessive 
‘irregular’ category has on our understanding of law and legal categories. The 
interests and contestations obscured by the label, IML highlight the complex nature of 
the nation-state and the function of citizenship, particularly with regard to the market 
economic system. Simultaneously, the fact that the label, IML, is used reveals rather 
than obscures that there is an excess of the regular that needs to be identified, albeit in 
quasi-recognition as irregular and migrant. International and national legal regimes of 
immigration law and labour law fall short of capturing the demographic of workers 
referred to as IML. I suggest that this is due to the multiplicity of factors intersecting 
in IML, the lack of a cohesive or coherent demographic but moreover the salience of 
predetermined/prescribed notions of citizenship and membership. The function of a 
very broad label is that it attempts to capture the Other against which the normal legal 
subject and citizen are constituted.  
Citizenship is both a formal legally recognised identification and an idea that 
is, in practice, constantly contested both by those considered to be inside and outside 
membership in the nation-state.33 Citizenship’s popular and political significance rests 
in its tenacity, reaffirmed throughout history by the likes of Aristotle, Kant and most 
every political thinker of the 20th century, as an indicator of belonging. Citizenship, 
materially recognised in an identity document such as a passport, demonstrates that 
the holder is a member and subject of the nation-state. Labour migration is 
intrinsically tied to concerns about citizenship, where movement across territorial 
boundaries—moreover the movement of persons who are economically ‘active’ and 
productive—affects citizenship by the presence of non-citizens living and working in 
                                                
33 Anne McNevin, Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the Political (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011).  
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the ‘community’ that traditionally would be the commonality from which citizenship 
is granted. Labour migration raises questions about the role and constitution of 
community as it informs, and is ordered by, law; law that controls who is and who is 
not granted citizenship. Furthermore, the labour market demand for persons working 
in so-called irregular situations is enabled by immigration and labour law, where legal 
grey areas facilitate market economic priorities and processes of neoliberalisation34 to 
continue even where these processes conflict with legal aims. The intersection of 
labour and immigration and the multiple interests involved suggest the emergence of 
a new field of law, labour migration law, where these intersections and their 
multifaceted concerns can be further explored and questioned more directly. 
However, for the present investigation it is the limit of the law and legal frameworks 
themselves that are of interest. As such, I will examine first the underlying factors and 
interests underneath the label, IML, and then I proceed to explore immigration and 
labour as these legal fields identify and address a problematic identified as IML, but 
in doing so reaffirm the broad and elusive lumping of ‘irregular’ experiences under 
the label IML.  
 ‘Irregular migrant’, as a title or label, suggests a different status or a different 
type of belonging with reference to territorial boundaries of the nation-state and 
citizenship. Migrant implies transience. Migrants are considered to be foreigners, in 
that they are non-nationals, but more potently their foreign-ness implies that these 
persons are external to what is considered ‘regular’ within the nation-state. The 
‘irregular’ presence of migrants suggests that these persons do not fit into the regular 
recognition by the nation-state but neither are they fully external and excluded. 
Importantly, the label ‘irregular migrant’ is different from the label ‘illegal migrant’. 
The irregular migrant is not ‘illegal’. What the term  ‘irregular migrant’ demonstrates 
is, as Hans Lindahl describes, ‘inclusion-by-exclusion.’ 35  Irregular migrants, as 
present—living and working—are part of the state, but insofar as they are irregular 
which means that they are excluded from full participation and recognition. However 
as ‘irregular’ rather than ‘illegal’ they are not directly in contravention of immigration 
or criminal law. To deem someone’s presence ‘irregular’, neither legal nor illegal, is 
                                                
34  Jaime Peck, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brennar, "Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule after the Great 
Recession" The South Atlantic Quarterly 111: 2 (Spring 2012): 265-288, 268. 
35 Hans Lindahl, "In Between: Immigration, Distributive Justice, and Political Dialogue" Contemporary Political 
Theory 8: 4 (2009): 415-434, 423. 
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to discursively blur the lines between the apparent legal distinction of what is 
legal/illegal, and the conventional presumption that there is a difference, a border, 
between those who are citizens/noncitizens.36 
 Moreover, when policy and media discussions identify persons as IML, their 
status as ‘labourers’ is ambiguous where it is not synonymous with ‘employment’. 
For instance, those employed in low-waged and low-skilled37 labour often are not 
included in the legal definition of employment. Employment entails a contract of 
service between an employer and an employee, bound by mutual obligation, as per a 
standard contractual employment relationship,38 whereas the work of IML is often 
temporary, arranged through agencies and/or limited to specific services (contract for 
service). Experiences of persons considered IML are also excluded from policy 
discussions concerning ‘highly-skilled’ economic migrants, thus the ‘irregularity’ and 
marginalisation based on irregular status is linked to labour sector, perceived 
speciality or skill level and income.39  
Concerns for labourers who are in irregular—indeterminate, often precarious 
and unstable—situations in spite of their physical presence and labour contribution in 
a nation-state suggests that citizenship, while seemingly a formal recognition that 
establishes membership in the nation-state, is, in practice, a highly contested category. 
Bridget Anderson uses the expression of a ‘community of value’40 to discuss the 
space beyond legal categories where social membership and belonging is arbitrated. 
The ‘community of value’, according to Anderson, recognises membership of the 
Good Citizen, who is deemed to share values of the national community, in the UK 
case of which Anderson also writes these values are liberal, Christian and tied to 
market economic values and success. The Good Citizen is rewarded in contrast to the 
Failed, or sub-citizen, who is exemplified by the IML that does not conform to the 
                                                
36 The term ‘irregular’ is a term that can be understood to blur the line, or rather open up to, the fact that 
legal/illegal, citizen/noncitizen are not clearly distinct identities.  
37 I say ‘considered low-skilled’ because the assessment of what ‘skilled’ means is based on a standards developed 
by the UK Home Office Immigration Regulations. These do not a) necessarily reflect the skills that the individuals 
working in these jobs possess and b) reflect the actual skill that may be required to do a particular job well. 
38 Judy Fudge, “Feminist Reflections on the Scope of Labour Law: Domestic Work, Social Reproduction, and 
Jurisdiction” Feminist Legal Studies 21:3 (2013), 1-22; Leah Vosko, Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship 
and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.   
39 Elspeth Guild and Sandra Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration (London: Ashgate, 2011), 3.  
40 Anderson, Us & Them, 178. 
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parameters of national community membership and is therefore ‘irregular’. The social 
function of a community of value is an implicit acceptance of liberal values (including 
autonomy, individual rights and market participation, all of which are founded in 
Western, European and patriarchal ideas) and an aversion to others, namely 
‘migrants’, particularly those stuck in low-waged, ‘low-skilled’ labour. ‘Migrant’ is 
broadly used to refer to those generally ‘ethnicised and “racialised” by association 
with the idea of the ... immigrant or third country national.’41 The term migrant, in 
addition to irregular, therefore can function as a label to exclude, or at best blur, one’s 
membership in the community of value. In some situations, persons may be identified 
as ‘migrant’, the term implying foreign non-nationals, while holding formal 
citizenship. Thus the experiences of marginalisation due to legal grey areas can 
further be enforced through popular ideas of who belongs, and who is deserving of 
membership, notwithstanding formal legal membership. 
IML are differentiated within the nation-state. Physically present and 
contributing through their labour, their exclusion from the community of value is an 
excluded-inside. This exclusion-inside is justified through what Hans Lindahl 
describes as a ‘proto-political community’ 42 , which the nation-state ultimately 
depends on to define its own borders against a broader, ostensibly shared, community. 
The label of IML requires interrogation in order to understand who carries the label 
and how the demand for precarious, irregular, workers is sustained, despite protective 
labour legislation and immigration laws devised to preclude exploitative work. I 
suggest that we need a methodological approach that filters through political and legal 
terms and norms to recognize how multiple layers of interests and actors interact to 
maintain IML. This methodology informed by Susan Marks’s notion of ‘false 
contingency’ and Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy unearths buried assumptions in law, 
labour and citizenship that make it difficult to think alternatively about labour and 
migration.  
 
                                                
41 Guild and Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration, 298.  
42 Lindahl, “In Between”, 416.  
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Contested	  Citizenship	  	  
When asking who migrant workers are, and what makes them irregular, we 
might ask the reverse: who are non-migrants and ‘regular’? By broadly referring to a 
migrant (racialised, ethnic) labour force, the label of irregular effectively constructs 
the domestic citizen labour force as regular. These are the persons who share the 
values of the community of value and form the national community. The community 
of value enables the state to claim legitimacy through shared values, presumed to be 
shared by the people: ‘the community of value is populated by Good Citizens, law-
abiding and hard-working members of stable and respectable families.’43 As legal 
status, national citizenship—identified through a passport or other national identity 
document—represents belonging, identity and rights. Formally, citizenship is 
understood as referring to the rights and obligations of persons within a sovereign 
nation-state, of which they are considered to be a national. Through citizenship, 
sovereign states distinguish their national members from foreigners, and control 
access to rights accordingly.44 However, the community of value illustrates how 
formal citizenship is more than a symbol of membership in a state; it is part of an 
international system where states bear the responsibility to admit and govern those 
they have accepted as their citizens.45 Citizenship under the law, what I refer to above 
as formal citizenship, tends to universalise belonging, because it suggests that there is 
an attainable legal status for all persons within a territory. Meanwhile, in practice 
citizenship is ‘characterised by inclusion and exclusion.’46 However the inclusion and 
exclusion is not physical, but from membership which is troubled, or in practice 
defined, by the community of value. Citizenship closes off membership, while 
                                                
43 Anderson, Us & Them, 3. 
44 Saskia Sassen, "Globalisation or Denationalisation" Review of International Political Economy 10: 1 (2003): 1–
22. 
45 Bridget Anderson, "What does ‘The Migrant’ tell us about the (Good) Citizen?" Centre on Migration, Policy 
and Society Working Paper University of Oxford, 94 (2012), 1, 4. 
46 Margriet Kraamwinkel, "The Imagined European Community: Are Housewives European Citizens?’" In Labour 
Law in an Era of Globalisation: Transformative Practices and Possibilities, Joanne Conaghan, Richard M Fischl 
and Karl Klare, eds., 321-338 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 323. Citizenship has been associated with 
political-economic participation that is based on a liberal, individual, male, property (land)-holding subject being 
recognised as a citizen of a political community, namely the nation-state. Since the emergence of the nation-state 
and subsequently the modern welfare state, the distinction made between citizen and non-citizen has become 
further intertwined with economic entitlements. Citizenship as social entitlement differs from citizenship as a legal 
status. Moreover, citizenship as social participation is different from citizenship as political/governance 
participation. 
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purporting to represent universalism. 47  Membership in a nation-state through 
citizenship is not only a matter of legal techniques and requirements; it is based on 
conditions of desirability according to the community of value. These conditions 
make practical membership for some impossible.48 Bridget Anderson’s Good Citizen 
overpowers formal citizenship status, such as holding nationality through a passport, 
because it is a popular category that excludes those who, through circumstances such 
as gender, ability or occupation, fall through the cracks—the Failed or sub-citizens. 
There are many examples of citizenship being contested and/or experienced that 
complicate formal, legal, state-centric, interpretations of the term. In the UK in 2014, 
there was much debate about how to limit the citizenship rights of, or ban re-
admittance to, British citizens who left the country to join the Syrian army and the 
army of the Islamic State.49  
A domestic labour market suggests a labour force of citizen-workers. 
However, the UK labour force has always included the labour of those historically, 
and currently, not considered full citizens: women,50 colonial subjects, slaves or 
indentured servants, 51  disabled persons, 52  prison inmates 53  and children. 54  The 
experiences of persons designated within these categories further demonstrate that 
legally possessing citizenship status does not ensure equal recognition of rights in the 
nation-state.55 Social and economic inequalities isolate certain sectors of the citizenry, 
                                                
47 J. Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment” 110, in reference to Jean Cohen, "Changing 
Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos," International Sociology, 1999: 245-268. Cohen 
also discusses changing paradigms of citizenship for both political democratic citizenship and juridical conception 
of citizenship. 
48 Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 54. 
49 Patrick Wintour, ‘David Cameron Shelves Move to Ban British Jihadis Returning to UK’ The Guardian 1 Sept 
2014. 
50 Joanne Conaghan, and Kerry Rittich, Labour Law, Work, and Family: Critical and Comparative Perspectives, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8. 
51 Adelle Blackett, "Emancipation in the Idea of Labour Law" In The Idea of Labour Law, edited by Guy Davidov 
and Brian Langille, 420-436 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 420-21. 
52 John Rigg, "Labour Market Disadvantage amongst Disabled People: A Longitudinal Perspective," Centre for 
Analysis of Social Exclusion, 2005, 2. Also, advocacy groups bring attention to exploitation of persons with 
disabilities in “sheltered workshops”, hospitals, “therapeutic work activities” in institutions: Jihan Addas, "A 
Legacy of Exploitation: Intellectual disability, unpaid labour and disability services." New Politics 14:1 (Summer 
2012), 53. 
53 Noah Zatz, "Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment 
Relationships," Vanderbuilt Law Review 61:3 (2008).  
54 Geraldine Van Beuren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1998), 263. 
55 Anderson, Us & Them, 4.  
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who subsequently are relegated, through the labour market, into irregular labour 
situations that are neither fully inclusive nor exclusive.56  
Citizens considered less-desirable—foreign-born, as well as those not 
considered to be fully-citizen, work-able (women, children, disabled, criminally 
convicted, prison inmates)—together with non-national, migrant workers, can be 
excluded from the community of value while still being included as necessary actors 
in the proto-political, global market economy. This is the included-as-excluded.57 As 
mentioned above, the idea that there is a ‘global’ and post-national or international 
community suggests a universal, or a proto-political, belonging that transcends the 
immediate national jurisdiction. It is ‘proto-political’ because it is treated as if it 
existed before and beyond the particular contexts of governments and national 
politics. Nevertheless, labour protection and support remains the jurisdiction of the 
national management of market economies, politics and law. With regard to the 
citizen, the idea of the proto-political community supports a myth of global 
belonging, which works within a framework of national citizenship but suggests a 
belonging that supersedes the nation.  
The EU suggests elements of this belief and thereby there is a belief that EU 
Citizen workers may be protected by legal frameworks that are beyond the particular 
nation-state where EU migrant labourers are living and working. While this may in 
some cases be true, where EU Directives may be followed in order to secure 
protections and freedoms for non-nationals, reciprocity within the EU and allegiance 
is enlisted by enforcing differences based on who is ‘inside’ versus ‘outside’. These 
distinctions reinforce an external border against non-EU nationals—the ‘inside’ being 
those nations that reflect shared values, namely European values inscribed in the 
                                                
56 Jane Wills, Datta, et al., Global Cities at Work: New Migrant Divisions of Labour (London, New York: Pluto 
Press, 2010), 1. 
57 It is noteworthy as well to identify that the economy is not synonymous with the market. Both the market (the 
neoliberal economic market that informs demand in the labour market) and the management of the household (the 
broader definition of “economy”) form inclusions and exclusions within their definitions. For example, the market 
formally includes the declared legal market that is identified through wage labour and exchange. The economic 
household includes traditional (Western-liberal) ideas of household, usually based on a classic model of a nuclear 
family and male-breadwinner model of employment and income generation through participating in the formal 
economic market. Judy Fudge, "Labour as a Fictive Commodity," in The Idea of Labour Law edited by Guy 
Davidov and Brian Langille, 120-136 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 131. However the ‘economy’ can 
include a plethora of markets, where market is defined as supply and demand. 
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Treaty of Lisbon.58 Yet in practice, the reciprocity envisioned within the European 
Community is not a political reciprocity that extends beyond the community of value 
of the European sphere in its own right. The proto-political reciprocity that is meant to 
protect non-nationals within the European Community rests on the belief in a more 
fundamental and all-encompassing political sphere where European values are seen as 
‘universal’. These values are furthermore permitted to remain ‘universal’ while 
enforcing exclusion of difference in the form of non-nationals. According to Lindahl, 
this is especially the case in the EU where ‘the European polity harbours an outside 
within itself, such that, retrospectively, boundary crossings by immigrants can reveal 
Europe as being inside out.’59 Thus, migration within the European member states can 
be limited based on ones country of origin. Furthermore differences are reinforced by 
exclusions from, and within labour sectors, that limit employment opportunities along 
racial, gendered and socio-economic (class) lines.  
 Notwithstanding practices that indicate significant departure from the 
effectiveness of the proto-political community, the idea of a broad proto-political 
sphere can allow individual countries to avoid responsibility for the persons living 
and working within their borders who are not considered national citizens. Persons 
recognised as ‘migrants’ thus may not be excluded directly; rather the ‘logic of 
boundaries’ is such that ‘boundaries do not simply include and exclude; they include 
by excluding’60 and exclude by including. These boundaries are not only of citizenship 
and the nation-state, but opportunities for employment and legal protections in cases 
of employment malpractice and abuse.61 Labour migration considered to be irregular 
exposes this logic of boundaries where ‘the twofold process of inclusion and 
exclusion’ assumes that ‘certain interests [determined] as worthy of legal protection’62 
                                                
58 Treaty Of Lisbon, Amending The Treaty On European Union And The Treaty Establishing The European 
Community 2007/C 306/01 Preamble 1 (a): Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of 
the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. 
59 Lindahl, “In Between”, 429. The proto-political community suggests that “Arendt’s celebrated formula, the 
“right to have rights,” does not mean a “moral” right to have “legal” rights.” Rather, Lindahl contends that this 
right to have rights refers to a “threshold leading from proto-political to political reciprocity.” Lindahl, 426. This is 
thus a discussion of political community, and what underlies the political such that we can speak of a “proto-
political” community.  
60 Lindahl, “In Between”, 425. 
61 Siliadin and Hounga will be discussed in chapter four. Would be better to cite cases in full as examples of how 
the law intervenes with brief description for the reader at this point and then state that a full discussion will follow 
in chap. 4. 
62 Lindahl, “In Between”, 424. 
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exclude the fact that the national market is dependent on sub-citizens, considered to 
be ‘migrants’. The nation-state still encloses an exclusive ‘common space: the 
common market.’63 The common market is seen as a common political interest, and 
political citizenship boundaries are intertwined with market priorities that guide who 
is recognised as a legitimate economic citizen in contrast to foreign labour suppliers. 
Meanwhile the proto-political captures those who participate as ‘global’ labour 
suppliers and therefore external of recognition from within the particular nation-state. 
Within the EU, ‘By referring to the market as common, the Treaty of Rome 
transforms this economic notion into a normative and, in particular, political 
notion.’ 64 Nation-states thereby maintain an exclusive hold on their supposedly 
‘domestic’ economic market, while accessing labour more broadly in the EU. 
Furthermore the ‘global’ market economic model remains situated within, and 
supported by, the modern liberal nation-state. Thus the ‘domestic’ economy is 
intricately linked, even intertwined, with the so-called international or global.65  
These trends continue processes that are identified as noliberalisation, by 
Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Neil Brennar. The authors argue that neoliberalism is 
an ongoing process that is ‘a crisis induced and crisis inducing form of market-
disciplinary regulatory restructuring.’66 The movement of neoliberalisation will be 
discussed in greater detail in my theoretical methodology explained in chapter two, in 
reference to Jean-Luc Nancy’s writing on ecotechnics. However noteworthy here is 
that the chronic instability and patterned tendency of the contemporary, neoliberal 
market described by Peck, Theodore and Brennar opposes the notion that formal 
citizenship guarantees status and protection by being included within the nation-state. 
Peck, Theodore and Brennar use the term neoliberalisation, instead of neoliberalism, 
to refer to the ongoing process that is ‘a historically specific, unevenly developed, 
hybrid, patterned tendency of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring.’67 For this 
reason, neoliberalisation happens both within the nation-state and in the proto-
political. The success of neoliberalisation lies in its ability to encompass, and conform 
                                                
63 Lindahl, “In Between”, 424. 
64 Lindahl, “In Between”, 424.  
65 Differentiated citizenship that impacts labour power and legal subjectivity is not a new phenomenon. See, David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
66 Peck, Theodore and Brennar, “Neoliberalism”, 268.  
67 Peck, Theodore and Brennar, “Neoliberalism”, 269. 
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to, human action. It is able to respond to and create shifts in population, migration and 
labour regardless of distinctions in citizenship and immigration status.  
Economic growth within the globalised labour market intersects with the 
nation-state, where seemingly fixed borders and citizenship categories are purportedly 
protected and upheld. Meanwhile, more flexible, capital-driven priorities steer 
practices of labour market demand and supply. The processes of neoliberalisation 
allow the demand and supply of labour, as irregular and as migrant and at other times 
in history as domestic or indentured, to continue to be sanctioned by a legal regime 
that espouses labour rights, social equity and a bounded nation-state. Market 
exchange has become ‘an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human 
action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs ... [Neoliberalism] holds 
that the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of 
market transactions.’68 Neoliberalism is itself based on economic efficiency and 
claims to ethical self-responsibility where ‘structural causes of social problems are 
erased by a discourse of moral culpability that manifests at the individual level.’69 
This is manifest in the community of value distinguishing between the Good, 
deserving, Citizen, and the Failed, morally culpable, sub-Citizen. 
The IML, in both labour regulation and border control, exposes dis-
empowering mechanisms of control and dependence, with ramifications for bio-
political governance beyond the subjects of immigration and labour. Although the 
mechanisms of governance and differentiation of subjects happen within the sphere of 
immigration’s purported control, control over labour migration can give way to 
‘control which is no longer about labour nor even about migration as the citizen and 
foreigner are equally subject to control.’70 The underlying mechanisms that perpetuate 
the discursive distinction between migrant and citizen, through IML, maintain 
situations of precarious labour and migration that benefit the neoliberalisation of the 
market economic system. IML illustrates that the measure of who deserves recognised 
membership does not derive from formal legal categories (e.g. immigration 
legislation), but from a ‘community of value.’ Instead of legal citizenship rules, the 
                                                
68 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3. 
69 McNevin, Contested Citizenship, 61. 
70 Elspeth Guild, ‘Equivocal Claims? Ambivalent Controls? Labour Migration Regimes in the European Union’ in 
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community of value refers to a shared set of values grounded in liberal individualism 
infused with historically specific social, economic and cultural biases, and value 
assessed through economic productivity. 
 
Who	  are	  ‘Irregular	  Migrant	  Labourers’?	  
According to the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), there are an 
estimated 80 million migrant workers around the world with ‘a large proportion of 
labour migration occur[ing] in an irregular manner.’71 Current discussions in both 
academic and policy research that address labour and migration struggle to encompass 
the complexities within the label IML, a label that ostensibly includes the excess of 
other existing categories of migrant labour—such as economic migrant, seasonal 
worker, temporary visa holder and family migrant. 72  The Euro-Mediterranean 
Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) describe IML 
as migrants who: 
 
‘… respond to actual opportunities offered by the labour market of the 
country where they are (generally in the informal sector), they do not 
respond to a formal demand for labour and do not fulfil all the legal 
conditions of entry, stay and employment, and therefore may be 
considered undesirable by the government of the country in question. On 
one side, the rise of this category is linked with economic changes in 
countries and with the emergence of new employment niches. On the other 
                                                
71 International Organisation of Migration (IOM). Labour Migration. http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/by-
theme/facilitating-migration/labour-migration (accessed January 5, 2012). 
72 Academic research, for example, Guild and Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration; Nandita 
Sharma, Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making of “Migrant Workers” in Canada (Toronto: University of 
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to the UK” (GLA Economics. London: Greater London Authority, 2009). 
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side, it is associated with policies and protectionist measures that reserve 
a number of professions, skilled or unskilled, for nationals in order to 
alleviate the problem of persisting unemployment. These policies create a 
fertile ground for an irregular labour demand and pave the way for 
different scenarios of irregularity: irregular entrance and/or regular 
entrance and irregular stay, or regular stay but irregular employment. It 
is noteworthy that part of these migrants had been initially admitted as 
foreign workers on a legal basis, who subsequently became irregular due 
to changing labour legislation or because they overstayed their residence 
permits. Frequently, migrants do not even perceive the different status 
given the low level of legislation enforcement.’73 
 
Significantly, the individuals considered to be IML exceed recognised 
categories of migration because their ‘entrance’ and ‘stay’ (immigration) is regular 
and their employment constitutes the ‘irregular’ element. Conversely, an immigration 
status can be considered irregular as a result of changing immigration legislation, lack 
of access to security in their immigration and employment status, and subsequently—
or as a consequence of their immigration/residency/work restrictions—an inability to 
be employed by other employers or in other sectors.74 It is most difficult, however, to 
identify IML who may not have any direct immigration issues but are working in 
contracts where they are not recognised as employees under the law and are in 
temporary, flexible work. Persons may still be considered migrants in spite of holding 
UK nationality and citizenship due to the ethnicisation and racialisation 75  of 
employment sectors. After multiple generations of migration networks, Eastern 
European or Turkish small business and shop owners for example, or food processing 
workers in the Midlands, have come to provide an ethnically/racially-specific supply 
of labourers.76 These businesses and the labour they demand can be popularly 
                                                
73 The Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM), ‘Irregular 
Migration’ (January 2010) http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=239 accessed 20 February 2013.  
74 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, 14-15.  
75 Racialisation refers to the way that certain labour sectors are associated with (and employers prefer) particular 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. Jane Wills, Kavita Datta, Yara Evans, Joanna Herbert, Jon May, and Cath 
McIlwaine, Global cities at work: New migrant divisions of labour (London, New York: Pluto Press, 2010). 
76 Martin Ruhs and Bridget Anderson, eds., Who Needs Migrant Workers? Labour Shortages, Immigration and 
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identified as ‘migrant’ labour due to the particular labour sector being racially 
identified as foreign and non-national, not because of the workers’ actual legal status 
(immigration and/or employment status and right to reside and work).  
The exclusion of IML from the community, and thereby from the legal 
protections of the nation-state is not definite. ‘Irregular’ is not ‘illegal’. In fact, the 
term, irregular, came into popular usage as an alternative to the reference, widely 
acknowledged as derogatory, of illegal migrants. Migration activists, for example the 
international movement No One Is Illegal, brought public attention to the derogatory 
label, illegal.77 Catherine Dauvergne, in Making People Illegal, uses the term illegal 
because of its pointed, specific implication of the law. Dauvergne discusses the 
process whereby labels “make people illegal” and create divisions of “us versus 
them”, and contends that the term illegal is the clearest example of this separation.78   
The term irregular does not implicate the law in the way that the term illegal does. 
Illegal has a direct association with criminality.79 Policy makers, researchers and 
academics more commonly use the term ‘irregular’ to refer to a subset of labourers 
who are not plainly contravening immigration or labour laws but nevertheless are 
marginalized in the shadow of regulations. As stated earlier, ‘irregular’ is a legal grey 
area, but grey to the extent that it does not directly implicate the law. Meanwhile the 
construction of legal boundaries and definitions directly create the space that is then, 
irregular. Media, international organisations, and advocacy channels have also 
adopted the term irregular to replace use of ‘illegal’.80 Yet the adjective ‘irregular’ is 
not innocent: it presupposes a ‘regular’ form of what it modifies. Moreover, irregular 
signifies that the presumed regular is negated—not regular. Because the term irregular 
labour refers to a broad assortment of employment circumstances, it blurs the 
distinction between the legal and illegal. Thus the regular citizen labourer is an ideal 
                                                
77 No One Is Illegal (NOII). http://www.noii.org.uk/ (accessed February 13, 2012).  
78 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, 16-19. 
79 Dauvergne Making People Illegal, 4. The legal ambiguity of the term irregular allows it to be applied to a 
demographic of labourers beyond a specific legal category. 
80 International Organisation of Migration, "Key Migration Terms." International Organisation of Migration. 
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infused with assumptions of what constitutes active participation in the nation-state 
and deserves to be recognised not within the formal legal nation-state, but within a 
community of value. 
The definition of migrant in reference to migrant labourer or worker is also 
unclear. According to the UN International Convention on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Family (UNCRMW), article 2 (1) defines a migrant 
worker as ‘a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a 
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.’ 81  The 
International Organisation of Migration (IOM) defines labour migration as ‘the 
movement of people from one country to another for the purpose of employment’ but 
does not define what would constitute employment. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) has defined ‘migrant for employment’ in Convention No. 97 
article 11 (1), as ‘a person who migrates from one country to another with a view to 
being employed otherwise than on his own account and includes any person regularly 
admitted as a migrant for employment.’82 The above definitions specifically refer to 
individuals crossing international borders. 
In the UK it is difficult to distil how the popular definition of ‘migrant’ is 
applied in data collection and research. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) and Annual 
Population Survey (APS) are typically used to measure the impacts of migrants on the 
UK economy and define migrant as ‘foreign born’. Based on this definition, 
calculations of a migrant population would include those who have citizenship and 
who would not be counted as migrants if ‘migrant’ were defined as those who are 
subjected to immigration control or distinguished by self-proclaimed nationality. For 
data according to National Insurance Numbers (NINo), ‘migrant’ is defined as a 
foreign national. However in the Office of National Statistics (ONS), ‘migrant’ is 
defined according to the UN definition, where a migrant is someone who is residing 
in a country other than his or her usual residence for at least a year. ONS data is used 
in the UK for measuring net migration. Data on net migration have a significant 
impact on immigration policy and political debates concerning immigration reduction. 
                                                
81 United Nations International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Family, article 
2 (1).  
82 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 
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Yet, the ONS data does not include statistics on actual departures from the UK. 
Length of stay is based on terms stipulated in migrant visas and self-reporting.83 The 
following table illustrates the differences in definitions of ‘migrant’ used in UK 
government data. 
Table 1 Definitions of migrant as represented in government data sources 
(from Bridget Anderson and Scott Blinder, ‘Briefings: Who Counts? Migrant Definitions and their Consequences’ 
Migration Observatory (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2013), pg. n/a).  
 
The differences in definitions used in UK government surveys are not 
insignificant. For instance, according to Anderson and Ruhs, if migrants’ share of the 
labour market is a concern for policy makers, that share appears sixty percent larger if 
one considers all foreign-born workers rather than foreign nationals. In practice, 
foreign nationals and foreign-born workers have different relationships with the 
labour market based on whether the intention to stay is permanent or temporary. 
Temporal restrictions and status concerns for foreign nationals impact the intensity of 
working hours and length of contract these individuals will agree to. These 
differences cannot be fairly summarised in most political debates and legal concerns 
about a migrant labour force. Complications of definitions can be a reflection of the 
different ways that nationality laws traditionally recognise citizenship: jus soli that is 
citizenship based on birthplace and jus sanguinis, based on nationality of parents. 
However, politically the use of the term ‘migrant’ can exploit the inconsistent 
statistical definitions of migrant to further political agendas. Political discourses 
significantly impact who is popularly considered to be IML, and consequently treated 
                                                
83 Bridget Anderson and Scott Blinder, ‘Who Counts as a Migrant? Definitions and their Consequences’ (Oxford: 
Migration Observatory, 2013), pg n/a.  
 ONS LTIM LFS Home Office 
UN definition (one 
year) 
Yes (self-reported 
intent) 
Can approximate 
with length of stay 
variable 
No 
Dictionary: "enter in 
order to settle" 
No (may be 
approximated with 
length of stay 
variable) 
Can approximate 
with length of stay 
variable 
Yes, settlement 
grants 
Subject to 
immigration control 
Yes, for those staying 
at least one year 
Can approximate 
by excluding EU 
nationals 
Yes, with entry 
clearance visas, 
border entries 
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as a foreigner and non-citizen. Political support for tighter immigration controls 
obscures the structural labour market (economic) reasons for precarious work as well 
as the reality of who is carrying out that labour. It is difficult to determine who is a 
migrant if the term is broadly used to discuss ‘foreigners’ but evokes flexible, 
temporary, transient labour.  
IML is not a legal category or definition. In practice (and in political 
discourse), those viewed as irregular and migrant are regularly included, as irregular, 
within an economic, political and legal system. Reports and studies in the UK reveal 
practices of irregular migrant work, exploitation and abuse that persist in spite of 
existing national and international labour standards.84  The work produced by these 
authors contributes to discussions by legal academics that concern the legal, political, 
economic and social reasons for a category of labourers that are considered to be 
irregular. 85  Although there are many connections, the link between IML and 
precarious work has not been established clearly. Precarious work can refer to a broad 
range of labour situations, which will be discussed below with regards to 
subcontracting and fixed-term contracts, whereas IML is commonly associated with 
low-waged, low-skilled or ‘bottom-end’, labour. Notwithstanding the absence of a 
‘robust legal definition of precarious work’86 and therefore the possibility that this 
category also can be used to identify divergent experiences, the concern about IML in 
the UK indicates possible connections between precarious employment in low-waged 
low-skilled sectors and a racialised labour force considered to be outside the 
boundaries of community (national) belonging. The label IML may be a way to 
deflect attention from increasing employment precarity as a labour norm. The 
difficulty in establishing both what constitutes an irregular migrant labourer and 
                                                
84 See Maria Hudson, Netto, et al., In-work poverty, ethnicity and workplace cultures, 2013; Working Lives 
research institute (http://www.workinglives.org) Sonia McKay, Eugenia Markova, and Anna Paraskevopoulou, 
Undocumented Workers’ Transitions: Legal Status, Migration and Work in Europe (London: Routledge, 2011). 
Research in sociology, see Bridget Anderson and COMPASS: Anderson, “What does ‘The Migrant’ tell us about 
the (Good) Citizen?” 2012; public policy: Finch and Cherti 2011; Anderson and Rogaly, Forced Labour and 
Migration to the UK Study 2005; Geography: Wills, Datta, et al. Global Cities; politics: McNevin Contested 
Citizenship, and economics: Ruhs, “Towards a post-2015 development agenda: What role for migrant rights and 
international labour migration?”; Dustman, Fabbri and Preston, “The Impact of Immigration on the British Labour 
Market”. 
85 J. Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment”; Guild and Mantu, Constructing and 
Imagining; Davergne Making People Illegal. 
86 Sonia McKay, "Disturbing equilibrium and transferring risk – confronting precarious work." In Resocialising 
Europe in a Time of Crisis, Nicola Kountouris and Mark Freedland, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 194. 
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precarious work raises the imperative to probe these labels and their function in the 
UK labour market. 
Although IML can be an elusive label, it is identified as a political problem. 
According to a 2011 policy report, No Easy Options, irregular immigration is ‘one of 
the most difficult public policy issues in the UK.’87 Concerns about immigration 
happening for the purposes of employment have significantly informed political 
agendas for over two decades.88 Immigration policies have focused on reducing the 
influx of immigrants identified as irregular, illegal, unauthorised or otherwise 
undesirable.89 In No Easy Options, the authors discuss the public concern around this 
issue,  
 
‘At the moment, there is clear public concern about levels of irregular 
immigration, with 71 per cent of UK respondents in a recent major 
international survey saying they are ‘worried’ by it, and 90 per cent of 
respondents agreeing with the need for stronger border measures and 
tougher penalties on employers to reduce irregular immigration.’90  
 
 This data sparks a series of questions that remain unanswered: What does it 
mean to be ‘worried’ about irregular immigration? Who are these irregular migrants? 
What does irregular mean? Is this a problem of persons crossing the border? Or are 
employers and employment opportunities to blame? What is the source of public 
concern when news media, public opinion surveys and the questions respondents 
believe they are answering, are inconsistent with legal definitions and with one 
another?  
                                                
87  Finch and Cherti, No Easy Option, 3; see also Saba Salman, "More action needed on illegal immigration, says 
report" The Guardian, April 20, 2011. 
88 International Labour Organisation, "International Labour Migration: A Rights-Based Approach" (Geneva: 
International Labour Organisation, 2010), 6. 
89 Scott Blinder, Briefing: UK Public Opinion Towards Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Public Concern, 
(Oxford: Migration Observatory - University of Oxford, 2012), 2, 6.  
90 Finch and Cherti, No Easy Option, 3.  
Chapter 1, The Irregular Migrant Labourer, Constructing a Category 
 42 
The discourses of irregular migration and labour that are common in surveys 
of public opinion, media and political discussions reinforce stereotypes of irregular 
migrant labour as a foreign menace, despite the ambiguity around who comprises this 
labour group. As the CARIM definition above makes clear, these are not persons 
subject to deportation or detention. Rather, definitions of IML reflect contradictory 
reactions to immigration on a popular level. Citizens who express outrage at media 
stories of women being trafficked to work in prostitution may at the same time 
support measures to deport migrant workers for purportedly stealing local jobs. 
Conversely, individuals who have no problems with new immigrants in their 
neighbourhood may agree, through their voting behaviour, that restricting 
immigration is a national imperative.91 Therefore, while IML is identified as a 
problem, isolating how and why this is a problem has been problematic, if not 
impossible. 
Identifying a population of IML is complicated by the diversity of 
circumstances that contribute to individuals working in certain jobs and employment 
situations and/or migrating with uncertain status or work permits. Although labourers 
deemed to be migrant and irregular are suspended in legal grey areas, they remain 
defined by legal norms. What is ‘legal’, however, can be as ambiguous as the 
individuals’ compliance with them. Legal norms have developed into technical, 
statutory provisions in the UK to regulate employment and protect workers. The 
Employment Rights Act 1996, National Minimum Wage Act 1998, Employment Act 
2002 and Equality Act 2010 are among legislation that protect employees by 
guaranteeing them a national minimum wage, statement of their employment 
particulars, access to leave, outlining disciplinary procedures, pensions, and 
protection against unfair dismissal. However within these ‘legal norms’, as will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter four, it is significant whether one is recognised 
as an ‘employee’ in an employment relationship. Failing such classification, the 
statutory provisions protecting employees can be inaccessible to persons working in a 
                                                
91 A further phenomenon that will not be explored here is migrant diaspora communities that become supporters of 
anti-migrant or anti-immigrant policies in order to conform to the presumed ideals of a secure Western European/ 
North American life, or perhaps to deflect attention away from their own difference from the norm. This is seen in 
voting patterns in some migrant communities. This is not something that has received sustained academic 
attention, but the following touch on this issue: Bridget Anderson and Ben Rogaly, "Forced Labour and Migration 
to the UK Study" (COMPAS in collaboration with the Trade Union Congress, 2005), 29; and Wills, Datta, et al., 
Global Cities at Work, 138-162. 
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contract of self-employment (freelance), training or internship, or agency work.92 This 
creates a space of ‘irregularity’. For some, their status as an irregular migrant labourer 
means that while employment practices authorize their presence, immigration laws do 
not. For others, their irregular migrant labourer status does not reflect insecure 
immigration status. Both persons with precarious immigration status and those with 
secure immigration status but in precarious work situations popularly can be included 
in the label IML. An investigation of IML must examine the experiences of both. 
Commonly, IML is addressed as if it were an immigration issue. However, 
particularly in the UK, workers who are viewed as immigrant labourers are often 
European Union citizens. Because the category of IML eludes strict definition, it 
captures a demographic of workers in low-waged, low-skilled labour that are treated 
as sub-citizens in the ‘community’ of the nation-state, regardless of rights granted 
through EU membership.  
Martin Ruhs and Bridget Anderson define precarious, or irregular, migration 
status as a spectrum of compliance, semi-compliance and non-compliance with law.93 
Compliance refers to workers who are legally in the country with a work-permit, a 
right to work, or citizenship status. Although this is not obviously a precarious status, 
workers who are in compliance with the law may nevertheless be employed in labour 
contracts that demand non-traditional flexibility and lack job security, as temporary 
work programmes (discussed in chapter three) demonstrate. Compliance refers to 
workers acting in accordance with the terms of their employment and residence, but 
not necessarily employer or business compliance with international or national labour 
standards. Employer practices merge into the next area on the spectrum. Semi-
compliance takes into account a worker’s circumstance that seems to be illegal but is 
not permanently, or wholly so. An example of this would be participating in 
undeclared, informal work while waiting for a work-permit or working for employers 
who are not in full compliance with the law in their own employment practices and 
hiring policies. In some cases, employers might evade labour regulations by omitting 
over-time pay with the worker’s ostensible consent. Work that is not formally 
included in the labour market, such as care work or other non-marketised labour could 
                                                
92 Government of the UK, Agency Workers Guildelines, 2010.  
93 Martin Ruhs and Bridget Anderson, "Semi-compliance and illegality in migrant labour markets: An analysis of 
migrants, employers and the state in the UK," Population, Space and Place 16, no. 3 (2010): 195-221. 
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be employment that is in semi-compliance with labour laws by virtue of the 
definitions of employment not fitting the labour carried out. Finally, in other instances 
non-compliance may be a breach of the law, such as entering the country without 
documents (e.g. avoiding passport control) and working informally, using a false 
identity, passport and national insurance number, or not declaring one’s income, 
residence or wages-earned. This depends, however, on being able to determine what, 
in fact, the law is that is being transgressed.  
Precarious employment is something that falls mostly within ‘semi-
compliance.’  Leah Vosko defines precarious employment as: 
 
‘work for remuneration characterized by uncertainty, low income, and 
limited social benefits and statutory entitlements. Precarious employment 
is shaped by the relationship between employment status (i.e. self- or paid 
employment), form of employment (e.g. temporary or permanent, part-
time or full-time), and dimensions of labour market insecurity, as well as 
social context (e.g. occupation, industry, and geography) and social 
location (or the interaction between social relations, such as gender, and 
legal and political categories, such as citizenship).’94 
 
Precariousness cuts across all forms of remuneration and is not defined only 
by ‘non-standard’ employment, even though it is most often associated with non-
standard forms of work such as agency work, part-time and fixed-term employment.95 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines precarious employment as a 
‘work relation where employment security which is considered one of the principal 
                                                
94 Vosko, Managing the Margins, 2. 
95 Vosko, Managing the Margins, 1; Judy Fudge, "Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The 
paradox of international rights for migrant workers" Comparative Labour Law and Policy 34:1 (2012): 95-131, 
111. 
Chapter 1, The Irregular Migrant Labourer, Constructing a Category 
 45 
elements of the labour contract, is lacking. This term encompasses temporary and 
fixed-term labour contracts, work at home and sub-contracting.’96  
Precarious employment is not a new phenomenon. 97 The context of 
precariousness can also be referred to as ‘vulnerable work’; however unlike 
‘vulnerability’, precarity brings to mind the labour or employment situation as 
connected to an underlying atypical, fragmented state.98 When we identify labour as 
precarious in low-waged, low-skilled sectors especially affecting a racialised or 
‘foreign’ demographic, we also include a category of workers who are not included in 
legal definitions of forced labour and trafficking. According to the European Experts 
Group on Trafficking in Human Beings,  
'...the key element to the Trafficking Protocol is the forced labour 
outcomes, encompassing forced labour and services, slavery, slavery like 
practices and servitude. It is these human rights violations against the 
individual that the Trafficking Protocol seeks to redress.’99  
Forced labour and trafficking situations are included as offenses in the UK 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The offence is of holding someone in slavery or 
servitude, or requiring forced or compulsory labour.100  Ben Rogaly and Bridget 
Anderson note that trafficking and forced labour is addressed in UK immigration law 
in The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Bill 2004.101 The 
inclusion of trafficking and forced labour as both a criminal and immigration offense, 
but not addressed as an employment or labour issue, suggests that ‘the primary 
                                                
96 ACTRAV, "Policies and Regulations to Combat Precarious Employment" (Geneva: International Labour 
Organisation, 2011). 
97 For a historical account of shifts in labour in relation to economic and social change, see E. P. Thompson, The 
Making of the English Working Class, (New Penguin, 1991). 
98  Bridget Anderson, "Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers," Work 
Employment & Society 24:2 (2010): 300-317, 303. 
99 Draft Report of the European Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings, Consultative Workshop in the 
Framework of the EU Forum for the Prevention of Organised Crime, Brussels, 26 October 2004. The report 
continues, ‘While in some cases it can be difficult to determine whether conditions are merely illegal and 
extremely exploitative, rather than forced labour or services there is a wealth of history of international law, 
standards and interpretation of these concepts to rely on, which can provide sufficient certainty for criminal law 
and sanctions'.   
100 Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 creates an offence of holding another person in slavery or 
servitude or requiring them to perform forced or compulsory labour. The offence came into force on 6 April 2010 
(United Kingdom 2009). 
101 The legal definition of trafficking, both in the international definition of trafficking adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in November 2000 and the UK Bill 2004 implies situations of forced labour. 
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concern is with the movement and its facilitation as constituting the kernel of the 
crime of trafficking, rather than? the forced labour aspects or abusive employment 
relations.’ 102  Precarious, irregular, low-waged, low-skilled work can be highly 
exploitative, but it is not necessarily forced; there may be ostensible consent, albeit a 
lack of choice, to work in given conditions. If consent is seen to be lacking, then the 
employment situation is one of ‘forced labour’.103 However, persons may have little 
or limited choice to determine their situation of work, yet not indicate a lack of 
consent. Individuals who need wages and income to meet their basic needs may be 
relegated to low-waged, low-skilled labour sectors without alternative options, but not 
‘forced’. Nevertheless, employment law may not be accessible to them, and thus their 
situation may become increasingly irregular. In the UK, employment law offers 
statutory rights and protections for those who are in employment situations based on a 
traditional, standard contractual employment relationship. The contractual 
employment relationship is based on principles of contract law, including notions of 
individual autonomy and the voluntary nature of entering into a contractual 
relationship. The standard contractual employment relationship in law is based on 
long term, full-time employment, with a single employer in a single country and 
workplace.104 Non-traditional, flexible, temporary, subcontracted precarious forms of 
labour are easily excluded from employment law categories. Without employment 
opportunities that meet the threshold of a standard contractual employment 
relationship, workers can be prevented from being legally recognised as ‘employees.’  
Precarious labour, as IML, in low-waged, low-skilled sectors has not been 
widely identified in policy discussions as a labour market and employment 
problem.105 Instead, the focus in public policy and political discussions is on the 
immigration status or nationality of labourers. Reports from two UK-based research 
                                                
102 Anderson and Rogaly, Forced Labour and Migration to the UK Study, pg n/a. 
103 The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Bill 2004, states that any person who facilitates 
travel to or within the UK is guilty of the criminal offence of trafficking if an individual so facilitated: 'is the 
victim of behaviour that contravenes Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention  (slavery and forced labour)' Or 'is 
subjected to force, threats or deception (i) to provide services of any kind (ii) to provide another person with 
benefits of any kind, or (iii) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind. Work, or ‘services’ that are 
entered into with the ostensible consent of both parties (contractual employment or work relationship) does not 
meet the definition of ‘forced labour’. Anderson and Rogaly, Forced Labour and Migration to the UK Study, pg 
n/a.  
104 J. Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment”, 8. The employee is entitled to benefits both 
private and public, such as pension and unemployment insurance. 
105 Maria Hudson, et al., In-work poverty, ethnicity and workplace cultures (London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
2013). 
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institutes, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and the Migration 
Observatory, analyse public opinion surveys that have identified illegal and irregular 
migration as ‘one of the most important aspects of immigration.’106 According to 
public opinion surveys, the ‘public’ wants lower rates of immigration, but, ‘the 
evidence base lacks detailed information on a crucial issue—how do members of the 
public define ‘immigrants?’’107 Not only is IML elusive, the use of ‘immigrant’ as a 
label or category is often unclear. Individuals may refer to diversity in their 
neighbourhoods as an example of immigration even when all residents are legally 
citizens. The lack of precision around who is considered an immigrant indicates that 
the data, namely public support, that law makers use to legitimise measures intended 
to decrease illegal immigration, may be inaccurate. 
 We can see an example of the obfuscation of meaning surrounding the 
immigrant label in the common sentiment that illegal Eastern European migrants are 
stealing British jobs.108 Yet, Polish, Latvian, Hungarian and other Eastern European 
workers are EU citizens with the right to work in the UK, according to the 2004 
Directive/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the ‘right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States.’109 IML may refer to persons without secure legal 
immigration status, in low-waged labour often without the ability to enforce their 
rights in their country of employment. In the UK, however, research indicates that 
political and popular discourses of IML commonly refer to workers who are likely EU 
nationals.110 EU nationals with the freedom of movement within the EU have a secure 
immigration status. They are entitled to legal rights equal to British citizens. Thus 
IML is a label used to describe ‘non-national’ workers and is imbued with unsettling 
connotations of deviance inscribed onto foreigners. Persons who are admitted legally 
                                                
106 Matt Cavanagh, Migration Review 2011/2012. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2012, 5. 
107 Cavanagh, Migration Review 2011/2012, 5. 
108 Anderson and Ruhs, Who Needs Migrant Workers?, 31.  
109 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC  
110 Scott Blinder, Public Opinion: how does the public define the immigrants it wants to reduce? (Oxford: 
Migration Observatory - University of Oxford, 2012). Christian Dustman, Francesca Fabbri, and Ian Preston. "The 
Impact of Immigration on the British Labour Market" Economic Journal 155:507 (2005): 324-341. 
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and have legal permission, and rights, to live and work in the UK are labelled 
‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’.  
Immigration reforms do not address the question of EU freedom of movement; 
these reforms target migration of third country nationals, seen to infringe not only 
onto UK territory, but onto the EU as well. Nationalist, populist politics, most 
recently represented by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), are 
concerned with these consequences of EU membership and often champion the 
rhetoric of ‘migrants’ ‘stealing’ British jobs. While UKIP espouses xenophobic and 
racist tendencies, national surveys subsequently used by British policymakers to 
demonstrate public opinion towards migrants do not delineate the ‘migrant’ 
population in question.111 The anti-EU sentiment that the UKIP articulates can 
become confused with fears of unemployment that result in harsh anti-immigrant 
policies.112 Members of the public are not asked to define why they may be opposed 
to immigration, or what experiences inform their opinion. The labour market and 
demands of a ‘globalised’ economic market are not part of the discourse that garners 
support for restrictive immigration. The discourse of irregular migration, and IML, 
has surpassed the actual experience of migration, citizenship and employment.  
The study, Public Opinion: how does the public define the immigrants it wants 
to reduce?, by the Migration Observatory demonstrates that public concern with 
permanent immigration does not match with immigration policies intended to stem 
irregular immigration. The Migration Observatory survey analysis also demonstrates 
that although irregular migration, and migration as a whole, generates fear in the 
British public, few people identify migrants as problems in their own 
neighbourhood.113 If people do not feel the effects of immigration as a problem in 
their communities, and yet identify immigration as a concern, the concern identified 
in survey results and picked up in political discourses feeds a fictional fear that 
migrants are threatening the integrity of the nation-state and its labour market 
economy. 
                                                
111 Bridget Anderson and Scott Blinder ‘Who Counts as a Migrant? Definitions and their Consequences’ (Oxford: 
Migration Observatory, 2013). 
112 Andrew Osborn ‘UK’s anti-EU party under pressure over race, immigration before vote’ Reuters 15 May 2014.  
113 Scott Blinder, "Report: UK Public Opinion Toward Immigration Overall Attitudes and Level Concern," 
Migration Observatory Briefing (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2011), pg n/a. 
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According to the Migration Observatory:  
 
‘Survey questions about ‘immigration’ or ‘immigrants’ rarely define these 
terms, and certainly do not offer the government’s official definition. ... 
When thinking about immigrants, people in Britain most commonly think 
about foreign citizens—62% normally think about non-EU citizens and 
51% about EU citizens (excl. British)—rather than people who were born 
abroad and acquired British citizenship after moving to the UK (40%). 
Very low proportions of the public have in mind British citizens moving 
(11%) or returning (7%) to the UK. Similarly, few people normally have 
in mind the UK-born children of immigrants to Britain (12%).’114 
 
Moreover, public opinion surveys do not consider ‘migrants’ to be members 
of the responding ‘public’; and ‘taxpayers’ are not seen to include irregular migrant 
labourers, despite the contrary reality.115 Immigration policies that attempt to address 
concerns about excessive immigration tend to restrict temporary visas—namely 
labour migrants and foreign students. This same study of survey questions and results 
shows that ‘the public’ is more concerned with permanent immigration than 
temporary immigration. The concern with permanent immigration status is interesting 
because irregular immigration status is commonly believed to be a result of temporary 
legal status. Just over half of respondents to the survey studied by Scott Blinder and 
the Migration Observatory, supported a reduction in permanent immigration, while 
                                                
114 Blinder, “Public Opinion: how does the public define the immigrants it wants to reduce?”: ‘While negative 
views of immigration have been common for a long time, the high level of public concern with immigration is 
more recent. Aside from migrants with useful skills, those living in one’s own neighbourhood seem the most 
popular with the British public—or the least negatively regarded. In something of a paradox, while vast majorities 
view migration as harmful to Britain, few claim that their own neighbourhood is having problems due to migrants. 
Apparently, much of the opposition to migration comes from general concerns about Britain as a whole rather than 
from direct, negative experiences in one’s own community.’ 
115 Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge, and Eric Tucker. Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the 
Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), 74; Kerry Prebisch, "Development as Remittances or Development as 
Freedom? Exploring Canada’s Temporary Migration Programs from a Rights-based Approach" In Constitutional 
Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case, Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker eds., 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), 86. 
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just under half supported reductions in temporary immigration. 116  Perhaps this 
response reflects the tension created by a fear of migrant settlement and permanent 
residency paired with the understanding that temporary migrant labour is vital to the 
economic market. 
IML, therefore, is a category that needs to be disentangled from political 
discourses and sensationalised fears of foreigners stealing jobs from British citizens. 
Persons in precarious employment situations who live and work in legal grey areas 
are maintained in this position due to multiple factors, not only immigration status. A 
fear of exposure for persons with precarious immigration status (fears of expulsion, 
deportation, detention) as well as fears of ‘law-breakers’ benefiting from work and 
residency ‘illegitimately’ sustains discussions of IML within the realm of immigration 
law. Furthermore, the market economic benefit provided to the state and industry by 
persons working in legal grey areas, as precarious workers, encourages the complicity 
of labour and immigration law in tacitly supporting the current system and elusive 
category of IML. This complicity is closely linked to the market’s dependence on a 
precarious labour force. Whether individuals are with or without citizenship and legal 
status/permission to work, the lack of information available about statutory 
employment rights as well as the lack of legal protection available to labourers in 
non-standard contracts, in other words, precarious workers, reinforces priorities of 
market economic growth over the wellbeing of labourers.  
Many labourers in low-waged and low-skilled sectors live with insecurity. 
This parallels a lack of certainty involved with precarious immigration status which 
Nicholas DeGenova calls ‘the deportability of everyday life.’117 Taken together, the 
insecurity of precarious employment and uncertainty of living without secure 
immigration status forms a shared space of ‘irregularity’ even if individuals do not 
experience both at the same time. Labourers with secure immigration status who are 
still considered IML because of their racialised and/or disadvantaged socio-economic 
position do not fear deportation, but nevertheless live with no security of income, and 
                                                
116 ‘Less than a third of the public reports having temporary immigrants in mind when normally thinking about 
immigration.’ Blinder, “Report: UK Public Opinion Toward Immigration Overall Attitudes and Level Concern”, 
pg. n/a.  
117 Nicholas DeGenova, "Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life," Annual Review of Anthropology 
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no formal recognition of their consistent participation in the economy and 
community.118 
 The label of IML used in media and policy suggests that this condition of 
labourers is anomalous. The particular way that mainstream media and policy 
discussions inscribe IML as ‘irregular’ serves to justify the prerogative to distinguish 
between Good Citizens and opportunistic migrants, or Failed citizens. The term, 
inscribe, refers specifically to the way that Jean-Luc Nancy uses this term to refer to 
what is made part of the text. The ‘failure’ of IML to live up to citizenship standards, 
and thus their irregularity, is attributed to individual fault. Meanwhile market 
economic priorities support labour deregulation and decentralisation, maintaining 
workers in low-waged, low-skilled precarious employment. This status is justified by 
the nation-state and sanctioned tacitly by law, for the sake of maintaining global 
competitiveness and economic growth. Thus, in spite of economic insecurity and 
rising domestic unemployment, the economic needs particularly serving urban centres 
in high-income countries continue to demand low-waged, irregular labourers. This is 
especially evident in service and hospitality, construction, domestic care work, 
janitorial/cleaning, agricultural work, and food processing sectors.119 
Economic concerns and immigration oscillate between government efforts to 
ensure that the UK is attractive to the ‘the best and the brightest’ immigrants—highly-
skilled, financially secure and independent migrants—and vigilance to preclude lax 
policies that might encourage ‘opportunistic’ migrants to remain in situations where 
they are ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’.120 Although legislation does exist to protect against 
undocumented workers and opportunistic employers, for example monitoring of 
Gangmasters (under the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and Act of 2004), 
enforcement is limited due to lack of funds and resources.121  Bernard Ryan suggests 
that ‘the general weakness of labour market regulation in Britain’122 can be associated 
                                                
118 Wills, et al., Global Cities at Work, chapter 3: ‘London’s Low Paid Foreign Born Workers’, 59-93.  
119 Phillip Martin, "Recession and Migration: A New Era for Labor Migration?" International Migration Review 
43:3 (2009): 671-691. 
120 Bernard Ryan, "The Evolving Legal Regime on Unauthorized Work by Migrants in Britain," Contemporary 
Labour Law and Policy Journal 27 (2006), 33. 
121 Mike Wilkinson, "Out of sight, out of mind," Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 20:1 (2012): 13-21, 15, 17. 
I will discuss the Gangmasters Act 2004 more in chapter three. 
122 Ryan, “The Evolving Legal Regime”, 33.  
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with unauthorised work. In other words, on the one hand lax employment regulations 
may encourage non-discrimination in employment to find the ‘best and the brightest’, 
while on the other hand, these same regulations may allow for unauthorised and 
essentially illegal employment. Thus employers in sectors that disproportionately 
favour migrant workers may continue employment practices that regularly undermine 
existing laws with relative impunity, as long as they demonstrate economic growth. 
Employers may run profitable businesses123 by refusing to pay for overtime hours 
worked, and expect workers to live in inhumane conditions. Even when subjected to 
regulations, practices can go unchecked. For example, there are reported cases in the 
UK of employers who purportedly pay their workers the national minimum wage, but 
then deduct for clothing, training, transport, and even refuse collection.124 The climate 
of global economic market insecurity encourages firms (businesses, employers) to 
prioritise their global economic competitiveness by employing low-waged, low-
skilled labour, thereby reducing workers’ stability, security and bargaining power, 
which in turn results in an erosion of the collective bargaining model in labour law. A 
globalised economic market also creates a global supply of labour, making workers 
more easily replaceable. Consequently, labourers are forced into increasingly more 
precarious situations, choosing between sub-standard conditions or joblessness.   
The employment of a transnational labour supply, albeit often EU citizen-
workers, particularly for precarious work, also contributes to a further downward 
trend in wages for all employees in sectors that disproportionately employ foreign-
born, ‘migrant’ workers. According to a labour and migration research team in 
London, ‘neo-liberal economic management, the market—and particularly 
subcontracting—has been used to push down the wages and conditions of work in 
jobs like cleaning, care and construction.’125  Within the EU, inequalities between EU 
member states, not to mention beyond the boundaries of the EU, mean that some 
individuals who have migrated to the EU ‘may be prepared to take on jobs at wages 
and conditions that many UK nationals [and other industrialised nations] would not 
                                                
123 Wilkinson, “Out of Sight” 15; Gary Craig, "Special issue editorial overview," Journal of Poverty and Social 
Justice 20:1 (2012): 5-12, 8. Craig also identifies that, contrary to public scare-mongering about benefit tourism, 
migrant workers rely little on public funds, therefore are of even more ‘economic benefit’ to the state because of 
not taking advantage of services. 
124 Wilkinson, “Out of Sight”, 14-15. 
125 Wills, et al., Global Cities at Work, 1. However the authors emphasise that this is not a new, neo-liberal 
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consider.’ 126  Despite the expressed concern of the UK government regarding 
domestic unemployment, precarious work continues to draw on the ostensible global 
supply of labour. 
The challenge that the existence of IML poses to the legal system of the 
nation-state exposes why legal definitions regarding immigration and employment fail 
to capture the precarity demanded by the market economic system. In fact, delineating 
precarity would position the legal system in opposition to the market economic 
system. IML are not clearly distinguished through citizenship status or legal right of 
residence or entry. The lack of clarity comes up against tenacious inside versus 
outside distinctions, where the nation-state and categories of citizenship only 
recognise those who are ‘inside’ versus those who are excluded because they are 
‘outside’. Meanwhile, irregular status, to a large extent, presents an impasse because 
these are persons ‘included-as-excluded’ living and working ‘inside’. This impasse 
translates into the legal field where it is rare for cases concerning irregular, precarious 
labour to be brought into formal legal arenas.127 The problematic of identifying 
irregular migrant labourers exposes the limitations or incapacity of structural ‘rights’ 
provisions to extend towards a marginalised labour demographic (such as freedom 
against exploitation, statutory provisions providing for protection against 
discrimination and unfair work practices outlined above). Migration scholarship that 
is concerned with irregular migration and precarious labour outside the scope of 
employment legislation tends to focus on expanding existing statutory provisions or 
including migrants into legal categories, for instance work by Ryszard 
Cholewinski.128 This attention does not extend to an investigation of the conditions of 
sub-citizenship demanded by labour markets or a consideration that rights may be 
ineffective protection for those who fall outside of the scope of legal recognition. As 
long as state-centric legal structures remain the common reference point of scholarly 
analyses, the question of how to comprehend the irregular migrant labourer, who is at 
once included and excluded, cannot be addressed.  
                                                
126  Bridget Anderson, "Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers," Work 
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Notwithstanding the question of who, actually, is a migrant, the demand for 
migrant workers is structurally embedded in neoliberalisation processes of market 
growth. This returns our focus to the labour market. Migrant labour is desired, in fact 
demanded, in the UK because it is often considered a guaranteed hard-working labour 
force. Migrants are perceived as a ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-sustaining labour supply’ 
due to their economic and legal vulnerability.129 When demand for their labour is 
high, many non-British citizens will come to the UK and supply the labour. When 
demand is low, migrants—EU citizens included—may choose to stay in their country 
of nationality or (more permanent) residency. According to Piore, writing in 1979, 
migrants are disproportionately available for work regardless of over-qualification 
because they may choose temporary work or due to the ‘wage differential with their 
country of origin.’130 This remains a factor, which has become structurally embedded, 
relegating workers to a ‘temporary’ status in spite of them holding EU citizenship and 
thus entitlement to existing labour rights and protection. Again, temporary status 
implies that migrants may be subjected to sub-standard working conditions and 
demands to which workers usually would not consent.  
Labour markets structured by the preference for a flexible and intense labour 
force and unfavourable conditions for domestic workers, have created path 
dependencies on the form of labour traditionally provided by migrant workers. 
Indicatively, agriculture and food processing have restructured job requirements and 
classification to allow employers to rely on migrant labour, where hiring British 
workers is not seen as an option. Although not explicitly stated by the authors, this is 
an example of where immigration law may be adapted and used to serve market 
preferences.131  Other researchers have noted the inconsistencies of immigration law, 
refugee law, and likewise labour law, which are used to serve the national interests at 
any given time.132 Consequently, immigration controls have focused on both keeping 
out potential migrants to prevent a downward pressure on wages and conditions, as 
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well as sanctioning opportunistic employers.133 However, since ‘migrant’ can be 
defined in a way that includes EU citizens with access to the labour market equal to 
British citizens, the reliance in these labour sectors on a migrant labour force is not a 
consequence of lax immigration controls. To a large extent, the focus on immigration 
and not on practices in the labour market and employment has exacerbated the 
situation of IML. 
 
The	  Labour	  Market	  And	  Migrant	  Workers	  
Judy Fudge, drawing from observations made by Bridget Anderson, maps a 
taxonomy of the ‘nexus between precarious migrant status and precarious 
employment.’134 The taxonomy demonstrates that the causes of precarious migrant 
status overlap with factors of precarious work. This summarises the above discussion 
to demonstrate that while individuals with precarious migration status experience the 
greatest insecurity, the category of IML broadly encapsulates a range of legal grey 
areas that cannot be easily addressed through immigration law or existing 
labour/employment law. Categories in immigration create precarious statuses for 
migrants and the legal categories of employment similarly produce a spectrum of 
precarious legal recognition for workers.  
 
Table 2. Fashioning precarious workers 
Conditions of Entry 
• Migrant worker: skill level, age, gender, country of origin, marital status  
• Family accompaniment  
• Employer: occupation, sector  
• Temporal: duration of visa  
• Spatial: mobility to leave and re-enter receiving country and to move 
around it  
                                                
133 Employment relations and wages will be discussed further in chapter three.  
134 J. Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment”, 109.  
Chapter 1, The Irregular Migrant Labourer, Constructing a Category 
 56 
Employment relations 
• Labour market mobility: dependence on an employer  
• Duration of employment relationship  
• Terms and conditions of employment: wages, hours, health and safety  
• Legislative protection: employment standards, occupational health and 
safety, collective bargaining, workers compensation  
• Unionization   
Institutional insecurity  
• Social citizenship entitlements: health, unemployment insurance, social 
assistance  
• Pathways to more secure migrant status  
• Family reunification 
Figure 1 From: J. Fudge 2012, 14-15 from Anderson, ‘Fashioning Precarious Workers’, 307-12. 
 
The relationship between precarious labour and immigration involves a 
process whereby uncertainty is institutionalized. Employers favour workers who are 
in a state of temporariness and insecurity.135 The availability of workers from within 
the EU, willing to work for less, and a deregulated labour market in the UK promotes 
a supply in response to a demand for precarious workers. However, importantly, the 
ideal flexible worker does not include workers whose immigration status depends on 
their employment. For precarious work, ‘employers must avoid being tied into 
sponsorship and other obligations, and [thus they] turn to flexible labour already in 
the UK.’136 Temporary work programmes and the legal employment of third-country 
nationals are highly regulated. Thus immigration controls ‘rather than a tap regulating 
the flow of workers to a state, ... might be more usefully conceived of as a mould 
constructing certain types of workers through selection of legal entrants, and the 
requiring and enforcing of certain types of employment relations.’137 Citizen workers, 
especially EU-citizen migrants who may be willing to work for less, are left with little 
choice but to conform. Thus in spite of the problem of defining who are IML and 
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what this label attempts to encompass (and consequentially homogenises), much 
attention is invested into thinking of immigration, economic migrants, labour and 
citizenship.  
The dynamic of labour demand and supply focused on migrant labour requires 
further analysis and methodology to avoid a focus solely on non-British citizens at the 
expense of ignoring the labour participation of persons who are not mobile or 
migrating. Although migrant labourers are integral to supplying a particular type of 
temporary, flexible and precarious worker, the labour demand (flexible, temporary, 
precarious) extends to citizen-workers. Employers will demand what they ‘think they 
can get from the various pools of available labour, while at the same time, labour 
supply often adapts to the requirements of demand.’138 Thus employers will demand 
the same cheap, expendable, flexible labour from all workers (low-waged, considered 
low-skilled) whether they are ‘migrants’ or not. Workers in these labour sectors have 
little choice but to follow suit and supply this type of labour, which is characterised 
by a lack of security and precarious circumstances. The perception that these are 
‘migrant’ jobs heightens animosity against anyone suspected of being a ‘foreigner’, 
even if such suspicions are evidently racial and discriminatory. 
The perceived availability of a migrant labour force has facilitated a reduction 
in training programmes and incentives to invest in local workers. The lack of training 
and investment weakens the connection between the state, industry and people, that 
builds a system of social welfare and creates traps of in-work poverty, where 
individuals may be employed but without access to job progression, wage increases or 
training.  One method practiced by employers to maintain workers in this employment 
stalemate is to offer non-permanent contracts to ‘self-employed’ workers rather than 
hiring them as ‘employees.’ If workers are either technically self-employed or not 
legally defined as ‘employees’, employers are able to evade the legal responsibilities 
that they would owe to ‘employees’.139 This allows employers to cut costs and 
maintain economic competitiveness.  
                                                
138 Anderson, “Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers”, 6.  
139 According to the UK Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), ‘workers’ are entitled to national minimum wage, 
health and safety protections; whereas rights and responsibilities are granted only to ‘employees’.  
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Another tactic used by employers to avoid contractual employment obligations 
is through relying on subcontracted labour. Subcontracting has become the 
paradigmatic form of labour in the twenty-first century.140 Subcontracting in labour 
most often means that workers are placed in precarious situations where they are not 
considered employees (in a standard contractual employment relationship) because 
they are hired by a third party or agency. Avoiding the definition of the standard 
contractual employment relationship absolves the employer from extending statutory 
protection to these workers. The worker is left to depend on the market, income and 
work, for her/his well-being. Subcontracting functions in tandem with deregulation. 
After a primary contract is negotiated between those demanding labour and those 
supplying (contractors), those responsible for supplying the labour in turn enter into 
another contract with workers to supply a portion of the labour. These workers are not 
the primary contractors and are responsible for only a specific aspect of the total job. 
Subcontracted workers are more precarious because they are vulnerable to the 
demands of the first contract and second contract, the second or subsequent contracts 
often holding fewer guarantees of protection and obligations.141   
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has raised international concern 
with subcontracting, particularly in construction industries. 142  Similarly, in the 
hospitality industry, catering companies may rely on subcontracting and/or 
outsourcing to provide food for hotel events.143 Commonly, workers in hospitality 
                                                
140 Jane Wills, "Subcontracted employment and its challenge to labour," Labor Studies Journal, special issue on 
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offer everything from catering services to private prison security to hospital staff and waste removal services. 
Sodexo have their own ‘human rights policy’ where they “promote respect for human rights” and “ask suppliers to 
abide by a code of conduct” which is based on the ILO Group Supplier Code of Conduct. However, Sodexo is not 
governed by national or international law in the way that the government of a nation-state (in a liberal democratic 
nation) ostensibly is. The lack of enforcement or accountability guiding Sodexo and their code of conduct (or its 
adherence to the ILO standards) means that they are able to operate in a legal grey area of their own.  
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services are hired through an employment agency and then subcontracted to third 
party employers, who are not the direct employers of that worker. This is in contrast 
to hospitality staff being hired directly through the human resources department of a 
large hotel chain, for example, and thereby entering into an employment contract with 
that business.144  
A focus on immigration control distracts from the market preference for 
precarious and irregular labour. Currently, economic growth under a flexible, ‘global’ 
labour market and restricted immigration are both assumed to be necessary for the 
good of the economic system of the nation-state. Indeed, restrictions on immigration 
suggest that persons considered to be migrants can be relegated to low-end labour and 
low-wages. The intensive production expectations of workers depends on a labour 
force that is willing to work for less. Workers from less economically strong EU 
member states and British nationals in disadvantaged positions can consent to work 
for less, for indeterminate periods of time, within a labour market that looks to 
international flows of workers as if this would supply a steady, self-regulating stream 
of labourers when needed. These factors result not only in a downward pressure on 
wages but also in conditions where individuals are not employable or hireable unless 
they conform to lower standards of employment and pay.145 In other words, unless 
workers are willing to become IML, the jobs are not available.  
Political discourses speak of migrants ‘stealing British jobs’. Significantly 
economic data and sociological studies have demonstrated that the demand for 
migrant labour is not based on real labour shortages. A ‘native’ citizen-based labour 
force is reluctant to work in particular sectors. Citizens with access to education and 
social welfare are unwilling to take lower paid, devalued jobs.146 Nevertheless, 
statistics of unemployment during the first decade of the twenty-first century in the 
UK demonstrate that a citizen labour force could adequately fill labour demand.147 
                                                
144 Rosemary Lucas and Steve Mansfield, “The use of migrant labour in the hospitality sector: current and future 
implications” in Anderson and Ruhs, Who Needs Migrant Workers?, 157-187. 
145 Bridget Anderson, and Martin Ruhs, "Reliance on migrant labour: inevitability or policy choice?" Journal of 
Poverty and Social Justice 20:1 (2012): 23-30, 25. And Guild and Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour 
Migration, 3. 
146 Anderson and Ruhs, Who Needs Migrant Workers?, 29.    
147 Anderson and Ruhs, Who Needs Migrant Workers?, 3. These sectors have become associated with particular 
racial or ethnic groups—stereotypes include the ‘Ghanaian security guard’, ‘Portuguese hotel cleaner’ and ‘Polish 
plumber’. 
Chapter 1, The Irregular Migrant Labourer, Constructing a Category 
 60 
Popularly, this data can be used to blame persons who are unemployed, those 
dependent on social assistance citizens and migrants for causing problems relating to 
precarious work and irregular migrant labour. However, if employment conditions 
and job quality (part-time/full-time, availability of benefits, long-term secure 
contracts, training opportunities and so on) were improved, a citizen workforce and a 
regular migrant workforce could be better regulated and would not push down wages. 
As we have seen, employers and industries concerned with cutting costs and 
maintaining market competitiveness prefer IML. However, an overt demand for the 
type of worker embodied by the migrant would belie the purported values of the 
twenty-first century liberal democratic nation-state. Purported objectives, as 
articulated in Western European and North American countries, include democratic 
governance, the rule of law and human rights as intrinsic to their constitution. If 
liberal democratic nations explicitly demanded an easily exploitable irregular labour 
force, this would contradict foundational elements of their constitution. Thus when 
‘migrant’ refers to those who are EU citizens, these workers can occupy legal grey 
areas where access to rights and recognition of citizenship status is complicated by the 
structure of the EU. The difficulties of engaging in coherent discussions about 
migrant labour outlined above and heightened by the experience of free movement in 
the EU suggest that the nature of citizenship is more in question than immigration 
controls. The nature of IML does not derive from a denial of formal legal status or a 
lack of formal legal protection for non-citizen workers.  
Guy Standing argues that trends of restructuring labour markets, employment 
and purportedly globalised markets have formed a new precarious working class: the 
precariat. He contends these workers are prevented from seeing the social and 
economic situation that is creating and producing a common set of vulnerabilities.148 
Low-waged, low-skilled labourers are distinguished into two equally contrived 
categories: ‘irregular migrants’ contrasted to ‘benefits scroungers’. 149  Precarious 
citizens and workers are pitted against each other and blame each other for their 
subjugated and disadvantaged position. The broader economic and political system is 
                                                
148 Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 
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not blamed for systemically enforcing precarious situations and disadvantaging, 
marginalising and ‘excluding’ certain members of the population. Rather, these Failed 
Citizens provide a vehicle for social regulation, to dissuade people from transgressing 
the law, but also to juxtapose the Good Citizen against the Failed Citizen. These 
forms of control are focused in the community of value as the reference point of 
worthy membership/belonging. According to Bridget Anderson,  
 
‘… the Illegal Immigrant and Benefit Scrounger serve as powerful 
warnings to benefit claimants and legal migrants of what they might 
become, and what they must dissociate themselves from. In the same way 
that the immigrant is faced with actual and rhetorical slippages into 
illegality, the claimant must constantly beware the slippage into the 
scrounger.’150   
 
Neither the irregular migrant nor the benefit scrounger is able to achieve the 
rank of ‘modern citizen’ ‘public’ or ‘taxpayer’, in spite of their actual social and 
economic participation and formal legal status. Research in migration can often 
inadvertently place persons considered to be irregular migrant labourers into two 
camps—either as victims or villains—without drawing attention to how this 
dichotomy simplifies otherwise complex social and economic relationships.151 Unless 
the concept of citizenship is questioned, citizenship norms can continue to be 
reconstituted on neoliberal lines, according to market priorities. Legalising the status 
of undocumented workers, or extending labour legislation to include more precarious 
forms of labour, significantly raises awareness of this labour force. Nevertheless, 
legalisation can exacerbate rather than remedy the factors underlying irregular 
migrant labour. Granting status may alleviate anxiety surrounding potential 
deportation and detention without changing one’s precarious employment situation. 
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Recognition and extension of legal ‘protection’ remains focused on worker’s 
employment status in increasingly flexible, temporary and insecure work oriented 
towards a global labour market. Thus, engaging in waged labour in low-skilled, low-
waged sectors is contingent on accepting a labour market that relies on a subjugated 
labour force. Furthermore, proposals for legalisation and citizenship can reaffirm 
flexibility and insecurity as a form of civic virtue if these proposals do not 
problematise the labour demand for precarious labour.152  
As discussed above, the common market is intertwined with the ‘global’ 
economic market and labourers, nationals and foreign nationals, are together caught in 
hierarchies that differentiate citizenship. In practice, Good Citizens are those who are 
deemed worthy and ‘Good’ participants by the nation-state, and consequently have 
access to the common market. Others whose participation is mediated through legal 
grey areas are excluded from the ‘common market’ and are therefore irregular, sub-
citizens or Failed citizens. In spite of their actual participation and contribution, these 
people are neither consumers nor taxpayers, and their active citizenship is obscured. 
The idea of the global market, as a presupposed common market, permits nation-states 
to differentiate between regular and irregular labourers, all the while maintaining 
those deemed irregular (outsiders) within (inside) this same domestic economy and 
territory.153  
 
Conclusion:	  Questioning	  Immigration	  and	  Labour	  Law	  
Existing legal mechanisms, if un-interrogated, buttress the universal and 
totalising claims of a proto-political community. Interrogating the category of 
irregular migrant labour demonstrates the constraints of ‘legal, social and cultural 
circumstances in which [migrants] are embedded.’154 However, the legal, social and 
cultural circumstances are not inevitable, or the only possibility for law. Law’s 
authors constrain these circumstances. Law itself is no-thing until it is given value and 
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meaning by those who use it. The discourses of citizenship, legal status and rights 
currently fail to access the persons, the beings who are participating in the on-going 
constitution of the labour market. Existing frames for understanding our economic, 
political and legal relationships (work and citizenship) continue to perpetuate the 
deeply entrenched marginalisation of precarious, ‘irregular’ ‘migrant’ workers. A 
fundamental questioning of what these terms and categories signify, and how they 
might be re-thought, is vital before a viable approach might be found to address 
persons existing in legal grey areas, vulnerable to employment exploitation.  
IML is a category that is based on practices of recognition that blur the 
distinctions between inclusion and exclusion. Persons caught in this category 
experience contestations of citizenship and ambiguous exclusion from a community 
of value. Processes of neoliberalisation within the market economic system maintain a 
demand for precarious work that is supplied by persons in the ambiguous spaces of 
‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’ labour. Consequently, the structure of the nation-state is 
upheld by a fiction of formal legal citizenship. It is a fiction because it relies on the 
marginalised presence of ‘superfluous’ populations, those whose presence contests 
categories of ‘regular’ ‘citizen’ ‘worker’. In other words, the structure of the nation-
state relies on the idea of formal legal citizenship facilitating belonging and 
recognition, whilst the practices of citizenship and the economic system that upholds 
the nation-state includes a demographic of labourers who are considered irregular and 
treated as sub-citizens. However, because the nation-state and market economic 
system are both seen as essential, even natural, their tenacity and universality is 
unassailable. The law and legal instruments regulating migration and work are 
complicit in obscuring the reality of persons living and working within a certain 
territory. The jurisdiction of immigration and labour law is established based on what 
I will explore in greater detail in chapter two using Susan Marks’ term, ‘false 
contingencies’.155 These are the conditions of possibility embedded in the system of 
the nation-state and market economy.   
Governments concerned with the labour market impact of a foreign, migrant 
labour force may criticise immigration law for not being hard, or strict, enough. 
Concerns about migrant labourers and low-waged, low-skilled workers vulnerable to 
                                                
155 Marks, “False Contingency”, 10. 
Chapter 1, The Irregular Migrant Labourer, Constructing a Category 
 64 
abuses from employers, highlight tensions within immigration law, but also conflicts 
between immigration and labour. This is especially true given responses to the 
economic crisis of 2008 and de-centralisation/re-regulation of UK employment law in 
the twenty-first century. Proposals to remedy the problem often ‘do not challenge 
underlying mechanisms of labour subordination, including citizenship.’156 There are 
many reasons for this. The very real situations of abuse and exploitation that are 
experienced by persons in irregular labour market situations make it difficult to take a 
step back and consider the underlying paradigms of thought that condition categories 
and frameworks surrounding the institutions involved. Indeed, there are immediate 
ethical and justice claims that demand attention, such as being aware of forced labour, 
modern slavery and in-work poverty.157 However, responses to these exigencies 
reaffirm nation-states and their borders (as a necessary evil) that enable governments 
to organise populations into liberal nation-states, and thereby to support liberal 
democratic values.158 The state and its institutions are always our addressees in labour 
and in immigration law. However, ‘when they self-privilege as our most important 
addressees, we are called into and by their perspective and we lose hold of our 
capacity to imagine politics otherwise.’159 Thus, existing frameworks are reaffirmed. 
The values believed to be contained within the nation-state and its institutions seem 
incontrovertible because of the universal benefit they offer. Values include the 
primacy of the individual, the idea of the autonomous citizen-producer (as an 
economic unit) as well as social welfare as determined by political priorities and state 
governance.  
The terms, ‘standard employment’, ‘work’ and the ‘labour market’—like 
‘migrant’—are terms used legally and politically to signify particular value or 
worthiness in the nation-state. These categories operate based on historically specific 
and ideologically informed conditions of possibility, which obscure how the labour 
market is only one possibility of measuring value and economic participation. The 
                                                
156 Bauder, Labour Movement, 200.  
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158 ‘It is this dystopic vision that allows for either the consequent Hobbesian response […] or the related 
communitarian response (in which national state formations are defended on the grounds that democracy itself can 
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market economic system is neither natural nor necessary in its particular scope; it is 
historically conditioned. Similarly, in migration scholarship, border control and the 
mediation of immigration at the border of the nation-state is assumed to be natural 
and necessary. Popular conviction that citizenship and legal status are the only 
possibility for recognition and justice in the face of precarious, irregular, employment 
ignores other possibilities of thinking of population of persons in-common, forming a 
social, an economy and law.  
Although rights and benefits may be bestowed onto non-citizens, ‘there are 
important variations as to their universality and accessibility. Many restrictions are 
imposed on the basis of residence and other criteria.’160 At the same time, people turn 
to rights and law to speak to the concerns and needs of a marginalised population. The 
law is imbued with a desire within liberal democratic states for grounding and 
ultimate truth: for bounded and protected national borders to ensure security (force), 
concurrent with a benevolent government that recognises basic human rights (justice). 
According to Jacques Derrida, ‘Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that 
there be law, but justice is incalculable, it demands that one calculate with the 
incalculable and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are 
necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision between just and 
unjust is never insured by a rule.’161 Irregular migrant labourers expose law as a force 
in tension. Yet this tension is not an impasse that is fixed or static. It is aporetic. Law 
is in constant tension within its presence as a tool of enforcement, in the hands of 
government, economic market priorities and state power, and the continuous 
movement and calculation within governance, economic market and shifting social 
relations. While law enforces order for a population through the mechanisms of the 
nation-state, it is irreparably tied to enforcing a limit of what is already part of its 
constitution—law can only exclude that which it encompasses and comes before, or 
under, its ambit. Jean-Luc Nancy’s work can be interpreted as calling on analyses of 
law to bring into the frame of legal analysis what is being written-out of legal and 
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230-258 (New York: Routledge, 2002), 244. 
Chapter 1, The Irregular Migrant Labourer, Constructing a Category 
 66 
political discourses.162 Thus thinking of law away from the political frame of the 
nation-state demonstrates how law traces interactions and relations of sociality, of our 
being together in pluralities. This plurality exceeds the categories of belonging in the 
nation-state or what is recognised as participation in the economic market.163 It also 
exceeds the way law is instrumentalised, and illuminates that law is not something. 
In the next chapter, I discuss a political-juridical-ecotechnical approach to 
investigate how, in spite of fighting exploitative labour situations, legal scholarship, 
theory and advocacy can itself be part of the enforcement and re-enforcement of 
categories and frameworks that create IML. Susan Marks’ attention to ‘false 
contingency’ unearths the tenacious belief in a proto-political community, which 
affects the persistence of the ambiguous label, IML. Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of law, 
and his fundamental ontological questioning, further deepens attention to ‘false 
contingency’ by opening onto the exscription that is active and working beyond IML 
as a label and category. The concepts that these two writers have developed cast a 
new light on the problematic of IML by deeply questioning underlying conceptual 
frameworks and contingencies that bolster thinking of the nation, citizenship, 
regularity and work. The methodology developed from Marks’ and Nancy’s work 
addresses the questions raised in this chapter because as an approach it embraces the 
unspoken within our dominant frameworks, rejecting the universalising claims of 
contemporary models in favour of an understanding of law as necessarily 
incommensurable and constantly in process. 
                                                
162 Due to the notion of exscription, and if exscription is thought of in the context of legal and political discourses 
as I am attemption to do.  
163 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, Peter Connor eds., (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991), 28. 
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Chapter 2. A methodology of 
exscription: politics, law and 
ecotechnics 
My analysis of irregular migrant labour (IML) begins with the previous 
chapter’s description of a particular economic market system that, through what Hans 
Lindahl refers to as ‘inclusion-as-exclusion’ and ‘the proto-political community’, 
constructs migrant labour as ‘irregular’.164 ‘Irregular migrant labour’ (IML), as the 
previous chapter describes, is as a broad, homogenising term used to encompass an 
elusive population. Labelling heterogeneous experiences of migration and labour 
together in one category of ‘irregular migration’ juxtaposes migration, and individual 
migrants, that do not conform to existing categories within immigration and labour 
law to an equally elusive notion of what is ‘regular’. Moreover, the term IML used to 
refer to the individuals themselves suggests that their irregularity is a consequence of 
individual actions, where non-national foreigners transgress existing immigration and 
labour standards. I have sketched the shortcoming of current legal and conceptual 
frameworks in that they assist in the creation of the illusory category of IML in the 
previous chapter. In this chapter, I elaborate how Susan Marks’ false contingency and 
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s fundamental ontological questioning helps me to 
develop a methodological approach to the study of IML that is political, juridical and 
ecotechnical.165 The respective writings of these two authors bring into relief the 
contingencies and categories that create IML. Susan Marks explains these 
contingencies are false because they do not operate as contingencies of events and 
interactions as they are happening. Instead, predetermined conditions of possibility 
are rewritten as contingencies. For instance, recognition of one’s person-hood, or 
one’s status as a member of a community and society, is believed to be possible 
through legal recognition, constituting the legal subject as a citizen. The basis of 
recognition is pre-determined from a historically specific point of reference, which 
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now is conditioned through the market economic system. The market economic 
system is privileged as it was not only necessary but natural. It is difficult to imagine 
persons working, in other words labouring, in a framework different from one that has 
developed in reference to citizenship and the market. My methodology ultimately 
challenges us to think of IML and law differently, by bringing attention to false 
contingency in order to open onto Nancy’s work.166 I suggest a methodological 
approach that enables Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical questioning to speak to the 
gaps of legal remedies and existing legal instruments. Nancy pushes beyond debates 
that acknowledge the limitations of our language and conceptual frameworks yet fall 
short of considering how the physical materiality of our bodies and their labour 
continues the movement of the world in spite of categories that limit recognition.167  
This chapter provides a detailed outline of my methodological approach while 
chapters three and four identify the false contingency of immigration law and labour 
law in order to illuminate the systems of thought that underpin situations of 
precarious, subjugated labour—homogenised under the label IML. In the final 
chapter, I will return to consider the consequences that thinking differently through 
ecotechnics and a bodily ontology might have on labour and migration, specifically 
where experiences are exscribed from what is able to be marketised and commodified 
in care and care work. 
Eco-technics is a word Nancy uses to refer to the circulation of capital, but as 
connected to the ecology of our being in-common. Eco-technics enables thinking of 
the simultaneity of techniques of capital, of labour markets and processes of 
neoliberalisation and the way persons come together in originary sociality. In the 
originary sociality, the drive for determination, for categories and labels, is 
incommensurable with the material reality or experiences that are always exceeding 
the categories and frames. In no small way, this suggests returning critiques of 
processes of neoliberalisation and labour market demand back to consider the original 
sense of the term, economics. Economics originally refers to the regulation, or logic, 
                                                
166 Nancy’s work includes a corpus of articles, books, interviews that by quantity and theoretical contribution far 
surpassing the article from Susan Marks that I refer to for false contingency. Thus, I do give greater weight to 
explaining Nancy’s work. 
167 Nancy’s work discusses how the corpus of the plurality of singular bodies that cannot be programmed or fit 
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of the ‘home’, the household (οικος).168 In the development of modern liberal thought, 
the home and household played a key role in providing the foundation for the citizen. 
Problematic for its blatant racial and gendered basis, the household was the 
foundation from which the man—the original ‘good’ citizen—then was enabled to 
participate in the public sphere. Women, children, slaves, domestic workers, in 
contrast were contained in the so-called private space of the home. Eco-nomics thus 
on the one hand harkens back to this traditional link where the citizen emerged from 
the private to the public, and his economic activity upheld both the home and the 
public (the state). On the other hand, economics, the logic of a household, does not 
need to necessarily reaffirm the historically specific interpretation of the household. 
The ‘household’ and the ‘home’ could be the basic relation of the singular plural 
(discussed below), uprooted from the ideologically prescribed, patriarchial and 
limited (false) contingency of the nation-state and citizenship. 
 Nancy’s ‘bodily ontology’169 puts into material presence the ‘eco’ of eco-
technics. Through the body’s physical, material, presence Nancy suggests that our 
being is known, ‘we’ know ‘I’, in the relation of the singular being with the plural. 
The world of bodies is a plurality of singular beings not because the plurality is a 
‘community’ or a ‘nation-state’ or a ‘citizenry’, but because a plurality of 
singularities—whatever we call them, however we aim to contain them—is 
experienced. Moreover, the experience of body, as bodies, is always exterior—we can 
never know from the inside of our body what ‘we’ are as a physical being—and for 
this reason then our singularity and singular experience is not enough.170 The singular 
plural is relevant to eco-technics because the eco-technical circulation of capital is 
founded on the basis that the world is a world of bodies, singular bodies in the plural. 
If we take as a starting point that bodies are the materiality of the world, then the 
bodies coming together form the concretisation of circulation: capital, economics, 
law. But the capital, economics and law are not what form the bodies or our being as 
foundationally singular plural. The foundation as singular plural being is always in 
                                                
168 As explained in the introduction, the term eco-technics links the eco, home, household (from (οικος,  meaning 
‘house’, and used in eco-nomic, eco-logy, but connects also the body, the biology), with technē (from τέχνη, 
meaning ‘craft’ or ‘art’), the technical structure that orders and ‘makes sense of’ the interruptive, incoherent and 
incommensurable (often ‘law’ refers to this technical practice, technique of order). 
169 James, The Fragmentary Demand, 150. 
170 Derrida discusses this aspect of Nancy’s understanding of body, corpus, in Jacques Derrida, On Touching—
Jean-Luc Nancy, trans., Christine Irizarry (Standford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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circulation; it is in constant motion determined in as much as it constantly exceeds 
determination. The incommensurability of our sociality is, for Nancy, what we have 
as the world: it is the sense of the world. Moreover, Nancy’s focus on what is 
happening in the sociality (singular plural) that is the basis of the relation as a naked 
element of our being in the world, involves attention to both the inscription, what is 
inscribed through text, language, within boundaries and the exscription, which is the 
term Nancy uses to refer to what is ‘written out of the text’.171  
Within this web of explanations for our being (singular plural) and our sense 
of sociality (as the groundwork of our world), law plays a key role. Firstly, law 
provides an example of both inscription and exscription. Rules, orders and structures 
are inscribed as laws, legislation, codes and judgements/judicial decisions. Equally, 
the processes that pursue justice, fairness, which involve interpretation and decision-
making, as well as the contingencies, traditions, prejudices and force of law are law’s 
exscription. Secondly, in its basic role or bare task, law traces the originary sociality. 
Thinking of law in this way brings us toward sense, in terms of the 
experiences happening in the world, rather than focusing critical perspectives of law 
on the destruction of existing law or construction of new law. In ecotechnics, the 
technics of our being, technology as well as our very bodily materiality, are taken into 
account as they ‘amass’ together as the material experience of being. Another one of 
Nancy’s many terms is struction, which he uses to name this ‘amassing’ or ‘heaping’ 
of sense that is not construction, not destruction, but struction.172  In other words to 
summarise these words and multiple terms, I draw on an ecotechnical approach in 
order to bridge the experience and materiality of labour markets with a theoretical 
exploration of what categories are relied upon to frame belonging and membership. 
This is furthermore linked by an overarching question of ontology: of how being is 
understood and related. The theory is built from Marks’ false contingency, used to 
demonstrate how, and consider why, discourses and categories cover up experiences 
and material, bodily, realities. Nancy’s understanding of law (via sociality and sense) 
serves as a basis to think about what is after false contingency. 
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Susan Marks, an international law and human rights scholar who writes from a 
Marxist tradition, discusses false contingency to comment on critical perspectives in 
international legal scholarship.173 The notion of false contingency has relevance 
beyond international law and poses a challenge to scholars who are critical of labour 
law and immigration. A critique of false contingency in IML challenges us to 
question not only how but also why economic choices are prioritised over social 
concerns. False contingency as connected to false necessity174 exposes the complicity 
of existing legal regulations to maintain a precarious, IML force. False contingency 
refers to what are thought of as the only contingencies—the only conditions of 
possibility. Their imagined singularity offers a false sense of resolution. False 
contingency refers to ideologically informed and historically specific determinations, 
which have been embedded into the framework of the dominant political-juridical-
economic system (liberal, democratic, Western). They are false because they are not 
reflective of the multiple possibilities and experiences within and beyond these 
frames. When these conditions of possibility are disentangled from assumptions that 
are otherwise unquestioned and therefore presumed to be inevitable, it becomes 
clearer how operative categories and identities are contingent on a particular historical 
perspective that excludes other possibilities of thinking otherwise.  
 The political-juridical-ecotechnical approach I use in this thesis opens to an 
analysis of the systems of power (political, juridical) and the circulation (eco-
technical) of bodies working and moving in the global market economic system. The 
economic market system has assumed a totalising presence in a global-international 
system and is enabled through every day practices of social and economic relations. 
Labour market pressures seem to contradict legal regulatory regimes, however both 
are rooted in the regime of bio-political governance and control.  
The critique of the label IML through my methodological approach does not 
explain the experience of individuals. Neither does it provide an explanation for how 
to move forward in a normative assertion of an alternative. Instead, I question how to 
think deeper about the intersectionalities and interweaving systems of categorisation 
that are reaffirmed even in legal attempts to remedy the situation of persons 
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considered to be migrants and relegated to precarious, exploitative labour situations. 
Writing does not construct a new programme or framework of thinking that could 
ever explain the depth and diversity of such experiences. Instead, an approach through 
ecotechnics is ongoing and affirmative—it is about bringing together and taking 
account of the practices and experiences that are forming our world.175 Nancy’s work 
as well as Marks’s attention to false contingency contributes an approach to migration 
and labour akin to what Costas Douzinas identifies as ‘critique from the point of view 
of radical change.’176 ‘Radical’ change is radical because it involves resistance to 
repetition of the same identifications and false contingencies (intersectionality and 
gender studies included). The basic happening and relations within the coming 
together of sociality, as a process of becoming, is considered the starting point for 
interrogating the phenomenon of IML. This is important in order to suggest a 
different way to think of labour, migration and the law that would be more relevant to 
the experiences of workers and persons coming together, forming the ecology and the 
technical production and reproduction, in a common social and economic space 
(already happening and continuing). My approach is not intended to re-write 
legislation, reform legal practice, or to re-frame community for the purpose of 
creating a space for IML. Nor is my approach akin to critiques of the undeniably 
gendered and racialised experiences of exclusion, and inclusion-as-exclusion, 
experienced by persons who are identified as migrant labourers in irregular situations. 
More fundamentally, pre-legislation, I question law’s role and the meaning of legal or 
quasi-legal categories that affirm and reaffirm a politics of belonging versus sub-
citizenship. I do this through attention to ecotechnics, which allows a theoretical lens 
to situate the methodological approach within a concern with how people are already 
physically present and active as a part of the labour market. Questioning law in this 
way, revealing the distinctions between areas of law as false, could lead to a 
rethinking of legal fields by changing the frame as a necessary starting point for re-
thinking and for change. IML highlights an imperative to think of labour migration 
and the so-called global market economic system as an intersecting phenomenon, one 
that begs a holistic legal and theoretical approach. 
                                                
175 In critical theory, others have written about an ‘affirmative ethics’ in ways that resonate with my interpretation 
and discussion of Nancy’s work. For instance, Rosi Braidotti, The PostHuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). I 
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As a way to think of an ecotechnical approach, I mentioned above the term 
struction. Struction, according to Nancy, means ‘to amass, to heap’, that which is 
beyond construction and destruction. Nancy uses this word to imply what it is that 
happens, that is, without a unitary principle of coordination.177 Struction is a state of 
being that de-familiarises the systems of being that traditionally, normatively 
inscribed value. Nancy brings attention to struction as a process that is contiguous and 
contingent sharing, which opens onto a present but is never accomplished as 
presence.178 Struction as a term helps to give form to a thinking of ecotechnics, where 
struction is affirmative in that it refers to something material and concrete against the 
mythologies and fictions of predetermined categories. Along a similar vein, Rosi 
Braidotti writes of ‘ethics of affirmation’ as an ‘eco-philosophy of multiple 
belongings for subjects constituted in and by multiplicity.’ 179  While the terminology 
and entry into discussing ethics is different from my approach here, Braidotti writes 
towards an ethical relation that looks at joint projects and activities to affirm a 
positive becoming.180 Her approach to critical theory is about affirming a non-
essential vitalism concerning multiple ecologies of belonging. Braidotti’s approach, 
while using different terminology parallels Nancy’s struction, which similarly 
concerns that which is experienced together, in an affirmative (another word for 
‘productive’ without the connotations of market productivity and quantification) 
ecology of experience and happenings. However, I remain focused on the words and 
terms Nancy uses and do not engage with the perspective of ethics. In an ecotechnical 
approach, therefore, being is not in itself a self-fulfilling entity, but part of ecologies 
of belonging and becoming. Being is instead about ‘contiguity, contact, tension, 
distortion, crossing and assemblage.’181 For Nancy, being is paradoxically within 
itself as a singular being and opposed to the unity and singularity of being that denies 
the interdependence with a plurality of other beings.182 Rosi Braidotti refers to the 
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being here as a subject that is ‘post-anthropocentric’, a subject that is relational, and 
non-unitary but also distanced from assumptions of universal value.183 Nevertheless, 
Nancy’s ecotechnics brings this similar gesture and approach into a fundamental 
ontological questioning that engages with the philosophical, and critical legal, canon 
that guides modern Western philosophical thought and understanding of the legal 
subject. Moreover, ecotechnics and struction directly relate to thinking of the 
materiality of fundamental questioning, and the excavation, in Susan Marks’ terms, of 
false contingency.  
The politics of ecotechnics are different from politics understood as 
‘management of production, exchange and growth.’184 Politics, when thought of via 
Nancy’s numerous terms de-familiarises the normative vision of self and others. The 
defamiliarisation at play works to shatter ‘the flat repetition of the protocols of 
institutional reason’, 185  where the ‘institutional reason’ is what conditions and 
constructs precarious work into categories of immigration, relegating individuals into 
an ambiguous category of IML in order to support a neoliberal market economic 
model. According to this model, capitalism—capital accumulation and economic 
growth—is proliferated through its power to define value. Value is understood as 
proliferating infinity of ends. Accordingly, the end to be reached is an endless 
increase imagined through un-inhibited market growth. Economic growth of this kind 
is total, and the economic market model espouses capital as the ultimate and only way 
to participate in the economy. Nancy’s work, alternatively, identifies the ‘heaping’ of 
politics as much more incoherent and inconsistent. The circulation of happenings, of 
bodies interacting, relating and labouring is more akin to, what Nancy calls, a politics 
as of the (k)not.186  This is a politics of the tying, rather than setting, or conforming to, 
pre-determining categories. This is a politics of sense, of being singular plural, where 
the imperative of the limit, that is law, and the decision, are constantly in process and 
motion.  
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184 Marie-Eve Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 104. 
185 Braidotti, PostHuman, 169. For Braidotti, de-familiarisation is towards a post-human frame of reference 
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Within such a politics, economics is never static. Rather the tying of the (k)not 
constantly questions what eco-nomics itself is: what is home and the household, and 
how it is enacted, and how or what does regulation of home mean.  Importantly, by 
drawing on Nancy’s notion of ecotechnics (including struction and politics of the 
(k)not), this is not to counteract or deny the market economic processes referred to 
above as neoliberalisation. The eco-technics of the world is not non-economic. 
Instead this politics of the (k)not suggests moving away from pre-determined 
economies, and as such may facilitate a deeper understanding of the market and 
neoliberalisation itself.  
It must be emphasised that false contingency is imperative to this analysis 
because it is the link between identifying legal grey areas and gaps in existing legal 
formulas in immigration and labour, and thinking differently through Nancy’s 
theoretical propositions. Ecotechnics (and struction) remind the critical analyses of 
immigration and labour of the very practices and happenings that are presently 
determining difference in law, legal categories, and subjectivities.  
 
Political-­‐Juridical-­‐Ecotechnical	  Approach	  
The political-juridical-ecotechnical methodological approach of this thesis is 
firstly political, both in terms of questioning dominant political discourses and 
opening onto a politics of the (k)not. Public policy discourses have created an 
ambiguously defined category of IML. The political and popular salience of this label, 
particularly in sensationalised reactions to migrants threatening British jobs, 
illuminates how citizenship refers to belonging in a community of value and not to a 
formal legal category. Notwithstanding, rights are granted under European Union 
(EU) Directives on the freedom of movement for labour and give equal status to 
Union citizens as to British nationals. 187  Nonetheless, the community of value 
arbitrates along a privileged community, which cannot be understood solely through 
legally defined statuses. Persons may be legally entitled to live and work in a 
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territory. They may be formal ‘citizens’, but are still treated as sub-citizens or Failed 
Citizens and are considered to be ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’. Their irregular situation is 
permitted and the cheap, flexible labour they provide is demanded by businesses 
according to political priorities of economic growth and subsequently weak labour 
regulation.  
Thinking politics as a politics of the (k)not shifts the discussion of IML away 
from conventional discussions of citizenship and immigration as concerning the status 
of foreigners. Politics, according to Nancy, is a gesture that is the (k)not in process—
always still to be tied. He suggests a politics without sovereignty.188 This politics 
immediately shifts thought away from false contingency of the 
citizen/subject/community/sovereignty paradigm. The withdrawal from the paradigm, 
that underpins dominant frameworks of the nation-state, economic participation and 
law, neither denies the force of this thinking nor denies the need for technical 
engagement and critique. But in order to bring into relief the structures that make it 
seem impossible to move away from particular frames of thought that predetermine 
conditions of possibility politics of the (k)not aims to open onto the happening of 
relations and the technē before and beyond the 
citizen/subject/community/sovereignty. This ‘politics’ is a political spacing according 
to who and what informs the particular tying, in an indeterminate sociality. Nancy’s 
politics of the (k)not challenges us to think of the movement, the tying and untying, 
that takes place within these political discourses and categories. The ‘tying’ is the 
imperative to speak, to inscribe persons and their entitlement to rights. The ‘untying’ 
is the multiplicity of contestations that constantly interrupt the inscribed by the 
exscription, that together (as the words and terms above) are the incommensurability 
of the originary sociality.189  
To further explain the relevance of Nancy’s work in dis-entangling IML it is 
important to note the trajectory of Nancy’s thinking on the political. Nancy, together 
with Lacoue-Labarthe, suggested a distance from political philosophy and a retreat 
from the political.190 In 1982, they established the Centre for Philosophical Research 
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189 Nancy, Sense of the World, 103. 
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of the Political (Centre de recherché philosophiques sur le politique). This centre was 
intended for ‘the philosophical questioning of the political’ and ‘the questioning of 
the philosophical about the political.’191 The aim was to question the notion of a 
philosophico-political paradigm itself, without being tied to a single philosophical 
and/or political figure. According to Illan Rua Wall, ‘[t]hey claimed that it was im-
portant to take such an approach, because the political had withdrawn from politics—
it had retreated. Thus, traditional political theory and political science were incapable 
of thinking the political because they simply took politics as their object.’192 Nancy’s 
starting point with the term political is therefore a politics that is detaching from 
itself.193 This detaching is similar to the work of Susan Marks’s false contingency, 
which questions why certain ideas have come to be privileged over other possibilities 
and modes of thinking of the individual being, the subject and coming together in 
common or community. For instance, Nancy’s most recent engagement with ‘politics’ 
asserts democracy as ‘the figure of a politics without foundation, without Cause, ... 
.’194 And this comes back to the term I use: ecotechnics. The eco-technics, according 
to Nancy, have come to dominate what is now ‘politics’ in the world. The politics, 
evident through IML, is now in many ways synonymous with economic concerns, 
recognised through the market economic system.	   Ecotechnics as a word aims to 
describe the technique that forms, and performs, the logic of a world.195 
An approach to IML that is political, juridical and eco-technical brings 
attention to what is in circulation, what is happening in labour markets beyond or 
between political discourses and legal categories/juridical processes. This happening, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, is what neoliberalisation, as the process 
mechanism of the market economic system, capitalises on. Nancy’s sense of politics, 
thought through, illuminates the technique of economic circulation, of capital and the 
global economic system as part of the sense, the politics of the (k)not, that is the 
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world,  not as a quest to make sense, ‘but as an infinite tying up of sense from the one 
to the one, or as a tying up of this infinity that sense is—abandoning consequently all 
self-sufficiency of subject or city, allowing neither subject nor city to appropriate a 
sovereignty and a community that can only be those of this infinite tying.’196 This is 
relevant to understanding IML because as a consequence of global economic market 
pressures on labour markets, IML is both a technical awareness of subjugated, 
precarious labourers and an admission of their not-illegal status—in other words—
their suspended irregularity. The ambiguous legal position reveals the insubstantiality 
of the regular citizen standard employee, as well as the forms of control and allocation 
of value that operate above and beyond legal categories and political discourses.  
The second part of this methodological approach looks at juridical categories 
inscribed into statutory regulatory provisions for migration and labour at national, 
European Union and international levels as well as the practical interpretation of these 
categories in UK case law. These juridical frameworks are imbued with false 
contingencies that are manifest in countervailing agendas of rights, protection, 
freedom and access to economic markets. The difficulty for legal definitions to 
regulate migration and labour across national boundaries and the legally-enabled 
processes of neoliberal economic markets, notwithstanding the fact that law-makers 
and legal theorists think within a nation-state centric ‘globalised’ economic system, 
create legal grey areas where persons are made to be ‘irregular’. Yet, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, IML is neither fully legal nor strictly illegal. Persons in these 
grey areas are subjected to the law, in that they are included within the ambit of law 
by their activity, and importance, in the labour market. However, they are denied 
recognition as ‘full’ legal subjects, both through popularly reinforced notions that 
they are ‘migrant’ and foreign/non-citizens, and because their labour market position 
relegates them to spaces and conditions that are in the margins of statutory protection. 
The legal grey areas occupied by persons considered IML suggest that to search for a 
legal remedy for the phenomenon of IML is to face a legal impasse. However, 
Nancy’s understanding of law frames this impasse as an impasse only if the frame 
ignores what is beyond the limited conditions of possibility inscribed in legislative 
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instruments. In other words, the impasse exists if the only legal possibility is based 
from within the false contingencies of labour and immigration law.  
The experiences of persons considered to be IML are exscribed from the text 
of the law. Experiences that do not fit into existing categories are written out of the 
legal instruments that address immigration and labour. Meanwhile, individuals in 
precarious and racialised/ethnicised labour sectors are inscribed as IML. This 
inscription means that persons identified as IML are presumed to be outside of the 
‘regular’ national jurisdiction. This does not mean that recognition is denied, but this 
recognition is presumed to come from belonging to a proto-political community and 
not the community of the nation-state. The inscription as ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’ 
exscribes experiences of people whose labour provides a ‘regular’ labour force, albeit 
precarious. IML exscribes the heterogeneity of the people living and working in the 
margins of recognized citizenship and labour as well as the fact that ‘regular’ 
(common) labour practices rely on precarious workers. Jean-Luc Nancy’s work when 
brought into critiques of law brings to light law’s incommensurability, where law is 
the trace of the limit of an originary sociality. Thinking of law in this way, as the 
tracing of the limit of this coming together, or in other words of providing a frame 
each time for the sociality, shifts how we think about law—law is not something in 
and of itself. Law understood as this tracing or framing therefore does not precede the 
sociality, however neither does it shape nor respond to a different originary sociality 
each time. Rather law, as incommensurability, is between inscribing the limit of 
sociality each time and adapting the tracing to the shifts to the frame that an originary 
sociality may cause. Moreover, based on the dominance of determinate categories and 
their pursuit, law is always (not inevitably) being prescribed and predetermined by 
those who enjoy recognition, and therefore authority, within the community of value 
(the Good Citizens, full legal subjects, privileged in the modern Western 
philosophical paradigm).  When we think of law in this way, we no longer look solely 
to how we might improve legal categories. Law is not something to be applied, used 
and instrumentalised, nor is it something that contains its own power within itself. 
Law, instead, is a tracing movement of the singular plural beings that are relating and 
forming a limit. But within the current circulation of beings, capital production and 
economic market systems this limit operates within a specific ideological paradigm 
that names privileged legal subjects while obscuring the participation of others. Yet 
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‘law’ as a constituting limit and the force of this limit is not limited to these particular 
vocabularies and ideology. In fact, as will be discussed in chapters three and four, the 
indeterminacy of some judicial decisions with regards to ‘irregular’ migration and 
labour/employment, demonstrates that law, by what it ultimately permits, traces the 
eco-technics more so than it firmly re-enforces rigid frameworks of existing legal 
categories or is consistent in offering the protection mandated by legislation.  
Law plays a broad role to constitute and legitimate communities, communities 
that have in the modern era been identified through the framework of the nation and 
nation-state.197 The nation-state has been understood to, in turn, prescribe the law.198 
This serves as a foundation for the modern legal system and modern theories of law. 
Contrarily, not unlike other theorists of law, Nancy speaks of law from within a 
‘radiant paradox’199 where law guarantees the exception—what is beyond it—as a 
condition of its possibility. The law constitutes and legitimates nations, and the 
nation-state enables legal systems to order and regulate populations, through 
legislation and the UK common law jurisprudence. The law is concurrently connected 
to notions of justice, which reveals incommensurability between a juridico-ethical 
pursuit and the order of law as a regulatory regime. Law, in its paradox, is open to the 
possibility of what is beyond the confines of the nation-state border and that particular 
historically specific ideology: again, while it defines a limit, the law is not some thing 
unto itself.200   
Importantly, any examination of how Nancy uses the term, law, must 
acknowledge the issue of translation. The translation of Nancy’s use of ‘law’ is both 
linguistic and jurisdictional: English common law and French civil law. According to 
Gilbert Leung, ‘Nancy often uses the term loi or law in this typically civil law sense 
of positive and institutionally recognised legislation.’201 Nancy uses the term droit ‘to 
refer to what common law lawyers understand as ‘law’ rather than right.’ As well, 
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Nancy uses the term ‘law’ outside the juridical context to refer to an ontological 
context, where ‘“law” involves an obligation, order or imperative voice that is 1) 
obeyed and/or disobeyed, 2) respected and/or transgressed, 3) the tracing or providing 
of limits.’202 The ontological elements of law can also, according to Leung, apply to 
juridical law. The key difference, however, is that juridical law is imposed onto a 
subject, while the existential law is: it imposes itself upon itself. Juridical law is the 
law of order and management. Here, legislators write the law and legal subjects are 
under the authority of the law. Subjects are recognised according to law’s prescribed 
definitions. Existential law is the law that is in the occasion of persons together with 
each other that imposes a limit by being a sociality of beings. Law traces the limit 
constituted by a particular plurality of beings in-common. It is a ‘particular’ plurality 
of beings because this coming together and constituting or re-constituting law is 
unique each time. Nevertheless, the coming together with one another is a formation 
of community. Because the plurality, as an originary sociality, is particular, 
community cannot be something that is predefined—it depends on the unique 
experience and configuration of persons being together (common).  
According to Nancy, law inscribes community in spite of its excess. The 
constitution of a sociality through law makes a common, a community, and is 
reaffirmed by law and through law. This merges juridical and existential law in the 
happening of law. It is impossible, ultimately, to keep the identified juridical and 
existential aspects of law distinct from one another—juridical law and existential law 
are distinct but they also co-appear203 in the inscription of community (juridical law), 
which is challenged beyond itself by what is part of the common before it is inscribed 
(the reason for existential law imposing itself). What is exterior or external to 
definitions and categories nevertheless informs and makes law, but further, to say law 
‘itself’ is to make it go out of ‘itself’ because law cannot be contained ‘in’ a ‘self’.204  
Nancy’s resistance to signification challenges us to think not of a separation of laws, 
but instead to think of juridical and existential law as co-existing and happening, 
within the ecotechnics, circulation, of the world.   
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This particular perspective on law—juridical and existential law—is a 
theoretical study of law’s presence and role. The practical experience of relating to 
juridical law imposing legal subjectivity, however, is not irrelevant to this discussion. 
There are experiences that are enforced as an acceptable part of law and those that are 
condemned. Still others are exscribed and exterior to law’s articulation. Nancy’s work 
draws attention to the creation and constitution of the imperative for law where 
exscription makes possible the ex-istence, and the inscription, of law as a limit.205 
Law is a tracing of the movement generated through the coming together that happens 
in the originary sociality, and thus it cannot be reduced to solely a fixed entity 
arbitrating order and justice, or what is legal versus illegal. 
The paradox of law (law’s incommensurability) suggests that although 
juridical law is guided by categories that provide order and definition, these categories 
can only offer a limited order due to an ever-shifting existential law and vice versa. 
This paradox practically causes the ambiguous legal grey areas where persons are 
considered IML. Existential law mandates that there be a law recognising those living 
and working in a given territory. The limited frames of recognition instrumentalised 
by juridical law and bound by citizenship, however, prevent openness to all bodies 
living and working in a given territory. The way that this tension of juridical and 
existential law is played out is not prescribed, but is seized by neoliberalisation and 
economic market values. Law is instrumentalised in the nation-state system and 
market economy, but this structure is not inherent to law itself. Rather it is a condition 
of law’s authors. Law itself, juridical and existential, is no-thing until it is given value 
and meaning by those who speak it and are subjected to it.  
The practical experiences of migration and labour demonstrate an exposure to 
incommensurability. The necessity, inevitability and impossibility of being signified 
are evident in the ambiguous legal treatment of persons at the intersection of labour 
and migration. In other words, we cannot escape the fact that there will be categories, 
definitions and order imposed onto experience. Likewise, we cannot escape that this 
will always fall short of what is experienced. Both indicate that we cannot escape law: 
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we are ‘abandoned to law.’206 Abandonment in law is not a withdrawal of being to a 
totality that is claimed by a universal or over-arching law. Abandonment to law does 
not affirm an absolute force of law. Rather, abandonment refers to the loss of control 
over sense. We cannot ‘know’ abandonment—where knowing would involve 
conceptual grasping, or at the very least a making present of something. Being 
abandoned to law is to be abandoned to the exscription, where law is open to its 
incommensurability. Nancy refers to this opening to violation as freedom. We are 
abandoned to law as/because the exscription of law opens to freedom, freedom being 
the lack of determination, the naked happening of being. The only address that law, 
and our abandonment to law, can make is to this freedom.207 Freedom is without 
contingency, not an alternative space or other experience. Freedom is the experience, 
sensed, that jolts what has been inscribed. With regard to the IML, freedom is the 
question of the ‘irregular’ that is in fact a regular presence in the labour market. 
Furthermore, the question asks how the presence of IML, who are not necessarily 
‘migrant’ and not ‘irregular’, challenge (interrupt) legal categories and notions of 
citizenship and the nation-state.  
An interrogation of the factors at play in IML through an ecotechnical 
approach encompassing Nancy’s thought provokes an altered thinking of law. As 
emphasized in the previous chapter, my aim is not to make existing legislation or 
legal practices more just or open. It is the form itself that I question. If our critique 
demands that law be something ‘better’—when ‘it’ itself is (falsely) constituted as a 
thing and a totality—then the happening of beings relating in the world, where the law 
is shaped by and shapes events and economic interrelationships, is obscured. Nancy’s 
perspective on being and the world is informed by fundamental ontological 
questioning that offers a way to see law as vitally connected to the happening of a 
sociality. Sociality refers to the social happening, where beings participate together in 
shared economies of production, reproduction and exchange. This includes law as a 
part of its constitution, but law does not, and cannot, define the totality of sociality.  
This incommensurability is the starting point for Nancy. The singular-
plurality, and the coming together that this involves, affirms incommensurability as 
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the only grounding for existence—which, as incommensurable, is not a ground.208 
Consequently, as argued above, the law is no-thing. It is infused with signification 
and meaning from what is inscribed as law, but also what is exscribed from this 
signification. Law takes place, it happens, as an imperative. 209  Through this 
imperative, law enables a sharing which is ‘always incomplete, or it is beyond 
completion and incompletion.’210 This sharing is not cohesive or coherent, but it is 
sharing because it is a consequence of our being together in the singular plural. This 
‘sharing’ (sharing of the incommensurable) is where the law addresses itself to an 
opening. This opening is an incomplete sharing which opens to freedom, to that which 
is beyond inscription. But law is not founded by freedom. 211  Law acts as a 
commandment that is what binds subjects, bringing order against freedom. But law is 
never able to fully satisfy the binding because neither law, nor the subjects, are an end 
unto themselves. The commandment can always be violated212 because there is more 
than the framed being as a subject under law’s authority.  
Jacques Derrida, in “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ ” 
describes law as the ‘element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice 
is incalculable.’213 He contends that law necessarily exists in tension with justice, 
which is ‘an experience of the impossible’.214 The law carries the potential to respond 
to a call for justice, while at the same time law as the limit, the ‘force of law’, can 
never do justice to justice. Derrida too is writing of the incommensurability of law 
with justice. Arguably, Derrida and Nancy share an approach to law and justice, 
where justice involves a search for a way to speak that would ‘do justice to what is or 
what occurs. 215  In Derrida’s words, ‘deconstruction is justice’ 216; justice is an 
experience of aporia.217 While in Nancy’s work, ‘justice can only reside in the 
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renewed decision to challenge the validity of an established or prevailing just measure 
in the name of the incommensurable’.218 Justice in the name of the incommensurable 
is thus the inability to secure a ground, a firm basis from which the subject can be 
fixed. 219  Here, thinking of justice is not about seeking a concept or word to 
encompass ‘justice’ or to situate it between concepts. Rather, justice is the same 
aforementioned abandonment, where we are abandoned to groundlessness—the 
freedom from strict determinacy.220 Truly, it could be argued that there is little 
difference between Derrida’s ‘deconstruction is justice’ and Nancy’s justice in the 
incommensurable and our abandonment to this incommensurability.  
Where Nancy’s theory and writing differs from Derrida is in his extension and 
development of the body and the materiality of bodies as the sense of the world. 
Nancy insists on the question of Being as a fundamental question because of the being 
of bodies always already happening in the world that philosophy speaks of and 
philosophises about. Eco-technics, sense and exscription are all developed by Nancy 
as a corpus of thought that I have taken as an invitation to think about the production 
and reproduction of labour migration. Nancy’s corpus, notably most thoroughly 
engaged by Derrida himself in the book On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy (2004), 
affects analyses of law and critical discussions of law because it is vitally concerned 
with the material experience of bodies on the ground. This is not a different pursuit 
from Derrida’s work (deconstruction, differance, aporia and the force of law), and yet 
it differs in its sensuality and its insistence on the core of the body and bodies as the 
being singular plural that is the sense of the world. Where in this thesis I explore how 
IML serves not the dominant language and categories of the UK or European law and 
legal systems but the language of neoliberalisation and the circulation of capital, 
ecotechnics brings attention to how the presence and labour of bodies on the ground 
circulates. Nancy’s work offers a theoretical space to speak of the legal grey areas 
where IML can be deconstructed.  
Nancy’s engagement with community and the world, sense and the being 
singular plural is concerned with the conversation, the text and the limit, that is the 
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confrontation between the regular and the irregular. This concern re-aligns, or rather 
disorients, contingencies and the very paradigm of law in the nation-state by the 
question of foundational ontology and contingency. In spite of Nancy’s language of 
abandonment, justice is not abstract. It is the co-originary material sense. This will be 
discussed in chapter five as a bodily ontology, which highlights being as presence, 
and this being present as a form of justice.221 The clarity that Nancy’s work strives for 
is the justice of bodies, in the singular plural. Conversely, injustice is ‘the mixing and 
stifling [broyer] of bodies, making them indistinct’222, which is what happens in the 
homogenising label of IML. A juridical approach within the political-juridical-
ecotechnical methodological approach considers both the legal juridical frameworks 
that frame the homogenous label of IML and the underlying notion of law as 
connected to justice that demands attention to the happening and experience of 
persons considered to be IML. 
Thirdly in my methodological approach, I draw on Nancy’s eco-technics to 
bring to the fore the presence of bodies-at-work, in spite of and because of categories 
that inscribe beings as regular/irregular, citizen/noncitizen, marketised/nonmarketised. 
As Nancy writes, the experience of the world, being together and sense is forever 
exscribed—written out of the text—of that which is inscribed, as law.223 Yet the 
inscription is as much a part of what is happening as the exscription. Together the 
inscription/exscription form the eco-technics of our world. Eco-technics includes the 
circulation of capital that is furthered by processes of neoliberalisation, yet the 
circulation of capital cannot happen without the circulation of sense. Eco-technics 
opens onto fragments that reveal the exscribed that underlay what the technical 
(apparent) structures overtly obscure.224	  Thus ecotechnics refers to the materiality, the 
circulation, of our activity as beings: beings that are singular plural. This includes 
both the techniques of circulation and the ecology of being. I interpret an ecotechnical 
approach as one that recognises that a plurality forms economic exchanges, labour 
markets and their contestations. This plurality is simultaneously predetermined within 
existing governance and regulatory regimes (e.g. the market economic system and 
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circulation of capital) yet open to the circulation of bodies before and beyond regimes 
of order.  
The technique of economic activity has been made intelligible via a market 
economic system. However, processes of neoliberalisation are constantly in 
movement responding to, and engulfing bodies-at-work as labourers: 
casual/temporary/employees, within shifting labour market demands. These labour 
relationships transcend categories that order identities through the nation-state. An 
ecotechnical approach opens onto processes of neoliberalisation where the critiques of 
political and juridical approaches are unable to capture movement beyond, or in 
excess of categories and frameworks. Neoliberalisation moves beyond the inscribed 
labour market that operates within a nation-state. Within this system, workers are 
maintained as vital and as irregular. They are vital because they are irregular, and 
irregular because they are vital to a purportedly free market globalised, economic 
system. Yet, this circulation of labour and capital is neither free nor geographically 
global.  
On the one hand, the ecology of labour markets and economic exchanges is 
the happening of capital and social reproduction that occurs when persons come 
together. On the other hand, labour markets and economic exchanges are identified 
only through already limited economic experiences and subjectivities. Meanwhile 
these experiences purport to be ‘global’ and ‘equal’, in other words, proto-political. 
The ecotechnical approach suggests that the originary sociality of singular plural 
beings forms economies of sociability, as well as a need for a limit and an order. This 
is the paradox of law: a need for law clashes with the ecology of sociality, which is 
only known through, and because of, the technique of economics. Thus, Nancy’s 
ontological being singular plural, is made to make sense through the technē that is the 
bodies-at-work, which based on their originary sociality and co-appearance, create the 
need for categories and order. At the same time, this sociality and co-appearance goes 
beyond the categories and order that informs an elusive demographic of IML.  
 The living materiality of the ecotechnical responds to the injustice of having a 
vulnerable, exploited labour force relegated to legal grey areas, but also does not shy 
away from the very incommensurability of law as regulation and order that cannot 
include-without-excluding. Ecotechnics is not a programme or a prescription. Rather 
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it aims to refer to what is the world and the co-appearance of singular plural beings 
together within the world. The ecotechnics of the world refers thus to the technical 
material function of incommensurability. Here, nothing is external to the circulation 
of law and law as an instrument that traces limits of originary sociality: socialities that 
are interruptions of inscribed happenings, not limited to persons or human beings, but 
that take into account the experience of ecology and all beings. However, within law 
as we know it through the nation-state, and through operative identities that grant 
belonging via citizenship, justice for all beings is continuously exscribed. For some 
critical theorists working off Jacques Derrida’s ‘Force of Law’, justice is distinct from 
law as a consequence of the very indeterminacy of law.225 In Nancy’s work, this 
indeterminancy is the incommensurability of law. My discussion of migration and 
labour, and the persistent labelling of persons as IML who experience a plethora of 
diverse labour and migration restrictions and subsequent precarity, aims to 
demonstrate how the existence of the label of IML and the inscription and exscription 
that maintain legal categories as (false) contingency are a consequence of law’s 
incommensurability.  
However, crucially, this incommensurability is not predestined and 
predetermined to relegate persons to the shadows of the law due to their immigration 
status, labour sector and skills, gender, citizenship, race and so on. Rather, attention to 
the eco-technics of migration and labour brings to light that the practices of 
movement and employment (whether formal and legally recognised employment or 
not) happen within a circulation of bodies and capital and markets that may even 
themselves be part of the incommensurability of law. Law itself, as Nancy insists, is 
no-thing. Law removed from being a thing of signification and instead tracing the 
happening of persons in common, or in other words Nancy’s sense of the world, thus 
must be deeply analysed as part of a political-juridical-ecotechnical movement that is 
happening, in movement, in the world and not restricted to the categories and 
frameworks that thinking of a legal system or legislation maintains.226  
                                                
225 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Finding Normativity: Immigration Policy and Normative Formation’, in Hans Lindahl ed., A 
Right to Inclusion and Exclusion? Normative Thought Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
Oxford: Hart Publishers, (2009), 118-135. 
226 In thinking of law as no thing, and thus as the sense and not the signification, one could move this analysis into 
psychoanalytic thinking and in particular discussions of law and Lacan (see Maria Aristodemou, Law, 
Psychoanalysis, Society Oxon: Routledge, 2014). For the purpose of this thesis however, I remain solely engaged 
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Nancy’s work draws out elements of the juridical and existential law, and 
thereby offers ‘a way of thinking that attempts to address positively its own 
conditions: the social, political, linguistic, meta-physical and historical conditions of 
its own thought.’227 His attention to sense, as the ecotechnics of being singular plural, 
‘render[s] inoperative every appeal to an authentic original togetherness’ but starting 
from ‘everydayness’ instead of abstract thought.228 The sense of the world that Nancy 
makes central in his work is not an abstraction from the actual practices in the world. 
This is what I refer to as the happening, or what is on the ground. The sense of the 
world precisely refers to the ecotechnics—the ecology, circulation and interweaving 
of various interests, fields (private, public, social, singular) and the technical 
practices—of neoliberalisation, as well as to the violence, hatred, antagonism, 
resistance, subversion, revolt present in what we call politics, as this is all enacted on 
our very bodies. As above, for Nancy, the starting point of thinking is not the 
discourses or political-juridical systems themselves. The starting point is the originary 
sociality that is the very singularity of our bodies as bodies that continue to function, 
work, create, and reproduce. What Nancy’s work therefore offers us is to think of 
what is the world away from categories of determination, or what in Susan Marks’ 
words are the contingencies that are made to be the only condition of possibility.229 
The movement away from Marks’ false contingency and pervasive categories of 
determination is found, according to Nancy’s work, in the body and bodies. Bodies 
are co-originary with sense, because they are: they happen. This co-appearance of the 
physical body and the sense that is exscribed escapes signification. Furthermore, 
vitally, this exscription of sense is not ‘beyond’, but rather is tangible in how we, in 
practice, enact our sociality in relation to juridical law and existential law. The sense, 
in other words, is the practice, but it is the happening, the eco-technics, and not what 
is identified when we restrict our legal analyses to existing false contingencies.  
                                                                                                                                      
with the critical legal studies interest in deconstruction and law, with a focus on what Nancy’s work offers critical 
legal theory following from discussions of Derrida’s work in law.  
227 Todd May, "From Communal Difference to Communal Holism." In Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, 
Levinas and Deluze, 21-75 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1997), 31. 
228 Ignaas Devisch, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Question of Community (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 116.  
229 Nancy argues, ‘we must respond to the world as it is without recourse to transcendental discourses, including 
the still-theological discourses of modernity operating within the logic of Christianity and its messainism.’ Peter 
Gratton and Marie-Eve Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), 2. 
Chapter 2, A methodology of exscription: politics, law and ecotechnics  
 90 
To refer this discussion precisely to Nancy’s work, the divergent and 
incommensurable happening of life is the sense of the world. Sense—‘the sense of 
life, the sense of man, of the world, of history, the sense of existence ... And the sense 
which exists, or which produces existing without which there would be no sense’230—
and the weight of our physical body in the plurality of singular bodies, the weight of 
thought, the weight or materiality of thinking, make experience of the world. Sense, 
like the being singular plural, is not a word that marks a presence of substance. 
Instead sense is what exceeds signification, paradoxically present and withdrawn.231 
This paradoxical logic is not as one or the other, or oscillating between one and the 
other. They are simultaneous.232   
Related to the analysis and investigation of migration and labour, the exigency 
of migration and labour as a legal issue highlights a central question troubling existing 
legal frameworks: what to do with persons relegated to legal grey areas and the 
shadows of the law? The elusiveness of the persons encompassed under the label, 
IML illuminates the limitations of concepts and categories that, when unquestioned, 
seem universal, natural and necessary frames of reference.233 The categories fail to 
encompass the experiences of persons living and working in ‘irregular’ situations, and 
thus this blanket term, IML, has emerged and is commonly used to refer to 
amorphous and vastly heterogeneous populations. Nancy’s theories and discussions of 
sense and ecotechnics help us to probe the intersections at play in IML. The sense that 
is the happening of ecotechnics emerges after thinking through false contingency, and 
reveals incommensurability, but does not stop at this revelation. Far from a validation 
of the transcendent, the incommensurability that Nancy identifies is rooted in the 
singular plural—it is ontological. However, this ontology is not a defined, or clear, 
                                                
230 Nancy, A Finite Thinking, 3.  
231 James, The Fragmentary Demand, 64.  
232 Sense is not the Other, but precedes ‘itself’ and ‘other’: ‘there can be no signification of sense, because sense is 
the condition of possibility of signification.’ Christopher Watkin, "Being Just? Ontology and Incommensurability 
in Nancy's Notion of Justice," in Jean-Luc Nancy: Justice, Legality, World, Benjamin Hutchens eds., (London: 
Continuum, 2012), 21. Sense is what escapes signification, but still is part of experience and part of what is the 
world. Sense is the structure of the world, but hollows out therein, such that sense is the significance of the world 
itself. Nancy, Sense of the World, 55. In other words, ‘sense will defer itself and will differ always from all that 
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of the World, 58.  
233 My engagement with the topic of irregular migrant labour is not to reproduce the findings of empirical studies 
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equation in contrast to conventional identifications and subsequent understandings of 
our being. Such conventional approaches identify subjects/citizens using a linear logic 
(represented through an equation): if ‘a’ plus ‘b’, then ‘c’ (a + b = c): if we are 
human-beings + living in a nation-state = we are citizens with rights and protections. 
Nancy’s singular plural confounds linear logic and rests upon the complexity of 
material being in the world, as the messiness of bodies inscribed and exscribed in 
various legal subjectivities that both include and exclude particular movement and 
labour. 
Labour migration is a particularly important entry point to engage in thinking 
of false contingency in legal categories and the happening, the ecotechnics, of sense. 
Labour and migration are examples of the concretion234 of the sense of the world. 
Work and movement are concrete instances, experiences, that instantiate the 
technologies, technics, of people coming together. Sense brings the concretisation of 
the world.235  In other words, the sense is people moving and working even if their 
status is irregular or undetermined along fixed, understood, legal categories of 
immigration and employment. Moreover, the fluidity of contemporary practices of 
labour and migration enable, concretely, the neoliberal market economic system to 
flourish due to the availability of de-regulated labour and employment arrangements 
that are themselves in the shadow of the law. Thus, the ecotechnics that is how 
persons live and work together makes concrete the modern ‘globalised’ market 
economic system and the current framework of the labour market. The labourers who 
work in precarious employment are the materiality, inscribed as irregular meanwhile 
their diversity and presence is exscribed, of eco-technics. This materiality is ‘the 
affect-medium in which objects endure (appear and fade away).’236 Materiality, like a 
body, is not an instance or a set definition, but resists itself as a singular expression 
because it is a happening of being in a form and presence. Thus the materiality of 
physical labourers who are able and ready to work in low-waged, low-skilled, bottom 
end labour, and supply the demand for cheap, precarious flexible workers in the UK 
                                                
234 Nancy, Sense of the World, 10. 
235 Nancy, Sense of the World, 14. 
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not only allows the labour market and economic system to continue, but depends on 
the legal framework to omit and obscure the regulation of exploited workers.  
To return again to Nancy’s own theoretical exploration of these concepts, the 
material bodies-at-work, which are the building blocks of the politics of the (k)not237, 
can be thought of as technē. Technē is a philosophical term that refers to the ‘craft’ of 
what moves towards experience ‘while simultaneously staying at arm’s length 
(experience is kept at a distance by calculation or the production of ‘good form’).238 
Technē is akin to technique, and the technique of the present, according to Nancy, is a 
‘calculated operation’, a ‘procedure’ whereby what is produced is not ‘with a view to 
another thing or a use, but with a view to its very production, that is, its exposition.’239 
The eco-technical aspect of the political-juridical-ecotechnical approach to labour 
migration therefore brings attention to this exposition and law as tracing this 
exposition (again, in my words, the happening) rather than law as fixing ‘use’ and 
‘productivity’ of present experiences. I will return to this in the final chapter where I 
consider care and care work through a bodily ontology. 
In drawing on Nancy’s notion of sense, we locate the sense of what is not the 
Other, but precedes ‘itself’ and ‘other’ as what is in the world.240 In other words, as 
discussed above with regard to labour migration and IML maintaining the labour 
market and economic system, sense is what escapes signification, but still is part of 
experience and part of what is the world.241 In Nancy’s words, ‘sense will defer itself 
and will differ always from all that you will seize, from all philosophy, and yet you 
will have had a sense of it, and philosophy will have the sense precisely of this.’242 In 
order to understand eco-technics, it is important to note that sense is a material 
                                                
237 Nancy, Sense of the World, 103. 
238 Mules, "Creativity, singularity and techné", 23. 
239 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Technique of the Present’ in On Kawara: Paintings of 40Years Texts by Shiuji Inomata, 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Osho, Producer by David Zwirner (New York/London, 2004). 
240  Accordingly, ‘there can be no signification of sense, because sense is the condition of possibility of 
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experience, the materiality is the experience tied to the technē or technical processes 
which then is the concretisation, as discussed above, of the world.243 
Nancy’s theory is further imbued with his specific understanding of being 
together, in a common. Being is singular plural; the plurality forms a common, and a 
sociality, that is finite before it is signified. This is the starting point of Nancy’s 
ontological questioning. In order to be something, to be a plurality, the thing is 
signified. The common, coming together in the singular plural is an ‘inoperative 
community.’244 It is inoperative because it is not something. The common, before 
signification, has no category and there is no inscribed aspiration toward a collective 
goal or agenda. The community is ‘inoperative’ precisely because the pursuit of, or 
longing for, an authentic community is a historically specific product of Western-
modern thought, attributable to philosophers such as John Locke and the Social 
Contract, or Immanuel Kant.245 Before signification, the common is inoperative. To 
bring this to the analysis in this thesis, legal categories and labels are fixed by pre-
determined (false) contingencies where individuals are signified as limited subjects 
despite experiences that exceed the determined frameworks. In order to think away 
from the categories and frames of recognition that guide Western thinking and 
modern law246, Nancy re-visits the term ‘community’ to refer to the sociality of 
singular beings coming together in a plurality with others that is the ‘common’.  
In The Inoperative Community, Nancy objects to conventional uses of the term 
community, where ‘community’ is used to describe a collective of individuals that 
can, and should, be formed.247 This constructive approach to community is one where 
people are made to fit and conform to a group. Such an approach is, for Nancy, the 
root of totalitarianism. It is also what underlies nationalism and citizenship, where 
people are made to fit, to conform to the community of value and are subjected to a 
                                                
243 Nancy, Sense of the World, 58. 
244 Nancy, The Inoperative Community. 
245 Nancy, Sense of the World, 109.  
246 Fitzpatrick; also for a discussion of the emergence of these categories in ‘modern philosophy’ as claiming a 
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self-affirming, overarching totality. This totality identifies its members according to 
an overarching governance programme that envisions a particular form of individuals 
in-common. Such an enforced collective can, in the extreme, result in the kind of 
uniformity and repression of difference seen totalitarian regimes. In ostensibly more 
benign or democratic contexts the idea of identifying members into a collective 
similarly enacts violence through enforcing power hierarchies and disparities. 
Identifying citizens against non-citizens can formally exclude and include persons in a 
community. Moreover, as discussed in chapter one, identifying a community or nation 
through so-called shared values reinforces powerful yet informal lines of membership 
in a community, based on repressing and marginalising those considered foreign or 
different.  In using the terms originary sociality and inoperative community, Nancy 
re-thinks what it means to ‘co’-exist in the world. Such a theoretical, and abstract re-
thinking ultimately entails a resistance to the governance power of predetermined 
programmes and categories because it enables thinking and giving credence to the 
materiality of the ‘co’. Configuring community as désoeuvrement, or inoperative is to 
think of the coming together of persons—inevitable because of the ontology as 
singular plural—as un-ravelling or in-operating pre-determined, programme-oriented 
categories and frameworks.  
Nancy’s re-thought community resists determination, and cannot be accounted 
for within common signification. 248  Community resists common definition not 
because of what it is before the definition prescribes meaning. Community, re-
thought, is a sense of being singular plural. It is imperative to see these terms that 
Nancy builds on and works with not as forming isolated, defined concepts, but as 
together articulating his particular pursuit of ontological questioning. For instance, 
since publishing The Inoperative Community, Nancy has largely substituted ‘being-
together’, ‘being-in-common’ and ‘being with’ for the term ‘community’, preferring 
the ‘with’ to the ‘co-’. Nevertheless, the sense of what he is getting at, what compels 
using these words remains largely the same.249 In “Confronted Community” Nancy 
uses the term, “unoccupied community”, but agrees that there is in community, in 
                                                
248 May, "From Communal Difference to Communal Holism,” 31. 
249  Thirteen years after writing Inoperative Community, Nancy’s 2001 (original publication) ‘Confronted 
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being-with-others, always something that is ‘occupied’.250 The question of what 
occupies our being in the singular plural continues to drive Nancy’s writing on the 
being-with. Nancy’s pursuit of the ‘with’ strives to ‘expose ourselves to what has 
gone unheard in community.’251 What is ‘unheard’ is the incommensurability of the 
‘sharing out of singularities,’ where community is nothing but this exposition: 
community is neither a bond nor a production of unity, but is the ‘condition of our 
existence.’252  
Nancy’s ontological questioning, which is embedded in his notion of being 
singular plural, sense and ecotechnics, has the potential to alter the terrain of the 
concepts that guide our political, juridical and economic life: citizen, subject, 
sovereignty and community. These terms dominate political and philosophical 
thinking. The citizen and subject are ‘two ways of organising community and 
claiming sovereignty.’253 In practice it has become difficult to differentiate the citizen 
from the subject under the totalising claim of the global, proto-political community 
discussed in the previous chapter. The citizen is a subject-member of a nation-state, 
while the subject is subjected to/recognised by an authority, or a legal order. With and 
without citizenship status, one remains a legal subject, but as with citizenship this 
subjectivity differs—one may be subjected to the law as a lesser subject, a sub-citizen 
or subject only to legal limits and force without enjoying any of the benefits of the 
legal order. The proto-political order is an imagined foil to the nation-state, and 
permits the nation-state to structure exclusive legal recognition and interpretations of 
law while being constituted by purportedly inclusive labour markets, that subject 
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everyone to its frame via claims of a global economic order. Through Nancy’s work 
we revisit the citizen and the subject at its core. ‘I’, the singular, is not completely 
defined by others. ‘I’ is not a citizen or a subject before being signified as one. 
Moreover, even as a citizen or a subject, ‘I’ maintain ‘my’ singularity—the sense of 
my singularity as well as the undeniable singularity of physical bodily form. A body 
can never be melded with an/other. This is physically, biologically, impossible and 
would cause death. I am at my limit in relation to other bodies, other singular beings, 
who themselves are always a singularity.254 ‘You’ touches ‘I’ and ‘I’ touches ‘you’, 
neither to become one or the other, nor to know one because of the other.255 This 
happening pursues a comprehension of being that is a radically different premise from 
the modern western philosophical paradigm where ‘I’ start from being recognised as 
something someone under a sovereign community, as a subject and citizen.  
The modern paradigm and its language is indeed our inheritance. Thus the 
form and the language is, inevitably, what we have at our disposal and must engage 
with. Nevertheless, resistant attention to sense and the materiality of the world offers 
a possibility to dig into the construction of law and legal categories that have created 
the political phenomenon of IML and the seeming impasse of existing vocabulary and 
legal categorisations. This so-called impasse is the incommensurability within current 
legal categories and frameworks of analysis to address and deal with what is 
exscribed in the shadows of the law. Attention to ecotechnics and the shift towards 
sense and deconstruction based on the very materiality of what is happening in the 
world—what my methodological approach calls for—aims to identify the messiness 
of labour and migration within the current market practices that are in tension with 
legal regimes.  
If we think about labour and migration in this way, then we think away from 
pre-existing categories—we are all merely bodies. But then what of the existing law 
and the force of the law, including its violence? If law is what traces the eco-technical 
circulation of capital, and of bodies, it is still a part of our sociality and a result of the 
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sociality. Law does not externally define the sociality, but is a technique of 
intelligibility: a technique that is employed by those in positions of power to make 
intelligible their ‘community of value’ as if it were universal. Thus, within the 
sociality, power immediately determines how the law traces the plurality. We cannot 
escape this determination, even through calls for justice—justice is part of the lexicon 
of modern law, and reinforces falsely universalising notions of equality, access and 
fairness, which remain contingent on the nation-state, citizenship and market 
economic values (such as socio-economic status). Thus, within the resistance to 
determination and unexamined acceptance of false contingency we must also resist 
thinking of law as ever capable of addressing the totality of our existence. If law is the 
trace of sociality, it must come from the sociality itself, and it is the very movement 
that continues to circulate (ecotechnics) as the sense of the world, wherein those who 
claim authorship over the law (power) would not be in power without the labourers 
and migration that maintains economic circulation and systems. Moreover citizenship 
would not be privileged were it not for the non-citizen, or migrant; the regular cannot 
exist without the irregular. The authority therefore is contingent on obscuring the 
interconnection of production and reproduction with economic market prosperity. 
Nancy’s re-thinking of the citizen, subject, sovereignty and community therefore 
involves uprooting these false contingencies without knowing what revealing their 
‘grey areas’ will spark—yet this ‘revealing’ is only turning our attention to was is 
already happening, what is struction, circulating in the eco-technics of the world. 
There is nothing new, nothing created or constructed.   
The sense of what is happening is what goes unheard in community as it is 
fixed and constituted. It is what is exscribed away from the text that is inscribed. 
Sense writes towards the fact that abandonment is at the heart of community; the 
community or any ‘common’ is at once present and fragmented. The community, like 
law, is nothing. The only possibility of justice, therefore, is ‘the exposition of finitude 
and abandonment in community.’256  So long as our thinking of community is 
concerned with establishing definitions and borders to identify, name and solidify 
experience and presence, then justice is definitively avoided. Our thinking of labour 
migration is confined to thinking of who is let into the community and whose 
membership is withheld. Labour and migration circulate in closed discursive 
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conditions of possibility, where contingencies remain bound to the nation-state and 
citizenship. According to Susan Marks, this is how determinism versus determination 
functions behind intellectual ideas and limits—the possibility of thinking about labour 
migration is determined by the categories that are referenced as frameworks of 
recognition. Attention to ecotechnics opens these frameworks because the circulation 
of capital transcends the order of the nation-state. The privilege of dominant 
paradigms prevents us from observing how the system itself depends on precarious, 
‘irregular’ labourers. Thus in order to ‘dethrone’ this privilege,257 false contingency 
analyses, when applied to the discussion of irregular statuses—in particular advocacy 
efforts towards legalisation and regularisation of status—demonstrates that the 
necessity of legal status and the equation of legal status with citizenship is historically 
specific. Access to rights, legal recognition and circumvention of exploitation of one’s 
labour are contingent on holding legal status, legal subjectivity, within the nation-
state. Such that when advocacy efforts aim to include persons considered ‘irregular’ 
into ‘regular’ categories, they reaffirm the very system that will, as a consequence of 
its very foundation, withhold recognition to those necessarily deemed ‘irregular’. 
As discussed in the first chapter, false contingency builds on the idea of false 
necessity. Roberto Unger uses the term ‘false necessity’ to refer to what we accept, 
without reservation, as essential conditions for order in our society and world. The 
economic market is prioritised over social welfare, under the belief that if the market 
is ‘happy’ then a society’s welfare will be provided for. This ideology reveals a ‘false 
necessity’ of economic growth: needing to keep the market happy. To a large extent, 
the concept of false necessity is broadly recognised and critiqued. Legal pluralism and 
socio-legal studies have exposed how the dominant legal system of the nation-state 
and economic participation according to that particular legal order are based in the 
belief that the legal and economic system is universal and necessary. Marks extends a 
false necessity critique to explore more deeply what are underlying false 
contingencies. The critique of false necessity would assist in refuting claims that IML 
is a category identifying persons who are in ‘irregular’ situations based on their own 
transgression and that facilitating their regularisation to citizenship status is of 
paramount importance. Whereas an analysis mindful of false contingencies offers a 
way to speak outside of what are assumed to be the only conditions of possibility: 
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recognition in the nation-state through becoming ‘regular’ and a ‘citizen’. Formal, 
legal citizenship is conditioned by false contingency, by limited conditions of 
possibility for recognising membership and participation. 
IML suggests an outsider status, different from categories of citizen and 
employee. Identifying workers who are participating in the labour market as if they 
were irregular and foreign reinforces an idea of who is ‘regular’ and ‘inside’. 
However the persons who may be considered IML are participating ‘inside’ in various 
ways. Underlying the label, IML, is the false contingency of regular labour, and how 
labour is recognised. Regular labour is consolidated through legal identities and 
definitions that recognise employment relationships but are founded in principles of 
citizenship as mediating participation in the collective community of the nation-state. 
One’s access to ‘rights’ is contingent on recognition within a nation-state as equal to 
citizenship. However, the nation-state is a relatively recent historical phenomenon.258 
Furthermore, the priorities of a globalised economic market system and economic 
growth can trump practices, or presumed entitlements, of citizenship. Citizenship is 
differentiated according to economic power and productivity in much the same way 
as the power of sovereign states is hierarchically valued in the international sphere 
according to financial wealth.  
Whereas legal scholars may be familiar with acknowledging variations of 
regulatory regimes and legal structures, awareness of false contingency in nation-state 
centric legal systems requires paying attention to how particular ideas come to be 
privileged, such that what is considered to be necessary may be rewritten as 
contingency.259 As previously noted, having a low-waged, flexible temporary labour 
force is considered to be necessary to keep the market ‘happy’ and for the UK to 
maintain global economic competitiveness. This is rewritten as contingency when 
having a low-waged, ‘irregular’, casual, precarious labour force is seen as the only 
way to maintain labour in the twenty-first century. It is no longer merely 
advantageous for the economic market; it transforms into the only possibility of 
managing labour demand and supply.  
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Marks urges legal scholars to pay attention to the way in which our 
scholarship can reinforce limited and deterministic (ideological) frameworks. 
Academic scholarship that addresses labour and migration can, unintentionally, 
reproduce assumptions suggesting abuses and precarious vulnerable work are 
‘random, accidental or arbitrary’260 and therefore scholars neglect to analyse why 
‘irregular’ situations/categories persist. False contingencies are false in that they offer 
a false sense of resolution while underlying systems of belief (ideology) and “planned 
misery” are obscured. 261  Marks does not suggest that proposed conditions and 
frameworks alternative to the subject of critique would be less false. Nevertheless, the 
process of calling attention to limited conditions of possibility and making them 
contingencies rather than necessities creates a site for difference.262 Asking why 
necessities exist and what logics our critique follow, reveal the structures that ‘mask 
historicity of existing arrangements and prevent us from grasping their contingency, 
provisionality and hence, their mutability.’263  
Exposing false contingency reveals false necessity’s myths that uphold an 
established order made to seem normal, and the only way of being. Necessity may not 
be unnoticed, but it is disguised. Acting as if the nation-state legal system was self-
explanatory and market participation a key aspect of one’s citizenship and valuable 
participation in society may still inform our work in spite of recognising that the 
nation-state system is not the only system of organising law and populations.264 As a 
consequence of not being held in relief against the possibility of other experiences and 
frameworks or conditions, ‘injustices of the present order are made to appear as 
though they were random, accidental and arbitrary. And if they are random, accidental 
and arbitrary, then the prospects of changing them become every bit as remote as if 
                                                
260 Marks, “Human Rights and Root Causes”, 74. 
261 Marks’s term, ‘planned misery’ comes from Naomi Klein, Shock Doctrine (Allen Lane: London, 2007), cited in 
Susan Marks, “Human Rights and Root Causes.” Modern Law Review 74:1 (2011): 57-78, 75.  
262 Contingencies are false in that they seem to provide answers to a problem, but the conditions of the answers 
come from the same framework that forms the problem in the first instance. False contingencies are not inherently 
wrong in relation to something else that is true.  
263 Marks, “False Contingency”, 2. Marks acknowledges that traditionally legal scholars shy away from identifying 
historical specificity due to a fear of determinism. Marks does not advocate for determinism in the traditional 
Marxist sense. Her call is to bring attention to the process of determination where limits and conditions are 
affirmed and create “false” contingencies that are “false in what they exclude.” Marks, “False Contingency”, 17. 
Marks cites Terry Eagleton on ideological statements: “true in what they affirm, but false in what they exclude.” 
Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 16. 
264 Necessity may not be unnoticed, but ‘what we may still fail to recognise are the effects of acting as if it is; we 
may fail to see how this impacts upon lived reality.’ Marks, “False Contingency”, 18.  
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they were fated.’265 Thinking otherwise or differently becomes impossible because all 
possibilities are conditioned through a paradigm that remains unaware of its own 
limits and existence as a paradigm. The matrix of false necessity and false 
contingency prevent imagining alternative possibilities outside the most familiar 
framework.266 
False contingency, as part of a methodological approach names a process of 
conceptual de-familiarisation that aims to open up the possibility of alternatives that 
are not rooted in the same dominant frameworks of the nation-state, market economy 
and law. De-familiarisation is a process or technique of critical theory. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, de-familiarisation is a process of ‘dis-identification’ 
distancing from familiar, normative values.267 Rosi Braidotti writes in reference to the 
idea of the human and human subject, but her affirmation that the ‘loss of familiar 
habits of thought and representation’ can ‘pave the way for creative alternatives’268 is 
akin to drawing out false contingency to open unto conditions previously thought to 
be impossible. Immigration law and employment (labour) law reflect a specific 
version of contingent conditions of possibility. Within the international political 
system and global market economy, these specific versions are accepted as if they 
were natural. The citizen, the employee, and the legal subject, much like the global 
market, are presumed to be necessary categories that inform the conditions of 
possibility of our sociality, community and world. These categories frame 
possibilities and alternatives for difference. The global market economy can, for 
instance, be traced to the nineteenth century.269 The consolidation of a market 
economic system was not natural or inevitable, but based on ideas of individual free 
market exchange emerging from previous forms of association and systems of 
organising economic exchange. A market society however developed as subordinated 
to the market economy, rather than the market economic system existing as one of 
many possibilities for economic systems and exchange. The false contingency critique 
                                                
265 Marks, “False Contingency”, 20.  
266 Marks, “False Contingency”, 13: The topics of critique in our work are based in a particular logic, not just ‘a 
logic within the argument’ but a ‘logic stretching beyond it, a “bigger picture” of which this was a part.’ 
267 Rosi Braidotti, The PostHuman, 89. 
268 Braidotti, The PostHuman, 88-89. 
269 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2001 2nd). 
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of IML is partially about questioning the primacy of the particular labour market as it 
is wedding to processes of neoliberalisation demonstrated in the economic priorities 
of the UK government (allowing for firms to access cheap, flexible labour) and 
unexamined acceptance of a global economic market ‘system’. The other part of the 
critique recognises the shortcomings of existing scholarship that has proposed 
alternatives to remedy the situation of IML, where scholarship can, unintentionally, 
reproduce the same limited contingencies that reinforce the market economic system 
(like the proto-political community).   
 
Conclusion	  
By approaching the phenomenon of IML from the three angles, political-
juridical-ecotechnical, I aim to unearth how and why IML continues to be identified 
as an issue of public concern in the UK. False contingencies underlie legislative 
attempts and proposed (theoretical) alternatives to remedy persons considered 
‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’. Ecotechnics focuses on the bodies-at-work in the labour 
market rather than on the legal categories that seek to order and define people as 
citizens versus non-citizens. Law is deconstructed, via Nancy’s attention to the technē 
and sense of bodies in their circulation and sociality, and re-thought as tracing the 
processes of persons as an incommensurable ecology.270  
The value of this methodology lies in its resistance to the proliferation of legal 
principles. Rather than think of alternatives through more categories or broader legal 
instruments, I endeavour to think what it might mean to return to the political, ethical 
and justice claims that are rooted in the heart of law and its imperative. Anna Grear 
writes, ‘There is a need for law to face up to and embrace a certain non-negotiability 
of ethical demand emerging from the implications of living materiality itself.’271 This 
                                                
270 ‘We are in the technē of the neighbour’, the sharing bodes in the technē. This technē refers to the various ways 
that trace the areality along which we are exposed together, ‘not presupposed in a subject, not post-posed in some 
particular and/or universal end.’ Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, 91.  
271  Anna Grear, ‘Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice: Locating the 
Vulnerable Subject,’ in Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics Martha 
Albertson Fineman and Anna Grear eds., (London: Ashgate, 2013), 31. 
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demand involves resisting ‘the disembodying closures of the liberal juridical order,’272 
which in other words predetermine conditions of possibility. The liberal juridical 
order is based on a false contingency that presents a false sense of resolution by 
making a claim to a total, universal order—as if legal citizenship, as discussed above, 
could bring all citizens equality, justice and protection. The liberal, juridical order 
cannot within its framework comprehend the contradictions and contestation of 
bodies. Meanwhile, the market economic system working within (and without) this 
order thrives on the incoherence and irregularity of these bodies, at-work and moving 
across borders.  
The reality of precariousness and ambiguity of the label IML draws our 
attention to the way that existing categories are unable to define the experiences of 
labour migration and precarity. The fact that labourers and their labour position are 
considered ‘irregular’ disrupts the language, categories and organisation of labour, 
which cannot be reconciled with sociality as something that is in movement, and in 
continuous process of becoming. Whether the disruption is a product of workers’ 
status, defined ‘legally’, or the stratification of citizenship, it marks the inadequacy of 
the frameworks of subject and citizen. The ‘irregular’ disrupts as it appeals for the 
incommensurable manifestation of the singular plural.  
IML exposes and abandons us to the incommensurable. In Nancy’s words, 
 
A moment arrives when one can no longer feel anything but anger, an 
absolute anger, against so many discourses, so many texts that have no 
other care than to make a little more sense, to redo or perfect delicate 
works of signification. That is why, if I speak here of birth, I will not try to 
make it into one more accretion of sense. I will rather leave it, if this is 
possible, as the lack of “sense” that it “is.” I will leave it exposed, 
abandoned.273 
                                                
272 Fineman and Grear, Vulnerability, 31. The vulnerable subject is ‘embodied and affectable in the structural 
“unevenness” of the globalised world order, which she contrasts with the mythical “evenness” of the juridical 
plane implied by the formally equal actors at the heart of liberal legal theory.’  
273 Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 5.  
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Thinking of Nancy’s philosophical thought in the context of IML moves 
scholarship away from a focus on the legal universe, or law and legality as something 
that encapsulates and encompasses, or not, community into its fold. This does not 
deny the power of law to be enforced, experienced and resisted. In fact resistance, is 
central to Nancy’s thinking of being/being-with. This is the resistance within 
engaging with sense rather than categories, of delving into the messiness of 
ecotechnics as processes of liberalisation shape labour relations at the level not of 
legislative changes, but material practices and relationships we engage in as workers, 
consumers, employers, citizens and beings. In place of a universalising claim for law 
or the opposite being a denial of law, ‘we are then left with a radiant paradox: the law 
guarantees the outlaw, it guarantees the exception to the exception indeed it becomes 
their condition of possibility.’ 274  Thus law itself—juridical and existential—is 
complicit in the ambiguous category of IML. However the ways in which IML is left 
unquestioned is not an inevitability of law, but rather a failure to interrogate the 
categories that are perceived as natural contingencies assumed to be the only 
possibilities, thereby obscuring the processes subjugating particular persons and 
workers. A politics of the (k)not, ties and unties material experience as it is struction. 
The relations happening here open towards a radical critique of the political-juridical 
systems that depend on maintaining the eco-technical happening of labour, market 
and populations of people coming together in grey areas.  
The blanket use of the label IML demonstrates the constraints of ‘legal, social 
and cultural circumstances in which [we] are embedded.’275 These circumstances are 
experienced in neighbourhoods, households, workplaces, schools and bureaucracies.  
The border of the nation-state, which I discussed in the previous chapter as 
membership in the community of value, is enforced at various points of time and 
space to distinguish between those included ‘inside’ the nation as Good Citizens and 
those ambiguously maintained ‘outside’ as sub- or Failed Citizens. Yet the experience 
of these legal, social and cultural circumstances exceeds the boundaries imposed 
through categories of identification. This excess of categories is evident in how we 
                                                
274 Gilbert Leung, "Abandonment," in The Jean-Luc Nancy Dictionary, Gratton and Morin, pg. n/a. 
275 Bauder, Labour Movement,  200.  
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relate to each other in our basic relational living experience, socially being together 
day-to-day, and also in the way that the category of irregular migrant labour itself 
exceeds definitive lines of what is ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’. The label IML acts 
therefore not as a catch-all, but as an empty signifier of discrimination, 
marginalisation and vulnerability to abuse and exploitation. IML is not a legal 
category, and yet it is used as if the label captured a transgressive, extralegal labour 
force. Meanwhile irregularity, precariousness and foreign-ness are experiences shared 
by persons with citizenship status and those considered non-citizens. The experiences 
at the nexus of the category irregular migrant labour are, in Jean-Luc Nancy’s words, 
exscribed, beyond inscribed legal frameworks and political terms. Experiences are 
necessarily exscribed, but the way in which IML exscribes by inscribing (how the 
label IML perpetuates an inclusion-as-exclusion) demands attention due to the 
harmful situations labourers, rendered to positions of sub-citizenship, find themselves 
in.  
A critical legal perspective recognises how with the multiple assumptions of 
power, in the name of justice and law, beings are constituted through recognition of 
their continuous becoming subjects. Political/cultural/social factors inform and 
categorise becoming subjects, but what is exscribed always escapes the category. 
Exscription, according to Nancy, is not a surreal beyond, such as thinking of the 
metaphysics of Being. Rather the exscribed is the material happening that is written 
out of the text—in some sense ‘formally’ unaccounted for, but part of the happening. 
The exscribed forms and informs the imperative of law to be a continuous process but 
also Nancy’s work opens onto a deeper critique of subjectivity itself. Law, in the 
sense of grappling with both the inscription and the constant exscription, is more than 
any one structure, system or meaning. At the same time, law is nothing without the 
infusion of meaning via conditions of order, regulation, and limit.  
The task is not to make law ‘differently’, but firstly to expose and resist the 
totalising presence of law—where law is posited and problematised as if it were an 
absolute, and total, authority. Law maintains a sense of what is exscribed because it 
assumes a relationship with justice. Secondly, the challenge is not to lose sight of law 
as a regulatory limit that articulates the definition of a sociality, a population living 
and working together, in-common, and the imperative of law’s force. Law, according 
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to Nancy, traces the limit of persons coming together and forming an in-common. But 
as a tracing, law is also what renders ‘inoperative’ coming together, ‘operative’, when 
bound into prescribed (legal) limits. This is where law is incalculable: it is both a 
movement and a fixed limit. Law is also incommensurable with being defined as 
something just as our sociality is incommensurable with the singular plural of being.  
The radiant paradox of law, if it grapples with a process of sociality as becoming 
rather than assuming law is fixed or stagnant (either in its notion of justice or 
regulation), subverts the false contingency where law occupies a total presence as a 
predetermined authority mediated through the structure of the nation-state and 
citizenship, or through extra-national, post-national governance. 
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Chapter 3. Immigration law and the 
construction of irregular migrant 
labour 
 
Immigration law plays a critical role in constituting IML. Immigration law 
presumes the necessity of a nation-state government to mediate access to residence 
and citizenship status within its borders and jurisdiction. Citizenship is desirable, and 
sought after, because formally it identifies the legal subjects of the nation-state. For 
instance, even if the United Nations recognises that each human being is endowed 
with ‘rights’, it is the nation-state that recognises a person as a member of the nation 
and therefore a legal subject of the state. International legal instruments and UK 
immigration laws support this structure of recognition through the nation-state.276 
Indeed it is difficult to conceptualise our identity and sociality, the ‘common’ Nancy 
writes of, beyond the framework of nation-state and its legal regime. Critical theories 
of migration and citizenship may trouble nation-state centric boundaries that privilege 
citizenship. They interrogate the role played by law to recognise and restrict 
membership via immigration rules and to enforce distinctions between legal and 
illegal migration. However, some critical perspectives on citizenship and immigration 
law, which will be discussed in this chapter do not acknowledge or question the false 
contingency of citizenship and legal subjectivity that forms the building blocks of 
how we conceive of our identity in-common. Thus the necessity of citizenship  
remains unquestioned. The inscription of migration and labour as regular or irregular 
as if remedied through attaining citizenship supports a false contingency of 
subjectivity and recognition. Contingencies, which form conditions of possibility, are 
based not on the experience (inscribed and exscribed) of migration and labour, but on 
predetermined frameworks. These frameworks support categories of recognition 
                                                
276  International legal instruments, particularly those regarding human rights, are commonly thought of as 
capturing what amounts to a ‘proto-political’ community or humanity. ‘Proto-political’, comes from Hans Lindahl, 
"Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood," in The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, M. Loughlin and N. Walker eds., 9-24 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 9. 
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according to the movement of the market economic system and processes of 
neoliberalisation.  
 This chapter applies the political-juridical-ecotechnical methodology by 
identifying false contingency in immigration law and scholarship. 277  After 
considering subjectivity and the shortcomings of legal rights and human rights 
provisions beyond the nation-state, I examine UK immigration law in relation to the 
constitution of the label IML. IML, and indeed the individuals experiencing 
precarious labour situations and considered to be foreign migrants, can neither be 
identified nor remedied through immigration law and conventional deliberations of 
citizenship and the nation-state border alone. IML, grouping together persons in the 
legal grey areas of immigration law, reveals the false contingency of citizenship 
against the false necessity of the market economic system. Both citizenship and the 
market are inscribed as the conditions of possibility for recognition, status and legal 
subjectivity. Meanwhile the existence of such elusive irregular labourers permits 
labour practices (and thus, in practice recognition) that are in excess of the frame of 
citizenship and that evade existing formal labour laws to employ people maintained in 
the shadows of full legal subjectivity. IML therefore is not only allowed, but 
constitutes a regular feature of low-waged, low-skilled labour markets (demand and 
supply). 
  Throughout Europe, ‘the proliferation of laws on immigration has given rise 
to enormous legislative efforts, some virulent debates, a degree of legal uncertainty as 
to the law applicable to the facts in a given case, and procedural ambiguities that give 
police considerable latitude, but it has not changed the demographic and economic 
realities.’278 Dider Bigo argues that policies, state and regional, that have tried to 
regulate, control and order migration have failed. Bigo suggests policy-makers have, 
for example, ignored research that shows how prohibition policies create more 
problems, including a professionalisation of fraud. Instead law and policy continues 
along the insecurity continuum that builds on fears of an im/migrant threat. 
Furthermore, immigration law, in spite of attempting to tackle the problem of IML, in 
                                                
277 Labour law will be discussed separately in chapter four. 
278 Dider Bigo, "Reflections on Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe." In Constructing and 
Imagining Labour Migration, Elspeth Guild and Sandra Mantu eds., 293-305 (London: Ashgate, 2011), 294. 
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effect maintain persons as IML.279 Irregularity establishes insecurity as a state of 
being. Although immigration law purports to control borders,280 immigration law and 
policies are in practice largely subservient to labour market and economic factors that 
are exscribed from the nation-state centric law. Immigration law sanctions the market 
by demanding a limited, contingent legal subjectivity where persons are differentiated 
not only due to immigration status, but as well based on their economic market 
productivity and value. In other words, their place in the labour market as low-waged, 
low-skilled equates these workers with ‘irregular migrant’ status. A precarious labour 
force, considered IML, is preferred and encouraged so long as these workers remain 
in the legal grey areas that allow their labour to be exploited. These grey areas exist as 
a consequence of false contingency of citizenship. Yet the labour market demand for 
‘irregular’ workers—racialised, marginalised, and ‘migrant’—reveals the 
ecotechnical circulation of labour, bodies and capital beyond conventional legal 
measures and categories.281  
 
Law	  and	  the	  Subject	  
Costas Douzinas describes the legal subject as paradoxically both ‘the subject 
of law or subjectum the holder of rights and the bearer of duties and responsibilities’ 
and ‘the subject as subjectus subjected to law, brought to life by law’s protocols, 
                                                
279 Bigo, “Reflections on Immigration Controls”, 294. 
280 Immigration law is identified as the legal field responsible for persons considered migrant labourers, since 
crossing borders instigates a ‘dynamic and on-going process of status determination.’ Guild and Mantu, 
Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration, 3. 
281 This is the case not only in the UK. Guild and Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration, ‘The 
Appearance of Control: Examining labour migration regimes with high control claims’ (135) analyses countries 
that appear to be in control of their migration policies, and how the realities are nuanced or silenced. Chapters in 
this section discuss Canada, the EU, Australia and Japan, exposing competing interests and priorities, as well as 
how global competition and economic priorities take precedence over rights and overt claims of immigration law’s 
priorities and limits. The needs of the economy in Canada, for example, demonstrate a need for “low-skilled” 
migrants. However, the image and rhetoric of Canadian immigration policy favours high-skilled migrants, and 
lower-waged labour migrants employed in the country are not recognized formally and given rights such as access 
to citizenship (Christina Gabriel, chapter 6, 137-155). Anais Faure Atger’s chapter on “Competing Interests in the 
Europeanization of Labour Migration Rules” (157-174) discusses how European Union Directives ultimately are 
not harmonized and the protection of rights of third country nationals is left up to the individual employers, rather 
than controlled by the EU. The fragmentation within the EU further criminalizes irregular migrants and push 
towards undocumented labour. The case of Japan, explored by Midori Okabe illuminates how changes in labour 
needs/demand/influences are not reflected in immigration law and policy, and this disconnect is attributed not to 
economic concerns, but international security concerns. 
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shaped by law’s demands and rewards.’282 Here, law functions as both something 
binding (static), and something fluid, actively being redefined. Writing in the context 
of international law, Juliette Rogers argues that the legal subject is split amongst 
differentiated bodies such that certain people are subjectum while others are only 
subjectus. ‘Regular’ citizens (male, Western) are seen as subjects of the law 
(subjectum, state belongs to them). In contrast, marginalised beings are subjected to 
the law (subjectus, they belong to the state).283 The persons assumed to be IML 
appear to be in the latter category, what I’ve referred to previously as sub-citizens. 
The absence of vocabulary to unpack who and what IML are, in legislation or UK 
case law demonstrates IML’s exclusion. However, these labourers are not practically 
excluded from residence, work and employment in spite of possibly being excluded 
from the legal status of ‘employee’ as will be discussed in chapter four. The 
inscription of IML indicates how the assignation of this identity relates to the state—a 
person’s identity of ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’ is in reference to the regular citizen of 
the nation-state. However to gain membership as a regular citizen is to participate in 
the community of value, not merely to attain legal citizenship status. The precarity 
and vulnerability of persons in labour situations that are in legal grey areas is 
precisely a consequence of certain persons being located within the nation-state where 
their participation is obscured but not prohibited. These persons are present but 
invalidated, thus ‘irregular’. The economic role of persons considered IML is to fill a 
gap in the labour market and thus their partial subjectivity continues without remedy. 
IML are recognised and subjected to the law, in that they are identified as being not-
regular, not-permanent citizens. But their subjectivity is not equal to ‘Good Citizens’ 
(regular) who are participating agents of the law, subjectum. When the effects of IML 
in the labour market are felt, such as downward pressure on wages, IML are identified 
and blamed, but not as individuals with power in the law. Rather IML is addressed 
through calls for stricter immigration law and immigration controls to exclude these 
‘foreigners’. 
                                                
282 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century, (Oxford, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2000), 183.  Douzinas further notes, “We think of the subject as the exclusive vehicle of 
freedom, perhaps because the split is no longer fully apparent as it was in pre-revolutionary Europe; the 
subjectum/subjectus dyad has been fully internalised and the law, self-given and externally imposed, already 
inhabits and conceals itself in the recesses of the self.” Douzinas, 226. 
283 Juliet Rogers frames this in terms of the female body and FGM: “Flesh Made Law: The Economics of Female 
Genital Mutilation Legislation” in International Law and its Others, Anne Orford ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 364. 
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Douzinas’s paradox of the legal subject rather than lying within one 
person/subject can depend on one’s position relative to citizenship and the nation-
state. In other words, it is from within the exercises of state power that subjectivity is 
distinguished. Persons may be subjected to the state, but only insofar as they are 
subjectus—belonging to the state. However, subjectivity, the condition of being a 
subject, is not a sovereign precondition of action and thought. More accurately, the 
condition of being is subsumed to the authority of the state through the idea of the 
Subject. This state of being parallels Judith Butler’s analysis of legal dispossession.284  
According to Butler, it is state power that produces, maintains and continues legal 
dispossession. Legal dispossession detracts subjectivity but only insofar as 
subjectivity is predetermined as an essential condition of the subject. In and of itself 
the subject is a ‘socially produced “agent” and “deliberator” whose agency and 
thought is made possible by a language that precedes that “I”.’ 285 The ‘I’ is produced 
through power and exercises of power in politics and law determines who can be a 
subject. ‘I’ means inclusion, and dispossession is the exclusion of the ‘I’. 
Nevertheless, politics and law determine the subject as ‘a differential effect or power’, 
not as a precondition of politics. There is being that comes before, or after, the 
subject, exscribed away from these politics and law. This being is, in Nancy’s work, 
the being singular plural where the sense of being is materially experienced in our 
very bodies, away from the categories that precondition Being. Bodies are not an item 
able to be objectively viewed and analysed; instead bodies are sense, they happen.  
Bodies experience exscription and inscription. It is the bodies of labourers relegated 
to so-called irregular situations that meet the current labour market demand for 
precarious flexible, cheap, labour. The ‘regular’ legal subject seems to occupy the 
language of how, what and why bodies come together. But there are persons—
bodies—that are kept out of the definition of the subject, all the while identified as 
part of subjectivity. This is, again, what Butler discusses as the dispossessed: persons 
who are dis-possessed with reference to the state that prescribes possession of 
subjectivity and status. Individuals are identified as dispossessed or irregular because 
their being is only understood in reference to the limited frame of recognition, and 
within this frame the ‘irregular’ is what does not fit into the ‘regular’. This limited 
                                                
284 See Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, (London, New York: Verso, 2004), 
10-13. 
285 Butler,  Precarious Life, iii. 
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frame of recognition is the false contingency of state/citizenship/economic market and 
can include immigrants, foreign nationals, women, non-marketised workers of various 
kinds, ‘criminals’ and other such sub-citizens distanced from the community of value. 
While it seems that what makes a person recognisable is their subjectivity, ‘to 
be a subject at all requires first complying with certain norms that govern recognition 
– that make a person recognisable.’ 286  For Butler, the critique of subjectivity 
illustrates the gender and sexual norms that govern our social relations and 
recognition, that pre-empt and determine relations in the sociality. The originary 
sociality is denied because the subjectivity is constituted by the normative force of 
predetermine recognition. IML further exposes the relationships of power and law 
that determine what is recognised participation in the nation-state. The complexity of 
these relationships deepens with the intersection of labour market priorities and 
economic productivity, where irregular status is beneficial to capital growth. 
In summary of this initial opening, the legal subject can be understood as split 
between the subjectum—where the state belongs to them—and the subjectus—where 
they are subjected before the law. The subjectum, where the state belongs to them, are 
those included within the ‘regular’ or the Good Citizen. The status of the subject is 
always made in reference to the Good Citizen. In the UK, this Citizen is British, 
economically productive in a standard employment relationship. The subjectum, Good 
Citizen, provides a reference point, or grounding 287 , from which the IML is 
differentiated. Persons considered to be IML are not denied subjectivity, but are 
subjectus, subjected before the law. They cannot be otherwise unless they conform to 
the parameters of Good and worthy membership in the community of value and 
standard employment. The movement from subjectus to subjectum, however, is 
unlikely because of the priorities of economic growth and demand for cheap, flexible 
temporary labour. One may hold citizenship, as discussed in chapter one, but remain 
an IML—as if they were irregular, temporary and foreign—in order to fill the labour 
market demand for precarious low-waged, low-skilled labour.  
                                                
286 ‘And so, non-compliance calls into question the viability of one’s life, the ontological conditions of one’s 
persistence. We think of subjects as the kind of beings who ask for recognition in the law or in political life; but 
perhaps the more important issue is how the terms of recognition—and here was can include a number of gender 
and sexual norms—condition in advance who will count as a subject, and who will not.’ Butler, Precarious Life, 
iv.  
287 James, The Fragmentary Demand, 53. 
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Jean-Luc Nancy’s exploration of exscription, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, can suggest that those who do not comply with the norms of society are the 
exscribed of subjectum. However, it is not sufficient to identify IML as the 
exscription of the subjectum. IML inscribes difference as ‘irregular’ ‘migrant’ 
‘labour’. The inscription suggests that persons considered within this label are 
justifiably different and can be treated as sub-citizens based on the presumptions of 
citizenship and regular, standard employment as paramount to ‘full’ legal subjectivity. 
Thus in order to think away from the legal subject-as-citizen, we must rethink the 
exscribed, or in Butler’s words think of what comes after the subject. Butler and 
Nancy’s work converge where both theorists identify the significance of what is left 
out of the text of legal subjectivity, where the Subject assumes a universal and total 
presence. Because of the dominance of the Subject, we struggle to conceptualise what 
may be before or beyond the subject. However, Nancy’s work suggests that the 
corporeal materiality of the body, the sense of the world as the coming together of 
persons in-common, is struction. Struction is not about identifying subjectivity 
because the subject is made in reference to false contingency. This false contingency 
involves immigration law as the border controlling citizenship, but even more 
fundamentally, the idea of the individual autonomous subject with power over and in 
the law. 
The very notion of subject and subjectivity refers to a particular historical and 
philosophical context: the shift from feudal relations (status) to ‘modern social and 
legal relations’ (contract), when ‘the liberal individual became the fundamental unity 
of law.’288 According to Anna Grear, ‘[a]rguably the most complete conflation 
between personhood and rights-bearing status or legal subjectivity was achieved with 
the historical emergence of liberal individualism.’ 289The subjectification of the 
individual follows from the belief that the individual can be an essence, a totality in 
and of itself, and an economically productive unit. The individual subject is 
recognised and subsumed (subjectum and subjectus) under the authority of the law 
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spoken through the juris-diction of the nation-state. 290  Individuals are thereby 
subjected under the universal claim of law as it is entangled within a proto-political 
community assumed to transcend beyond the nation-state itself, but ordered through 
the nation-state. Subjectivity in the law is presumed to provide individuals with rights 
and freedoms that precede the nation-state via a proto-political community, where the 
idea of legal subjectivity is shared. The proto-political community is implied through 
the frame of the nation-state that exscribes a universal, common and all-encompassing 
legal space ‘in which, in principle, everyone has her/his own place.’291 Although 
citizenship is embroiled within this construction of the individual and recognition, 
citizenship is assumed to be a reflection of subjectivity, where ‘modern man is the 
law’s subject in a double sense: he is the legislator, the subject who gives the law and 
the legal subject, subjected to the law on condition that he has participated in its 
legislation.’292 The legal subject is a citizen and much more than a citizen because this 
recognition extends to the proto-political community.  
 Modern man, or the liberal individual subject (gendered and racialised), can 
be paralleled with Anderson’s description of the practice of citizenship via the Good 
Citizen as a member in the community of value. Anderson discusses citizenship rather 
than subjectivity; nevertheless she identifies how citizenship, like Rogers’s 
subjectum/subjectus split, is experienced and differentiated with reference not to 
formal legal recognition in the nation-state, but through what is given value or seen as 
worthy and deserving of recognition. The community of value is the domain of the 
subjectum, while the subjectus are the Failed Citizens who do not share, or participate 
in, the community of value. Failed Citizens (or sub-citizens) experience legal 
dispossession beyond the limits of the sayable, formal law. They are not denied 
subjectivity, as I will demonstrate below when looking at legislation (national and 
international) that addresses IML. Yet people that can be referred to under the label of 
IML are considered ‘failures’ because their presence and activity are always measured 
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in reference to subjectivity interpreted through notions of the individual, liberal 
economic Subject, which is also the Good Citizen. 
Failed citizens are made ‘irregular’, not ‘illegal’, dispossessed of the 
community of value or participation in the law (subjectus) in spite of their continued 
subjectivity and even their formal legal status. The ideal of the Good Citizen is 
embedded in the legal fiction that the individual legal subject, modern man, contains 
both subjectum and subjectus. The individuals considered to be irregular partake in 
the communities that collectively influence the practice of law. Nevertheless, 
‘autonomy before the law only exists within the context of recognition by the law.’293 
IML as a label recognises the situation of certain persons as being not-quite regular: 
not illegal, but not-quite fitting in. When this ‘law’ is the law that is rooted in the 
nation-state, then the migrant labourer in precarious employment and/or precarious 
immigration status is recognised only in relation to the inscribed law. The category of 
IML inscribes the legal grey areas of sub-citizenship participation in the nation-state. 
Meanwhile the experiences of precarious workers—not clearly migrant, not clearly 
irregular—are beyond definition, they are the exscription of citizenship. They are 
persons, they are bodies working, they are even recognised because their labour is 
included in the labour market. Yet these persons are denied full participation and 
subjectivity even within the category that supposedly encompasses them: IML. 
Therefore, the very idea of the subject and legal subjectivity, even when we try and 
widen this definition, supports and constitutes a division of an inside-outside but 
simultaneously troubles the line between the two. Citizenship, affirmed and 
distributed through immigration law, enacts differential subjectivities, which can be 
understood not as inside versus outside but the very incommensurability of being in 
categories where beings are subjected to law; from our originary sociality where we 
are singular beings in the plural. 
 
Irregular	  Migrant	  Labour	  in	  International	  Law	  and	  Scholarship	  
Integrating such analyses of subjectivity and citizenship is far removed from 
most legal scholarship concerned with IML. For some scholars, international 
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legislation and legal instruments offer hope that persons who are not included in 
national legal regimes may be protected by a broader, proto-political, legal regime. 
This prospect is most often explored through human rights law. Virginia Mantouvalou 
suggests that international human rights law can provide a normative standard for 
citizenship rights based on humanity ‘irrespective of nationality’.294 Other scholars 
are more wary of the practical applicability of human rights as a way to remedy for 
IML. Mark Bell discusses the reluctance of states to accept and implement 
international human rights instruments. Often national governments may fear that 
human rights legislation infringes on national sovereignty and ‘domestic’ matters, 
namely economic priorities. Yet the important role that extra-national legal 
instruments can play in transforming the situation for non-nationals in abusive labour 
situations cannot be discounted. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for 
instance, protects individuals against ‘extreme forms of exploitation’295. The case of 
Siliadin v France296 demonstrated how the ECtHR provided a vehicle for rights 
recognition of persons whose claims of abuse and exploitation by nationals at the 
level of the country’s Courts were dismissed. In Siliadin v. France, Siliadin—a 
Togolese national—received insufficient protection from the French state for her 
rights under the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (article 4: 1.  No one shall be held in slavery or servitude 
2.  No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour). This case 
demonstrated the ability for the ECtHR to intervene in cases of extreme exploitation 
of non-nationals. However, Siliadin may remain an exceptional case. Broad labour 
protections for non-nationals, EU third country nationals and precarious workers in 
low-waged labour sectors would need to be adopted and enacted by the nation-states 
in order for ECtHR law, Council of Europe recommendations and conventions, 
European Council and EU Charters outlining principles of European labour law (such 
as the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers) or International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) treaties and recommendations297, to be substantively 
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effective.298 Conceivably, such protections would only be adopted only if immigration 
law were to change its mandate away from defending the territorial border protecting 
the sovereign nation-state from foreigners. As long as national territorial sovereignty 
is the basis of legal regimes, any international or trans-national effort to create supra-
national laws will come up against the prerogative of immigration law and territorial 
sovereignty.  Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter four, current 
exceptional judicial decisions that extend protection to non-nationals in abusive 
labour situations do so on the basis of forced labour and modern-day slavery. 
Currently, political and legislative attention to forced labour and slavery in the UK 
has been primarily focused on the individual female victim of traffickers and ‘evil’ 
employers. This individual focus is not accompanied by broader commentary or 
analysis of the labour market demand for workers in slave-like conditions, and the 
legal grey areas that permit these practices to persist.   
A deeper critique of international legal human rights provisions suggests that 
human rights remain within a historically specific conceptualisation of humanity and 
a belief in the individual, sovereign subject.299 Rights, as they have conventionally 
developed through human rights instruments and are applied through existing 
legislative instruments, are limited in application and practice based on their inability 
to firstly, ‘be’ something tangibly granted, and secondly to ‘be’ universal. 300 
Moreover, human rights are recognised in the legal subject. In other words, one’s 
human rights are protected when one is a legal subject. If one’s legal subjectivity is 
‘lesser’, illustrated above regarding dispossession or sub-citizenship, then the power 
to claim rights is diluted. Within the practice of law, IML are not devoid of legal 
rights. Due to the work and persistence of international Human Rights campaigners 
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and advocates, international and national statutory provisions recognise migrant 
workers, domestic workers and moreover labour and employment legislation can be 
interpreted to extend to include non-citizens, or persons in domestic/national legal 
grey areas. Universal rights are ostensibly for all persons and thus the work of many 
legal scholars is to continuously attempt to enact and mobilise rights.301  Especially 
since the language and vocabulary does allow for ‘universal’ application. 302 
International and domestic laws extend to workers as human beings such that 
immigrants and non-citizens are legally recognised, albeit as subjectus.  
Examples of international legal efforts to extend protection to vulnerable and 
migrant workers include the Multilateral Framework on Migration (MFM) from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the ILO Conventions on workers’ rights, 
including Core Labour Rights303 and European Union Directives on work, family 
reunification and rights304 and the European Social Charter.305  Within the European 
Union, migrant, non-national and temporary workers in particular are recognised in 
the European Social Charter, Article 18 (3) and Article 19, which requires states to 
protect the rights of migrant workers and their families, and assist them with 
information, access to health services, support and equal treatment.306 Beyond the 
European community, the 1949 ILO Migration for Employment Convention (No. 97) 
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was meant to address and facilitate the worldwide movement of ‘surplus’ labour from 
Europe. It encouraged bilateral agreements and equal treatment for migrant workers 
to citizen workers. However this was only applicable for migrant workers who were 
legally working and living in the country where they were not nationals.307 The ILO 
Convention No. 143 (1975 Migrant Workers Supplementary Provisions) included 
some rights for migrant workers with irregular status. The premise of the Convention 
is that states respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers.308 Currently the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (ICRMW) is the main international provision for the 
protection of migrant workers. It was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN in 
1990, but entered into force in 2003. Effectively, the significant lack of signatories 
from migrant-receiving, high-income nations means the ICRMW fails to guarantee 
this protection. Most high-income, migrant-receiving countries have not signed or 
ratified this Convention.309 Moreover, even if nation-states were willing to be bound 
by international legislation, the ICRMW Convention recognises the primacy of state 
sovereignty to give priority to its laws, including immigration law to determine 
inclusion or exclusion of foreign nationals. According to Article 79 of the ICRMW: 
‘nothing in the present Convention shall affect the right of each State Party to 
establish the criteria governing admissions of migrant workers and members of their 
families.’ 310  In spite of the Convention’s limitations, it ‘endeavours to sever 
immigration law issues from labour issues’ where employers and their employees 
engage in a contractual relationship separate from the relationship of the state to the 
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foreign national.311 The value, for some, of this separation is that the labour issues can 
be strengthened via a human rights approach to marginalised, precarious labour.312 
Yet the shortcoming remains that few nations are willing to adjust immigration laws 
to reflect labour practices that prefer migrant workers precisely due to their 
irregularity/precariousness.  
These international conventions mandate that state parties recognise the rights 
of all workers while at the same time permit restrictions that create ‘illegal’ and 
‘irregular’ situations.313 The market economic system and priorities of economic 
growth benefit where immigration priorities counteract labour demands and enable 
labour demand to by-pass migration controls. In doing so, the limits of immigration 
law create irregular, exploitable labourers in legal grey areas. Tendayi Bloom and 
Rayah Feldman note that ‘international Convention rights for migrant workers are 
much less recognised than those pertaining to refugees, despite several major 
concerns being widely recognised by many authorities including international human 
rights, legal and church organisations and the International Labour Organisation, as 
well as academic authors and NGOs.’ 314  States maintain their prerogative to 
determine how international and EU Directives are incorporated into domestic 
legislation when it comes to labourers who serve an economic market purpose.  
The difficulty for legal categories to recognise—identify and name—
transnational movement, employment and residence status, what is referred to as the 
spectrum of precarious status, means that many people’s status can slip into categories 
where they are considered irregular or fall under the jurisdiction of domestic criminal 
law into ‘illegal’ situations. Neither the ICRMW, nor ILO Conventions on Migrant 
Workers (No. 97 and 143) can offer protection or rights beyond existing categories 
and practices that depend on legal subject status being recognised by the state.315 
These legal instruments can only be instrumentalised to maintain differentiated 
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subjectivities, in spite of rights discourses opening dialogue for remedying the 
phenomenon of IML.316  
In order to conceptually move beyond rights discourses and legislation, 
scholars, such as migration scholar Catherine Dauvergne and political theorist Seyla 
Benhabib, have suggested alternatives to the current international and European 
legislative frameworks. In the first example of an alternative, Dauvergne 
problematises how people are ‘made’ illegal. In order to counteract the endemic 
political and social differentiation of foreigners identified as ‘illegal’, she suggests 
‘unhinging’ the rule of law from state sovereignty in order to sever legal status and 
legal subjectivity from national citizenship.317 The dominant interpretation of law is 
that law is something embedded in the nation-state, mythologised as a quasi-
theological force within a modernist narrative of the nation-state. Unhinging the law 
from the nation-state, according to Dauvergne, would allow the law and the legal 
form (the rule of law) to operate independently from the state. Citizenship, as a 
measure of membership in a territorially defined political community, would lose its 
claim in identifying and differentiating legal subjects. Rights and accountability 
would be judicial and international.318 Dauvergne develops this proposal in light of 
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the ‘global crackdown on extra legal migration’319 in response to the perceived loss of 
control of states over policy initiatives. Dauvergne contends that the inability to 
control migration has more to do with political governance than with the law.320 
States derive power from ‘the global’ to organise identity and economic production, 
but an emphasis on governance prevents comprehensive, sustained enforcement of 
migration at both the local and the global level. If the state is no longer the arbitrator 
of one’s legal subjectivity, then one could be a ‘global citizen’ without membership in 
a particular nation-state but still have one’s rights, particularly labour rights, 
protected. This protection, Dauvergne argues, would prevent the current situation 
where illegality is created in part by a lack of comprehensive migration policy and 
enforcement.  
Dauvergne confronts the ‘hierarchical arrangement of sovereign power’321 
where wealthier nation-states dictate migration laws onto the international sphere. In 
spite of her awareness that international governance is hierarchical and hegemonic, 
her alternative reaffirms traditional frameworks of a hierarchical law. By placing faith 
into an extra-national law, Dauvergne assumes that law is something that can exist 
apart from the nation-state and be used to govern or contain human interaction and 
sociality, namely labour. Dauvergne contends that if migration laws were 
international they would allow for equality amongst nations and their citizens, as well 
as those excluded from citizenship. Accordingly, she purports that globalisation has 
opened onto the rule of law’s emancipatory potential322 where law, unhinged from the 
nation-state, holds the capacity to include the excluded.323 Yet her commitment to the 
rule of law as a potential to mediate migrants internationally does not problematise 
historical exclusions in the practice of law and the limits of the rule of law as a 
concept. Furthermore, Dauvergne further fails to consider that the international itself 
is based on the hierarchical arrangement of sovereign power that relies on 
membership of citizens in a nation-state. Those who speak in the name of the 
“international” have the power to dictate the terms and conditions and to subject 
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others to their authority. What is more, power in the ‘international’ has been in the 
hands of those who created the system in the first place.324 Unhinging law and the 
nation-state would shift the boundaries of migration law. Nevertheless, the question of 
where to locate legitimacy remains.325 This question exposes the fact that legitimacy 
does not need to be found in the nation-state. However if law is the tracing of the limit 
and not an entity or governing body itself then the tracing must reconstitute the 
sociality based on who is participating in the sociality in order for the law, the tracing, 
to depart from the existing order and thus consistently return to the (false) 
contingency of nations and citizenship. Dauvergne’s work does not pursue the 
question of law and thereby her proposal continues to be based within a framework 
that reaffirms a faith in the ability of law to withstand separation from the nation-state 
and still be something independent.326 Dauvergne pre-supposes law as a rule, some-
thing, that when instrumentalised in the nation-state is a false contingency of 
sociality. Moreover, Dauvergne does not problematise the relationship between the 
law and market, and the power of market forces guiding recognition and legal 
subjectivity. Thus while it is conceivable that the law and jurisprudence would 
manifest justice and order differently were they not embedded in the nation-state, the 
significant presence of the global market economic system cannot be ignored for the 
sake of reifying an emancipatory potential of law. Thus while rights may be 
recognised, subjectivity is ‘incomplete’ for some and of particular interest to this 
thesis, incomplete for persons considered within the label, IML. 
The second proposed alternative of radical transformation of the international 
and its relationship to IML is Seyla Benhabib’s disaggregated or cosmopolitan 
citizenship. Benhabib explores the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship in the context 
of claims for distributive justice. Benhabib refers to Kantian cosmopolitanism from 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace.327 According to Kant’s design of cosmopolitan citizenship, 
                                                
324 Origins of international law, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Enrique Dussel, ‘Anti-Cartesian Meditations: On The Origin of the 
Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity’ Journal for Culture and Religious Theory 13:1 Winter 2014, 11-52. 
 
325 Davergne, Making People Illegal, 183.  
326 Davergne, Making People Illegal, 188.  
327 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, section II ‘Containing the Definitive Articles For 
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foreigners have a right to membership and to be naturalised in a given territory.328 
From this, Benhabib proposes a ‘discourse-ethical standpoint’ where the sovereign of 
a democratic nation decides between the principle of rights and a schedule of rights in 
order to best address the needs of the population they oversee.329 In spite of proposing 
to challenge existing frames of recognition and citizenship, Benhabib’s theory 
reaffirms false contingencies of citizenship-as-belonging. Benhabib fails to 
disentangle the paradigm of the nation-state, as central to recognition, from ideas of 
citizenship and membership in a universal community. Her work suggests that there is 
a proto-political community, as discussed in the first chapter, which would be able to 
capture the ‘cosmopolitan citizen’ who is not granted membership in the nation-state.  
While Benhabib does think beyond the limits of the nation-state, citizenship 
remains the ultimate goal and symbol of identity and belonging. A similar belief in 
the importance of citizenship is reflected in proposals for the regularisation or 
legalisation of statuses.330 Undeniably in the immediate short-term, being granted 
citizenship where one otherwise is an illegal or undocumented migrant is beneficial as 
it can reduce immediate threat of deportation and subsequent vulnerability to abuse as 
a result of this fear. In the longer-term, regularisation as a solution to IML, or the 
experience of working in precarious situations, fails to recognise that legal status and 
formal citizenship do not remedy sub-citizenship or subjugated, precarious 
employment in spite of formal citizenship.331 Thus, IML continues to benefit the 
market economic system while persons are neglected the privilege of citizenship, 
under the assumption that persons ‘excluded’ from the community of value 
(citizenship in the nation), discussed in chapter one, will be included in the proto-
political community. The idea of a global proto-political sphere purports to unite 
people politically and socially across national borders and differentiated citizenship 
while allowing nation-states to forego responsibility for workers in the ‘global’ 
market. 
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Benhabib’s cosmopolitanism, in spite of claiming to be open for everyone—
all humanity under a cosmopolitan citizenship—remains rooted in the structure of the 
modern nation-state as the mediator of rights and granter of status to the individual. 
Her view of cosmopolitan citizenship, that she calls ‘disaggregated’ citizenship, 
obscures how it is the purported exclusion of some, at the boundary of the nation-
state, which forms and gives identity to the bounded nation-state. The citizen is 
recognised in contrast to the non-citizen. In the face of globalised economic markets 
and labour mobility ‘citizenship is an aspiration to persist’332 in the nation-state. Yet 
claims of cosmopolitan citizenship elide the actual experience of being excluded-
inside, of sub-citizenship and marginalisation within the system of the nation-state. 
Within the nation-state, immigration and labour laws are used to manage and regulate 
the movement and citizenship rights of individuals. Some persons are marginalised 
into unofficial situations of sub-citizenship or simply not given the power to speak as 
subjects.  
Judith Butler refers to such situations as ‘highly juridified states of 
dispossession.’333 Butler argues that within the nation-state, we are deprived of 
lexicon to understand other networks of power—all we have is reiteration of the same 
terms and same perspectives on power. For example, a key element of the nation-state 
is the border. The border allows a nation-state to exist, physically, as a defined 
territorial space. On the one hand, the border assumes a physical place such as an 
airport or seaport where the territorial border is physically policed on the spot. On the 
other hand, and more relevant to concerns of IML, the border is not a territorial border 
of a nation, but is a shifting construct that follows certain persons (Failed and sub-
Citizens) who are considered to be ‘outsiders’ ‘inside’.334 The dominant political and 
social idea that citizenship is negotiated through immigration law at the border does 
not take into account the shifting borders that affect citizens and non-citizens through 
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333 Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Who Sings the Nation-State? (New York, London, Calcutta: 
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differentiated membership (discussed in the first chapter). The physical border exists 
as if to control who is ‘in’ versus who is kept ‘out’. Yet the more elusive border that is 
within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state privileges those who are 
recognised as valued, economically productive, Good Citizens and marginalises 
others as sub-citizens.335  
 In response to concerns for the recognition and protection of migrants’ rights, 
scholars beyond Benhabib have explored the potential for de-nationalised citizenship. 
The European Union (EU), and within this the idea of European community, was one 
such imagined haven of post-national citizenship.336 It is through this potential that 
Benhabib argues that legal recognition (rights) should not rely on national citizenship, 
but on citizenship as a global, cosmopolitan belonging. Benhabib uses the EU as her 
primary point of reference. Benhabib proposes that a discourse-ethical standpoint, 
recommended as a perspective for the EU, is a double gesture that extends itself 
beyond itself and thus has the potential to include those excluded. Benhabib uses the 
language of hospitality to describe the ‘mediation between the ethical and the moral, 
the moral and the political.’337 However, her distinction of ethical, moral and political 
implies a normative standard that new claims for membership need to meet and 
satisfy before they can be validated or included.338 Benhabib reaffirms a faith in 
universality as a principle from which claims are judged. This implies an overarching 
logic that conditions the categories and the definition, or limits, of the universal. The 
foreigner, or the one labelled as a migrant, is always ‘marked as particularly in 
relation to European universality.’ 339  Rights claims concern the foreigner’s 
relationship to the fixed universal encompassed in the myth of the EU. ‘They’ are 
foreign to ‘us’, the international, universal European. While the European Union may 
represent success for the inclusion of some through its supra-national citizenship-
potential, Benhabib’s claim that it represents a ‘remarkable evolution of hospitality’340 
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or a new type of transferrable, post-national cosmopolitanism denies the present 
realities of persons, citizens and non-citizens, relegated by a nation-state-centric legal 
governance regime to legal grey areas.  
Although the EU is used as an example of post-national citizenship, it was not 
constructed to transcend the nation. The EU is an economically motivated union of 
separate sovereign nation-states. According to Jacqueline Bhaba, already in 1998 it 
was evident that ‘the concept of European Union citizenship, designed in part to 
address the rights deficit within Europe, has not so far created a base of fundamental 
rights capable of trumping state interests. Instead EU citizenship functions primarily 
as an exclusionary concept directed against non-Europeans.’341 The EU is defined by 
its exclusionary border, in spite the inclusion of rights provisions within the Lisbon 
Treaty for those inside the Union being included. It is the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) under the Council of Europe that recognises legally admitted visitors 
and/or residents and allows claims to be brought forth to the European Court, as 
mentioned above with the example of Siliadin v. France. The ill treatment of IML can 
be held to be in contravention to the ECHR, specifically article 3, prohibiting torture, 
degrading or inhumane treatment, and article 4, prohibiting slavery, servitude, forced 
or compulsory labour. 342 However these provisions do not easily extend to cases 
where one is without legal status or when residency and/or employment are insecure 
within the EU. The external borders of the EU are furthermore constituted such that if 
one is not a Union citizen then EU hospitality and disaggregated citizenship, as 
celebrated by Benhabib, is of little practical consequence. 343  In spite of the 
supranational economic structure of the EU and provision for the freedom of 
movement, citizenship in the EU is regulated by individual nation-states through 
unique processes of naturalization and immigration laws. EU citizenship enables 
mobility and labour rights within EU nations signed onto the Schengen agreement (as 
of 2006 the Directive on the right to move freely344) however persons deemed 
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undesirable, predominantly but not exclusively non-citizen with precarious legal 
status, in spite of their work and residence, can be removed. For example, in 2010 
there was a broad, legally sanctioned expulsion of Roma workers (EU nationals) that 
were deemed to be in France ‘illegally’.345 In 2015, the ongoing criticism of Greek 
and Italian immigration controls reveal the policing of Europe’s external borders, 
particularly at the border with North Africa. The European community’s decision to 
cease funding the Italian ‘mare nostrum’ programme in 2014 further exemplifies the 
limit of European hospitality and the stark lack of recognition of the humanity (their 
human rights, the ‘universal’ protection of which European nations pride themselves 
on) of persons beyond European citizens.346   
My approach to IML is primarily focused on the individuals who are labourers, 
actively working, as if they were irregular and migrant in low-waged and low-skilled 
sectors. Benhabib’s claim does not take into account the, what I call, political-
juridical-ecotechnical, experiences of people and labour markets, consequently falling 
short of interrogating the limits of universalism (universalism refers to a foundation, 
which contradicts its ability to be universal) and hospitality that are experienced by 
those that are relegated to the grey areas or sub-citizenship. Claiming universalism 
would mean overcoming statism. Until this conceptual leap is made, all acts claiming 
the ‘universal’ are subsumed within a state-centric project and are reliant on 
citizenship to organise membership. For this reason, the political-juridical-
ecotechnical methodology questions how, and why, claims for universal or total 
identities or belonging persist. Similarly, hospitality, when used as a utopian concept, 
can undermine the violent protectionism that is inherent in the state and its practice of 
citizenship and immigration law. This issue invites a much broader discussion which 
is beyond the scope of my present focus on citizenship and proposed alternatives.347 
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The claim for cosmopolitanism, rather than an open inclusive notion, can become a 
‘technically delivered accountancy for the powerful.’348 While Benhabib aspires 
towards a conceptualisation of ‘mediation between the ethical and the moral, the 
moral and the political,’349 this, ultimately, is limited to a predetermined framework 
backed by false contingency. Under the pretence of ‘universal’ or ‘cosmopolitanism’, 
the categories of ‘ethical’, ‘moral’, and ‘political’ are not questioned for their 
meaning (or for their false contingency). Benhabib assumes that these are the logical 
categories through which to speak about rights, citizenship and migration, specifically 
the rights of non-citizens or new citizens.    
Importantly, both Dauvergne’s and Benhabib’s theoretical analyses of 
irregular migration prompt alternative ways to think about IML. However, they also 
reaffirm the false contingency to the necessity of the nation-state and the market 
remain citizenship, proto-political community and a particular law-as-transcendent-
order. False contingency limits imagining possibilities based on experiences of 
coming together of persons in common, experiences that are caught up in processes of 
neoliberalisation and market economics as they fall into grey areas of formal 
definitions and categories. Citizenship is assumed to be the only way to order our 
identity and belonging, as if the nation-state were the only possible governance 
structure that our scholarship must either instrumentalise or resist. The process of 
revealing false contingencies and thereby de-familiarising dominant paradigms guides 
critical analyses to work towards bringing into relief the particular systems that 
continue our understanding of the nation-state, citizenship and economic market 
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participation. As alternatives they remain addressed to the structure of the state and its 
institutions, obfuscating possibilities of discovering foundational false presumptions. 
Hence, the suggestion remains that Jean-Luc Nancy’s work is invaluable in its 
capacity to illuminate what it might mean to be open to contingencies, beyond current 
false contingencies.350 Thinking of IML necessitates a step back from migration and 
labour scholarship if we strive to address false contingencies, in an effort to avoid 
reproducing the same limited conditions of possibility. This enables us to consider 
‘critique from the point of view of radical change,’351 where even critical legal studies 
of immigration and labour need to be kept in check for their own unquestioned 
contingencies.  
Immigration law has been the site of attempts to remedy the condition of 
irregular, or illegal, migration. Popularly, the emotional fear of migrants threatening 
UK borders and domestic (national) economic (labour) opportunities persist. In the 
UK, the fear of migrants and their labour market impact has its roots in a history of 
non-national workers supplementing a domestic labour force, especially during times 
of economic growth. Both immigration from the Commonwealth nations and the 
European Union has influenced the labour market availability of low-waged, low-
skilled labourers. 
 
UK	  Immigration	  Law:	  Reinforcing	  limited	  subjectivity	  for	  IML	  
If we identify above that legal subjectivity rests in a state-centric normative 
order, then the next step of identifying the false contingency of immigration law that 
supports the blanket label of IML is to question how national immigration laws 
address the issue of irregular migration and labour. Immigration law in the UK is 
uniquely situated between historical connections to the Commonwealth and the 
European Union (EU)—formerly, the European Economic Community, EEC. 
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Citizens of Commonwealth nations held, and continue to hold, certain privileges in 
the UK. The European Union and the Council of Europe meanwhile oblige their 
members to adhere to certain Conventions and Treaties. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
UK found itself in a position between controlling immigration from the 
Commonwealth and managing the free movement of labour from the EEC.352 The 
policy question concerning UK immigration was whether to fill labour shortages with 
workers from the Commonwealth or the EEC. The government favoured European 
workers who were less likely to remain in the country, since unlike citizens of the 
Commonwealth they had no claims to citizenship in the UK.353 The policy choice to 
favour European workers set a precedent for employing European workers on short-
term employment contracts in the UK—migrant workers—commonly facilitated 
through temporary worker programmes. In the UK, the Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Scheme (SAWS) initially permitted non-British nationals to work as agricultural 
workers, through a scheme that was separate from other temporary work permits (for 
low-skilled migrants). In 2012, the SAWS was limited to nationals of Bulgaria and 
Romania and only for six-month work terms. This country-specific limitation 
followed changes in 2008, when the Home Office phased out Tier Three, the category 
of immigration that allowed temporary low-skilled work permits to foreign nationals 
including non-EU nationals. The availability of EU workers was identified as 
sufficient to satisfy demands for this sector of migrant workers.354 Moreover as of 
January 1, 2014, the special permit/restriction for Romanians and Bulgarians in SAW 
was removed.355 Guestworker/Temporary Foreign Worker programmes were, and 
some continue outside the UK to be, promoted by governments and are believed to 
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benefit both countries of emigration and immigration.356 The two largest guest worker 
or migrant worker programmes began in the 1940s in Germany, the gastarbeiters, and 
the United States, the bracero programmes. The gastarbeiter programme was 
discontinued in 1973, and the bracero programme was abolished in 1964. Both have 
since been widely criticised for causing massive influxes of immigrant populations; 
the ‘guest’ workers never left.357 In spite of government-sponsored temporary worker 
programmes implemented in countries worldwide, scholars and advocates have been 
critical of many of these programmes.358 A migrant labour force has been a factor in 
labour market restructuring towards precarious employment: seasonal migrant 
workers were, by definition, precarious workers in intensive, short-term and thus 
exceptional employment situations. Those in favour of temporary worker programmes 
argue that the remittance payments given back to the country of origin benefit 
‘developing’ economies while the migrant is working abroad. It is assumed that 
migrants will invest skills, labour and money in their country of origin after they 
return from the temporary work programme.  
Notwithstanding criticism of remittances, the actual temporariness of 
temporary work programmes is misleading. Rather than facilitating a neat exchange 
of labour for money, these programmes have established patterns of circular 
migration, which not only supply a regular (constant) labour force that is ostensibly 
temporary and therefore precarious (lacking in security and long-term employment), 
but circular migration can lead to a lack of investment in local and national industries 
and a dependence in the country of emigration on foreign income.359 In the ‘host’ 
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country, guest worker programmes create a demand for, and a reliance on, foreign 
workers. These workers provide a type of labour that was never considered to be 
regular, but is seen to be economically beneficial and thus has become part of the 
regular (common) labour market. 360  Although restrictions and limits placed on 
immigration have reduced or discontinued many seasonal work programmes, as noted 
above in the UK, the demand for flexible, seasonal, irregular labour remains.  
Since the SAWS programme in the UK for low-skilled workers has been 
phased out, migrant advocates and researchers warn that the vulnerability of 
agricultural workers has increased. Martin Ruhs summarises key failures of temporary 
migrant workers programmes as the following: the exploitation of migrant workers in 
both recruitment and employment; the emergence of labour market distortions, and 
the growth of a structural dependence by certain industries on continued employment 
of migrant workers and, perhaps most importantly from the receiving country’s point 
of view, the non-return and eventual settlement of many guest workers.361 The UK 
agricultural sector is currently less regulated for all labourers including for EU and 
citizen workers, who are working in this sector.362 The standard expected from 
employers and workers for both costs of production and consumer costs are based on 
the seasonal agricultural worker supply. Moreover, as non-EU nationals have little 
possibility for acquiring work permits in low-waged, low-skilled labour in the UK, 
their labour is still desirable. For instance, as soon as EU citizens have access to other 
labour sectors, which, as noted above became the reality for Bulgarian and Romanian 
workers since January 1, 2014, it has been suggested by employers and politicians 
that EU-nationals will find work in less demanding industries as these opportunities 
become available. This would renew demand for workers in bottom-end jobs.363 
However, the downward pressure on wages and labour practices suggests that 
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regardless of being EU nationals, labourers in bottom-end jobs are treated as IML.  
The employer demand for migrant labour (where hiring temporary foreign workers is 
one option among many), and measures to facilitate return have been identified as key 
areas of analysis necessary to determine the positive and negative effects of 
temporary worker programmes.364 This is salient to our discussion of IML because the 
conditions and standards established through years of employment through seasonal 
temporary worker programmes are now the model for irregular labour—a flexible, 
temporary, dis-missable, precarious and ‘captive’ labour force. Temporary worker 
programmes have contributed to an institutionalisation of irregular demands, which 
now form commonplace labour practices in low-waged, low-skilled sectors. The 
prices of the production and commodities, such as affordable ‘British grown’ produce 
depend on the availability and employment of cheap, flexible and precarious labour. 
These labour practices, together with a lack of regulation from the government or 
labour organisations, have led to many low-waged, low-skilled sectors demonstrating 
a high potential for undeclared and irregular work.365 Often, but not exclusively, 
workers in these sectors are considered to be ‘migrants’.  
Immigration policies that restrict internal/national mobility, as well as access 
for non-nationals to state support, further increase the probability that persons without 
citizenship status can end up in irregular situations.366 A practice of immigration 
control that causes more irregular situations while purportedly deterring irregular 
migration is, for example, preventing persons already living and working in a country 
to apply for permission to work.367 When persons already present within the UK are 
not allowed to apply for permission to work whilst within the country, they are forced 
to decide between exiting the country to apply for a work permit from abroad, or 
working without a valid permit. For persons employed in high-skilled work with a 
sponsor the administrative step of leaving to renew or apply for a work permit may be 
costly but not unviable. Those without a stable permanent employer, who would not 
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be able to secure official sponsorship for a work permit or those who have a failed 
asylum claim may chose to continue in unregulated irregular work without a valid 
work permit. This may be the preferred choice, worth the risk, despite the increased 
vulnerability to worker exploitation and the ‘illegality’ of working without a valid 
permit. The policy decision to limit access to work and services (similar to those 
afforded to citizens) intended to deter migration in practice creates a division of 
labour and a demand for the labour force that results from these irregular situations.  
In the UK, since 1999 Immigration Acts have tightened regulations and 
limited access to formal citizenship.368 Failed asylum claimants (persons without 
status) are excluded from accessing benefits.369 While a discussion of access to rights 
for asylum seekers is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is noteworthy that Section 55 
of the 2002 Act demonstrates inconsistencies between UK immigration legislation 
and EU commitments and ILO Conventions.370 The Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 established criminal sanctions against employers hiring labourers 
who did not have permission to work; however these reforms did not successfully 
address precarious statuses. The 2002 Act also strengthened Section 8 of the Asylum 
and Immigration Act 1996: section 8 deemed it an offence ‘to knowingly or 
negligently employ people without permission to work.’371 Contrary to expectations 
that this provision would decrease the prevalence of irregular employment and help 
                                                
368 Among the Acts established since 2000 are the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Asylum 
and Immigration Act 2004, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004, Immigration, 
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Act 2008, and the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. 
369 Section 55 of the 2002 Act stated that there was no obligation on the State to provide support where the claim 
for asylum was not made within ‘reasonable’ time. This caused a legal uproar after individuals (migrants) were left 
with no access to support, and were prevented from legal employment, when they arrived to the UK as asylum 
seekers. United Kingdom Border Agency, ‘Full Guide for Employers On Preventing Illegal Work in the UK’ 
(London UK: Home Office, May 2012), 33.  
370 The House of Lords case, Szoma [2005], held that the blanket application of section 55 was contrary to 
international legal obligations. In Szoma, the House of Lords decided that people temporarily admitted into the UK 
were “lawfully present” and therefore could not legally be denied access to all benefits. Szoma v Secretary of State 
for the Department of Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 64 para 9: Whilst previously the appellant had been 
entitled to income support simply by virtue of his presence in the United Kingdom, the 1999 Act changed that 
position. Section 115(1) of the Act, under the heading "Exclusion from Benefits", provided that no one is entitled 
to income support and a number of other specified security benefits "while he is a person to whom this section 
applies." Subsection (3) provides that "This section applies to a person subject to immigration control unless he 
falls within such category or description, or satisfies such conditions, as may be prescribed." Subsection (9) 
provides: "'A person subject to immigration control' means a person who is not a national of an EEA state and who 
- (a) requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but does not have it. . ." These inconsistencies 
include neglecting commitments to human rights, and passing acts and amendments with great frequency and 
speed. These factors create irregular legal status for individuals who may have legal status and rights according to 
some regulations, and, according to other regulations, may have illegal status. 
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workers, the 2002 Act protected employers by ensuring that employers had a statutory 
defence against section 8 violations. If employers held that they did not know about 
illegality at the time of entering into the employment contract, then they were not 
contravening section 8.372 As a result only their workers, the ‘migrants,’ were at 
fault.373  
The focus in immigration policy on legal sanctions to prevent unwanted 
foreigners from entering the country rather than confront why employers continue to 
employ workers in sub-standard conditions reflects Britain’s historical reluctance to 
regulate employment in the UK.374 Regulation is seen to harm economic growth. 
However, increased controls may also unintentionally increase the prevalence of 
undeclared employment because non-compliant employers hide their undeclared 
employment practices more carefully, instead of dismissing their employees.375 Even 
the threat of sanction for employers has exacerbated conditions that create uncertain, 
irregular immigration and labour statuses because employers are pushing their 
workers further ‘underground’.  
The 2002 White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven, suggested that to end the 
availability of illicit work for irregular migrants, government, business and the public 
needed to form a collective response, ‘to ensure that illegal work is not readily 
available in the UK.’376 The proposal in the White Paper, however, did not consider 
questions of why, in economic terms, the demand for irregular labour existed in the 
first place. In other words, the proposed strategy aimed to deactivate the pull factors 
that encouraged irregular migration withheld an analysis of labour market demand 
and economic market pressures. The proposal further reinforced citizenship as a 
                                                
372 A Home Office document in 2003 on the Prevention of Illegal Working proposed changes to the list of required 
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cornerstone of membership and participation.377  According to the White Paper, 
migrant labourers were providing false and fraudulent documents to their employers 
in order to gain admission and employment to the country. Ostensibly, the deceptive 
techniques of those persons lumped together under the label IML became responsible 
for irregular employment. In practice, the White Paper shifted responsibility onto 
employers to ensure that the documentation of migrant labourers was not fraudulent. 
However the lack of enforcement that followed these recommendations indicates the 
absence of serious consideration by government in regards to underlying factors that 
create and maintain a precarious labour force. 
Security precautions for all visa holders and mandatory sponsorship are 
measures, introduced in 2005, aimed at ensuring that migrants on temporary permits 
leave the UK when their permit expires.378 The Home Office introduced the points-
based system (PBS) for work permits. The PBS obliged all applicants below Tier 1 
(highly skilled work permits) to apply via a UK sponsor. The employer-sponsor was 
responsible for the migrant—for their entry requirements and, more importantly, for 
their exiting the country according to the conditions of their work permit.379 This shift 
abrogated government oversight over immigration work permits and opened the 
potential for businesses to benefit from cheaper labour, which government saw as 
beneficial for the national economy. However, sponsorship has also increased the 
potential that workers will be exploited. Workers are bound to particular employers 
for their legal right to be in the country and thus without recourse to seek safer, or 
non-abusive employment.380  
Immigration policies prioritise an employer-led, flexible system, ‘responsive 
to market needs’381 above labour protection. Work permit sponsorship has lent more 
                                                
377 Anderson, Us & Them, 2. 
378 United Kingdom Border Agency, "Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain," Cm 6472, 
2005, 8. According to Charles Clarke, “swift removal [of failed asylum seekers and other immigration offenders] 
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power to employers and, although there are regulations intended to hold employers 
accountable, the provisions against exploitative employers have not been enforced to 
the same extent as those punishing labourers. An example of the lack of enforcement 
is the 2004 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act and, 
separately, the Gangmasters (Licensing Authority) 2004 Act (GLA). These Acts 
addressed unregulated employment and situations whereby employers knowingly 
employ illegal workers by introducing workplace inspections and spot fines for 
employers using illegal workers.382 The 2004 Act and the GLA were specifically 
meant to respond to gang labour. Gang labour is ‘a form of temporary casual labour in 
which an agent (‘gangmaster’) contracts and supplies workers for employment in the 
British labour market, traditionally in the horticultural and agricultural sectors.’383 
This form of employment facilitates a flexible labour supply that is mostly filled by 
migrants from EU countries. According to Kendra Strauss, ‘many gang workers are 
economic migrants from the EU accession countries, recruited in their country of 
origin by local labour intermediaries, while some ... are undocumented workers who 
become enmeshed in local networks of non-British labour contractors.’384 
Many migrant advocates and workers welcomed the intervention made by the 
GLA in 2004. However, the GLA focuses only on particular labour sectors, excluding 
labour that is self-employed or agency work. Consequently, much of the on-going 
exploitation experienced by precarious labourers occurs beyond the scope of this 
legislation. The GLA also suffers from a severe lack of funding to enforce its mandate 
and carry out inspections.385 In spite of the GLA’s mandate to regulate employers and 
the Points Based System (PBS) formalising work permits, the demands in 
employment that maintain irregular and exploitative labour practices exceed existing 
regulations. The continuous lack of funding has prevented the GLA from being 
enforced in a way that would sufficiently guard against exploitation in the workplace. 
The PBS made the process of acquiring legal permission to migrate and sponsor 
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migrants more difficult, and the number of persons coming in from non-EEA 
countries to work in low-skilled/ low-wages occupations has decreased. Meanwhile 
the standards, wages and conditions in the labour sectors have not improved.386 
Neither the PBS nor the GLA eliminated precarious employment where this type of 
employment is kept off record. Employers may extend working hours, withhold pay, 
or require workers to work overtime without pay, all the while appearing to give their 
workers autonomous choice to consent or refuse. Employers are able to manipulate 
terms of employment that defer their responsibility, for example when labourers are 
technically self-employed or sub-contracted through an agency. In these cases, the 
employer is not necessarily bound to protect the workers through existing company 
regulations or policies.387  
Since 2004, much of the focus in government policy has been on border 
crossing and entry. This has not left room to focus on ‘how to make the UK (and the 
EU as a whole) a more unattractive environment for working illegally.’ 388  If 
employment conditions were improved, regulated and monitored, then the type of 
jobs and conditions precarious migrant workers are employed in could potentially be 
avoided. Many low-waged sectors profit, and rely on, a supply of labourers who work 
in sub-standard conditions. Since 2010, the coalition government has continued to 
target ‘illegality’, but simultaneously has prioritised economic growth that relies on a 
precarious labour force. Thus, government policy and legislation has largely failed to 
confront the on-going exploitation of vulnerable labourers: EU workers, British 
working poor, and non-EU immigrant workers.  
As mentioned above, the accession of ten East European states to EEA in May 
2004 decreased the demand for labour from outside of the EU.389 EU-country 
nationals are not immigrants with precarious, or uncertain, immigration status. Instead 
of immigration, IML may be explained more accurately as a racialisation or 
ethnicisation of labour sectors, where ethnic, linguistic and race-based factors—even 
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if second generational—determine the type of work in which people are employed.390 
This suggests that, as UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown implied through the slogan 
‘British jobs for British workers’391 in 2007, there are limited jobs available for white-
ethnically-British workers. Thus, in spite of the enforced exclusion of non-EU 
labourers, labourers considered to be migrant continue to fill a labour demand that is 
conditioned towards a migrant labour force. The political and media rhetoric claims 
that labourers considered migrants remain disproportionately represented in certain 
sectors to the extent that employers do not seek out a ‘British’ (implicitly white) 
labour force. The ethnicised groups from which employers draw their workers in low-
waged or bottom end sectors fuel discourses that blame immigrant labour for 
displacing existing workers.392 Meanwhile, research indicates that, ‘despite high-
profile media debate on this issue ... migrant labour does not generally disadvantage 
existing workers by displacing or depressing wages.’393 Economic evidence published 
in 2014 supports this fact.394 
Labour sectors that continue to employ low-skilled, low-waged workers, often 
in irregular labour situations, remain absent from visa guides to the UK. 395 
Concurrently, restrictions have increased for all migrants, and since 2013, the future 
of EU membership became a major political concern.396 Employment practices that 
exceed traditional frameworks and bypass existing employment law protections 
continue, which suggests that persons with actual immigration status and/or 
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citizenship are employed in irregular situations—or in some cases, migrants may 
enter as skilled workers but are soon swept into low-waged, low-skilled sectors due to 
existing networks that directly feed a particular demand for this labour.397 In either 
case, low-waged, low-skilled labour sectors impact the legal subjectivity of labourers 
regardless of their citizenship status. Thus, IML are those who are denied legal status 
as ‘full’ subjects: both subjectum and subjectus. They remain only partial subjects 
because they are only subjectus: ‘subjected to law, brought to life by law’s protocols, 
shaped by law’s demands and rewards subjected under law.’398  
 
Conclusion:	  False	  Contingency	  in	  the	  Demand	  for	  Migrant	  Workers	  
The idea of legal subjectivity and who is a legal subject, with access to rights 
and status underpins immigration law’s mandate to mediate citizenship. A citizen of a 
nation-state is believed to be a subject of the law, and the law is believed to exist for 
the subject and because of the subject. The label IML imposes a different subjectivity 
onto persons who do not conform to the community of value, in other words to 
acceptable categories of immigration and belonging within the nation-state. The 
condition of subjectivity for persons considered IML is that they remain IML in legal 
grey areas while contributing to the economic market system. Immigration regulations 
are intended to regulate legal status, and legal status allows one to access rights within 
the nation-state. Yet formal citizenship that is equated with full legal subjectivity is 
based on the false contingency of citizenship. If one is considered a British citizen, it 
is assumed that s/he will be granted rights that enable her/his participation as a subject 
of the nation-state. This subject is believed to be active in the liberal democratic 
system constituted by, and in obedience to, the law and legal system. Employment 
status and one’s economic productivity recognised in the market economic system 
intertwine with what is considered regular legal status. Citizenship is often 
synonymous with having the right to vote in elections, having ones (human) rights 
protected, being in an employment relationship, earning a waged income and 
participating productively in the economic market. Citizenship, legal subjectivity and 
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economic productivity are not the same thing. One’s economic participation may be 
more or less recognised by the market economic system, and rendered more or less 
desirable as an attribute of Good Citizenship. Moreover, one can be a subject or 
subjected to a regime (legal and national) without enjoying the presumed privileges of 
citizenship.  
When the law acts as a regulatory regime of the nation-state, the law 
establishes the Subject as free and autonomous but simultaneously subjected to the 
logic of institutions. The methodology of my analysis of IML meanwhile relies on 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s theorising of law, which pushes us to think of law and frameworks 
beyond, or before, the presupposition of a Subject. Nancy discusses this through 
thinking of the ecotechnical circulation of bodies: the very materiality of sociality as 
the law that can be traced, but not traced-into (inscribed) predetermined categories as 
predetermined sociality, namely the formal nation-state and in practice the community 
of value. Law as it is conventionally discussed and instrumentalised relies on Subjects 
to be subjected, submitted, under law’s authority. The legal system is deemed to 
represent the ‘dominant ideology of society,’399 and therefore implicitly law has its 
authority and legitimacy affirmed by the consent or approval of those same subjects. 
This legal relationship determines those who are ‘within’ a society as subjects of the 
law, granted rights and protection from the law mediated through the state. 
Immigration law ostensibly allocates worthy participation against those who are 
deemed unworthy of citizenship (non-citizens). Thereby immigration law relies on the 
order of the international political and legal system, where it is presumed that 
everyone belongs to a state. ‘Migrants’ are identified as migrants because, within the 
ideal of the nation-state and citizenship, they are persons in movement but with a state 
that is their ‘country of origin’ to which they can return for their rights and citizenship 
to be validated.400 
It remains difficult to conceive of remedies for IML where immigration law is 
unaffected. According to Dider Bigo, it is not so much a failure of immigration law, 
but mis-placed attention through policy responses to security. Efforts to resist overt 
discrimination in EU immigration claims have at times been successful ‘based on 
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fundamental rights, legal cohesiveness and social and political mobilisation ...’ but 
this has meant that ‘those most affected in practice are the most vulnerable foreigners, 
second generation immigrants ...’. 401 Immigration law does not address the embedded 
racial and socio-economic discrimination that reinforces the elusive category of IML, 
based on legally reinforced social and legal sub-citizenship. There is no coherent, 
single labour force or migration demographic that is IML. Moreover, it is insufficient 
to say that this category is beyond existing legal categories, as if constructing more 
categories would create inclusion. The demand for migrant labour begs for close 
scrutiny in order to unravel the phenomenon of IML,402 and yet a ‘reliance on migrant 
labour will not be decreased by immigration policies alone.’403  2010 statistics of 
unemployment in the United Kingdom (UK) demonstrate that a citizen labour force 
could fill labour demand and therefore a migrant labour force is not practically 
necessary. However, citizens, Good Citizens, with access to education and social 
welfare support are reluctant to take lower paid, devalued jobs. 404  Overall 
employment conditions and job quality (part-time/full-time, availability of benefits, 
long-term contracts and so on) would need to be improved in order to attract a citizen 
workforce.  
The demand for IML is structurally embedded and dependencies have been 
created for both migrant and citizen workers. The impact on production expectation of 
temporary worker programmes and the racialisation of low-waged labour sectors has 
created a downward pressure on wages. There are workers agreeing to work for less, 
for intense periods of time and international networks supply a steady, self-regulating 
stream of labourers when needed. These factors result in conditions where people—
EU citizens, nationals and non-nationals—are not hireable unless they conform to 
lower standards of employment and pay. 405  In other words, processes of 
neoliberalisation condition workers to become IML, sub-citizens with economic value 
only as subjectus. The inscription of value based on low-waged, low-skilled, 
ethnicised and racialised labour, is based on false contingency of citizenship, 
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404 Anderson and Ruhs, A Need for Migrant Workers?, 29.  
405 Anderson and Ruhs, “Reliance on migrant labour”, 25; Guild and Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour 
Migration, 3. 
Chapter 3, Immigration law and the construction of irregular migrant labour 
 144 
economic value and subjectivity. Substantial institutional changes need to be 
implemented regarding immigration, citizenship and employment to address labour 
protection for all workers engaged in social production and reproduction. These 
changes would address the current division that posits a national (domestic) labour 
force, as if these people were able to demand minimum wage and labour protection, 
while foreign labourers are those willing to work under substandard conditions and 
pay because they have no other option. Contrary to commonly expressed fears in the 
UK and beyond, there is no direct correlation between unemployment and 
immigration.406 Consequently, ‘immigration should be seen as the effect of wider 
problems, not the cause.’407 According to a UK policy analyst, firms ‘stuck in low-
skill, low-value business models, employing millions of people on chronically low 
wages’ are the deeper and more pressing, issue.408   
My argument follows that labour market forces and the legal and social, 
moreover economic, subjectivity—how persons are subjected to the false contingency 
of the labour market as ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’—is the more pressing and 
fundamental issue. Precarious employment is common for around two million 
workers in the UK.409 Labourers agreeing to work with short-term flexible contracts 
are replacing a permanent workforce. 410  Whether through subcontracted work, 
agreeing to zero-hour contracts,411 not claiming hours worked or forfeiting overtime 
wages and/or benefits, labourers and businesses that fight to maintain economic 
competitiveness exist in legal grey areas and irregular situations.412 And while 
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businesses may prosper in the short-term, workers remain in precarious, marginalised 
and shadowed positions.  
Defining these demographics and their direct relationship to law is impossible. 
This is both a condition of the inability for the label IML to capture the experience of 
precarious labour and migration, including the way labour sectors are racialised and 
ethnicised, and the inability for law to be a fixed mould applicable to all experiences. 
The suspended recognition encompassed in the category of IML discussed here 
disrupts legal immigration categories. Yet the systemic ‘irregularity’ is exscribed in 
relation to a changing ideal, as well as exscribed from the homogenising category of 
IML. To speak about IML and the experiences that are inscribed into this label as well 
as those exscribed, we must move beyond conventional notions of subjectivity, 
citizenship and legal status arbitrated through immigration law. 
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Chapter 4. Labour Law’s False 
Contingency 
 
This chapter discusses false contingency in labour law. Attention to false 
contingency opens up other fresh possibilities of labour law’s scope and mandate 
where traditional labour law is identified as limited. The political-juridical-
ecotechnical method of examining IML points to the previously under-theorised 
importance of labour and labour markets. The eco-technics of labour bring to light 
what is happening on the ground within political discourses, juridical decisions and 
practices of employment, work and economic participation. Harry Arthurs suggests 
we think of ‘labour law as law incarnate’.413 He joins other labour law scholars to 
scrutinize question and debate the role and purpose of labour law in the twenty-first 
century.414 Labour law is particularly suited to my methodological approach and 
Nancy’s work, particularly where labour concerns social reproduction, care and un-
quantifiable work, which I introduce in the final section of this chapter. Approaching 
IML through a deep questioning of subjectivity and citizenship utilizing Nancy’s 
notions of ecotechnics, struction415, sense and exscription416 can be transformative for 
labour law. 
Currently, diverging international and national labour regulations and legal 
regimes make it difficult to consolidate what protections and regulations exist for 
precarious labourers and migrants (persons considered IML). 417  The lack of a 
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415 Struction changes the way that we relate to categories and definitions—away from expecting legal categories, 
in particular, to contain a remedy or to maintain a regular, encompassing framework above the market. Law is 
instrumentalised within processes of neoliberalisation, yet law itself is no thing and consequently is not solely a 
tool of neoliberalisation and market ideology.  
416 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 338. Exscription refers to what is beyond the inscribed, what is 
present, but placed away from the ‘text’. Nancy uses this theme in many of his writings, but what is relevant here 
is when Nancy attempts to articulate the ‘sense’ of the world and the world of sense. Nancy, Sense of the World, 9, 
14. 
417 Chantal Thomas, “Convergences and Divergences in International Legal Norms on Migrant Labour” (2011) 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 32: 405-444. 
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consistently defined demographic that is IML together with the difficulty of 
negotiating national, European and international jurisdictions in trans-national labour 
regulation challenges conventional frameworks of legal analysis. Theoretical 
deliberations of labour law and production struggling to reinvigorate mid-twentieth 
century labour rights and justice concerns also are challenged by the shift from 
industry production models of labour relations to trans-national, corporate business 
employers and firms. In much the same way that in the previous chapter we saw 
migration scholarship perpetuating a systemic—economic labour market—reliance on 
IML, labour law scholarship can too be complicit in IML reinforcing legal grey areas 
by failing to recognize false contingency. Often, the conditions and limits of labour 
law are assumed to be natural and necessary and, therefore, unquestioned. The global 
market economic system and subjectivity based in a contractual employment 
relationship, and hierarchies of value based in economic productivity and 
participation are believed to form the foundation of labour and labour regulation. 
When challenged, the alternatives lie in notions of justice, equality and freedom that 
nonetheless assume citizenship in a collective nation-state as the basis for 
participation and economics. However, the dynamics of twenty-first century markets 
and shifting labour demands complicate these assumptions. This climate of flux 
enables labour law to turn towards an exploration of its potential to respond to a 
different understanding of incommensurability and the law. Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
theoretical challenge to re-think law offers a route to confront false contingency. 
Potentially, Nancy’s fundamental questioning can release our thinking from the 
confines of citizenship and, in labour law, the standard contractual employment 
relationship. Contingencies will infinitely encounter their false assumptions and false 
contingency as a consequence of the incommensurability of the limit (law). However, 
Nancy’s challenge to think of the experience of value and economics by people in 
originary socialities offers a significant movement towards shifting paradigms of 
thought and frameworks of labour and migration.  
IML is a label developed in contrast to operative ‘regular’ citizenship that 
enables or facilitates categories of employment and work in UK employment law. 
Again, these categories are bound by the dominant subject/citizen/state/sovereignty 
paradigm that has served as a foundation for conventional understandings of law, 
labour and economics. However the contemporary practices in low-waged, low-
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skilled sectors, where a flexible and temporary form of employment has become a 
requisite for businesses to maintain national and international competitiveness, 
suggests that the regular citizen worker, and the Good Citizen discussed in previous 
chapters, is not a tangible material practice.418 If anything, the ‘irregular’ is ‘regular’. 
Businesses/employers encourage a workforce that can be hired and fired in response 
to unpredictable changes, for instance, shocks in financial markets that affect labour 
market decisions.419 Short-term, fixed-term or temporary sub-contracted labour is 
commonly seen to be most economically profitable and viable as a labour practice in 
the globalised labour market system. Consequently, labour practices have instigated a 
shift in employment that affects the relationship of the social welfare state to persons 
in employment, where individuals are precarious contracts without stable or sufficient 
(living wage) income, as well as detrimentally affects an individual’s access to 
employment law and protection against abuse. 
In 2013, Prime Minister of Britain, David Cameron, deemed that ‘immigration 
and welfare are two sides of the same coin.’420 Migrants are blamed for labour market 
changes that result in higher pressures on social welfare systems and a perceived lack 
of resources. In fact, citizen and non-national workers are affected by de-centralised 
and global market-focused labour regimes that have privatised responsibility for 
workers and their social welfare. Consequently, if the social welfare and well being of 
workers is not a market or industry priority, there is little accountability to ensure 
individuals receive adequate wages, sick pay, and access to health care, pensions or 
disability pay. Labour practices based on the global market economy have shifted 
individuals position in relation to the state via the community of value that deems 
who is deserving of access to legal protections and legal subjectivity. Thus citizen-
workers, like non-nationals, are left to work in situations that are precarious and 
temporary—work previously reserved for a temporary, seasonal migrant labour 
force.421 The unquestioned, false, contingency of the economic market system and its 
                                                
418 Wills, Datta, et al., Global Cities at Work, 7, 23. 
419 “A ‘temp’ can be hired and fired at an hour’s notice, be paid less for doing the same job, and lacks rights such 
as paid holidays and redundancy pay.” Owen Jones, Chavs: Demonisation of the Working Class (London: Verso 
Books, 2012), 149. 
420  David Cameron, ‘Immigration Speech’ 25 March 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-
camerons-immigration-speech accessed 1 June 2013. 
421 See Anderson, “Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers”, 313; Anderson, Us 
and Them; Guy Standing The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 
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impact on labour markets assumes a totalising, global presence. It is simpler for the 
UK government to focus on immigration policies as the cause of IML rather than 
grapple with a neoliberalising, globalised economic model. The economic market 
system guides political and legal discussions and priorities. Therefore the institutional 
response to remedy IML comes first from within the market system that must keep 
this labour irregular. Moreover, this market economic system is believed to provide 
justice and rights through (free) market participation. The humanitarian or ethical 
imperative to respond to situations of subjugation and vulnerability can be placated, 
or silenced, by idealised market-ends. Therefore the market model continues largely 
unquestioned because its presence as the underlying, guiding false necessity and false 
contingency is for the most part un-noticed. Immigration tackles a familiar site of 
differentiation, the territorial border, and therefore problems of IML become 
immigration problems, rather than a consequence of neoliberal market economics. 
However immigration law and policy is incapable of addressing the market forces that 
underlie IML. IML is a manifestation of a privileged global market economic system 
that through processes of neoliberalisation has capitalised on the eco-technics of our 
coming together in-common.  
 
Critical	  Labour	  Law	  Scholarship	  and	  IML	  
As a legal field, labour law is situated precisely at the paradox of law’s 
incommensurability with itself: law is a co-appearance of a limit and the exscription 
of that limit. Labour law responds to a market economic system and is 
instrumentalised to establish legal rules as well as legal ambiguities according to the 
dominant market economic model. Concurrently, labour law traces a material 
sociality because the field of labour and law are understood to be capable of 
responding to our bodies at work (labour) as recognising them as more than a market 
and part of processes of social reproduction and community. Simply, a deconstruction 
of ‘labour law’ can be understood as part of the processes forming an economy as 
‘logic’ of the ‘household’, while labour is a mode/manner of interaction in a 
plurality/sociality/community. Labour law, therefore, is not fixed to the standard 
contractual employment relationship and market model. Labour law is not 
predetermined as a field of law in the way that immigration is meant to regulate and 
Chapter 4, Labour Law’s False Contingency 
 150 
control the territorial, nation-state border. Alternatively labour law has the potential to 
open avenues for work to be recognised for the value of persons’ labour as 
participation in a sociality in spite of the dominant global economic market. But this 
alternative can only be realised if expectations of legal subjectivity, and the practices 
of differentiating subjectivities (subjectum and subjectus discussed in the previous 
chapter) are likewise questioned and re-thought. Thinking of labour law alternatively 
is only possible insofar as we fundamentally re-evaluate what is considered to be 
labour, work and labour market participation.422  
Harry Arthurs responds to the crisis ostensibly facing labour law scholars by 
envisioning labour law as incarnate, since labour law is ‘to a significant extent path-
dependent; it takes its purpose, form and content from the larger political economy in 
which it originates and operates.’423 Labour law has developed with a purpose of 
enabling workers to seek equality and/or justice in the workplace and arguably the 
labour market. The structure of the workplace and labour market are currently 
predisposed to prevent access to labour protections for workers in the labour market, 
particularly for those in low-skilled, low-waged work. Regulations are seen to inhibit 
economic growth and financial progress. However labour law, and indeed labour and 
law independent of each other, are not isolated practices or sets of rules. As Nancy’s 
work indicates, law is no thing. Therefore labour law has within its ambit a task to re-
think, and arguably to re-define, how the limits of labour protection and the market 
are constituted and reproduced.  
One of the central tenets of labour law, enshrined in the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), is resistance to labour as a commodity. Although labour is 
exchanged within a labour market system, in essence it is the activity of social 
production and re-production—what keeps ‘society’ functioning. Meanwhile, labour 
has been constructed as if it were a commodity and something consumable as a 
modality of economic production. Judy Fudge identifies labour as a ‘fictional 
                                                
422 See Guy Davidov and Brian Langille eds., The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
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commodity’424 because labour cannot exist as a commodity independent of an owner. 
This distinction is important to distil from debates within labour law where ‘the object 
of regulation (a labour market problem of some kind or other here termed a regulatory 
dilemma) [is difficult to distinguish] from the means of regulation (particular 
institutional responses).’425 The labour market and market economic responses have 
engulfed labour study into a self-referential circuit. Labour law is totalised into a 
specific form of regulation, which although ‘responding at a particular moment in 
time has come to be seen as the form, rather than a form, of labour law.’426 The labour 
market and recognition of marketised labour is only understood in response to the 
market economic system, such that international or national regulatory efforts to think 
of justice or (labour) rights can do so only with reference to market participation. This 
is based on a false contingency of economic productivity and the market.  
Labour law’s transformative potential persists because of labour’s productive 
and reproductive capacity that reaches across multiple borders, including but not 
limited to the dominant market economic system.427 UK labour law is informed by 
practices of employment, cultures of work, economic markets, as well as notions of 
justice, fairness/equality (Equality Act 2010) and rights (Employment Rights Act 
1996). But labour law also concerns the link between production and social 
reproduction. The paradox of law is played out in the demand for regulations, 
flexibility, productivity, fairness and justice for workers and modes of production.428 
The movement of people providing labour (labourers) and the shifting demands, or 
fluidity, of the labour market challenge regulatory efforts and definitions of 
employment by what is exscribed beyond the inscribed frames of labour—both in 
terms of market economics and traditional Marxist theories of labour. The exscribed 
are the incommensurable forces of market productivity and fairness, of national 
(domestic) labour protection and global market economic growth that enact 
differential legal subjectivity inside the eco-technical circulation of capital and social 
                                                
424 Judy Fudge, "Labour as a Fictive Commodity," In The Idea of Labour, Guy Davidov and Brian Langille eds., 
120-136 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 121. 
425 Jamie Peck, quoted in J. Fudge, “Labour as a Fictive Commodity”, 121.  
426 J. Fudge, “Labour as a Fictive Commodity”, 121. 
427 Adelle Blackett, "Emancipation in the Idea of Labour Law," in The Idea of Labour Law, Guy Davidov and 
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428 Labour is dependent on the reproduction of labour. J. Fudge, “Labour as a Fictive Commodity”, 131.  
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being. By identifying the potential of labour law to be understood beyond the standard 
or conventional employment relationship model, labour law scholars are raising issue 
with the falsity of the market. The falsity of the market creates precarious labour as 
the demand and supply of workers and ‘global’ migration. Nevertheless, the question 
remains of how to avoid reproducing it. Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach has been 
proffered as a positive new approach to labour. However, in Sen’s approach, 
“capabilities”, are themselves limited to what an individual requires in order to 
participate as an active member of the social, economic, community. Judy Fudge 
highlights that according to Sen, capabilities are assumed to be for an individual who 
is autonomous, ‘unencumbered by care responsibilities.’ 429  As long as paid 
employment and “active” (wage-earning) participation in the market economic system 
is privileged over socially necessary, but undervalued work, for instance work in the 
home or care work, an approach that seeks to enable capabilities will continue to 
reproduce economic inequalities that are based on where and how value of work is 
allocated and recognised. The very nature of what is considered labour—waged, 
marketised, quantifiable work—impacts the scope of labour law’s ability to expand 
towards precarious, vulnerable labourers, even in alternative approaches such as 
Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach. The task to think about what is labour and how 
this connects to value and economic participation parallels work by critical legal 
theorists who draw attention to the ideological underpinnings and contradictions 
within traditional jurisprudence in order to think about the role of law in social 
reproduction and social being through post-structuralism and post-modern theory.430  
For instance, Judy Fudge’s critique of labour law as a fictional commodity 
presents an insight similar to labour law’s false contingency. As Susan Marks 
                                                
429 J. Fudge, “Labour as a Fictive Commodity”, 132. 
430 Douzinas and Geary refer to this task of critical legal studies as the “ontology of social life.” Costas Douzinas 
and Adam Geary, Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2005), 11. Theorists 
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law. Ruth Buchanan, Stewart Motha and Sundhya Pahuja, Reading Modern Law: Critical Methodologies and 
Sovereign Formulations (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).  
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cautions, false necessity431 can be rewritten as contingency: the ‘false necessity’ of 
economic growth has been re-written as contingency of the market.432 The market is 
but a form of labour organisation and one that is itself fluid and malleable, however it 
is assumed to be a natural and necessary framework. The single frame for labour law 
through the market is pervasive: ‘we are [not simply] wedded to and driven to see the 
content of labour law in [terms of consumer protection for the vulnerable in the labour 
market] ... we are also driven to answer questions about the scope of labour law in a 
certain way.’433 When market economic growth is the priority, inequalities produced 
and sustained by lax labour regulations are excusable. Persons considered to be IML 
are regrettable casualties of economic growth. Their precarious work is justified for 
the sake of Britain’s progress, as well as the income (and economic growth) they are 
believed to generate towards a proto-political, global, economic community. The 
contribution to a proto-political community here includes the economic benefit seen 
to be gained from a migrant labour force contributing remittance payments back to 
their home countries/ countries of origin.434   
To remedy or address these casualties of economic growth, some labour law 
scholars argue in favour of a more sector specific, localised labour law regime.435 For 
others, the pervasiveness of cross-border industries and transnational or multinational 
businesses suggest the need for a reformed, and stronger, international labour rights 
regime.436 A local labour law regime is difficult in the UK context, for instance, in 
light of the immigration history of migrant workers, discussed in the previous chapter. 
As well, the current legal obligations derived from EU membership mandate that 
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consideration be given to EU Directives that permit the movement of labourers within 
EU member states. Concurrently, as discussed in the previous chapter, international 
labour regulations can only provide directives for the nation-state, not enforcement. In 
the UK, the Courts remain ‘extremely resistant to the incorporation of ILO (and even 
ECHR) principles regarding the entitlement to engage in collective bargaining and the 
right to strike.’437 The ILO is potentially seen to infringe on national law. Especially 
when national laws are driven by priorities of economic growth, international 
regulations are avoided. The UK’s membership in the EU has already come under 
intense pressure and criticism in terms of the influx of EU-Citizen workers, and EU 
labour regulations are likewise met with reluctance or antagonism.438 Paradoxically, 
the resistance to international and/or EU regulations is justified not to enable a local 
regulatory labour regime, but by the need for the UK to participate more ‘freely’ in 
the global economic system. 
 
Labour	  Law’s	  ‘Crisis’	  
As mentioned earlier, in the twenty-first century, labour law is a field that is 
widely considered to be in crisis.439 The shifting labour practices discussed above 
undermine the regulatory aim and historically specific mandate of labour law, namely 
to facilitate the collective bargaining model of labour relations. The collective 
bargaining model holds a narrow focus on labour situated in workplaces, where 
workers are organised into unions or collective bargaining units to negotiate their 
rights and status with a clearly defined employer. The prevalence of more fragmented 
labour relations where employers-employees are not clearly defined, (in fact there 
could be multiple employers or subcontracted labour), and the breakdown of the 
industry model has caused labour lawyers to question the theoretical foundation 
(purpose) and future potential for labour law.440 The twentieth century witnessed 
responsibility for employment well-being and security shift from the nation-state and 
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collective bargaining models based on worker associations to individual and private 
employment contracts.441 In the more current model, the individual is expected to 
depend on the market and personalised negotiation of the market for support 
(insurance, risk, benefits), rather than on state and/or collective action.442 The market 
is substituted for ‘society’ and the proto-political community (discussed in the first 
chapter) is not an imagined site for collective support, but a free-market of 
individuals. Moreover, the ideology of the market assures that ‘the market will 
provide’ if only individuals conform to its totalising influence. The sociality is 
replaced by the market and thus the law that traces sociality traces the market and 
exscribes discrimination based on limited subjectivity and sub-citizenship (including 
limited recognition of participation in the market). 
However, labour law scholars and practitioners agree that labour law 
maintains within its defining purpose a sense of community that is perceived by its 
members as more than a market place.443 A shared goal amongst many labour law 
scholars is to ensure that people in many forms of work can be recognised and not 
exploited. The sense of community that labour law scholars claim as fundamental 
refers to traditional labour law’s task of improving workplaces for employees and 
resisting managerial models that subjugate workers to hierarchical employment 
structures.444 The disagreement, however, within labour law now lies in how labour 
law can work within or without the parameters of the labour market and dominant 
(global) market economic system. Through the practice of labour and employment 
law, regulations can exacerbate precarious employment and labour insecurity rather 
than encourage work environments where workers, by virtue of work rather than their 
conformity to a standard contractual employment relationship, are protected.  
For some, the crisis of labour law has prompted re-imagining ways for labour 
law to adapt to changing employment relations, for example through the personal 
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employment contract.445 For others, the crisis of labour law illustrates law’s inherent 
incommensurability. This incommensurability is not an impasse. Rather when we 
think through Nancy’s work on ecotechnics and sense, including more recent writing 
of struction as the heaping of experiences, Nancy suggests that instead of 
incommensurability leading to a vacant or unbounded imagination, labour law, when 
re-thought, opens onto the breadth of social modes of economic production that are 
already happening but are exscribed from conventional legal categories and political 
discourses. Re-thinking labour law is not a project of creating new forms of being or 
new forms of labour. Labour law is re-thought in order to give attention to what is 
already happening within the eco-technics of labour, which processes of 
neoliberalisation and the market capitalise on, while legal recognition struggles to 
keep up. The label of IML, identified in political discourses and public policy, acts as 
a repository of the labourers that are excluded from employment law categories and 
denied participation as Good Citizens in the community of value, but who are 
included—in fact are a regular and invaluable presence—in the labour market and 
economic production.  Thus the question linking together the above observations is 
what is the future of labour law with regard to protecting all workers against 
exploitation and precarity, regardless of citizenship and immigration status.  
According to Arthur’s notion of labour law as law enfleshed (incarnate), 
labour law can maintain a role questioning the ‘normative regimes whether domestic 
or transnational, formal or informal, that justify the ends and limit the means of 
concerted action by workers and other citizens.’446 Labour law can act to question the 
limit of employment law that prevents IML from being fundamentally problematised 
as a labour practice sustaining vulnerable, precarious labourers. Labour law is 
normative in that it is rooted in the idea that it is critical to regulate workplaces and 
work in pursuit of ‘equality’, ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ for workers engaged in an 
employment relationship or labour exchange. Moreover the definitions of ‘labour’ 
‘work’ and ‘employment’ are undeniably vital. Re-thinking labour law does not 
prevent labour law scholars from questioning, challenging and reworking the 
boundaries of its normative frame while still maintaining a normative frame. For 
instance, Brian Langille suggests labour law might be re-thought via an aspiration 
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towards human freedom, where labour is connected to a pursuit of freedom and 
justice.447 Langille supports labour law being guided by a strong theory of justice, 
connected to human freedom and capabilities. He argues labour law would be 
revitalised to advocate on behalf of workers for egalitarian working conditions, 
broadly extending beyond the industry model to link with Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
approach, mentioned above.448 Simon Deakin argues the capabilities approach in 
labour can offer institutional accessibility for market participation.449 This suggests 
that labour rights be constituted as part of the process of institutionalising capabilities, 
which reaffirms the institutionalised approach to labour under the neoclassical model 
of the labour market. I agree with Judy Fudge’s observation that the institutional 
approach tends ‘to place too much emphasis on the consistency and coherence of 
juridical concepts,’ as if it they were separate from economic and political systems.450 
Therefore an approach that recognises the movement of law and the operation, or the 
happening, of labour, away from institutional frameworks and aspiration rights, is 
necessary to re-think the field. Arthur’s suggestion of thinking of labour law as law 
incarnate challenges us towards thinking differently. How to think differently is 
where attention to false contingency and Nancy’s fundamental ontological 
questioning comes into play. 
The crisis or difficulty to form new ways of thinking of labour law only 
supports thinking of labour law as law incarnate. Paradoxically, according to Arthurs, 
labour law is both dependent on, and independent from, the state. Arthurs emphasises 
the practices of labour law where laws are regulated and mandated through state law 
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yet interpreted by ‘specialised public, private or hybrid agencies and tribunals.’451 
Priorities of economic growth and underlying ‘free market’ ideologies indicate that 
labour is not regulated solely by the state. Labour law’s many ‘non-legal’ areas, 
expressed in norms, administration and processes that are social, cultural, political, 
economic and transnational,452 suggest it is independent from the state. However 
simultaneously, labour law concerns our constitution as a sociality and collective 
political population. Ruth Dukes suggests labour law can be integral to the 
development of law’s constitution and constitutional law, because of labour law’s 
ability to intervene in situations of employment, work and economic participation 
beyond nation-state boundaries. These qualities of labour law support Arthur’s 
conclusion that labour law is ‘neither non-law nor a mutant form of law, but law 
incarnate, an experiment in social ordering that reveals the true nature of the legal 
system in general.’453 Yet this cannot be theoretically pursued without situating labour 
law’s complicity in processes of neoliberalisation. Labour law is orchestrated through 
the nation-state while practices of labour actively transgress bounded nation-state 
jurisdictions because market economic demands are transnational. Therefore on the 
one hand, the idea of labour law as law incarnate brings us closer to understanding 
how law might be thought outside the frame of the nation-state—how the false 
contingencies underlying the dominant standard version of labour law may be brought 
into relief as ‘false’ in their seeming necessity and universality. On the other hand, in 
a move similar to Catherine Dauvergne’s proposal of ‘unhinging’ sovereignty from 
the nation-state critiqued in the previous chapter, isolating (‘unhinging’) labour law 
away from the nation-state is not sufficient to enable us to expose false contingencies. 
Thinking beyond the nation-state, unless accompanied by a critique of the proto-
political international, or global, community will not reach the fundamental 
ontological questioning involved in recognising the struction within IML.  
Labour law functions as law incarnate via its diverse applications and 
significance. Labour law acts in response to the labour market, which responds to a 
neo-liberal market economic system. The labour market—demand and supply—
                                                
451 Arthurs, “Labour Law After Labour”, 15.  
452 Also, this has opened the field of labour law to various perspectives of legal pluralism, critical theory and 
reflexive law. Arthurs, “Labour Law After Labour”, 16. 
453 Arthurs, “Labour Law After Labour”, 16. 
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differentiates subjectivity, where some people are maintained in precarious labour 
situations when their work is not valued equal to an ideal citizen labourer in a full, 
standard employment relationship. The market, however, is not an entity itself. The 
nation-state and citizenship are subsumed to the ideology of a market economic 
system that works in tandem with the architecture of the nation-state that practices 
differentiated citizenships to the benefit of (short-term) economic growth. 
Nevertheless, labour law is positioned to engage critically with the privilege of 
economic productivity and growth. While some suggest labour law should be merged 
with broader social welfare concerns, justice and social rights (social security law), 
labour law is also specifically concerned with employment, work, productivity, value 
and economic participation.  
This specificity enables labour law to speak to the privilege and totalising 
presence of the market as it has conditioned work and labour to be limited to labour 
and employment that is recognised within the labour market.454 The market that is, 
like citizenship, a false contingency. Labour is, under this lens, a ‘mass but not 
collective activity’, where ‘the lower you are on the economic scale, the less formal 
your relation to the economy, the more alone you are in the project of maintaining and 
reproducing life.’455 A right to work and earn wages is espoused as a fundamental 
element of social inclusion and citizenship. For example, the previous chapter 
highlighted how UK immigration law privileges ‘high skilled’ workers through the 
Point-Based System (PBS). Consequently, unauthorised work, non-market labour, un-
paid work, or undeclared work, including precarious or undefined work, is a basis for 
exclusion, marginalisation and sub-citizenship.  
While currently legal categories and definitions of citizenship equated with 
legal subjectivity are delegated from within the nation-state, attention to the practices 
of labour law illuminate how a governance regime embedded in the nation-state is but 
one form of social order imposed onto broader, divergent social relationships. Labour 
categories are made to fit into processes of neo-liberalisation, but these processes 
depend on unequal labour relations to facilitate market competition, growth and 
financial profit regardless of labour categories purportedly extending labour 
                                                
454 This excludes the value and economic contribution of social production and reproduction. 
455 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 167. 
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protection equally to a range of workers. Although the dominant economic market 
model and the labour market as a tool of the economic market appear to support or 
depend on the framework of the nation-state, the market also relies on the (idea of 
the) proto-political global community, which is transgressive of nation-state 
boundaries and limits while justifying exclusive national boundaries. It is difficult to 
escape the circulation of the market and neoliberalisation. Perhaps then the precise 
value of Nancy’s understanding of law as tracing the sociality of singular plural 
beings together is that it is not an alternative to neoliberalisation. Instead, through his 
work we can access a better understanding of the eco-technics of production and 
capital, co-appearing and forming the limited economy. Processes of neoliberalisation 
happen through the movement and groundlessness of our bodily ontology, only as the 
being singular plural amassing of bodies happens removed from (in spite of) 
predetermined legal categories. This movement complicates efforts to pinpoint law’s 
precise limit or purpose in migration and labour because the processes of 
neoliberalisation and eco-technics constantly overreach legal limits, notably when 
immigration laws and labour laws are transgressed. If law is understood as the tracing 
of a sociality, then the political and juridical systems of governance that mandate 
legislation and inscription of law are removed from law itself; the systems of 
governance do not define law, they instrumentalise it. 
 
Labour	  Law’s	  False	  Contingency:	  the	  structure	  of	  UK	  employment	  law	  
A shift within the field and approach of labour law, as suggested above, 
cannot happen without dismantling the regulatory power of the labour market and 
categories of employment law (based in contract law principles). Proposals to expand 
the definition of labour to recognise persons working in precarious situations allow 
the false contingency of the labour market system to continue unquestioned. 
However, a shift from the traditional, standard frame of labour to a different 
orientation does not only mean engaging in deconstructive questioning. The very 
practice itself is anxiety-inducing,456 not least because this fundamental (ontological) 
questioning touches upon our very relationship to law and to our way of 
                                                
456 Mark Freedland, quoted in Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice” in The Idea of Labour Law Guy 
Davidov and Brian Langille, eds., 101-119 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 107-108. 
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understanding sociality and social relations. It uproots traditional labour law, which 
was intended to mediate inequality for workers in disadvantaged bargaining positions. 
A new approach questions labour law’s complicity in maintaining disadvantaged 
positions for precarious workers. This is unsettling because what then would exist as 
protection for those recognised within the existing system? Judy Fudge suggests that 
nothing less than a new imaginary is required to address the regulatory dilemmas, 
inclusions and exclusions, which result from the limited scope of labour law. For 
example, when thinking of what it would mean to include care work in labour law, 
Fudge argues labour law could shift ‘to include all of the regulatory dilemmas 
inherent in governing the labour market [...] to address power relationships in 
households, workplaces, and society at large.’ 457  A new imaginary involves 
addressing the embedded contingencies that inform labour law and employment, 
while keeping within the frame of analysis the real situations of workers and 
employment practices. 
Labour law, specifically its more common juridical manifestation of 
employment law in the UK, has developed within the market system based on 
contract law principles.458 These principles are believed to facilitate labour market 
participation. For some workers considered to be IML, their labour market 
participation is made possible precisely because they are persons outside of the legal 
categories and contractual employment relationships that would facilitate their access 
to rights and protection. The political priorities of economic market growth are 
opposed to greater labour regulation. Indeed, in the UK, labour law protections are 
seen to restrict growth. The UK has long been guided by a belief that ‘limiting 
employers’ freedom to manage, hire and fire without restraint’ 459  would be 
economically devastating. For instance, in May 2010 the Government committed to 
review employment laws for ‘employers and employees, to ensure they maximise 
flexibility for both parties while protecting fairness and providing the competitive 
environment required for enterprise to thrive.’460  
                                                
457 J. Fudge, “Labour as a Fictive Commodity”, 136. 
458 Hugh Collins, Employment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 2nd ed), 4.  
459 Hepple, “Employment Law”, 220. 
460 UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Employment Law Review (United Kingdom: Government 
Publication, 2012). Measures included cutting costs, imposing mandatory two-year employment periods before 
being able to claim unfair dismissal against an employer). Government discussions were concerns with how to 
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In the UK, labour law has developed in a climate of de-centralisation where 
private firms manage labour relationships with their employees and workers. The 
promotion of a flexible labour market contrasts with labour law’s mid-twentieth 
century origins of collective laissez-faire. 461  Concerns for redistribution and 
protection of workers with unequal bargaining power have been overtaken by legal 
regulation to facilitate competition and flexibility. Predating and following after New 
Labour, British governments have been reluctant to regulate labour. Regulations have 
been seen as potentially interfering with the freedom employers and businesses have 
to control their workplace and negotiate employment contracts. The UK has long been 
guided by a belief that ‘limiting employers’ freedom to manage, hire and fire without 
restraint’ 462  would be economically devastating. Bob Hepple suggests the UK 
coalition government is ‘locked into a model where there is a presumption that 
regulation interferes with the efficient working of free markets.’463 In 2010 the 
Government committed to review employment laws for ‘employers and employees, to 
ensure they maximise flexibility for both parties while protecting fairness and 
providing the competitive environment required for enterprise to thrive.’464 It is 
questionable whether protecting fairness is compatible with providing competitive 
environments, but it seems the latter constitutes the main pursuit. For example, during 
the era of the economic recovery schemes (2012-2013), Britain’s Prime Minister 
expressed the incentive for the government’s policies as a need to compete in the 
‘global race’. Economic growth and maintaining competitiveness in a global market 
were made explicit priorities for the British government. Priorities included 
maintaining a global economic presence to compete with other national economies, 
and immigration policies aimed to attract the ‘best and the brightest’ immigrants, 
whilst keeping out those believed to ‘drain’ the economy.  
                                                                                                                                      
‘equalise’ the playing field because perception was that too much power in employment law was given to the 
employee. 
461 Ruth Dukes, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An Edifice without a Keystone?’ Modern Law 
Review 72:2 (2009) 220-246, 221. 
462 Hepple, “Employment Law”, 220. 
463 Hepple, “Employment Law”, 220. 
464 UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Employment Law Review (United Kingdom: Government 
Publication, 2012). Measures included cutting costs, imposing mandatory two-year employment periods before 
being able to claim unfair dismissal against an employer). Government discussions were concerns with how to 
‘equalise’ the playing field because perception was that too much power in employment law was given to the 
employee. 
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The definition of employment in the Employment Relations Act 1996 (ERA) 
reinforces a traditional model of employer-employee contractual relationships.465 
After the ERA, extensive legislation has created new categories, based on 
classifications of status such as employment protection (Employment Equity Act 
2010), working time (Working Time Regulations 1998), and provisions set out in the 
Temporary Agency Work and the Agency Workers Regulations (2010) and National 
Minimum Wage Act (1998).466 These statutory provisions divide workers not simply 
according to whether they are employees or self-employed but also according to ‘the 
degree of length and regularity of employment, the duration of normal working week, 
and the normal weekly wage or salary.’467 The classifications may seem to provide 
more opportunity for recognition. However, by being more specific these new 
categories exacerbate legal grey areas because they enforce stricter classifications that 
exclude those not specifically recognised. New regulations for agency workers, for 
example, have been drafted in response to the prevalence of these types of contracts. 
However their efficacy at offering protection has yet to be tested in case law.468 It is 
suspected that the legislation will fail to adequately affect the precarious situation of 
most agency workers. Primarily this is because the economic benefit of their 
dispensible labour is privileged over their protection.  
Recently legislated labour regulations have steered labour law’s mandate 
towards rights-based statutory discourses. Labour law’s scope nonetheless in both the 
collective bargaining model and statutory rights depends on defined employment 
                                                
465 Category of ‘employee’ in the Employment Relations Act 1996 (ERA) sec 230 (1): an individual who has 
entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment. (2) 
“contract of employment” means a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is 
express) whether oral or in writing.  (3) “worker” (except in the phrases “shop worker” and “betting worker”) 
means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under)— 
(a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether 
oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another 
party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or 
business undertaking carried on by the individual. 
466 My attention to who is excluded from the application and performance of labour law does not concern debates 
about the territorial scope of UK labour law. I am not addressing questions about the scope of the ERA 1996 for 
overseas workers, posted workers or expatriate employees. For instance, factors relating to Lawson v Serco Ltd., 
2006, and the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (The Rome Convention), 
incorporated into UK law by Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, and the Posted Workers Directive of the EU 
(Directive 96/71/EC). See Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris, Labour Law (6th. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 
121-123. 
467 Deakin and Morris, Labour Law, 134. 
468 Directive 2008/104/EC on Temporary Agency Work and the Agency Workers Regulations 2010. UK agency 
workers rarely have a contract of employment with their agencies, but possibly will have a contract for services. 
Deakin and Morris Labour Law, Labour Law, 210. 
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relationships. Traditionally, th distinction between contract of services (commonly the 
employer-employee relationship) and contract for services (temporary contract for 
specific period of time and specific service, commonly self-employment contracts) 
has been important because whether one is contracted for services or in a contract of 
services allows certain rights claims for employment malpractice to be made or 
refused. When one’s employment relationship is not recognised as a contractual 
employment relationship but a contractual agreement, the possibility of being 
considered ‘irregular’ and in legal grey areas is much greater. The distinction 
currently allows employers and businesses to evade statutory employment laws, as 
will be discussed below. Less regulation of employment practices is encouraged 
through political priorities focused on economic growth, where governments sanction 
economic competitiveness in a local and global labour market. 
Contract of services is a contractual employment relationship that has been 
interpreted as involving ‘mutuality of obligation’ of both parties to maintain an 
employment relationship. Both employer and employee are granted statutory rights. 
The worker is recognised as an ‘employee’ for the purposes of taxation and 
employment law, with statutory rights to holiday pay, sick pay, maternity and 
paternity rights, redundancy payments and termination of employment. Contract for 
services is not an employment relationship, but a contractual agreement for a limited 
period of time and specific service. There is no requirement for the business to treat 
the service provider as an employee, and statutory employment rights are not 
guaranteed. In terms of UK taxation laws, payments are made through invoices rather 
than payroll. In spite of the different treatment in law, the distinction between a 
contract of services and a contract for services can be difficult to discern in practice. 
In many cases, persons initially contracted via a contract of services clearly maintain 
an employment relationship with the other contracting party. However, it may be of 
benefit to the employers to limit the contract, officially, as one of contract for services 
where statutory employment rights are not protected and employers are not obligated 
to provide for their workers as employees.  
One of the main tests that have been used in case law to determine the type of 
contractual relationship is the presence or absence of mutuality of obligation. 
However the absence of ‘mutuality of obligation’ has centred on the experience of the 
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worker. Obligation is based on what an ostensibly free individual could do in such a 
contractual agreement. The case law (Carmichael v National Power plc and 
Consistent Group v Kalwak discussed below) has confirmed that ‘obligations’ are 
based on contractual terms, not on the relationship and social experience of the 
worker and employer. In other words, the basis of recognising an employment 
relationship is not on the ecotechnics—the way that the relationship and work is 
actually being carried out—but instead the categories (build on false contingency) of 
recognition. The case of Carmichael v National Power plc,469 affirmed that when 
casual workers have the option to refuse work this demonstrates a lack of mutuality, 
and thereby no contract of employment. The difference in obligation between when 
work was offered and the obligation at the time of work was understood to 
demonstrate that the parties were not in a relationship of continuous employment. 
Therefore, legally, there was no relationship of mutual obligation that extended 
beyond the contract for services. This waves workers’ entitlement to an employment 
contract, the reasoning being that they are not obligated to continue providing services 
(working) with that contracting party. Without an employment contract, workers do 
not have established provisions for grievance procedures, termination of contract, sick 
pay, pension or benefits. The contract law model operates on an individual contractual 
basis, without any consideration overarching the contractual agreements to provide 
individuals with assistance towards their well-being or social welfare. These benefits 
are believed to be the mandate of public services, not the private realm of contractual 
agreements. Due to the de-centralisation and de-regularisation of industries and 
labour, for the sake of encouraging a free market economy, the public social welfare 
system is increasingly unable to provide for individuals outside of their private 
employment relationships. After Carmichael, casual, or agency workers, engaged in a 
discontinuous contractual relationship were, by law, not considered employees. The 
obligation to provide support and protection to workers is interpreted as mutually 
reflected in the obligation of a worker to continue working.  
Similarly in Consistent Group v Kalwak,470 the Court of Appeal asked whether 
claimants were employees employed by Consistent Group Limited, and whether they 
were employees, workers or neither, of Welsh Country Foods Limited (WCF). The 
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discussion focused on whether the ‘obligations’ term in their contract of employment 
was legitimate or a sham.471 If the obligations element of the contract was found to be 
a sham this was on the basis that ‘both parties intended to paint in that respect a false 
picture as to the true nature of their respective obligations.’472 The Court of Appeal 
decided the relationship lacked the ‘mutuality of obligation’ to be a contract of 
employment. This meant that the workers were not legally considered employees of 
Consistent Group Limited.473 As a result, Consistent Group was not legally obligated 
to provide workers with compensation for unfair dismissal. The workers were not 
employees, but contracted, casual workers, and by virtue of not having access to 
protection as employees, this meant that they were rendered to positions akin to so-
called irregular (migrant labour) situations. However because according to the 
contractual terms the workers were able to refuse work, they were considered an 
autonomous contractual party in a voluntary contractual agreement. A contractual 
agreement that is not a contractual employment relationship removes labour law’s 
prerogative of negotiating an inequality of bargaining power in employment relations. 
The main shortcoming of these legal decisions is that the contractual model 
and notion of contracting for services assumes that the worker is able to refuse work 
and, equal to the business or employer, find employment and income elsewhere. In 
many casual, contract-based jobs, the worker is low-waged and under-paid for their 
labour. Individuals consent to work in sub-standard conditions often out of necessity, 
not out of a freedom of choice. The need to have a basic income to survive, places 
people in situations where they might consent to substandard, precarious and casual 
contracts; the right to refuse work is hardly an empowering factor. Nevertheless the 
common law has reaffirmed the contract law basis of employment relations and  
distinction between contract for services and contract of services which ultimately 
supports the ideal of the free market, bolstered by the ideal worker as the individual 
                                                
471 A sham employment contract has been recognised where legal rights and obligations detailed in the written 
contract are different from what is intended, and practiced, by both parties. Sham contracts were discussed in 
Snook v. London and West Riding Investment Limited [1967] 2 QB 786 para 802. A sham can be where the ‘actual 
legal obligations’ are different from words in a written contract. See Firthglow Ltd (t/a Protectacoat) v. Szilagyi 
[2009] EWCA Civ 98 para 52, 53. 
472 Consistent Group v Kalwak [2008] EWCA Civ 430 at para 28. 
473 Consistent Group v Kalwak [2008] EWCA Civ 430 at para 55. According to Lord Justice May, ‘the written 
contract between each other claimants and Consistent expressly purported to be a self-employed subcontractor’s 
contract for services. The ‘Obligations’ clause, ... , taken at face value ... would not constitute the claimants as 
employees for the purpose of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.’ 
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autonomous subject. 474  Accordingly, the individual engaged in a contract is 
recognised as being an autonomous party, on equal terms with another equally 
autonomous party.475  
For early twentieth century theorists the aim of labour law was to address the 
inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees. This was not done 
by questioning the frame of contract law itself, but by supporting, through collective 
action and organization, the bargaining power of workers. Thus, employment law has 
the difficult, if not impossible, task of ordering work, and social relations, into a 
particular contractual framework and economic system. 476  Paradoxically, the 
employment relationship is never a relationship of equal bargaining power. Labour 
law developed as an intervention to protect workers who were in a disadvantaged 
contractual position, constituted by an unequal bargaining power in collective 
bargaining.477 In the twenty-first century however, the inequality embedded within the 
labour relationship is exacerbated in low-skilled, low-waged work where employers 
presume that labour demand can be filled by a seemingly ‘global’ labour supply. And 
these labourers, embedded within the label IML, are without full legal recognition and 
subjectivity. 
Workers are disadvantaged in relation to the power of their employers because 
there is a presumption of greater supply than demand. In spite of the clear inequality 
of bargaining power, the contractual agreements in many low-waged low-skilled 
sectors are precisely the work relationships that are not considered to be contractual 
employment relationships and they exist outside the ambit of collective bargaining 
processes and national statutory labour regulations. In spite of the clear power 
imbalance between employer and employee, labour law decisions and legal statuses 
have been framed by fundamental principles in contract law where contracts are 
believed to involve a voluntary and mutual ‘meeting of minds.’ The equation of 
employment relationships with the classical model of contractual agreements has 
integrated other contract law doctrines have been integrated into the practice of 
                                                
474 Contract law is informed by eighteenth century notions of freedom of contract. Patrick S. Atiyah, The Rise and 
Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Claredon, 1979).  
475 Collins, Employment Law, 14-15. 
476 Collins, Employment Law, 5. 
477 Bob Hepple, ‘Factors Influencing the Making and Transformation of Labour Law in Europe’ in The Idea of 
Labour Law Guy Davidov and Brian Langille, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 30-42. 
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labour/employment law. Significantly for irregular migrant labourers, the doctrine of 
illegality has been used to prohibit persons without permission to work (illegal 
immigration status) from making claims against discrimination or enforcing their 
rights as workers. Moreover, persons fitting into the label IML often would not 
qualify as ‘employees’ based on the ‘casual’ nature of their employment 
arrangements. 
The contract law doctrine of illegality deems that if illegality is present when 
the contract was formed then this illegality, and its legal consequences, overrides the 
contract. 478  In 2009, the UK Law Commission affirmed that if illegality of 
immigration, as a statutory or common law offense, is known, then the contract, 
employment contract included, is void.479 The UK Law Commission report was 
influenced by a case that directly concerned persons considered IML in the United 
States: Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labour Relations Board (NLRB).480 
In Hoffman Plastic, an unauthorized Mexican worker was denied the payment owed 
to him (back-pay) due to his being ‘alien’, without legal immigration status. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled that immigration policy was more powerful than 
the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) policy of awarding back-pay. 
Following this decision, those working without legal authorization are not able to 
claim compensation or losses protected by the NLRB.481 Hoffman Plastics affirmed 
that legal immigration status is paramount; if not for this ruling, the state would be 
seen to condone illegal employment. As a consequence, the doctrine of illegality 
entitles the state to contravene its own labour law if the ‘foreigner’ transgresses 
immigration law. Therefore, even if the employer is at fault, the employee, if illegally 
working, may be blamed and will be unable to bring legal action against an employer 
for their illegal activities. The doctrine of illegality developed through UK law not 
                                                
478  Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, 21. With reference to Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 
(2002) and a United Kingdom case, Sharma v. Hindu Temple and Others (1990) EAT/253/90.  
479 Law Commission UK, Illegality Defense Consultation (UK: Law Commission, 2009), 12. The argument 
backing this doctrine is that if illegal conduct is condoned then the tribunal representing the law is overtly 
contradicting itself by permitting illegality.  
480 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) 535 U.S.137 (2002) 
481 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) According to Ho and Chang, “Hoffman discerned, 
for the first time, a Congressional policy to bar important remedies for undocumented workers under the National 
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) if such remedies could be construed to somehow “encourage . . . evasion of . . . 
immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations.” 
Hoffman 535 U.S. at 151-52, quoted in Ho and Chang 2005. Christopher Ho and Jennifer C. Chang, “Drawing the 
Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v. NLRB” Hofstra Labour and Employment Law Journal 22 (2005) 
473-531.  
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primarily in response to immigration illegality, even though this is currently the most 
controversial usage of this doctrine.482  
In UK law, Hall v. Woolston Hall Leisure Ltd483 the doctrine of illegality was 
not upheld due to the particular facts of the case. This was not a case of immigration 
illegality. In this case, Ms. Hall was involved in illegal conduct (unpaid tax on her 
income). Notwithstanding this illegality, she was allowed to pursue a discrimination 
case against her employer. The basis of the illegality, according to the Court of 
Appeal, was found to be not ‘inextricably linked’ to the issue of the complaint, which 
was compensation under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 for dismissal by reason of 
pregnancy. Thus the illegality was not incorporated as a term into the contract 
itself.484 In contrast, cases that concern immigration illegality, although nuanced as 
per the most recent 2014 decision discussed below, generally uphold the doctrine of 
illegality. In the 2012 Court of Appeal case of Hounga v. Allen, 485 the contract of 
employment was ‘tainted with illegality’. This illegality overwhelmed the 
discrimination case pursued by Mary Hounga (under the Race Relations Act). 
According to the doctrine of illegality, Mary Hounga’s non-dismissal discrimination 
claim was not allowed as a result of her illegal immigration status and employment 
(as a live-in au pair) without a work permit.486 The UK Supreme Court overruled the 
2012 Court of Appeal decision in 2014. However, this was not on the basis of the 
doctrine of illegality. Thus the contract law principle remains intact to be applied to 
cases of immigration status ‘illegality’. 
                                                
482 In 1991, the UK case Sharma v Hindu Temple (EAT/253/90 unreported, 1991) strengthened the doctrine of 
illegality in the common law, where the Courts deemed an employer with a criminal offense unable to bring forth a 
contract-based claim. In 2004, Vakante v Addey & Stanhope School affirmed the use of this contract law principle 
in employment, where an employment contract that is illegal in performance is nullified when illegality is known. 
Vakante v Addey & Stanhope School 4 AII ER 1956 also demonstrated how immigration law enforcement is 
preferred over labour standards. Discussed in Bernard Ryan, “The Evolving Legal Regime on Unauthorized Work 
by Migrants in Britain” Contemporary Labour Law and Policy Journal 27: 27 (2006), 58.. The UK Supreme Court, 
in the spring of 2014, reviewed the case of Hounga v. Allen and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 609, which concerns a 
migrant (foreign national) domestic worker who did not have a visa permitting her to be employed in the UK. 
Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 47. 
483 Hall v. Woolston Hall Leisure Ltd [2001] ICR 99. 
484 And Hall, a British national, was understood not to have actively participated in the illegality itself. Gibson LJ 
determined that there was ‘nothing that shows that she [Hall] herself was guilty of any unlawful conduct’. Hall v. 
Woolston Hall Leisure [2001] ICR 99 at para 47.  
485 Hounga v. Allen and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 609 
486 In Hounga, the Court of Appeal followed Vakante v. Governing Body of Addey and Stanhope School (No 2) 
[2005] ICR 231. Both cases concerned foreign nationals whose illegality was based on their lack of permission to 
work in the UK. 
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On the one hand, the leading UK case of Hall demonstrated that an employee 
may be ‘barred by illegality from enforcing her contract of employment’ but this will 
not automatically prohibit her from ‘claiming compensation for a discriminatory 
dismissal from her employment’.487 On the other hand, although Mary Hounga was 
herself in a situation of great vulnerability to her exploitative and abusive employers, 
for the Court of Appeal her illegal immigration status overwhelmed any 
discrimination claim against her employer. The Court of Appeal dismissed Hounga’s 
claim against her employers because her illegality was found to be intrinsic to the 
contract of employment, more so than in Hall.488 The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
(EAT) acknowledged Hounga was an employee of the Allens. However, as a Nigerian 
national in the country illegally, she had no legal right to be employed. Both the EAT 
and the Court of Appeal recognised that she was exploited by employers who clearly 
were themselves participating in her illegal situation. The Tribunal and Court agreed 
that the Allens had more knowledge of the illegal situation than Hounga herself. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal agreed with the EAT that Hounga herself did 
participate and continue her illegal behaviour, where the illegality was ‘inextricably 
bound up with’ the employment contract itself. As a result, Hounga’s discrimination 
claim in the EAT was dismissed, and supported by the Court of Appeal in 2012, based 
on the doctrine of illegality. 
 Similarly in Vakante v. Governing Body of Addey and Stanhope School (No 
2),489 a Croatian national who worked without a work permit tried to, after being 
dismissed from employment, bring a claim for race discrimination. His claim was not 
allowed based on the fact that his illegal conduct was ‘inextricably bound up with’ the 
claim. It was decided that to allow the appeal would appear to condone the illegal 
behaviour.490 Mummery LJ distinguished Vakante from Hall based on who bore 
responsibility for the illegal conduct. In Vakante, the fault was seen to be entirely the 
workers’ own.491 However in Vakante the employers were innocent of any illegality 
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and in contrast, the Allens (in Hounga) were judged to have participated in the illegal 
employment contract. This did not affect the Court of Appeal’s decision to apply the 
doctrine of illegality. There is much to be critiqued in the Court of Appeal case of 
Hounga. The Allens and Mary Hounga were deemed to have equally participated in 
the illegal conduct. The imbalance of power between employer and employee was not 
taken into account. Hounga arrived to the UK solely to work for the Allens and 
clearly was not familiar with immigration practices and policies in the UK. Whilst 
living with the Allens, Hounga was subjected to physical violence. Thus while the 
court refuses to condone illegality, it remained silent about the illegal (criminal 
assault: offenses against the persons) behaviour of the Allens. The labourer is blamed 
for her own illegal situation, in spite of the ongoing labour demand for an illegal, 
‘captured’ labour force. Hounga’s employment as a live-in au pair in the Allens’ 
house challenges the scope of responsibility and assumed consent to one’s illegal 
situation. The question of forced labour was taken up by the UK Supreme Court in 
Hounga [2014]. The Supreme Court reviewed the use of the doctrine of illegality 
against Miss Hounga’s claim for discrimination in employment, and ultimately 
allowed Miss Hounga’s appeal. The majority (Lord Wilson, Lord Kerr and Lady 
Hale) found that ‘Hounga was the victim of forced labour’.492 Consequently, the 
majority ruled that ‘it would be a breach of the UK’s international obligations under 
the Convention for its law to cause Miss Hounga’s complaint to be defeated by the 
defence of illegality.’493  Meanwhile the Supreme Court referred to current political 
attention to Modern Slavery, but did not overrule the application of the doctrine of 
illegality. The doctrine of illegality remains in place as a consequence of state 
sovereignty and immigration law’s false necessity to preserve to deem persons 
(immigrants) legal or illegal. 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in 2014, the two cases involving 
immigration law, Hounga and Vakante, demonstrated the prominence of the doctrine 
of illegality where immigration and employment intersect. The cases highlight the 
reluctance or inability of labour law to intervene in situations of precarious and 
vulnerable labour, where the power inequalities are extreme and where intervention 
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would contradict principles of contract law and freedom of contract. Furthermore, 
these cases applied the doctrine of illegality for the purpose of public policy and 
immigration control. The more ‘irregular’ the employment relationship, the more 
difficult it is for labour law to intervene because of its narrow categories of 
employment, particularly if there is an element ‘tainted with illegality’.494 Hall was 
able to proceed with her anti-discrimination claim based on the level of illegality, but 
also because her employment complied with the standard employment relationship. 
Meanwhile, as affirmed in the Court of Appeal 2012 decision, Hounga was not only 
working illegally without a work permit, she was also employed in a private setting, 
as a live-in carer, outside of the traditional and standard employment relationship. 
There is no language within existing labour law that would extend to recognise her 
employment relationship as worthy of law’s protection akin to workplace regulations. 
The ‘private’ matter of the Allens’ abuse, including compelling Hounga to come to 
the UK to work without legal status, was not considered a valid concern of labour 
regulation and the Employment Tribunal, or the Court of Appeal.  
The Supreme Court in 2014 held that the doctrine of illegality was founded in 
public policy and that the abuse that Mary Hounga was subjected to fell under the 
definition and therefore attention of trafficking (forced labour) legislation. 495 
Therefore according to the attention in the UK parliament to trafficking and forced 
labour, demonstrated in the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, Cm 8770, presented to 
Parliament in December 2013, the Supreme Court deemed it contrary to current 
public policy to interpret the doctrine of illegality in the way the Court of Appeal had 
dismissed Hounga’s claim in 2012. The Draft Modern Slavery bill has been reviewed 
and in June 2014 (Cm 8889) responded to parliamentary committee amendments to 
include a statutory defence to a victim of trafficking who, as a result of trafficking, 
has been compelled to commit a crime.496 The dissenting opinion did emphasise that 
this statutory defence was only possible if the trafficked individual did not knowingly 
commit the illegality in the first instance. And this fact was established in the 2012 
Court of Appeal decision. The dissent in Hounga 2014 contended that the extent of 
                                                
494 Hounga v. Allen and Another [2012] EWCA Civ 609 para 4. 
495 The legislation cited was the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (“the 
Palermo Protocol”) signed in 2000 and ratified by the UK on 9 February 2006. This was cited in para 47 of 
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her knowingly engaging in illegal action meant that she was not a victim of 
trafficking under this proposed statutory defence. In spite of this ongoing question in 
the law on illegality and the application of this doctrine, the majority concluded,  
 
‘ of the ILO’s six indicators of forced labour, there might be argument 
about the existence of the second (restriction of movement) but, on the 
tribunal’s findings, there certainly existed the first (physical harm or 
threats of it), the fourth (withholding of wages) and the sixth (threat of 
denunciation to the authorities where the worker has an irregular 
immigration status). Judicious hesitation leads me to conclude that, if 
Miss Hounga’s case was not one of trafficking on the part of Mrs Allen 
and her family, it was so close to it that the distinction will not matter for 
the purpose of what follows.’497 
 
  While the 2014 Supreme Court decision is a success for Miss Hounga and 
those fighting for the protection of non-nationals (especially undocumented migrants) 
from abuse and exploitation, the decision focuses on the criminalisation of trafficking 
and the individual private behaviour of the Allens. The legal debate has not taken into 
account what economic and labour market forces underpin decisions to limit non-
nationals from accessing Employment Tribunals to enforce their labour rights. The 
labour that is outside of the home holds labour market value and subsequently creates 
a demand for devalued domestic ‘home’ workers, while re-enforcing a concurrent 
disinterest in their well-being and labour market presence. So-called private 
employment situations exemplified by the work Miss Hounga was engaged in 
(domestic worker/live-in caregiver) but not limited to this type of work, are private in 
contrast to labour law’s public demographic of workers. Private forms of work, 
including care giving and care work inside the home, are excluded from 
conventionally recognised formal employment or waged work. Informal work in the 
‘private’-sphere continues to be an exception to what remain the ideal standard forms 
of labour. Einat Albin argues that the culture of particular labour sectors has a 
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significant impact on the type of labour and treatment of workers regardless of 
citizenship status or indeed access to the law.498  This is especially true where there is 
no organising collective that formalises this labour and the labourers. For instance the 
service industry operates with employment arrangements that are fundamentally 
different from the manufacturing model. Albin explores how workers in the service 
industry are expected to embody the company for which they work; they are not 
simply parts performing their labour. Like care work and work in the home, this type 
of labour is much more demanding of physical and emotional presence and can 
constantly necessitate workers to exceed their contracted hours. This expectation 
applies both in cases of high-waged business services and low-waged catering, 
hospitality services and care-work, which, although divided by income, exemplify 
employment practices that go well beyond what can be recognised within a fixed idea 
of labour regulation and can be considered forms of precarious work. Thus, the way 
that Hounga’s situation needs to be made exceptional via forced labour and not via 
existing labour law remedies emphasises the shifting labour practices are external of 
labour law and labour legislation.  
The twenty-first century emphasis on labour rights has shifted away from a 
collective bargaining focus to rights structured and enforced through national and 
international laws and citizenship-based recognition. Work is increasingly carried out 
in private and based on personal contractual employment relations, which Freedland 
and Kountouris refer to as ‘personal work profiles.’499 Industry-wide, multi-employer 
collective bargaining throughout the latter part of the twentieth century has been 
commonly replaced by private, single-employer enterprise level bargaining.500 The 
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private, personal nature of many employment contracts has shifted the site of rights 
recognition away from the centralised nation-state towards private policies of firms 
and corporate accountability.  
The tension between market forces and the demands of labour recognition are 
such that the expansion of marketised labour has not had the effect of extending social 
security provisions and state support to formerly private forms of labour. Instead, the 
marketisation of previously private spheres has led to a transfer of accountability to a 
new privatised realm instead of an expanded ‘public’. This was a clear policy 
promoted by the New Labour government (1997) to transform the sphere of 
employment to be more receptive to the demands of a neo-liberal, flexible and ever-
expanding labour market. The primary concern of employment regulation was to 
ensure growth and flexibility for business development.501 The labour market is 
guided by the logic of the dominant neoliberal economic system, and employment law 
is conditioned from within this frame of recognition.502 Consequently, the UK’s 
economic struggles are blamed on immigrants.503 Since the economic crisis, which 
began in 2008, fears of rising unemployment and joblessness in Britain dominate 
media headlines and political debates.504 Citizen-nationals seem to be positioned 
against foreign nationals in the labour market, competing for scarce employment. 
Concerns of economic downturn and rising unemployment, when discussed in media 
and public policy debates, rarely correlate with analyses of the globalised movement 
of labour or the dominance of a particular globalised economic market.505 The 
economic market and processes of neoliberalisation are seen as the only possibility. 
Consequently, they do not become the subjects of legal criticism particularly when 
legal discussions remain focused on how to work better within the existing, 
normative, paradigm. Hence Arthurs, Fudge and Langille among others, call for a re-
thinking of labour law.  
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The idea that political, economic and juridical decisions must serve and 
support the market, and ‘keep the market happy’, is seen as a necessity and a priority 
for government. The false contingency of the market suggests that our society, the 
social, is coterminous with the market economic system, which is manifest in the neo-
liberal democratic nation-state. The law, as practiced and developed under the nation-
state as a regulatory instrument that provides order and enforces social norms, has no 
alternative reference under the limited contingencies of the global economic system 
but to be subservient to the market. The market economy is dependent on a market 
society where all the elements of industry—labour, land and money—are required to 
be part of the market. These elements become recognisable (are made to ‘make 
sense’, in Jean-Luc Nancy’s terms) when subordinated to the market and understood 
within a market-driven ideology.506  
Nevertheless the labour market itself is ‘fundamentally contested, and law 
does not simply regulate an already existing labour market, but helps to produce 
employment and labour markets as social fields.’507  Recent case law suggests that 
there may be scope for judicial interpretation to open possibilities to challenge the 
exclusion of workers as a result of de-centralised and privately regulated employment 
practices. A 2012 Supreme Court decision, Autoclenz Limited v. Belcher and others508 
marks a turn in favour of workers’ being able to hold to account employers’ 
responsibility to pay entitlements to employees outlined in the ERA 1996.509 In 
Autoclenz Limited v. Belcher and others510 it was established that where written 
documentation of the contractual agreement ‘may not reflect the reality of the 
relationship’ it is possible to find the contract a sham employment contract.511 In 
Autoclenz, even though the terms of the contract explicitly stated that the workers 
were self-employed, the actual provision of services demonstrated that the contract 
was in reality one of employment. Here, valet parking workers were hired as ‘self-
employed’ workers; however, it was found that the self-employed status that was 
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written into the employment contract did not represent the reality of the employment 
situation. According to the Supreme Court, the workers were employees of 
Autoclenz. The case demonstrates that the terms and conditions of an employment 
contract may be drafted in a way that intentionally prevents workers from accessing 
protections. In this case, the concern was holiday pay. In other scenarios, rights to 
prevent arbitrary termination, for example, could be affected.512  
Thus in cases, such as Autoclenz, where employers intentionally had drafted 
contracts that, by using titles like self-employed in the terms of the contract, avoided 
their legal responsibility and accountability to labour standards, a judicial approach 
interpreting the contract based on the actual relationship has enabled judges to 
intervene on behalf of otherwise precarious, irregular, workers. However, the power 
of judicial interpretation can only go so far. In cases where an individual is illegal or 
is in ‘semi-compliance’ with the law because of insecure immigration or permission 
to work status, the precedent set in Hoffman Plastics [2004] and the Law Commission 
Report on the doctrine of illegality discussed above in relation to Hounga 
[2012/2014], suggests the UK Supreme Court would not favour labour protection 
over the individuals’ illegal actions. In spite of a decision that recognised Miss 
Hounga’s exploited situation, Hounga [2014] did not negate the continuing possibility 
of enforcing the doctrine of illegality in cases of immigration illegality and rather 
focused on her situation of forced labour according to political priorities combating 
Modern Slavery.    
The progress made in the case law, to date, suggests that the members of the 
judiciary are aware that the traditional and standard definition of the employment 
relationship may obscure realities on the ground. However, when not scrutinised in 
the Courts or the Employment Tribunal, employment practices continue to be under-
regulated particularly in sectors that are dependent on low-waged workers. Without a 
defined employment relationship, workers are marginalised within employment and 
labour laws that continue to look for a formal, standard contractual employment 
relationship. Thus we again see that the demographic considered IML is broadly 
encompassing of labourers who do not fit into the standard, limited, definition of 
labourer/worker.    
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Self-employed or casual labourers are not excluded from labour law 
regulations. However, there is a lack of uniform terminology within UK labour laws 
and EU Directives that refer to ‘workers’ and ‘employees’.513 While purportedly there 
is potential for rights to be extended to non-traditional, meaning more precarious, 
forms of labour/employment the contractual basis of employment continues to 
dominate as the regular form of labour. Embedded within this contract-based 
definition of employment is a particular legal subject as worker: a national with 
formal citizenship status, who is a full time employee working for one employer in a 
workplace that is neither the employer nor employees place of residence, and rights 
(benefits, holiday pay, sick leave and pension) are delegated accordingly. The 
community of value, described by Anderson and discussed in chapter one, recognises 
these employees and this contractual relationship as suitable membership in the 
community of value. 
 
Alternatives	  Within	  Labour	  Law	  To	  Challenge	  IML	  
The function and aims of labour law can be understood by looking at its 
‘constituting narrative.’514 According to Arthurs, the idea of labour law is that: there is 
an asymmetrical distribution of wealth and power in society and workers are 
inherently disadvantaged because they have less wealth and power than employers. 
Arthurs proceeds to explain that according to labour law, ‘disadvantage generates 
injustice, injustice resistance, and resistance social unrest. Hence, states must 
intervene in the employment relation.’515 Further, especially in the latter decades of 
the twentieth century, injustice mobilises public concerns that law should be 
mobilised to step in to enforce a ‘more just’ situation. Continuing with Arthurs’ 
explanation, the state responds to the injustice of labour relations typically in the 
following ways (all of which could be considered labour law): ‘redistributing wealth 
through taxation and transfer payment, detaching power from wealth by mandating 
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workers’ participation in enterprise and workplace governance, or by nullifying the 
advantages enjoyed by employers by encouraging countervailing worker power in the 
form of unions.’516 Or, another approach is to place ‘outer limits’ such as minimum 
labour standards, supporting social programmes, or conversely, silencing the 
disadvantaged and preventing unrest.517 
The current critical labour law scholarship recognises that labour law, and its 
constituting narrative, alone has been unable to address the way that market dynamics 
influence labour standards more powerfully than legislation and legal tools intending 
to protect disadvantaged workers (address injustice). In response to the limited scope 
of labour law within the standard contractual relationship, Alan Supiot suggests 
attention be given to the core fundamental principles of the ILO since the 1944 
Declaration of Philadelphia.518 The Declaration of Philadelphia, 1944, established the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) within the United Nations, and has as its 
founding principle that labour is not a commodity. The declaration recognises that 
labour is elemental to our sociality. To draw on Nancy, labour is key to how we are 
together as singular plural beings. Labour is what ‘we do’, as action, to maintain our 
common life. Yet the limited frame of recognition renders labour to be represented 
solely as labour market economic participation. Consequently, labour as basic human 
action is interpreted as productivity in the economic market. Human beings have been 
identified with their productivity, such that labour, especially in low-waged, low-
skilled sectors has become a commodity, superseding the persons involved. Labour 
treated as a commodity denies the significance of labour to social production and re-
production, and the circulation of commodities as one facet among many of our lives. 
Supiot’s, and others’, call to return to the principles of the ILO reflects an effort to 
bring attention to labourers as persons whose rights and dignity, according to the UN, 
need to be protected and honoured. The ILO aims to support countries to achieve full 
employment and affirms that ‘all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, 
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have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development 
in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity’.519  
Alan Supiot describes labour law as ‘social hermeneutics’.520 Labour law, 
when considered an issue of basic foundational social relations, is constitutional. 
Labour law’s constitutional significance dispels a distinction between the political 
public sphere and the workplace, often assumed to be private. A constitutional 
approach to labour law identifies vulnerability and powerlessness as something that 
affects all citizens and workers. This widens labour law’s scope beyond the workplace 
and employer-employee relations to have a social function.521 However, with regards 
to IML, a broad social role for labour law can detract attention away from the labour 
market and the economic reasons that irregular labour situations and precarious work 
are maintained. If labour law as constitutional remains within a legal framework that 
relies on the recognition of rights to be based in a nation-state system then the 
systemic, technical ways that economic policies condition a de-regulated labour 
market beyond the nation-state can be ignored.  
Throughout his analysis, Supiot focuses his attention on the European Union 
and Europe as a social arena. He argues that the EU’s founding principles should be 
used to revitalise Europe’s social justice agenda as part of constitutional obligations 
and duties to labourers. The 1944 Declaration affirmed that work is a human 
relationship and that workers are to be protected for their well-being as human beings, 
not because of their market exchange value. The ILO declared that ‘labour is not a 
commodity’. However, as I argue above, the treatment of precarious workers in low-
waged and low-skilled labour, and the phenomenon of IML, suggests that labourers 
maintained in legal grey areas are treated as commodities. People in these situations 
are defined by their precarious, temporary and replaceable work. They are denied 
recognition as persons, citizens, worthy of articulating their status and rights. In 
response to the persistent conditions of vulnerability experienced in work, and in 
society, Supiot proposes a ‘new type of norm’ where states would recognise labour as 
social hermeneutics. Principles concerning decent work would be mandated into state 
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policies and practices, but states would concurrently be obliged to define the local 
and/or national conditions needed to put these principles into force. Supiot suggests 
states would collaborate with international financial institutions and workers 
organisations to combine broader social justice objectives with local experiences of 
work.522  
There are strengths to Supiot’s attention to the sociality of labour. Yet like 
Benhabib’s notion of EU hospitality discussed in the previous chapter, Supiot does 
not recognize the EU’s inability to create and enforce substantive rights, particularly 
for those who are without practically recognized citizenship status. This limits the 
applicability of Supiot’s new norms.523 Moreover, the lack of constitutional doctrine 
in the EU has been pointed out as rendering discussions of constitutional duties 
futile.524 Without a fundamental critique of the demands within a neoliberal market 
economy, Supiot’s contention that international financial institutions and worker 
organisations would be able to discuss social justice and local experiences ignores the 
systemically embedded function of precarious, irregular labour in the neoliberal 
‘globalised’ economic market. A critique involving attention to false contingency that 
questions what is meant by sociality and justice, although linked to an 
incommensurability, may be the way to address why persons in irregular situations 
continue to be present in spite of legislative protections.525 The false contingency of 
the international legal regime and the persistent difficulty to discuss labour law’s 
complicity in the labour market—and what de-coupling labour law from the labour 
market would entail—suggests the imperative to think of a new and more 
fundamentally transformative approach to precarity and vulnerability in labour.  
The notion that labour law is rooted in a constitutional form, where the action 
of labour generates from a negotiation of social relations, parallels Nancy’s discussion 
of originary sociality, struction and ecotechnics. However, a sustained analysis of the 
possible implications of such a connection—between labour law, migration and post-
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structuralist theory—must continually keep in check recurring false contingencies that 
may obscure ongoing processes of neoliberalisation that, in order to be critiqued, need 
to be held in relief with the complicit systems of political and legal governance. 
Attention to the social dynamic (or root) of economics and labour, while crucial, 
cannot lose sight of labour law’s particular intervention in labour regulations, 
protection and labour markets. For instance, agreeing with Supiot’s work, Manfried 
Weiss suggests that labour law extend to social security law. A broader social security 
law would encourage transnational, international labour rights and principles. This 
approach seeks labour market membership as a social right based on participation in 
socially valuable work. Socially valuable work contrasts work that is given value only 
as a commodity in the market, where persons are given value and status as legal 
subjects based on performing marketised financially valued (high-income) work.526 
Methodologically, this would mean legal recognition equally encompassing all 
persons working no matter their income or status, as participants in Nancy’s originary 
sociality. However, international legal instruments purport to already do this. 
Meanwhile they lack substantive enforcement power due to the primacy of state 
sovereignty, but perhaps even more so because of the primacy granted to financial 
profit and global economic market concerns.  
Broad frameworks identify labour rights and protection for all workers. 
Nevertheless, ‘distributive justice for workers remains a pressing, and elusive, 
goal.’527 According to Kerry Rittich, countervailing labour law agendas undermine 
international labour standards. There is tension, or indeed incompatibility, within core 
labour rights and labour practices. Firstly, global labour norms exist in conflict 
between (national) protectionist limits on labour practices. Secondly, the priorities of 
international financial institutions favour labour market flexibility.528 While economic 
development schemes incorporate Core Labour Rights, economic imperatives dictate 
their own ‘position and prospects of workers in the global economy.’529 Employer, 
investor and corporate goals are ‘increasingly promoted and reflected in legal and 
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institutional structures at the national and international level,’530 at the expense of 
worker protection laws. The pervasiveness of cross-border industries and 
transnational or multinational businesses suggest the need for international labour 
regulations. Meanwhile international labour regulations can only provide directives 
for the nation-state, not enforcement.  
The present circumstances where core labour rights are opposed to labour 
practices via the demands of the global economic system demonstrate ‘countervailing 
labour agendas.’531 National labour standards are under downward pressure towards 
the ‘creation of subordinated flexibility’ in spite of provisions to protect core labour 
rights and ‘decent work’. 532 The downward pressure consequently places many 
workers in situations where they are not recognised as persons in work relationships, 
but they are subjected ‘simply to the logic of commodities.’533 The phenomenon of 
irregular migrant labour encompasses many of these workers. The labour market and 
economic market priorities create the conditions that legal rights instruments, core 
labour rights, intend to remedy. Concerns for redistribution and protection of workers 
with unequal bargaining power have been eclipsed by concerns for the facilitation of 
business competition and flexibility. Although the language of rights and protection 
(of unequal bargaining power as well as justice claims) persists in employment law 
discourses, labour/employment law is embedded in the neoliberal market economic 
system and access to rights and protections, through recognition of an employment 
relationship, is limited.534 If labour law is limited to mediating an injustice between 
employers and employees, based on inequalities of bargaining power in an 
employment contract then labour law’s limit lies at the limit of the collective 
bargaining model. If labour law is meant to speak for labourers participating in the 
labour market, both currently recognised and those in legal grey areas, then labour 
law must surpass traditional normative frames, including those of international legal 
instruments. 
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Critical labour law scholars seek to re-imagine the scope of labour law, 
contending that ‘to include all of the regulatory dilemmas inherent in governing the 
labour market allows [labour law scholars] to address power relationships in 
households, workplaces, and society at large.’535 Labour law holds the possibility to 
address labour restructuring and to respond with restructured frames. However the 
question troubling scholars remains a tension between law’s critique and labour law’s 
normative project. Labour law is a normative legal field that is informed by justice 
claims to better working situations and conditions.536 What the analysis of irregular 
migrant labour demonstrates, however, is that the proliferation of legislation, or even 
developing jurisprudential techniques to protect precarious work, will not be 
sufficient in addressing irregular migrant labour unless labour law and labour market 
are de-coupled from each other.  
How, then, to de-couple labour law and the labour market? As one alternative 
response, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris propose that a ‘personal work 
profile’ provide a locus for labour protection and organisation. This profile does not 
provide a set status or fixed employment relationship; it provides a ‘technique of 
analysis for understanding in what sense and to what extent particular personal work 
relations should be regarded as secure, autonomous, or freestanding, or precarious.’537 
Freedland and Kountouris argue that precarious work is not a category of work, since 
there is no ‘single-spectrum legal taxonomy’ that can encompass the complex 
dynamics of work arrangements, both personal and non-personal. Instead of a 
category of work, precarious work is ‘an increasingly broad and loose area of 
(de)regulation’ and it encompasses a growing range of work relations. Precarious 
work also includes employment and work relationships that were previously seen as 
‘secure.’538 The idea of ‘personal employment contracts’ and ‘personal work profile’ 
attempts to create space for the divergent experiences of precarious work without the 
limitations of pre-determined categories or definitions. However, identifying work as 
a ‘personal’ relation and contract furthers the individualisation of work, potentially 
exacerbating the lack of responsibility or accountability of broader social and 
                                                
535 J. Fudge, “Labour as a Fictive Commodity”, 136. 
536 Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice”, 107-108. 
537 Freedland and Kountouris, “Legal Characterisation of Personal Work Relations”, 191. 
538 Freedland and Kountouris, “Legal Characterisation of Personal Work Relations”, 196. 
Chapter 4, Labour Law’s False Contingency 
 185 
economic factors. Also, forms of labour that cannot be isolated into individual 
autonomous actors would have to be moulded to fit the frame of a ‘personal work 
profile’. Therefore while the personal work profile may be a positive move for those 
currently engaged in marketised work, it does not transfer easily to those in 
subjugated forms of labour due to their attenuated value in the dominant economic 
market. 
Among scholars concerned with labour and migration, particularly relating to 
low-waged ‘irregular’ migrants, there is general consensus that irregular labour fills a 
labour demand that is ideal for the economic market priorities of neoliberal nation-
state. A temporary, flexible and precarious labour supply is ideal for supporting a 
system of labour ‘generated by transformations in the systems of production.’539 
Bruno Caruso suggests that the flexibility and adaptability demanded through the 
market reflects the life of the individual migrants. It is possible that migrants may 
have a ‘lack of interest in comprehensive welfare coverage’540 and thereby encourage 
the flexibility as well as, ultimately, the vulnerability of their situation. As a remedy, 
Caruso proposes a new constitutional compromise where the right to work would be a 
universal right, regardless of citizenship. This is a ‘vision of globalization that is not 
purely economic, but social, political and cultural.’ 541  Caruso argues that the 
flexibility offered in the current labour markets could be in line with a new view of 
constitutional equality. 542  This vision of constitutional equality, unlike other 
conclusions that turn to cosmopolitan ideals or imagining situations beyond the 
nation-state, explicitly (unlike Benhabib) exists within a state structure. However it 
would allow labour contracts and arrangements to be legalised in spite of immigration 
law.  
This proposal, albeit interesting, may not be as viable as intended. Instituting a 
universal right, like existing universal human rights, may not bring change. The 
categories that determine membership and classification as ‘work’ or ‘worker’ would 
continue to limit claims to purportedly universal rights. Further, the frame of the 
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nation-state determines an exclusive and exclusionary recognition. Laws become 
contradictory or paradoxical when law opens the possibility of non-state-mediated 
rights through the language of universality and international human rights legislation. 
Fundamental human rights may be acknowledged through legal instruments, but at 
the same time, international legal instruments reinforce the sovereignty of the nation-
state and national legal frameworks. The IML, ostensibly a figure standing within a 
country that is employing her/him but systemically refusing to grant her/him legal 
subjectivity, is before the law and kept in the shadow of the law. Or, if law itself is re-
thought according to law’s incommensurability as part of the eco-technical reality of 
our world, then law can be understood as tracing what is happening within peoples’ 
relationships to each other, which is nothing but the experience that is the struction of 
sense in the world. 
Rather than extend the scope of labour law within the same market system, 
contemporary labour law can be seen as one form among many possibilities.543 The 
question remains, however, how can labour law recognise labour power ‘embodied in 
human beings ... tended in a network of social relations that operate outside the direct 
discipline of the market?’544  Contingencies that have been an ‘absent present’545, as 
for example, the possibility that the dominant economic system depends on legal grey 
areas that are participating and happening within the same labour market, can be 
questioned and resisted.546 Similarly, the notion that non-market labour is less worthy 
and not economically productive can be subverted and challenged. Recognising these 
contingencies is not a matter of strain and intellectual labour. The apparent necessity 
of prioritising the market economic system is in tension with social realities and 
needs—this tension is the incommensurability of eco-technics. Thinking of labour and 
migration as struction reveals activity, as well as processes of neoliberalisation, that 
are part of the paradox of law. 
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Labour	  Law	  Through	  A	  Political-­‐Juridical-­‐Ecotechnical	  Approach	  
The political-juridical-ecotechnical approach opens onto Nancy’s notion of 
sense and ecotechnics. My approach is concerned with the experiences that impact 
and are happening in and beyond categories. Ecotechnics—as the management of 
circulating bodies and technics, or practices, of this circulation and movement that is 
always already happening—lends itself to this approach. In labour law, such an 
approach brings to mind how labour relations have ‘relied on controlled borders and 
commodity flows as well as gendered/racialised division of labour to sustain an 
embedded liberal compromise in the North.’547 The liberal compromise sacrifices the 
freedom and autonomy of some (sub-citizens) for the sake of the Good Citizens. This 
means that materially, physically present bodies are consistently relegated to 
marginalized, ‘sub-citizen’ experiences where subjectivity is limited (subjectus) and 
their participation de-valued. Blackett demonstrates that labour law makes universal 
claims for justice and rights for workers, but ‘tolerates the commoditization of “other 
others.”’548 The other-others are primarily those persons whose labour is excluded 
from the market. Their ‘work’ is excluded from the idea of what is productive labour 
and work. For instance, work in the home and care-work.  
In the evolution of labour law in the UK, in the 1970s many women entered 
the labour market as waged, income-earners employed in work outside the home. The 
shift this caused in the labour market impacted so-called ‘public’ employment 
because the jobs that women took on were often more precarious, casual, part-time 
and lesser paid, than the dominant, standard employment model. Scholars have 
referred to this as a shift towards a ‘feminisation’ of the labour force. However the 
feminisation of labour also impacted the home, or so-called ‘private’ sphere, as 
discussed above. The work that predominantly women had previously carried out in 
the home, now vacated due to their wage-earning responsibilities. This created a new 
demand for domestic workers in middle-income, dual-waged earner households. This 
influenced a new marketisation of work in the home.549 Work in middle-income 
homes, which was previously non-marketised, un-waged and relegated to a ‘private’ 
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sphere, was integrated into market labour demand. However, this new labour demand 
remained external to the standard contractual employment relationship even when 
employees had to be hired outside of the home and the family. The pervasiveness of 
the standard contractual employment relationship as the point of reference for 
identifying labour market participation meant that formerly non-waged labour, most 
notably but not exclusively care-work, is not readily recognised as labour within the 
market. This is in spite of the labour itself becoming marketised and waged.550 
The example of women entering the formal labour market and criticisms 
involved in the differential value of this labour, which will be developed further in the 
next chapter, demonstrate that the incorporation of labour into the market is not a 
clear solution to protect unprotected workers. If labour were to be addressed through 
the market for its role in market efficiency, then labour law could be extended to 
protect ‘socially valuable work,’ as Alan Supiot argues.551 However, this brings us 
back to the concern that labour law is meant to a) bring non-marketised work into the 
market economic or b) expand labour law beyond the market to social economic 
production. Both proposals have consequences beyond individual rights for workers. 
The proliferation of legislation to protect care-workers or precarious work, for 
example, may reinforce existing false contingencies in labour law unless labour law 
and labour market are de-coupled from each other. Moreover, extending protection to 
care-workers does not address the underlying issue of what makes one’s labour 
intelligible and valued in society: society being a) the dominant market economy or b) 
the actual in-common of persons interacting and relating together.  
Noah Zatz argues that the future direction of labour law must extend to market 
and non-market work because of the ‘displacement of protected employees by other 
unprotected workers.’ Such changes are managed through a ‘relational flexibility of 
work.’552 This relational flexibility manages a broad scope of work, away from 
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‘paradigmatic market relationships.’553 Meanwhile, the market relationships were 
always grounded in pre-determined distributions of value and power based more on 
the social status of workers than on their actual production or the social importance of 
their work.554 If labour law seeks to frame labour, and non-traditional flexible labour, 
as within the market (market-labour or ‘market-enabling labour’), socially valuable 
work is made ‘an accessory of the [market] economic system.’555  The market 
economic system is neither concerned with fair regulation, nor with the emotional 
requirements of care-work. It is a system embedded in the process of neoliberalisation 
that values financial capital profit maximization on a purportedly global, universal 
scale. I will develop this further in the next chapter.  
 
Conclusion	  
The false contingency of labour law returning to the individual, ideal workers, 
in the market economic system persists even in alternative proposals for 21st century 
labour law. The methodological approach drawing on Nancy does not suggest 
originary sociality as an end point. It is not about seeing a broader social sphere, but 
about grounding our approach and critique of existing structures and frameworks to 
re-think what it means to come together and form a limit. Eco-technics draw attention 
to the way that processes of sociality continue, but this way can only be described as 
incommensurable. Giving attention to those who are exscribed from the practice of 
labour law, illuminates the false contingency that underlies international law’s 
universal claim. Moreover, law’s universal claim assumes that law can encompass 
every-body, and that a failure for law to have this scope is ‘random, accidental and 
arbitrary’.556 But if we are critical of the false contingency—categories and their 
predetermined mould that inscribes meaning—then the alternative is to think of law 
as negotiating the categories with and against the exscription.  
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Labour is integral to our basic sociality—how we relate together through our 
action and participation in relationships of exchange and production. While 
immigration is the administration of populations across fictional borders and 
territorial boundaries, labour is at the root of how the co-appearance of being together 
happens in our world and sociality. However, the language that speaks of labour and 
labour power is managed through a political-juridical system that frames membership 
in a sociality through the lens of citizenship, as the previous chapters have identified. 
Broadly, citizenship can refer to a formal legal status that entitles one to rights in the 
nation-state. Citizenship, in action, identifies accepted membership in a community of 
value, where value is related to social, cultural norms as well as financial productivity 
and status. The contested nature of citizenship betrays the false contingency 
informing frameworks of belonging in the nation-state. IML is a term that inscribes a 
non-regular, non-citizen labour force without interrogating the underlying factors that 
condition labour market participation and accepted participation in a so-called 
national community.  
Labour law can function exclusively within a limited framework where, in 
spite of inclusive language, legislation differentiates labour relationships and 
influences a differentiated legal subjectivity. Limited definitions of employment 
relationships exclude labour in spite of it being recognised within the labour market. 
Labour law and labour markets together privilege a hierarchy of legal subjectivity 
under the subject/citizen/state-community/sovereignty paradigm. Exclusion from 
labour protection is constructed as ‘random, arbitrary or accidental,’557 emphasised 
through the label, irregular migrant labour. Precarious work that is excluded from 
employment law categories is not necessarily excluded from the labour market. In fact 
it is vital to a neoliberal, capitalist, economic market.  The economic system that is 
prioritised by the UK government relies on the exploitation of labour. These labour 
practices happen in legal grey areas of national labour laws. This is a historically 
conditioned, specific distribution of labour laws that in the past has acted to ‘sustain 
citizens’ privilege through asymmetrical policies, namely the colonial and neo-
colonial division of labour ensuring privileged access to primary commodities in the 
process of industrial transformation.’558 Labour laws privilege ‘domestic’ ‘regular’ 
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labour and distinguish this from labour that is carried out by those considered IML, 
relegated to positions of sub-citizenship. 
The relationship between labour law and labour markets, and resulting labour 
practices, reveal discrepancies between the injustices that labour law purports to 
address and market economic goals that privilege differential citizenship and limited 
regulatory power. According to Karl Polanyi, before the nineteenth century, the 
market was but one facet of a broader socio-economic system.559 Once labour power 
was disciplined into an economic market, the market became the primary recognised 
mode of economic organisation. The belief in the primacy of the market has shaped 
the development of labour law in the twentieth century, particularly in the latter 
decades. Labour law’s mandate continues however as a ‘mix of repression, 
habituation, co-optation and co-operation, all of which have to be organised not only 
within the workplace but through society at large.’560 Consequently, participation in 
the market economy became an indication of one’s ‘good’ participation, in society, 
much like Anderson’s Good Citizen in the community of value discussed in the first 
chapter.  
Undeniably precarious forms of labour and employment are increasingly 
characterizing labour, employment and work relationships. Precarious employment, 
decentralized labour regulations, global economic markets and transnational firms are 
a challenge to labour law’s constitutive narrative in the UK. Many labour law scholars 
argue that labour law as a regulatory legal instrument, and a normative tool of social 
welfare and justice, is undergoing an identity crisis. IML exemplifies the reason for 
this crisis. Labour law as law incarnate opens the possibility of thinking of law 
differently. The political-juridical-ecotechnical approach suggests we look at why 
labour law is unable to address IML: the historically specific, false contingency of 
contract law (the standard contractual employment relationship) and the market 
model. Moreover, the ecotechnics of labour, the struction of work, productivity and 
the making sense of our being in common in economies here and now in spite of 
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immigration controls and other regulatory systems that seek to differentiate and 
separate, illuminates the option for labour law to look beyond the division of private 
versus public, or non-market versus market labour. Labour law, as law incarnate, has 
the potential to be a site for re-thinking value not based on a new or alternative 
ideology (of justice, rights or citizenship), but through thinking of what we do, how 
we labour, in our very being in-common. Again, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach may be seen to parallel this attention to the basic 
being in common. However, as above, Sen argues that economic growth can be 
sustained through supporting individual capabilities, developing broader 
understanding and the role of human capital. Poverty, conversely, is seen as capability 
deprivation.561 The capabilities approach looks at what are existing capabilities and 
what basic elements are necessary to allow an individual to fulfil their capabilities. If 
basic needs are provided for, according to this approach, individuals would be en-
abled to participate in social production and the economic market. However the 
capabilities approach relies on an ideology of individual freedom of the subject. 
According to Sen, the freedom that the individual has is the ‘freedom and capability 
to do something’.562 Capabilities are recognised based on individual capacity to 
provide for oneself. Once one has enabled their capabilities, then they are believed to 
participate through their labour in the economic market system. The extensive reach 
of the capabilities approach, according to Sen, is possible ‘because the freedoms of 
persons can be judged through explicit reference to outcomes and processes that they 
have reason to value and seek.’563 Yet in this way, the capabilities approach does not 
provide for persons who are dependent on support from others, where outcomes and 
value exceed the market economic frame.  Moreover, what is valued and sought can 
be based on false contingency if disconnected from material needs as well as 
conditions of social reproduction that exceed quantified economic value. Thus 
individual capability to achieve and express ones needs are only one part of the 
sociality that is the sense of the world. What is exscribed from the market must also 
be incorporated into what is presented as alternative frameworks of labour law and 
participation, such as suggested by bringing attention to the movement and materialty 
of ecotechnics.  
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Currently we have a crisis of the social contract because within the nation-
state some citizens are treated as a dispensable population. IML, in low-waged, low-
skilled work are treated as firstly migrant and therefore outside the standard of Good 
Citizenship and secondly, as replaceable labourers. The stability of the economic 
market system is built on the instability of the labour force. The process of de-
familiarising the market economic system as well as the notion of citizenship that is 
intricately bound up in it, is necessary to expose the prevalence of instability and 
precariousness, as embedded in the nation-state, citizenship and the labour market. 
Far from the contrary public perception, this precariousness and instability is not the 
fault of individuals labelled ‘irregular migrant labourers’. Rather as Nancy’s work 
reveals—through deconstruction via a bodily ontology—precariousness is not only a 
regular state of the neoliberal market system, but is the material experience of being 
in the singular plural. The universality of the individual ‘I’ as the autonomous liberal 
subject (Good, ‘regular’ Citizen) is a myth. The material experience in the sociality 
does not constitute individuals in independent spaces as imagined by liberal thought. 
The material experience, the being singular plural, when we try and conceive of it 
away from categories of recognition and belonging, is messy. Indeed we are left with 
a notion that lacks a familiar foundation, and thus even the thought of such experience 
and being is unstable and precarious. This disruption is, however, unavoidable 
because the stability and security that is presented by modern liberal philosophy as the 
ideal is itself incommensurable with the ecotechnics of being. Because being is 
constantly transgressing the categories that attempt to frame what, or who, is the 
Good Citizen, and the ‘full’ legal subject. Moreover, the categories (and supporting 
philosophical heritage) are incommensurable due to the historical specificity of our 
understanding of Being. Modern philosophy has been built on a colonial, racialised 
and gendered notion of the ‘I’: the autonomous, individual legal subject and citizen. 
The categories that have been constructed as necessary to the legal framework are 
predetermined from within the false contingency of modern philosophy. These 
categories consequently determine legal subjectivity and render a heterogeneous 
population of workers from various sectors, experiences and citizenships under a label 
as IML, but not as a natural distinction. The false contingency of modern philosophy 
can be traced back to the very construction of the foundational notion of the ‘I’, as an 
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individual singularity. The ‘I’ is central to modern philosophical questions arguably, 
as  Hegel affirmed, since Descartes.564 However, Dussel highlights foundations that 
preceded Descartes, which set the philosophical question as one concerned with the 
individual mind and body, as constructed against the colonial non-European other.565 
The false necessity of ‘I’ as the basis of modern thought is supported by false 
contingency (limited conditions of possibility) whereby what is excluded from 
modernity’s fold, what is outside recognition within ‘I’, are those ‘others’ who are 
deemed not-quite-there: backwards, underdeveloped, primitive and irregular. The ‘I’ 
can be traced in the construct of the Good Citizen, which leaves the ‘others’ as Failed 
or Sub- Citizens. Dussel sums up what may be understood as the false contingency of 
modern philosophy by making reference to the writing of Bartolomé de las Casas 
(1484-1566): ‘Bartolomé refutes, a) the claim of superiority of Western culture, from 
which the barbarism of indigenous cultures was deduced.’566 Indeed the modern 
philosophical framework justified the violence of conquest by juxtaposing the ‘truth’ 
of the European against the savage and underdeveloped ‘truth’ of the ‘Indian’.  
According to Dussel, ‘the entirety of Modernity, during five centuries, would 
remain in this state of “lethargy” of ethical political unconsciousness, as if “asleep”, 
without “feeling” toward the pain of the peripheral world of the South.567 From this 
lethargy, therefore, political and legal subjectivity has evolved to include the primacy 
of the citizen. The citizen-subject reaffirms the idealised autonomous being, as one 
that is necessarily though to relate to, and represent, a universal political and legal 
system.568 The fundamental ontological question that I draw from Nancy’s sense and 
ecotechnics enables me to address the specificity of the citizen-subject construct, 
where the sub-Citizen is embedded as the marginalised other (‘irregular’). By 
questioning the ontological foundations, it becomes evident that the idea of the Good 
‘regular’ citizen and legal subject, obscures the circulation of bodies that sustains the 
neoliberal economic market system.  
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Chapter 5. Thinking Alternatives 
Differently: States of 
Incommensurability   
 
In this chapter I explore how to attend to the exscription, beyond what is 
written into the text of Irregular Migrant Labour (IML). The exscribed of IML 
challenges the false contingency, perpetuated through immigration law and labour 
law, that sustains this labour phenomenon. Jean-Luc Nancy’s bodily ontology, 
explored through his corpus—the matter of bodies within the body of knowledge that 
has structured Western thought, the corpus of Western modern philosophy—
questions ontology at the level of our physical, material presence and actual, factual, 
experiences.569 Nancy writes from within the corpus and his own corpus, not by 
suggesting that there is, somewhere somehow, an external or limit-less/pure, 
perspective. The bodily ontology is exscribed from the dominant discourses (political, 
legal e.g. citizenship, the legal subject) that claim to tell ‘us’ what ‘we’ are.570 
However, the body is nevertheless a material presence that may resist signification 
through clear categories, but is sensed. The presence that Nancy is attuned to and tries 
to articulate is the relation of singular plural beings. However the experience of this 
relation happens through existing language and frameworks that are inseparable from 
hierarchies of power and biopolitical governance. Thus experiences of coming 
together include, in spite of exscription and inscription, writing of the experiences of 
sub-citizenship, where people, bodies, are judged against an ideal construct of the 
Good Citizen. As discussed in previous chapters, against this ideal construct, persons 
are marginalised according to categories of race, class, gender and ability, but 
collectively as ‘irregular’. The suggested alternatives to re-think the nation-state, 
citizenship and labour, law and social reproduction, gesture towards re-creating 
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The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 91. 
570 Ian James, ‘The Just Measure’ in Jean-Luc Nancy: Justice, Legality, World Benjamin Hutchens, ed., (London: 
Continuum, 2012), 42.  
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political discourses and legal categories to reflect the experienced movement and 
labour of individuals in action. Yet the challenge, as Susan Marks explains, is to resist 
re-creating the same frameworks and repeating false contingency that perpetuate 
race/class/gender-based categories of legal subjectivity as a consequence of not 
excavating the presumptions and predetermination that restrict conditions of 
possibility.  
Attention to false contingency takes concerted, reflective consideration of how 
and what is being examined and problematised. It is not only Marks who identifies the 
contemporary need, or urgency, to think differently. The exponential forms of 
precariousness affecting people not only in the UK but worldwide, compel us to 
consider how traditional, dominant legal categories of labour and immigration fail to 
encompass our individual and common experiences. Theorist Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos suggests that the need in the current climate of globalised market economics is 
not alternative thinking, but ‘alternative thinking of alternatives’.571 To think “big” is 
to step away from traditional paradigms of citizenship, identity and subjectivity.572 A 
bodily ontology, recruited to help us think about what is happening in IML and 
neoliberalisation processes beyond false contingency, opens onto the ‘amassing’ of 
experiences. Nancy refers to this ‘amassing’ as struction, that is both the circulation 
of life in the work and its technical management.  
Struction is Nancy's attempt to speak following what he identifies as a 
contemporary phenomenon of overconstruction. In overconstruction, words, 
frameworks and expanding categories take us further away from the sense of what is 
materially and concretely happening. Nancy searches, in his work and most recently 
with the term, struction, for a way to think of the happening without determination. 
This approach calls on sense, which may be understood as the concept before the 
concept. Sense devotes attention to the eco-technics of our being singular plural: our 
being together. It is from within this shifted texture, a shifted attention, where we can 
begin an alternative thinking of alternatives, and resist, as Nancy does, determination 
                                                
571 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South.’ Africa Development 37: 1 
(2012): 43-67. 
572 There are different ways to conceive of thinking alternatives differently. For instance, scholars of decoloniality 
call for a decolonisation of philosophy. This compelling discussion and rich literature is a crucial next step for 
thinking of bodily ontology, citizenship and legal subjectivity, however is beyond the scope of this present analysis 
and thesis. Enrique Dussel, ‘Anti-Cartesian Meditations: On The Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of 
Modernity’ Journal for Culture and Religious Theory 13:1 Winter 2014. p. 11-52. 
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according to pre-determined, unexamined categories. Yet, what does it mean to think 
alternatives differently—an alternative thinking of alternatives? For Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos, this means looking to epistemologies of the global South. Where, as a 
consequence of narratives systematically written out of modern philosophical 
framework, ‘impossible objects must be turned into possible objects, absent objects 
into present objects.’ 573  This revolution, so to speak, intrinsically challenges the 
limits of subjectivity and expands possibilities for being and relating in common. 
Nancy’s work takes into account how exscription constitutes our being in-common, in 
the world. ‘Being’, however, is a concept that stems from a Western (modern) 
philosophical tradition, as discussed at the end of the previous chapter. Indeed, this is 
the tradition to which Nancy speaks. Nevertheless, the fundamental questioning of 
ontology that Nancy proposes, and the re-thinking of our being in the singular plural, 
invite us to re-visit the dominant paradigms of thought to negatively expose our drive 
for categories, consequently opening onto an alternative thinking of alternatives.  
This thinking involves paying attention to the sense of the world. to what is 
happening in front of us, in spite of operative categories and established legal 
definitions. The happening of people moving across territorial borders and working, is 
the sense of our world. The sense includes both the neo-liberal economics that drive 
demand for low-waged labour and the common that is created when singular beings 
are in a space together. Ultimately, sense challenges the limits of the citizen-subject 
and modern philosophical thought, discussed above with regards to the ‘I’. Sense 
opens up the ‘I’ with its attention to the matter of materiality: there is, concretely, 
more than the modern legal subject. For instance, when we pay attention to sense, the 
‘irregular’ is regular, and precariousness is a condition of our being.  
It is difficult to write or suggest how thinking in terms of sense would 
materialise in our world. Yet as an intellectual starting point, in order to enable 
thinking of alternatives to political, juridical and economic problems or impasses, 
alternative thinking must take into account how thought is pursued. This is a different 
question from where thought frameworks come from in that how thought is pursed 
shifts focus from critical analyses troubling historically specific paradigms to how 
these paradigms are perpetuated and repeated.  Thinking of thinking in order to speak 
                                                
573 de Sousa Santos, ‘Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South’ Africa Development 37:1 (2012): 43-67, 52.  
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to political, juridical or economic problems can seem a futile exercise, unless it is a 
response to experience that is material: hence, a bodily experience of persons working 
in irregular situations not solely because of their immigration status, but due to a 
systemic and interlocking ‘global’ market economic system and processes of 
neoliberalisation, which are manifest in how we conceive of legal categories, 
recognition and legal subjectivity. The false contingency of this system allows the 
perpetuation of marginalisation, exploitation, abuse and suffering of those rendered 
‘sub-citizens’, with limited legal subjectivity, by the exscription of these experiences 
from notions of ‘regular’ work and citizenship; the ‘irregular’ is accounted for by 
being homogenised and marginalised. The inscription of the 'IML' serves a purpose 
by encompassing the excess, a legal grey area and ambiguous status, while the 
regularity of the irregular, and the heterogeneity of experiences within this 
constructed demographic is exscribed. Nancy’s work opens onto alternative thinking 
of alternatives at the starting point of the material presence (happening) of physical 
(technical) circulation of bodies within ‘an eco’. The corpus is at once contained in 
the Western colonial, patriarchal tale of modernity and exceeds it: the corpus is leaky, 
messy and physical. The corpus has within itself the ecotechnical circulation, as will 
be explained in more detail below. Thus, the circulation of material presence happens 
before and after it is capitalised and made intelligible to the labour market and 
economics, and subsumed into processes of neoliberalisation that dominate 
immigration and labour law. As such, the bodies labelled IML are in circulation and 
are part of the sociality that forms the need for law, but are inscribed as irregular by 
the political-juridical market economic processes that reduce persons to precarious 
forms of citizenship and subjectivity. The false contingencies bolstering immigration 
and labour law support this inscription, as well as the very labour market economic 
system that renders persons 'irregular' and precarious, without clear legal status. 
Nancy’s corpus, which I refer to as a bodily ontology, works to unsettle IML at its 
core.  
The political-juridical-ecotechnical approach exposes false contingency 
underlying the labour market system, which is embedded in existing legal 
(immigration and labour) frameworks. But after this exposure, overturning or 
providing a difference through attention to 'sense' and circulation away from 
established categories of intelligibility is an altogether different challenge. 
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Ecotechnics draws attention to the practices that create and transgress the 
frameworks, which for instance spark political attention to IML. To illustrate further 
what Nancy’s perspective offers to analyses of IML, in the latter part of this chapter I 
take a closer look at what is exscribed in labour migration law: care work. Care work 
challenges existing paradigms of labour law and migration because, while it is part of 
processes of neoliberalisation (marketised), ‘care’ is exscribed. I differentiate between 
‘care’ and ‘care work’, where care is the broader action and relationship of caring for 
others—this is non-paid and not quantified. When care-workers migrate to work in 
the care industry to a country where they are neither national nor permanent residents, 
they are no longer able to provide care in their home country, often the un-marketised 
and un-calculated care of members of their family.  Care work is a term used to refer 
to the work done by family members and by privately employed, waged carers whose 
legal subjectivity is not necessarily recognised within the standard labour categories. 
However, definitions of care and work blur where some ‘care’ is quantified by the 
state, where ‘carers’ receive benefits and tax deduction.574 Moreover, care, in practice, 
as bodily material experience, happens everywhere (what feminist economists refer to 
as social reproduction) and is written out of the text of law. Perhaps this is necessarily 
so; the sense of care is elemental to our sociality and the sense that is the world. Like 
sense it cannot but be exscribed. The eco-technics of care can be seen as an example 
where the dominant eco-nomic market model is dismantled.575 Thus care illustrates 
the potential for a bodily ontology, via Nancy’s thinking, to be an alternative thinking 
of alternatives for IML, citizenship and migration labour law, but an alternative that 
also coincides closely with the neoliberalisation processes. In the movement of 
neoliberalisation, labour and labourers are flexible, above and beyond legal contracts 
and formal citizenship boundaries. Nancy's ecotechnics draws attention to the 
happening that is exploited, but resists incorporation into legal categories. 
 
                                                
574 Carers in the UK, as defined by Carers UK, are unpaid persons looking after ‘an ill, frail or disabled family 
member, friend or partner’ and while 12 percent of the adult population in the UK are carers, there is also a large 
proportion of young adults, mainly from minority ethnic backgrounds, who are also carers. See Jonathan Herring, 
Caring and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 6. 
575  What happens in the eco-technē forever exceeds the categories that have been inscribed by Western 
philosophical frameworks that proclaim universality and citizenship against the experience of bodies on the 
ground/in the world. Richard Parry, ‘Episteme and Technē’ Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/episteme-technē/>. 
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Re-­‐thinking	  Irregular	  Migrant	  Labour:	  Political,	  Juridical,	  Ecotechnical	  
The label of IML used in policy and political discourse, as well as the reality 
of persons living and working on the condition that they are included-as-excluded, 
demonstrate how processes of neoliberalisation in both governance and employment 
capitalise on the practical circulation of bodies and the historically embedded 
discriminations that have created the ideal, and ostensibly universal, Good Citizen 
subject. Persons, bodies-at-work, are engaged in production, consumption and 
reproduction. These are essential to the circulation of sociability, which form the need 
for economics: the law or management of the household. Currently, migration across 
borders and to different regions may be a consequence of market forces and labour 
demand. However, the movement of resources is not necessarily a market force and 
furthermore predates markets being named and identified as pivotal to economic and 
social existence. Resources that are vital to basic, social and biological reproduction 
have been claimed, identified and given value as capital. Neoliberalisation has 
permeated social existence to the extent that it is difficult for us as critical theorists to 
disentangle the ontological questions with which Nancy engages, from the 
epistemological questions of economics and market.  
Keeping the market happy is a false necessity, and market measures and 
values are false contingencies determining work, production and reproduction. The 
options, the possibilities, to think of economics differently remain within a sociality 
known through the exchange of supply and demand based on ostensibly global 
financial measures. Moreover, this is a sociality where individuals are known 
(recognised) through their citizenship, which enables legitimate market participation. 
Following from this, the question remains of how law, especially labour law as 
discussed in the previous chapter, can be re-thought in order to resist or challenge this 
false contingency. As I have emphasised in previous chapters, political and juridical 
discourses are unable to reflect the tracing of our plurality as singular beings as long 
as they are embedded in the economic market model. The false contingency of market 
mechanisms, as if the market was the only site for the recognition of ones citizenship 
or status, underpins dominant understandings of the law, the nation-state and 
citizenship. The market, which privileges capital economic growth, has been 
constructed to appear as if it were the only possibility for imagining our being as 
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bodies in work and movement across territory. The market economic system 
presupposes the contingencies that would result from persons participating, not as 
migrants, but as people working (production and reproduction) indeterminate of the 
framework of citizenship and the nation-state. Whilst the label of IML purports to 
extend to persons beyond regular legal categories, IML captures the movement and 
work of contemporary labour markets in action only insofar as it captures to obscure: 
includes-to-exclude. If not for the label, IML, the diverse people moving, living and 
working could not be distinguished from the regular non-migrant employee worker, 
and differentiated based on an elusive border of the nation-state and its community of 
value. IML, instrumentalised as a category identifying a policy concern, continues to 
subjugate workers into labour situations where they are vulnerable to abuse and 
exploitation, but beneficial to the market. Without this differentiation, the entire 
paradigm of the modern nation-state would be fundamentally disrupted.   
 The unpredictable decision of Autoclenz or the controversial application of 
the doctrine of illegality that was used in Hounga [2012/2014], reflect the tension of 
law practiced within the dominant political-juridical system. Legal definitions and 
categories inscribed through statute and judicial decisions that speak of protection of 
vulnerable workers and rights exscribe the influence of market economic priorities. 
Market priorities are written out of the text, but are nevertheless guiding 
considerations for policy makers and legislators.576 The inability of the Supreme 
Court in Hounga [2014] to agree conclusively to overrule the doctrine of illegality in 
cases concerning immigration illegality reaffirms a political and juridical focus on 
nation-borders and border control, which in spite of being policed are left malleable 
and permeable enough to allow for labour market flexibility.  
The question troubling ontology that is central to Nancy’s body of work 
(corpus) strikes at the core of Western philosophical thinking of the subject: its 
relationship to the plurality of other beings and what it means to have a “collective” as 
a foundation of the economic system. Critical deconstructions of a ground—the 
nation-state (Catherine Dauvergne) or citizenship (Seyla Benhabib) (as discussed in 
chapter three)—must avoid reverting back to the same false contingency of 
                                                
576 Market participation judged according to a hierarchy of worth in the community of value (disguised as 
citizenship) is a false contingency of legal subjectivity. 
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citizenship referring to legal subjectivity, recognition and belonging via the nation-
state if they are meant to offer an alternative. However, our legal academic 
vocabulary lacks the language for us to be able to express conventionally the 
precariousness that is present within each claim to citizenship as well as every claim 
of legality (against an illegality, or a lack of legal recognition and sub-subjectivity).  
Yet precariousness is the only commonality that ‘we’ have against the claim of a 
universal truth. In other words, all that ‘we’ claims to be and to encompass is 
precarious; it is without ground. The universal is a historically specific, conditioned 
and constructed notion that has within it its deconstruction. The ecotechnics reveal 
this deconstruction. If we eliminate the faith in a fundamental universal, which 
inscribes legal subjectivity through the exscribed values of belonging according to 
economic productivity and market forces (in other words, that being a legal subject-
as-citizen is the ultimate privileged form of recognition), then what we have is the 
‘abandonment’577 to the fact that the ‘we’ and the ‘I’ are both ground-less. The ‘we’ is 
groundless but for the false contingency. And yet, Nancy insists that there still is 
circulation that is sense, whether identified as the concretisation of sense, ecotechnics 
or struction. These terms all move towards the same ‘sense’ in Nancy’s work: the 
sense of the corpus inscribed and exscribed in modern-colonial Western philosophy 
and consequently, its legal categories and language. This bodily ontology, therefore, 
speaks to what is unspoken and excessive in labour migration categories and 
discourses.578  
Ecotechnics involves attention to sense. Sense itself is not a ‘schema of 
construction or to one of destruction and reconstruction.’579  Rather it defers and 
differs, in movement towards and away from signification.580 This is similar to 
Derrida’s movement of deconstruction and justice as deconstruction. Yet by bringing 
ontology to the material, corporeal sense that we experience on a daily basis, Nancy 
identifies our precariousness as the only common that our coming together in-
common can rely on. Bodies at work, labouring in production and reproduction, and 
                                                
577 Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’ in Birth to Presence, 36.  
578 What remains beyond even this current deconstruction is that in the sense, not everything may be attributable to 
the social and to a sociality. This is beyond the scope of the current discussion, but worth pursuing in future 
research.   
579 Nancy, ‘Of Struction’, VI. 
580 See Appendix A, Explanation of terms, ‘Sense’. 
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bodies in movement, crossing, transgressing, contesting boundaries and borders are 
‘all that is’ and is happening.  In doing this, Nancy’s work exposes the ‘irregular’, the 
IML, as an intruder already, and always, inside.581 Interrogation of the problematic 
label of IML begs us to consider a legal-political-ethical terrain where the irregular 
interrupts constantly; it interrupts regularly. Thus troubling IML necessitates that we 
imagine and re-imagine law as speaking to what is happening as eco-technics in 
circulation—capital and neoliberalisation, as well as its challenge and transgression. 
In this legal-political-ethical terrain, law is incommensurable: it traces our singular 
plurality which is the (k)not politics of people: moving, needing work, agreeing to 
low-wages, working with visas, without visas, formally declaring or being paid by 
cash, finding work through agencies, signing contracts for full-time long-term work 
but as self-employed workers and so on.582  Politics, understood in this way, is a 
continuous tying of the politics of the (k)not—a knot that is never neat, tied and fixed. 
The eco-technics of labour ties exclusively, while never being tied and thereby always 
including. Simultaneously, labour market practices that further processes of 
neoliberalisation but are exscribed, written out, of legal categories are also a politics 
of (k)nots. (K)not politics feed the market demand for cheap, temporary, flexible—
irregular and precarious—bodies at work, but only insofar as they are 'irregular' and 
their precarity is affirmed through privileging a system that (falsely) promises 
stability and security. Consequently, as discussed in previous chapters, the privileged 
signification according to dominant constructions of the nation-state and market 
economics (that hold governance power) inscribe the irregular to allow the regular to 
persist as an ideal.  
The label IML and experiences of individuals in precarious work, emphasise 
the incommensurability of law. Law is nothing but for the interests that 
instrumentalise the regulatory force of law—the market priorities of the UK 
government—and the traditional idea, or mythology, of law enacting, or being the 
voice of, justice. But what justice means in the context of being law depends on the 
authors, those whose 'coming together' creates the space for defining and 
instrumentalising law. The incommensurability that defines law, according to 
readings of Nancy’s work in law as both juridical and existential law, is derived from 
                                                
581 Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Intrus trans. Susan Hanson (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2002). 
582 See Appendix A, Explanation of terms ‘incommensurability’ and ‘(k)not politics’. 
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the confrontation ‘with’ others, in the singular plural constitution of being and of 
sociality, that is groundless—but this groundlessness is the ‘secret of being-with’.583 
In other words, law’s existence as no-thing is consistent because no single foundation 
can be found to collectively ground being and world.584 Therefore law cannot ‘be’ 
something. Law makes sense nonetheless because the sense that is the world, Nancy’s 
sense of the world, is without a single, unitary foundation or comprehension. It is 
ontological only insofar as this ontology is materially lived and experienced through 
physical bodily being. Consequently, within every claim to a ground the framework 
itself is precarious. This is demonstrated in citizenship, whether it is citizenship 
imagined in the nation-state, idealised within the community of value or proposed as 
cosmopolitan/disaggregated citizenship.  
 The belief in a broader proto-political community, introduced in chapter one, 
affirmed through claims of rights and international directives and conventions 
inevitably comes up against its precarity as an ideological, historically bounded idea. 
This precariousness is revealed through the inherent impossibility that any inscription 
be all encompassing. There is always an exscription in any inscription, which is not 
its opposite but its possibility of being otherwise. However, there is something that is 
the world. The only truth in this precarity and groundlessness is the irrefutable 
material presence of our bodies—the bodies that labour, that form and participate in 
economies and are interpreted to fit into the categories and labels. Categories and 
labels meanwhile are neither natural nor inevitable. They have been developed 
through historically specific understandings of politics and instrumental uses of law. 
In the eco-technical manifestation of law with regard to IML (juridical law in action, 
practiced as a regulatory instrument), incommensurability is not acknowledged as 
within law, but is diverted onto ‘migrants’, outsiders, and those who are treated as 
sub-citizens through legal and social forms of control. 
 
                                                
583 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Confronted Community’ trans., Amanda Macdonald Post-Colonial Studies 6:1 (2003): 
23-36, 33: ‘It falls on us to think from this starting point: without god or master, without common substance, what 
is the secret of ‘community’ or being-with?’ 
584 See Appendix A Explanation of Terms, ‘Law’. 
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Bodily	  Ontology:	  Law	  and	  Incommensurability	  
As mentioned above, Nancy’s bodily ontology re-visits ‘being’ by giving 
attention to the physical, material presence of bodies as the basis of our sociality. But, 
contrary to phenomenology, this is not by privileging body as interior, or interiorising, 
Being. The body is something outside, which is always turned inside out.585 Nancy’s 
bodily ontology does not endeavour to conceptually place the body as the site, or 
locus, of identity. Rather, a focus on body, what it does and does not do, enables us to 
touch on the exteriority of being: here the being singular plural is an alternative 
thinking of alternatives wherein we know our body only by being externalised from 
anything that ‘it’ may be. For instance, when I am conscious of my body, it is often 
only because my body is acting in a way that seems to be independent of me—I know 
my body only to the extent that it is different from ‘me’; I only ever touch myself 
externally from ‘myself’. A body cannot be touched from inside, even if it is ‘my 
own’.586  Following from this, bodies are ex-istence—their being is ex-scribed 
through the inscription of ‘being’ and an inscription of corpus. And thus, they 
inevitably always exscribe their prescribed characterisation. Demands of the market 
economic system and processes of neoliberalisation capitalise on this exscription by 
inscribing a heterogenous demographic (that is not even a cohesive demographic) 
under an elusive, marginalising label of ‘irregular’ ‘migrant’ labour.     
Bodies are known only through experience and their exscription beyond 
claims to individuality, autonomy and even subjectivity. Bodies as physical, 
physiological and anatomical masses, in spite of all the physical and philosophical 
efforts to contain and define them, are unruly. Bodies are, for the most part, unknown. 
Nevertheless, bodies can be thought of as being the ‘with’ of originary sociality, 
especially in the context of labour because they are, traditionally and materially, how 
we enact our labour. Within the contemporary information-technology world, bodies 
continue to be all that we are in that their material presence matters.587  Yet the way in 
                                                
585 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 128. 
586 Nancy, Corpus (‘58 Indices on the Body’), 150-160.  
587 For instance, even in IT physical presence matters; IT and cyber data is physical. The person working in ‘IT’ 
still goes to work, is present in a work place and physically at a computer. Every web-based transaction is 
recorded, etched, inscribed onto physical material. Similarly, ‘cyber crime’ aka hacking, is investigated and 
recorded based on physical appropriation of hard drives and computer materials. The ‘hacker’ is apprehended and 
physically taken into custody.  
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which bodies are ordered and categorised limit the communication of experiences as 
they happen. We can say that bodies bring sense to the world, but insofar as bodies 
are not the signification of sense because bodies sense and are sensed more than any 
signification can identify or confine. Bodies, their well-being, sustenance, production 
and reproduction, impel development, industry and markets. Bodies and our bodily 
needs underlie the reason for work, wages, and income—in spite of the unruliness, the 
transgression and our inability to truly know or ‘be’ the totality of a body. And yet, 
the transgressiveness of bodies reveals the impossibility of universality and exposes 
interlocking systems of oppression that maintain persons as sub-citizens (and 
subjectum, as discussed in chapter three). 
The world and our sense of the world, like the body, ‘happens as that which 
remains outside of, or resists signification.’588 There is no closed circuit that is stable, 
fixed sense or meaning.589 For Nancy, the processes of thinking, what I refer to as an 
alternative thinking of alternatives, borrowing de Sousa Santos' term, entails 
fundamentally questioning ontology because of what the body is and is not. If this is 
an ontological starting point, a bodily ontology, it is not to bring transcendent thought 
‘ “back into” immanence’ but to demonstrate that the ‘ “transcendence” of thought 
and world’ is produced ‘through the exposure of infinite sense.’590  In other words, 
bodily ontology is the limit of a transcendent, or what I have called a total or 
universal, claim, such as the totalising claim of the (full) subject-citizen. Bodies are 
the limit of Western modern-colonial thought and their daily, bodily materiality is the 
breakdown—deconstruction or indeed struction—of philosophy, subjectivity and our 
operative legal categories.  
As discussed in chapter three, the IML is subjectus, not recognised as a subject 
who is both subjectum and subjectus. Such partial subjectivity is manifest through 
experiences of sub-citizenship, as explored in previous chapters, where individuals 
are excluded from the community of value (not-quite or less deserving citizens) from 
the starting point of their subjectivity. Diminished, partial or lesser subjectivity is, 
nonetheless, a consequence of being subjected to the law. The reference point remains 
                                                
588 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 132. 
589 Ian James, The New French Philosophy, (Cambridge: Polity Press 2012), 46. 
590 James, The Fragmentary Demand, 182. 
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the regular, autonomous, individual. Therefore, the idea of the subject is based on a 
false contingency of a being as something that precedes or comes before the 
inscription, or speaking, of the law. The ‘I’, ‘ego’ has been falsely (as if it were 
natural, necessary and contingent) taken as the enunciation, rather than the result of 
enunciation.591 Meanwhile, the false contingency has been incorporated into law. 
Law, instrumentalised as a regulatory regime of the nation-state, functions in favour 
of those who full-fill the subject, ‘I’, as the basis of legal recognition and rights. For 
instance, the contracting individual who enters into a legal contract, or standard 
employment relationship, is the autonomous, individual citizen-subject. Any 
departures from this ideal spiral down a hierarchy of recognition, towards irregularity 
and precarity.  
Nancy resists this false contingency when he emphasises that, by being 
nothing, law demands nothing prior to law being instrumentalised into a regulatory 
order. Thus law traces the limit of what we can know as ecotechnics: the experiences 
simultaneously part of the market economic system and the exscribed of the legal 
system, marketised value and claims to grounded economic order. This explains the 
difficulty for the law to intervene or speak to IML, where the regulation of what is 
purportedly ‘inside’—legally recognised categories of employment, high-skilled 
immigrants and Good Citizen workers—simultaneously sanctions the subjugated 
treatment of those included as excluded, as if they were outside. By interrogating how 
this ‘outside’ is constituted and who it is that is considered to be outside, IML, 
referring to persons who are included-as-excluded, demonstrates that the only outside 
that is exterior to the law and the dominant market economic system is the body: 
‘limit upon which self is exposed.’592 The exteriority, therefore, is not legal but 
existential at the same time that it is wholly physical. It is existential in that what is 
‘outside’ is the way that we know what we are, and the limits of what we are is the 
limit of our material bodies, which come together as bodies in common. This is sense: 
sensual, sensed, experienced and known away from the canon of modern (colonial, 
Western etc) intelligibility. The limit is not a legal definition because the legal 
‘citizen’ or ‘employee’ is a category that is constantly being transgressed, mainly by 
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592 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 148. 
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those in positions of power to inscribe, to speak, the law.593  For Nancy, the limit, the 
exteriority is where the self ‘feels itself existing’, and he refers to terms such as 
differánce to speak of this space of embodied movement, where the very elemental 
being plural is ‘feeling the world according to its opening’.594 This opening is the 
sense of groundlessness or indeterminacy that comes from contingencies that are not 
presupposed and predetermined. 
Nancy captures the significance of re-thinking labour, migration, citizenship 
and law in his exploration of the sense of the world. The sense of the world, referred 
to above and in chapter two, is the way that we are in-common with one another: in 
our labour, our production and reproduction. The sense of the world brings together 
the eco-technics of our being: the technical capital circulation that is currently 
maintained through governance, regulation, economic market exchange and 
capitalism, as well as the circulation that happens beyond these categories. Beyond is 
the exscription, the experiences that are sensed, but moreover are materially known 
through a bodily ontology and through the technical experience of material 
production. Again, this exscription is about the sensing of bodies, and in our 
deconstructive methodology bringing attention to what bodies are doing and how they 
come together as persons forming law (that becomes regulatory instruments), forming 
economics (that becomes the market system) and community (that becomes the 
nation-state), before the categories that shape these experiences. The heaping of 
experience that is grasped in Nancy’s term, struction, aims to speak of what happens 
as a naked indeterminate sense of the world, as it precedes, follows and is ever 
beyond categories.  
After unearthing false contingency, body and being as bodies (bodily 
ontology) is laid bare through struction. Struction refers to a passage and a space for 
contingency, invention and possibility595 This alternative thinking of alternatives, and 
of our constitution as beings, where subjectivity and movement beyond (or before) the 
subject are embodied and enacted in the daily relations of labour and work and 
                                                
593 Butler and Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State? (New York, London, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2010). 
594 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 150. Moreover, attention to bodies—and in Nancy’s work often this discussion turns 
to art—is not a turn to consider new concepts or ideas for thinking of ‘bodies’ and/or ‘art’. Rather attention to 
bodies is an attempt to touch on the body’s materiality. Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 125. 
595 Struction ‘offers a dis-order that is neither the contrary, nor the destruction or ruin of order.’ Nancy, “Of 
Struction”, VI.  
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ordered through law, is identified as the initial site for dismantling legal frameworks. 
Law is simultaneously juridical and existential: both the technique of order and 
regulation and the trace of labour and work that are part of our being. Rethinking law 
involves rethinking our relationship and treatment of body—physical body, and body 
of thought.596 The corpus is incommensurable as it is always within a moving, 
circulating and historically-understood (made intelligible, recognised), corpus. Yet 
the potential contingent possibilities, the conditions beyond intelligibility—what 
language, recognition, categories—are the contingencies waiting to be sensed. 
It is problematic to speak of what law might be in alternatives since, as noted, 
law is not a thing, but law traces the ‘amassing’ experiences—inscribed and 
exscribed. Further, it is difficult to imagine what openness to new contingencies and 
conditions of possibility might look like without action or embodiment. Indeed a 
bodily ontology is precisely what bodies are about, as weight, as presence, as 
happening, not about what they should be or should do.597 Nancy’s fundamental 
ontological questioning does not pursue what alternative law will ‘be’ or how it will 
be written. Rather, the issue is that there is law as a consequence of processes 
whereby singular beings come together to form plurality—a sociality, an economy—
and they are together. There, ‘law inscribes the uninscribable in inscription itself. It 
exscribes.’ 598  Through law, inappropriable experience is inscribed. This 
inappropriable experience is presence, and it is materiality and body. Thus law is 
sense and incommensurability always in the processes of eco-technics. Eco-technics 
as a focus of analysis can help to locate what is present as we mine for false 
contingencies that limit thought of how and what our experiences and systems signify. 
The technics and the ecology of existence reveal an experience of de-familiarisation 
because it is ex-ternal or ex-scribed from what is taken, assumed, to be natural and 
necessary (the false contingencies). It is complicated to speak about the exscribed, 
because it pertains to exactly what escapes signification. Thus, if law traces both the 
inscription and exscription, then law is incommensurable with the categories that 
attempt to give legal status and fixed legal order. Law-as-incommensurable appears to 
                                                
596 'Body' here extends beyond the physical to what Nancy refers to as Corpus, meaning the physical body of the 
person, the body of text, the body of material …    
597 Nancy, Corpus, 101. 
598 Derrida, On Touching, 298. 
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fall short in the face of the present political problem of IML. However, the politics of 
migration and labour, contestations of citizenship, processes of neoliberalisation and 
the precariatisation of labour are a politics of the (k)not. This, as a political 
experience, interrupts the notion that politics bring an end or adheres to a strict, 
progressive narrative. Subsequently it is impossible for law to be conclusive. Again, 
this does not discount other analyses that search for short-term solutions to speak to 
immediate, specific needs. However, when we consider the phenomenon of labour 
migration as a whole, which persists in spite of attempts to address ‘irregular’ 
migration and labour, then grappling with the incommensurability of these politics is 
an unknown, but important, conceptual step.  
Nancy’s work interrogates underlying paradigms of thought that dominate 
how we make sense.599 Notwithstanding the difficulties for standard legal frameworks 
to ‘make sense’ of labour and migration in the twenty-first century, in Nancy’s work, 
‘sense is the concept of the concept.’600 Thus the way in which sense is ‘made’ 
(‘making sense’) through legal categories and citizenship in the nation-state is 
uprooted by first questioning what concept creates the concept. What, for instance, are 
the parameters of intelligibility that formed the contingent possibilities? IML reveals a 
paradox within law when citizenship is shown to be a contested and inconclusive 
category that purportedly mediates belonging in the nation-state through immigration, 
but practices of labour demonstrate that citizenship does not mediate membership and 
participation along clearly ‘legal’ lines. As the previous chapters have discussed, this 
mediation functions through ambiguous and precarious notions of belonging in a 
community of value and economic market participation. The tensions that labour law 
scholars identify between regulating and protecting labour rights (Core Labour Rights 
and international labour directives) and encouraging a transnational labour supply for 
a global, capital oriented, economic market result in a flexible, transnational labour 
force where labourers, whether citizens or non-citizens, are compelled to be IML. 
This process appears inevitable, and yet it is not clear; it does not make sense. But the 
underlying false contingency of the market and the nation-state, as the concept of the 
concept of citizenship—once identified as false contingency—opens onto sense.  
                                                
599 This is Nancy’s ‘fundamental ontological questioning’. James, The Fragmentary Demand, 4.  
600 Nancy, A Finite Thinking, Simon Sparks ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 5.  
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Making	  Sense	  of	  Sense	  
Sense, like the being singular plural, is not a marker of substance or matter. 
Sense nevertheless concerns 'matter' because it concerns what is happening, sensed, 
present beyond presence. Sense is a paradoxical logic that does not involve choosing 
between presentation or withdrawal or oscillating between one and the other. Nancy’s 
use of the term ‘sense’ shares a gesture suggested within post-structuralist terms such 
as ‘aporia’ ‘differance’. 601  Through ‘sense’, Nancy affirms exscription, the 
experience, but paradoxically the need to write, to keep writing, in order that we may 
touch-on thinking but not determine thought. According to Nancy, categories and 
frameworks are constructed not in opposition to sense, but as an attempt to 
comprehend the world (make it intelligible), to make sense. Yet we must not stop 
making sense. The critique of sense, like the retreat of the political discussed in 
chapter two, is not a denial or de-activation. Instead Nancy’s attention is to the 
continuation of coming together: the sense of the world is the sense of the bodily 
ontology. This is the ongoing becoming, which drives the work of writing rather than 
the pursuit of an end or an answer. Nancy writes to resist a theoretical discourse that 
insists on appropriating sense.602 He writes of sense as not what is communicated, but 
‘that there is communication.’603 Further, because writing is inscription, new false 
contingencies are unavoidable.604 This catch, together with the previous discussion 
using terms such as paradoxical, incommensurable and impossible is what lies 
                                                
601 Derrida’s notion of differance, ‘is precisely that here there is neither “sensing oneself” nor “knowing oneself” 
in the sense of an appropriation or revelation.’ Nancy, Sense of the World, 35. Derrida and Nancy share an 
approach that Morin identifies as putting ‘community into erasure’. Marie-Eve Morin, "Putting Community under 
Erasure: The Dialogue between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy on the Plurality of Singularities" Culture 
Machine 8 (2006), 1. However Derrida insists on separation. Deconstruction, for Derrida, is a process of 
undecidability and the incalculable within the calculable. He maintains a distance from problematic terms in 
favour of marking the différance and deconstructive thinking. Nancy, meanwhile, writes of world disclosure, 
opening into sense and sensory experience of being as co-existence and not separation. James, ‘The Just Measure’, 
43. 
602 Ben Hutchens, ‘Archi-Ethics, Justice and the Suspension of History in the Writing of Jean-Luc Nancy’ (129-
142) in Peter Gratton and Marie-Eve Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking (New York: SUNY Press, 
2012), suggests that ‘the imperative to write impels a praxis of writing that incessantly interrupts philosophical 
discourses. In particular, it interrupts the practical desire to be practical, subverting all efforts to crystallise 
philosophy into conceptual patterns vulnerable to political subsumption.’ Hutchens speaks thus of an archi-ethical 
philosophical writing that is inspired by literary ethics, in resistance to discourses that close community and ‘the 
individuation of the singularity.’ (Gratton and Morin, 135). 
603 Nancy, Sense of the World, 117.  
604 Marks is clear that the critique of false contingencies is not suggesting ever being able to avoid creating new 
false contingency.  
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beneath IML. The incommensurability at the core of these concepts and the attempt of 
words and language to capture experience is what is happening with migrant labour 
considered to be irregular.  
Sense brings us to what is the world without recourse to determined 
existence.605 Thus we return to the previous discussion: the world is the body, our 
bodies. For Nancy, in bodily ontology, the body and bodies are co-originary with 
sense. This co-appearance of the physical body and the sense that is exscribed escapes 
signification, because body is ‘certitude’ of modernity and paradigms of philosophy 
and law, ‘shattered.’606 As explained above, bodies are in the world as material 
presence,607 which is never ‘the’ singular body.608  To write ‘the body’, is to affirm it 
as ‘a technical product of the eco-technical.’609 Meanwhile the weight or materiality 
of our physical bodies, and the plurality of singular bodies, make the experience that 
is also the eco-technics of the world. Eco-technics, unlike the dominant categories and 
legal frames, is made up of bodies in movement. ‘Creation’, and subsequent 
economic, political and social production and reproduction, is technē of bodies where 
bodies are technical objects and withdraw from transcendental or immanent 
signification. For this reason, the bodies and world of bodies have to be taken into 
account when considering how and why there is a need for law to trace the limit of 
persons coming together in an originary sociality. But also why ecotechnics touches 
on processes of neoliberalisation. The technē of bodies is the variety of ways by 
which ‘we’ are exposed together.610 This is the circulation that neoliberalisation, as a 
free-market ideology, capitalises on: the historically embedded paradigms along 
discriminatory constructions of race, gender and class (that provide cheaper 
labourers), as well as practices the reproduce the falsity of economic markets and the 
Good Citizen by pursuing only false contingency. Recognition and citizenship is 
                                                
605 Nancy argues, ‘we must respond to the world as it is without recourse to transcendental discourses, including 
the still-theological discourses of modernity operating within the logic of Christianity and its messianism.’ Gratton 
and Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 2. 
606 ‘… Blown to bits. Nothing is more proper; nothing is more foreign to our old world’. Nancy, Corpus, 5. 
607 Nancy, A Finite Thinking, 3. 
608 ‘il n’y a pas ‘le’ corps’ Nancy, Corpus, 2008, 104. According to J. Hillis Miller, ‘the organic unity model has 
had a tenacious hold on thinking in the West from the Greeks and the Bible down to Heidegger and present-day 
eco-poets and extollers of “the body.”’ J. Hillis Miller, “Ecotechnics Ecotechnological Odradek” Telemorphosis: 
Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 1 Tom Cohen ed., (2011). 
609 J. Hillis Miller, “Ecotechnics Ecotechnological Odradek” in Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate 
Change, Vol. 1 Tom Cohen ed., (2011). 
610 Nancy, Corpus, 89. 
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sought for persons in exploited and vulnerable situations, but recognition from and 
citizenship within the ‘I’. However, this ‘I’ and the ‘we’ will only ever recognise the 
other as ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’ while benefitting from their labour.  
Accordingly, we do not know the ‘other’, but neither do we know ‘we’ or ‘I’. 
Moreover, all that we know has been labelled, quantified, categorised through the 
canon of Western modern-colonial thought. Thus the experience, is that there is 
another body, that the world is a world-of-bodies,611 shifts unto groundlessness. The 
world is heavy with the technē of bodies in ‘an amassing and archi-tectonic drift of all 
macro/micro-cosmos ... where each body, spacing itself, also splits and degrades all 
spaces’612, all categories, labels that have become the contingencies of spaces of 
Being. Bodies are simultaneously creative and destructive, dis-location, dis-
localisation, consumption and degradation, in what Nancy terms ‘a double suspension 
of sense’.613 Bodies em-body the ‘self-same worldliness and corporeality: sense’s 
excretion, sense exscribed’614 because they are constantly moving beyond categories 
and limits. Our beings as bodies sense the limit of language, legal regulatory tools and 
definitions. All are incapable of grasping how we relate to each other in the world. 
The technical imperative of sociality, interpreted by the dominant political and 
juridical structures that order and regulate our sociality, frame the work of bodies into 
categories according to a (neo)liberal ideology embedded in the mythology of the 
nation-state. The violence of current processes of neoliberalisation, normalised by 
categories that prescribe recognition and exscribe the excess of these categories 
(labelled ‘irregular’), render certain persons less deserving of recognition as (Good) 
citizens in order that the market economic system may benefit from their labour.  
 
                                                
611 Nancy, Corpus, 31.  
612 Nancy, Corpus, 105. 
613 Nancy, Corpus, 105. 
614 Nancy, Corpus, 109. 
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L’intrus/	  The	  Intruder	  
In his essay, ‘L’intrus,’ Nancy writes of the intruder within.615 Introducing the 
notion of ‘intruder’ into the conversation concerning migrant labour, typically leads 
us to link IML with intrusion. However, the individuals rendered IML must not be 
considered unwelcome intruders because of their undeniable participation in the 
economy and labour market. Formally, their entry into the country can be legal and 
their presence and employment is economically preferred, if not overtly welcomed. 
Therefore, as discussed in previous chapters, it is not an explicit transgression of legal 
rules that signals exclusion from the community of value (which presumes itself not 
to be precarious). IML is not a label signifying persons who have blatantly 
transgressed legal rules. Rather, precarious employment and treatment as sub-citizens 
due to intersecting forms of discrimination, be it gender, race, (dis)ability, nationality, 
education, income and socio-economic status, are characteristic of persons broadly 
considered IML. The labour market presence that the label IML represents—flexible, 
temporary, low-waged, insecure—and provides is, instead, the intrusion on the myth 
of the liberal nation-state. The irregular are identified against/in reference to 
normative categories of the ‘regular’ ‘citizen’ economically productive in a standard 
contractual employment relationship. As such, precarious labour has unwelcomed 
effects on the nation-state, even though it is a part of and is caused by the processes of 
neoliberalisation vital to the globalised economic system.  
The precarious labourer, the ‘irregular’ not-quite Citizen represents 
‘disturbance and perturbation of intimacy.’616 IML are not outside or external, but the 
precarity of identity and the unravelling of citizenship that IML represents is a 
strangeness-inside: ‘A strangeness reveals itself “at the heart” of what is most 
familiar.’617 Nancy describes strangeness inside as something that is inherent and 
always present to what is assumed to be familiar. If, as above, the market economic 
system is taken as a necessity (false) and legal subjectivity is equated with citizenship, 
a (false) contingency of value as citizenship and labour participation recognised in the 
                                                
615 L’intrus appears as a chapter towards the end of Corpus and has also been published independently (Jean-Luc 
Nancy, “L’Intrus” trans Susan Hanson (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2002). Nancy wrote this piece 
as a reflection on his own heart transplant. 
616 Nancy, “L’Intrus”, 2. 
617 Nancy, “L’Intrus”, 4.  
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nation-state, then the irregular functions at the heart of what is most familiar. The 
strangeness at the heart of what is most familiar is the experience, the sense of our 
sociality including those who do not fit into the pre-determined categories and ideals. 
As this interrogation of IML demonstrates, the intrusion is the realisation of the 
precariousness of ideological foundations and their limited contingencies.  
How is the most familiar intrinsically unknown? For instance, who is the 
Good Citizen? Where is s/he? Strangely, in spite of ostensibly setting the goal for all 
others, how does this Good Citizen maintain the global economic system, save 
occupying a hegemonic position over the subjectivity of all others who are not-quite-
Citizen? These questions unsettle the accepted false contingency of citizenship. 
Nancy’s sense of the world activates, what other critical theory has called 
defamiliarisation.618 Recognising the unfamiliar at the core of what seems familiar is 
the crux of confronting an alternative thinking beyond or before the ground. Nancy’s 
‘intrus’ as a term acts to defamiliarize the awkwardness between what is sense and 
what is the dominant, unquestioned ideal of the rights-bearing, autonomous individual 
citizen-subject. In addition, the term ‘intrus’ potently hints at the idea of home or the 
household. Nancy’s ‘intrus’ (intruder) disrupts the notion that ‘I’ am the realisation of 
‘my’ own ‘self’, in the stability of a fixed home-space where ‘I’ belong: be it home as 
private property, owned and inhabited, or a domestic national market economy. In 
either case, the home has within it, intrinsic to itself in stereotypical assumptions, the 
disruptive ‘working’ woman and the disruptive ‘settled’ migrant. Far from being a 
settled, stable space, the home as a space for the ‘I’ is nothing but a site of 
technologies that can be replaced, operated on, and fixed in order to prolong ‘my’ life 
or to fullfill a particular paradigm defining ecotechnics. For the person held within the 
label IML, the economic market system promises ‘home’ to those who participate as 
Good Citizens. In practice, the market system is a technique of production and 
reproduction where neoliberalisation engulfs the work of bodies into an insatiable 
capitalist system. Even the Good Citizen is ‘irregular’ in the market. A shifted focus 
on IML highlights the limit of legal recognition and subjectivity in and of itself. The 
origin, home, is not found—nation-state and citizenship—are constructs, 
contingencies that substitute meaning. Home is nothing but a confrontation with 
home-less-ness, in other words with precarity and groundlessness. For this reason, 
                                                
618 Braidotti, The PostHuman.   
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sociability and the relation that occurs at the level of the encounter of plurality of 
singular beings is originary, disruptive and strange every time. 
Home, in conventional uses of the term, upholds ideals of Good Citizenship in 
a community of value. The home is a private space, where the individual 
(autonomous, citizen, property-holder) is protected and privileged, in contrast to ‘his’ 
public work and public engagement.619 The predetermined condition of home is vital 
to form a common, and a sociality.620 Home implies a site, or grounding, for economic 
practices (eco- household). Home also implies ownership, employment and property, 
which, like the classic model of labour discussed in the previous chapter as the 
industrial or male-breadwinner model, is a profoundly gendered notion of market 
economic participation.621 The woman, in contrast to the property-owning male, is 
charged with maintaining the home and its privacy. However in experience, the home 
is rarely a settled place and is not clearly distinguishable from the ‘public’ ‘political’ 
sphere. The private and the public are not neatly definable, as many theorists have 
explicated. 622  Moreover, theories that explore relationality and the virtues of 
citizenship beyond the nation-state have identified hospitality as a key value, yet even 
in hospitality the distinction between ‘guest’ and ‘host’ is not always clear. The host 
is assumed to be the one with recognised participation in the community of value and 
the guest the one permitted entrance. Nevertheless, the ‘guest’ when not welcomed is 
always at risk of slipping into being an intruder, while the ‘host’ is in danger of losing 
her ‘home’ once the guest enters and makes herself ‘at home’. 623  Within the 
community of value, persons considered citizens risk slipping from ‘host’ to ‘guest’, 
or to “not-quite-good-enough”624 merely ‘tolerated’ citizen.625 The proto-political 
community, citizenship and the market economic system obscure this precarity, 
necessarily in order for the Western, modern-colonial liberal ideology and economic 
market system to continue. Thus the theme of the intruder, the stranger, at its core 
                                                
619 Anderson, Us and Them, 4, 8. 
620 At the base of relating to others is the imperative, or the pursuit of home: place and belonging—a ground from 
which to stand. Luce Irigaray, ‘Toward a Mutual Hospitality’ in Tomas Claviez ed., The Conditions of Hospitality: 
Ethics, Politics, and Aesthetics on the Threshold of the Possible (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 47. 
621 Judith Still, Derrida and Hospitality: Theory and Practice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).  
622 For instance, Judith Butler and Spivak’s criticism of Arendt in Who Sings the Nation-State?  
623 A. Tataryn, Law Text Culture (2013).  
624 Anderson, Us and Them, 6. 
625 Anderson, Us and Them, 89 & 93. 
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intrudes not only on epistemic categories, but intrudes at the very core of ‘our’ idea of 
moral correctness. The intruder is at the heart of Being. Good Citizens are meant to be 
welcoming, according to liberal democratic ‘humanitarian’ values. But this moral 
correctness, or political correctness, cannot address the intrus because the irregular is 
not a guest; the irregular is already within—a defamiliarisation that is always already 
happening: 
 
‘The theme of the intrus is inextricable from the truth of the stranger. 
Since moral correctness [correction morale] assumes that one receives 
the stranger by effacing his strangeness at the threshold, it would thus 
never have us receive him. But the stranger insists, and breaks in [fait 
intrusion]. This is what is not easy to receive, nor, perhaps, to 
conceive...’626  
 
‘Breaking-in’ disrupts the categories that inscribe ostensibly clear borders of 
belonging and citizenship. Yet the political, juridical, ecotechnics of circulation, when 
considered through attention to bodily materiality, render not the body of the stranger, 
the IML, as the intrusion, but the economic market, de-familiarised, comes into relief 
as the stranger inside. The market model and processes of neoliberalisation capitalise 
on bodies producing and reproducing, in spite of categories that claim to frame being. 
The frame is determined by the hegemonic dominance of those whose personhood is 
inscribed in the Western modern-colonial philosophico-juridical idea of the citizen 
subject and claim authorship over a universal sphere. Because the neoliberalising 
market prioritises capital and economic growth, it allows for the exscription in IML, 
and the intrusion on the movement of social and (k)notted political, economic, social 
reproduction. Bringing all of this to light, it is therefore the political and juridical 
(k)not embodied by the label IML that exposes and abandons us to the 
incommensurable. This abandonment even pushes us to think beyond all of Nancy’s 
terms. In Nancy’s words, 
                                                
626 Nancy, “L’Intrus”. 
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‘A moment arrives when one can no longer feel anything but anger, an 
absolute anger, against so many discourses, so many texts that have no 
other care than to make a little more sense, to redo or perfect delicate 
works of signification. That is why, if I speak here of birth, I will not try to 
make it into one more accretion of sense. I will rather leave it, if this is 
possible, as the lack of “sense” that it “is.” I will leave it exposed, 
abandoned.’627 
 
Seeing	  Law	  Through	  Ecotechnics:	  Care/work	  
The bodies, amassed, weighted by their very presence in the technē of the 
world, without pre-determined categories have within themselves the intruder. The 
normalisation of citizenship through the label of ‘irregular’ (IML) reaffirmed and 
perpetuated in immigration and labour is the intruder inside the philosophical and 
juridical subject. The exscribed ex-perience, ex-istence, is the expression of the eco-
technics that, ultimately, reveal no-thing except the art of bodies. Therefore, if our 
critical approach to IML strives to see law through ecotechnics then all we are is the 
coming together of persons in-common, in incommensurable, non-harmonious and 
often ‘unrecognisable’ ways. And law is the tracing of this movement. An approach 
via ecotechnics challenges, on the one hand, the capitalist appropriation as a linear, 
definitive (transcendent) experience that re-defines, or destroys, the radical 
(transformative) potential of labour action and social reproduction. On the other hand, 
through attention to ecotechnics (sense notwithstanding) we also see the counter-
experiences that are at play as persons migrate, work and are made precarious. The 
experiences as they ‘amass’ and ‘heap’ interrupt categories and frames of recognition, 
and keep the law as an electric? body that is at once a limit, a regulation, and an 
instance of movement and circulation. This makes the irregular part of processes, not 
excluded or ignored. Therefore, recognition and remedy of the problem of IML is 
inseparable from a critique of the economic market and nation-state system. 
Following, and tracing, the ecotechnical circulation of capital and bodies shows us the 
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IML is ‘irregular’ not because of particular labour or immigration laws, but due to the 
paradigm in which modern nation-states, law and market economics are founded.  
It is impossible to draw conclusions from Nancy’s work for IML in a way that 
would suggest immediate changes for these persons that experience situations of sub-
citizenship. Ecotechnics, for instance, does not lend itself easily to conversations with 
the critical approaches to migration, citizenship and labour law discussed in chapters 
three and four, without explicating the false contingency of ideas of citizenship as 
connected to the very foundations of notions of Being. Nevertheless, the glimmer that 
Harry Arthurs’ suggestion offers, of labour law as law incarnate (discussed in chapter 
four), is the beginning of a deep questioning of law and the legal subject, which 
would necessitate change directed towards a greater reality of experience than 
presently. The main challenge for any approach is to, counterintuitively, resist 
appropriation into a fixed project orientation by deferring to the (k)not of interests and 
bodies involved. A new programme or prescription for progress would re-inscribe 
existing frames of reference that provide, or construct, a ground. For instance, 
regularisation programmes reaffirm the false sense that citizenship status brings equal, 
or fair, labour practices. Similarly, the notion that law, unhinged from the nation-state, 
can distribute a ground of justice and fairness derives from a false presumption that 
law is something of an entity in and of itself. Furthermore, ideals of disaggregate or 
cosmopolitan citizenships repeat the insistence on a universal and proto-political 
community and belonging. In labour law scholarship, proposals for justice-based 
labour law (Brian Langille) on the one hand, or personal employment contracts (Mark 
Freedland and Nicola Kountouris) on the other, reaffirm structures using current 
reference points of both the idea of universality and the current legal system.  Given 
this, the exploitation of foreign, irregular workers is justified based on their inclusion-
as-exclusion. Each of these grounds provides a false sense of resolution unless the 
contingent possibilities of thinking otherwise, different from the frames and ideals but 
based on material and sensed experience, are left open. For this reason, a future 
project along these lines could include a rigorous engagement with scholarship of 
decoloniality and decolonising philosophy.628 
                                                
628  Enrique Dussel, ‘Anti-Cartesian Meditations: On The Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of 
Modernity’ Journal for Culture and Religious Theory 13:1 Winter 2014, 11-52; Walter Mignolo, ‘Delinking’ 
Cultural Studies 21:2 (2007) 449-514. 
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The inscription and exscription of law is experienced on a daily basis and in 
legal practice. While the techniques of exclusion and exscription are part of the eco-
technical circulation of capital, discursive categories do not reflect the eco-technics of 
a bodily ontology. The being marked as ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’, lives and works 
next to a person considered to be a citizen-national. The categories are not as distinct 
as they seem. For this reason, my methodology questions why it is that one person is 
considered to be an IML, whilst the other is not, and how this differentiation serves a 
particular political, economic and/or legal purpose. This differentiation reinforces 
constructions of race, gender and class, but fundamentally, foundationally at the level 
of the construction of being, sociality and law. 
IML, I have explained, is used to refer to persons who are living and working 
in low-waged, low-skilled labour situations where they are fully in compliance neither 
with traditional categories of employment nor with the dominant ethnic and racial 
demographic of the nation-state. In the UK, IML is not engaged in a standard 
contractual employment relationship and is for the most part assumed to be non 
‘white-British’. IML is identified as an issue of popular and political concern, in spite 
of the inability to isolate precisely who ‘irregular’ ‘migrant’ labourers are. 
Nevertheless, these are persons excluded from ‘full’ membership as citizens of a 
political, social and legal community. The existence of this demographic of labourers 
calls into question what citizenship or ‘full membership’ is, and whether this ideal is 
ever experienced or possible beyond a very specific hegemonic category (white, 
educated, able-bodied, English speaking, heterosexual male). Full membership 
implies a complete and enclosed, attainable, entity. The condition embodied in IML 
reveals the trouble with claims of predetermined community. Those whose activity 
vitally sustains the community can be excluded from legal categories and 
protections/regulations. According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘all that is not 
recognised or legitimised by the canon is declared non-existent.’629 And this ‘non-
existence is produced as a form of inferiority, insuperable inferiority’ that, as 
insuperable, cannot be an alternative to the superior ones.630 Similarly, as discussed in 
chapter one, benefit scroungers and IML are blamed for each other’s transgression 
and both kept away from the desirable, Good Citizen. The included-as-excluded, 
                                                
629 de Sousa Santos, “Public Sphere”, 52.  
630 de Sousa Santos, “Public Sphere”, 53. 
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where exclusion is affirmed through practices recognizing the citizen as a ‘viable 
actor,’ are only such when their participation is deemed worthy according to the 
shared values of the elusive community of value.631  
The community of value is not a legal space. It is part of what is exscribed 
away from the text of law—it is the practice of inclusion and exclusion that is beyond 
the text of the law, and enforced through forms of social control. In spite of 
immigration law’s attempts to control and order the border between ‘citizens’ and 
‘non-citizens’, citizenship and participation in society is based on ideologically 
charged notions of value and worth. These can be written into the law, but also are 
mediated beyond the confines of legal definitions and are therefore within the practice 
of participation in-common. The limits of the sayable are determined based on who is 
permitted speech as a legal subject and thereby admitted as a worthy citizen, as both 
subjectum and subjectus. The community of value is reserved for those who are 
‘regular’ ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’ without the hint, or implication, of foreign-ness. As 
such, persons considered ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’ are external to the community of 
value. 
Nonetheless, labour and labour markets are concerned with concrete action, 
production and reproduction, rather than with an act of speaking. For this reason, 
labour that is outside the limit of the sayable, the work done by IML, is exscribed, yet 
present. It is part of the sense of the world. At the same time, the sayable exscribes the 
experience that what is said is always limited and that full recognition is impossible. 
Harry Arthurs’ vision of labour law as the incarnation of law requires that we 
interrogate the regulation of labour to discern how and why legal categories are both 
affirmed and contradicted. As labour is about action and activity that happens, labour 
law takes into account a broad context for law. Law cannot be seen as a purely nation-
state centric jurisdiction when labour and labourers cross administrative/bureaucratic, 
political and territorial boundaries. Similarly, those who are not recognised as active, 
‘full’, legal subjects are nevertheless subjected to the law. They are marginal in 
reference to the law, in legal grey areas. This law, I have shown, is practiced within 
                                                
631 According to Butler, ‘The public sphere is constituted in part by what cannot be said and what cannot be 
shown. The limits of the sayable, the limits of what can appear, circumscribe the domain in which political speech 
operates and certain kinds of subjects appear as viable actors.’ Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence. (London, New York: Verso, 2004), xvii. 
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the dominant (Western, modern-colonial) liberal nation-state epistemology, ideology 
and ontology. Here, lawmakers privilege a market economic system, and obscure the 
control mechanisms deployed through the mythology of the nation-state. The market 
economy is believed to be the only possible way of imagining labour demographics 
and labour markets. Law-makers and law-practitioners are influenced by labour 
market demands and priorities to sanction differential recognition of labour and 
citizenship. Limited recognition creates irregular situations and IML. As discussed in 
chapter one, IML and precarious work that is not recognised as ‘employment’ under 
labour law as well as practices that differentiate citizenship (the Good Citizen versus 
the Failed Citizen) allow businesses to demand cheaper, more temporary and 
precarious forms of labour in order to maintain economic market competitiveness on 
an ostensibly global scale.  
The (k)not politics of IML open up to economic market exchanges where 
neoliberalisation is malleable and adapts to categories, labels, legal regulations, 
always with the aim of maximising economic competitiveness and (short-term) 
financial profit. ‘Law’ as we know it in immigration and labour, fails to recognise 
how neoliberalism operates. At the same time, law is in the hands of those in whose 
interest it remains to prioritise economic growth and forego protection, for fear of 
limiting or regulating a ‘free’ market. The appropriation of categories and frames of 
recognition exploits these movements of sociability, such that persons who are 
integral to the experience of coming together are the exscription of communities. This 
benefits the market economic system because their work (labour) can be relegated 
below the radar of existing legislation and protections, and thereby these workers 
supply cheaper, temporary (expendable) forms of labour. These practices, I have 
argued, can only be understood as a politics of the (k)not.  
Care and care work present another illustration of (k)not politics. Just as the 
construct of IML exists in legal grey areas to serve the neo-liberal market, so too care 
and care work reinforce our recognition of the market as an intrusion which falsely 
frames our being. Care work, rather than accruing value on entering the labour 
market, maintains its stigma as a burden on the economic system. A shifted 
perspective on care and care-work gestures towards what feminist literature has 
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identified as recognising reproductive labour or social reproduction.632 Work in social 
reproduction is the technē that maintains the ‘house’ in a broad sense, whether it is the 
neighbourhood, nation-state, or society. In the words of feminist theorist Silvia 
Federici, ‘the reproduction of human beings is the foundation of every economic and 
political system ... the immense amount of paid and unpaid domestic work done by 
women in the home is what keeps the world moving.’633 However, since shifts in 
labour dismantle an ideology that separates a public and a private domain, and women 
in the workplace as well as flexible, casual labour is no longer anomalous, the care 
work industry accounts for the provision of care related workers and increasingly 
relies on marketised, albeit precarious, irregular labour often performed by non-
nationals’. Care-work and domestic work have become ‘labour sectors’. 
 On the one hand, feminist activists and scholars have fought to be recognised 
within dominant political, juridical and economic frameworks because care and 
domestic work are part of ecotechnics: vital to the circulating sociability that forms 
our political, juridical, economic relations and systems. On the other hand, the 
commodification of care-work has not led to care, nor are its predominantly female 
and migrant labourers valued as equal to other labour sectors.634 While gaining 
recognition through wages for persons disenfranchised in what previously was non-
income generating work (work in the home, ‘women’s’ work), the work recognised as 
‘care’ is the exscription of marketised labour, and as such cannot be captured within 
the frame of the market, in spite of the market’s insatiable attempts to manage and 
exploit a care-work industry. 635  Care is not exscribed for its reduction to a 
transcendent feminine quality. Rather, there is a sense of care that connects not to 
market value, but to our basic relationality, and similar to IML, processes of 
                                                
632 Judy Fudge, ‘Feminist Reflections on the Scope of Labour Law: Domestic Work, Social Reproduction, and 
Jurisdiction.’ Feminist Legal Studies 21:3 (2014) 1-23; Antonella Picchio, Social Reproduction: The Political 
Economy of the Labour Market (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
633 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle (PM Press, 2012), 
2. 
634 Federici, Revolution, 117: ‘In England the government has given caregivers the right to demand flexible work 
schedules from employers, so they can “reconcile” waged work and care work. But the dismantling of the “welfare 
state” and the neoliberal insistence that reproduction is the workers’ personal responsibility, have triggered a 
countertendency that is gaining momentum and the present economic crisis will undoubtedly accelerate.’ 
635 Federici, Revolution, 110: ‘Wage employment may be a necessity but it cannot be a coherent political strategy. 
As long as reproductive work is devalued, as long it is considered a private matter and women’s responsibility, 
women will always confront capital and the state with less power than men, and in conditions of extreme social 
and economic vulnerability. It is also important to recognize that there are serious limits to the extent to which 
reproductive work can be reduced or reorganized on a market basis.’ 
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neoliberalisation frame and capitalise on care being exscribed and yet vitally part of 
ecotechnics. The definition and limit of ‘labour’ and how law is to recognise and 
regulate within its limitations is a matter of debate amongst labour law scholars, as I 
discussed in chapter four. At their core, these debates question whether labour is a 
means or an end. Is it action itself that is labour, or is it action within a particular 
framework and paradigm? There is a plethora of actions that our sociability in 
common demands. I agree with Nancy that at times ‘it seems as if the category of 
“labour” were extending and distending itself to the point of dilution, as if it were 
about to ‘impregnate all spheres of existence’.’636 Nancy is critical of a ‘generalised 
becoming-laborious of social existence’.637 To counteract this potential dilution of the 
significance of labour, the identification of eco-technics (household, home-practice, 
craft) highlights the ideology of the market system, which has sought to capitalise on 
social existence itself. Meanwhile the market is only one possibility of sociability, 
which has assumed a totalising presence based on historically specific ideology. The 
market inscribes participation of autonomous, able-bodied, individuals as the labour 
of Good Citizens in contrast to Failed Citizens or IML.  
Non-marketised labour exists beyond what is measured according to monetary 
value. Nevertheless, the market is fundamentally reliant on this non-marketised work 
for social (and actual biological) reproduction. Thus while labour needs to be defined, 
and recognised for its use/value in the labour market economic system, where value is 
allocated through wages and inscribes social status in the community of value, the 
work and labour that is exscribed from market quantification also needs to be present 
to labour law. The purpose of such recognition is not to include and thereby re-write 
this excess. Rather the bodily, materiality of care is experienced and its recognized 
value can open possibilities of defiance to the false contingency of market economic 
productivity.  
Work ‘outside’ the home, in the ‘public’ labour market is sustained by work 
(largely unrecognised) in the private ‘home’ where economically productive active 
citizens are reproduced and cultivated. As a result of shifts in the labour market the 
home has become a space of private labour markets, as demonstrated in the case law 
                                                
636 Nancy, Sense of the World, 96. 
637 Nancy, Sense of the World, 97. 
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detailed in the previous chapters, Siliadin v. France and Hounga v. Allen. In both 
cases, a non-national worker was working, providing care, in a private home. This 
rendering of care to the private home stems from false contingencies of citizenship 
and the (particular) legal subject. The home is at once private and public; it is outside 
the scope of standard employment categories but also elemental to the functioning 
and order of the public. The home is fundamental to market eco-nomics. The 
dominant market economic model has inscribed onto the idea of home the values of 
privacy, property and patriarchy.638 Thus, where ‘care’ takes place appears to be as 
movement and relationality of ‘home’: home that can be thought of as the sense of 
being in the plural with multiple possibilities of an ungrounded ‘home’.639 Home, 
rethought, is constantly constituted and unconstituted within the eco-technical 
processes of production and reproduction. Here, care acts as a non-productive but 
essential part of the circulation of bodies and sense. Care, in the very material bodily 
practices, happens in the sense of the being singular plural. A bodily understanding of 
care exceeds capital circulation and poses a fundamental, ontological and 
ecotechnical challenge to neoliberalisation and the dominant economic market model, 
including the sense of the market. 
The commodification of care-work and a care-work industry in the UK 
privatises social responsibility and the responsibility of the welfare state to provide 
for its citizens through social support. The shift to a professionalized care-work sector 
has both positive and negative effects, not least of which is that it radically shifts 
models of employment from classic workplace domains, with set hours of ‘work’ 
(public) in contrast to hours ‘at home’ (private). Care-workers are employees, but on 
non-traditional contracts and in jobs that previously would have been considered 
private work and outside the ambit of formal (public) labour/employment. The 
persons employed for this work are often employed through temporary work 
agencies, as self-employed and casual labourers, and are therefore engaged in 
‘contracts of services’ without the protection of statutory employment protections. 
Especially in the case of live-in caregivers, labour and employment take on a very 
                                                
638 Luce Irigaray ‘Toward a Mutual Hospitality’, 42-54.  
639 I discuss home and hospitality through Nancy’s work in more detail in my article, ‘Revisiting Hospitality’ Law 
Text Culture 17:1 2014, 184-210. My engagement with home in this article responds to Jacques Derrida’s Of 
Hospitality and the relationship of the stranger, the migrant, to the home from which hospitality is extended or 
withheld.  
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different quality, with new sets of concerns and regulatory needs. This labour sector 
under trade in services, where women migrate to work as caregivers in homes, is 
characterised by ‘constructed precariousness under temporary migrant schemes, 
limited community market access rules, and channels of perpetual irregularity.’ 640  
 Moreover, when care work persists in being under-paid and socially 
denigrated as work for ‘irregular’ employment, particularly for migrant labourers, 
those working as carers are often unable to provide the ‘care’ actually needed in order 
for the person needing support to thrive. Potentially, a notion such as Judy Fudge’s 
‘care activation’641 could mean that the work of care becomes a recognised aspect of 
economic life as it affects every-body’s labour market participation and possibilities. 
Such a shift in the economic value of care and care work would only be possible if we 
dismantle the (false) contingencies of what is value(d), which underlie even the idea 
of market economics. Thinking of care, and care as vital to the circulation of sense, 
reminds us of what it is that is valuable to individual beings and the being singular 
plural (the being together) in the sense of the world, prior to economic markets and 
financial measures.  
Through the issue of care-work and care as a responsibility that is an aspect of 
the originary sociability and not an imposed burden of individuals, labour law is 
forced to contend with the responsibility of being as singular plural, what Marie-Eve 
Morin calls being more than one. This recognition is similar to the ‘ethical 
subjectivity’ that feminist scholars such as Rosi Braidotti and Adriana Cavarero 
activate to bring attention to subjectivities from a perspective diverging from the 
dominant Western, masculine paradigm. Braidotti suggests that thinking of care and 
being together is thinking of ‘living being prior to inscription into a cultural code; 
prior to its being fit into a specific order’.642 This is not the traditional sociological 
notion of the ‘ethics of care’, which can essentialise the role of caring into a 
normative, female, stance. Rather, care is something that is a fact of our being 
singular plural within law, law as the trace of our originary sociality. Care is not 
something to be acquired or activated by law. And neither is ‘it’ ascribable to one 
                                                
640 Blackett, “Emancipation”, 430. 
641 J. Fudge, “Labour as Fictive”, 135. 
642 Rosi Braidotti, Foreward, In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy Adriana Caverero 
(New York: Polity Press, 1995), xvii.  
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category of gender and not others (such a classification moreover reinforces and 
naturalizes constructed categories of gender, race, class and so on). Thus the 
responsibilities of all labour market participants include the responsibilities of care, 
not as a programme but as the ecotechnics of the world of singular plural, which form 
the social, which is what forms the need for an economic system and the tracing that 
is the law.  
 
What	  is	  ‘care	  work’?	  	  
 The nature of ‘care-work’ is difficult, if not impossible to measure according 
to market economic standards. Care work involves physical and emotional 
engagement as well as intimate work with bodies.643 Bodies are messy, smelly, and 
uncontainable in their excess. As Nancy describes in Corpus, our physical bodies are 
bound by skin, structured by bones and weighted, heavy.644 Yet bodies are a mess of 
fluids, organs and orifices that take place in between each other.645 The established 
Western European framework, and current neoliberal market lens of understanding 
the citizen and the subject discussed in the previous chapters, emphasises the Good 
Citizen and the legal subject as an autonomous, able-bodied, individual: an individual 
whose body is “under control” (control of oneself and control by the state are melded 
as one and the same). This model imagines a fixed, defined, compartmentalised 
(dichotomous through the mind/body distinction) idealised body. A bodily ontology, 
in contrast, shifts away from thinking of this ideal as a fixed, attainable sculpture, 
towards seeing what we are: we are bodies. And bodies need care, and do care. Yet 
the body is not an object, it is a process of becoming that is a body of being.646 
Unpredictable and finite, the corporeal is ‘an event at the limit of sense’647, where 
bodily sense is thinking against idealism and abstraction.648 The ideal and abstract is 
                                                
643 Julia Twigg, ‘Carework as a form of bodywork’ Ageing and Society 20 (2000): 389-411. 
644 Nancy, Corpus, 7. 
645 Nancy, Corpus, 35, 113, 121. 
646 “In this way the body is always open, always ready to think its form and its manner in terms of its own rejection 
and expulsion. The open body or the body-as-open is never a void, a blank page; it is an open calling for a double 
action or double movement: going inside to recover that which then, through its entrances, will be forced outside.” 
James, The Fragmentary Demand, 131. 
647 James, The Fragmentary Demand, 131.  
648 James, The Fragmentary Demand, 132.  
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the standard, the measure of a Good Citizen in the community of value as well as the 
myth of a full legal subject: the able-bodied, economically productive subject.  
Care work involves the body. In fact, the discursive focus on ‘care’ may be an 
attempt to sterilize or make palatable the bodily nature of this work.649 Body work, 
and focusing on bodies-at-work650, can refer to a broad range of activities, from the 
work that individuals put into their own bodies, as health regimes or beauty, to paid 
work done on the bodies of others: ‘medical, therapeutic, pleasurable, aesthetic, 
erotic, hygienic, symbolic.’651 Body work connects to a bodily ontology. Body work, 
more specifically, refers to the work that is done around bodies that is messy, ‘dirty’ 
(dealing often with ‘human waste’ and ‘leaky bodies’652), private and hidden. The 
body, like the categories that we place bodies into, leaks out of the confines of the 
home and predetermined household and into the space of the IML and precarious 
legal subject. Body work is often carried out either by intimate (family) members, or 
the lowest paid, ‘low-skilled’, foreign workers. The exscription of care with regard to 
commodification in employment and labour is discussed in terms of the emotional 
and interpersonal elements that cannot be captured in standard employment or job 
descriptions.653 However, I follow Twigg who writes of care work as body work 
where care deals with the ‘negativities of the body—dirt, decay, decline and death.’654 
Care work exscribes the body, moreover the name (care work) euphemises as well as 
devalues the labour. The work involved in body work is physical and emotional—
challenging the entrenched ideology of a body and mind separation, especially in 
work/labour. At this nexus of the material, physical body, and the emotional demand 
of care and intimacy, bodies interrupt and exceed dominant Western conceptualisation 
of the individual. Bodies cannot be inscribed within a market system. Moreover, even 
care work exceeds the market system because the work that is involved in ‘caring’ 
does not undo the body. In other words, the bodily exscription in constructions of 
                                                
649 Julia Twigg, “Carework as a form of bodywork” Ageing and Society 20 (2000): 389-411, 389; Ann Stewart, 
Gender, Law and Justice in a Global Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 20, 162.  
650 Wolkowitz defines body work as: ‘the paid work that takes the body as its immediate site of labour, involving 
intimate, messy contact with the (frequently supine or naked) body, its orifices or products through touch or close 
proximity.’ Carol Wolkowitz, Bodies at Work (Washington: Sage Publishing, 2006), 8.  
651 Julia Twigg, “Carework”, 389.   
652 I borrow this term from Margrit Shildrick, Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and 
(bio)ethics (Routledge: Psychology Press, 1997). 
653 Twigg, “Carework”, 394.  
654 Twigg, “Carework”, 393.  
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labour, employment (contracts) is part of the market. Therefore care work is 
exscription of work.  
 Yet care work, in labour law and employment discourses, refers to the 
marketization of care and jobs that specifically require ‘care’ givers. This 
marketization has positive consequences of recognition of care in the dominant 
market employment model, as well as negative consequences. Care-givers who 
choose to care for their family members and/or lack the economic ability to pay for 
care-work support, as well as those who are precariously employed privately in 
households to ‘care’, are excluded from notions of active, Good Citizenship. The 
economic measures of productivity deem Good Citizens as those in standard 
employment relationships. An often migrant, referred to as irregular, labour force, 
supplying care work raises racial and gender issues. Care as a marketised labour 
sector and an industry may be liberating for women who are enabled, ‘freed’, to 
participate in the labour force as breadwinners; someone else can be hired to take care 
of the(eir) care-responsibilities. Their liberated situation simultaneously marginalises 
care responsibilities away from every-day experiences and off-loads ‘care’ onto para-
professional workers whose economic disadvantage relegates them to the private 
sphere of foreign houses, often in foreign countries. Care responsibilities are seen as 
an individual burden that is emancipated through the market, a ‘burden’ that is placed 
onto global supply chains of foreign workers that supply care work in ostensibly 
‘economically productive’ or ‘economically active’ (meaning, neoliberal) countries. 
Meanwhile, the foreign workers who migrate to supply care work in highly 
marketised countries leave behind a care-gap in their own families and countries of 
origin that is then filled by aging parents, siblings, or other carers. This is also part of 
the circulation of an apparently globalised market economic system, and the eco-
technical circulation of capital and sense in the world. 
The way that the ecotechnics currently guiding our world continue to devalue 
care work connects to the historically specific frameworks of labour and employment. 
Adelle Blackett and Judy Fudge both write about ‘market-enabling’ labour, labour 
which is outside of the dominant labour market, yet part of the market because it 
enables labour in the sphere of the market. 655   For example, domestic work 
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(traditionally female) facilitates the participation of the (traditionally male) income-
earner. The breakdown of the male-breadwinner model as a consequence of the 
feminization of labour, and especially in the twenty-first century the rise of precarious 
employment, has instigated scholarly awareness of the market-enabling work of care-
givers by supporting the wage-earner(s) through their ‘private’ work. Fudge stipulates 
that ‘dependent caretakers are part of the system of production and they engage in 
household production, producing workers of the future, and discharging the 
obligations everyone has to dependents.’656  The narrow parameters of traditional 
labour law have constituted a care-work industry in response to the demand in 
working (double-income, dual breadwinner) households. The commodification of 
care work, which began as an issue of equality in employment in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, is credited with increasing women’s employment rates. A ‘care-
work industry’ has meant that care responsibilities that are characteristic of society, of 
sociability of persons in common, are marketised, placed within a market commodity 
(service) model. The market for care work predominantly constituted by the demand 
and supply of a female, migrant labour force. This is ironic because the care work 
industry emerged from a labour market model that stresses women’s active 
participation in the ‘public’ market economy.657 
No immediate marketable value emerges from the ‘work’ put into caring for 
another, especially because often the person needing care is not an ‘active’ economic 
producer. Therefore, care is undesirable labour. It is neither productive, nor rewarding 
in the eyes of the market economic system. Those who work as carers, predominantly 
women in both the care-work industry and those who have accepted personal 
responsibility as carers, are marginalised—they are not Good Citizens participating as 
productive, active, public members of the community. The former become sub-
citizens for taking ‘bottom-end’ labour (low-waged, often with little demand for 
skills) that others do not want, and the latter for choosing to be care-givers, often in 
their own private home. Those who accept responsibilities are regarded as 
economically unproductive, living with a burden that is a consequence of their 
                                                
656 J. Fudge, “Labour as Fictive Commodity”, 134. 
657 The demand for (female) foreign workers allows ‘citizen workers’ to participate in market economic labour as 
‘active citizens’ without care responsibilities. This reinforces a neoliberal, as well as patriarchal notion that the 
ideal Good Citizen is without the ‘burden’ of care, or at least has sufficient income to pay for someone else to 
‘take care’ for them. Bridget Anderson, Doing the Dirty Work?: The Global Politics of Domestic Labour (London, 
New York: Zed Books, 2000).  
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personal failure to keep up with the community of value and the expectations of the 
economic system. The rising precaritisation of labour in the UK, and the cuts to social 
services and social support, has resulted in increasing numbers of people who cannot 
meet the costs of care in the care-work industry, and have to care in addition to 
participating in the labour market economy. 658  Economically productive labour 
market participation is measured by productivity and output. In care-work the input is 
the direct output—there is no ‘productivity enhancement’ or reward that meets the 
goals of market economic growth when you are a care-giver.659 In other words, most 
care-work, although valuable in terms of well-being, does not meet a progress 
narrative where the more work you do, the more market efficient you, as the care-
giver, will become. Consequently, within the dominant market system it is not seen as 
being productive or efficient to be a care-worker. If you are able to be ‘productive’ in 
the labour market, presumably you will not return to care-giving/work, but will have 
the income means to pay someone else to carry out this labour and thereby support the 
market system. Furthermore, the discrepancy, or “penalty”, in income for working in 
the care sector, or as an informal carer, is stronger for women. 660  
As was discussed in the previous chapters with regards to immigration and 
labour, the proliferation of legislation to protect care-workers will not be meaningful 
unless labour law and labour market are de-coupled from each other. Extending 
protection to care-workers does not address the underlying issue of what makes one’s 
labour intelligible and valued in society: society being a) the dominant market 
economy or b) the actual in-common of persons interacting and relating together. 
Further, the commodification of care-work and a care-work industry privatises social 
responsibility and the responsibility of the welfare state to provide for its citizens 
through social support. However, even if the state, for instance the UK National 
Health Service (NHS), does fund care-workers, unless the measure/value of this work 
changes, care will continue to be under-valued.  
                                                
658 For this as a global phenomenon, see Federici’s discussion of women as the ‘shock absorbers of economic 
globalization’. Federici, Revolution, 108. 
659 Judy Fudge, ‘Feminist Reflections on the Scope of Labour Law: Domestic Work, Social Reproduction, and 
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660 Paula England, Michelle Budig and Nancy Folbre, ‘Wages of Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work’ Social 
Problems 49:4 (2002) 455-473.  
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Yet, care and care work are vital to the ecotechnics of the market. Care work 
enables other labourers to be ‘freed’, but also reinforces a home space from which the 
public domain is enabled. We know that the home is false, but the exscription of care 
work, the body and bodily ontology, is elemental to ecotechnics of the world. Care, 
and indeed care-giving, touches on the sociality and relations in the social, which are 
not translatable into the dominant framework of labour law where the labour market 
(and market economic system) is bolstered as the only possible form of economic, 
and thereby social, organisation. On one level, care-work illuminates a larger problem 
in law: what is the relationship between law and market? By emphasising legal and 
market effects on care-giving and care-work, the question is not how law facilitates 
economic growth, but what is the role of law in negotiating or regulating an ethic of 
responsibility or our relationships/shared vulnerability as persons in-common with 
each other? Particularly when our in-common is, at its core understood as an originary 
sociality, ‘original every time’ without the set foundation that we seek through fixed 
notions of home, citizenship and law. What is the relationship between law and both 
the persons who cannot care for themselves (are dependent) and those who offer this 
support but consequently are excluded from measures of ‘economic productivity’? On 
a second level, the eco-technics of care suggest that, like the IML, care begs to be 
thought of through the alternative thinking of bodily ontology, where all that we are is 
us as bodies (leaky, precarious, unstable, interacting, producing, consuming, 
reproducing, and dying), while simultaneously, incommensurably, we are so much 
more than our bodies.   
Conclusion	  
Labour migration is not new. Neither is the differential treatment of workers 
believed to be migrant and foreign. What is new is the hyper mobility of labour 
characteristic of the twenty-first century that intersects with institutionalised 
uncertainty in the wake of heightened securitisation and border policing. The 
phenomenon of IML follows from a ‘hyper labour mobility too often unmediated by 
labour law but heavily policed by ‘protective’ immigration law.’661 The discourses of 
labour migration focus on the border of the nation-state and distinction based on 
citizenship. Yet immigration law falls short of capturing the factors that drive labour 
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market demand for a ‘migrant’ labour force: hyper labour mobility is ‘an ultimate re-
presentation of contemporary labour market commoditisation.’662  
A post-structuralist legal critique, which among critical legal scholars is often 
explored in reference to Jacques Derrida’s ethical-juridical discussion in ‘Force of 
Law’, can be used to illuminate how immigration policies form and create irregular 
statuses in reference to a regular that is constituted by what is beyond the normative 
claim of law.663 Studies that discuss semi-compliance in immigration statuses and 
employment relationships reveal an aporetic tension contained within law, between 
the imperative of the limit that is enforced through the force of law—the boundary of 
what is legal and what is illegal—and the drive for an ongoing recognition of the grey 
areas of ‘irregular’ precarious work, and processes of neoliberalisation. Such a 
perspective demonstrates the indeterminacy of law that exists in spite of law’s 
positivist, and ostensibly determinate, claim. The aporia can be identified in common 
law practices where the indeterminate qualities of law are illuminated in case law. 
Even in the Supreme Court decisions of Hounga 2014, it is unclear whether in future 
cases the indeterminate ruling on the doctrine of illegality will result in judgements 
that continue to apply the doctrine based on the reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
decision 2012. Or, if the reasoning that found Miss Hounga’s situation as one of 
forced labour will be sufficient to prevent the doctrine of illegality from being applied 
to persons who are exploited based on their ‘illegal’ immigration status.664  
A critical legal analysis that limits itself to identifying the incommensurability 
at the heart of law, however, continues to struggle with the lack of available 
vocabulary. Indeed, language is limited and limiting. Writing is constantly enforcing a 
limit and exscribing. Derrida’s discussion of the aporia, the tension between the force 
of law and the pursuit of justice, or the conditional and the unconditional may suggest 
an impasse. Within this impasse, it is difficult to see a practical movement forward 
with concepts such as law, justice or hospitality. Rather than an emptiness, this aporia 
addresses what may be understood as the world and our lived experience more than 
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any signifier—text, word, vocabulary—can capture. I suggest that Nancy’s 
fundamental ontological questioning that draws on ecotechnics, pushes this further to 
explore the notion of sense and being singular plural. Nancy’s work in terms of 
migration and labour, allows me to speak of what it might mean to write in an effort 
to communicate the experience of this aporia and to trouble the incommensurability 
from its origins. The aporia will never be communicated. This impossibility of 
communicating the aporia is where Nancy’s attention to bodily ontology departs from 
Derrida’s work. To write, however, is to further sociality through literary 
communication. This effort brings to the fore of our thinking the experiences that are 
contestations of the categories and frameworks we assumed to be necessary, or 
contingencies that seem random or accidental. These categories are based on (false) 
contingencies that come from historically specific thinking that has ordered our being, 
our subjectivity, and our being-with each other in the world. Once this false 
contingency is unearthed and challenged, we are left with, in Nancy’s words, being 
abandoned. Yet we are abandoned to law: law as no-thing.665 Thus law and theorising 
law is the site of this practice.  
Commonly, studies of immigration and labour conclude with solutions either 
to work within immigration law and the limit of the nation-state, or they suggest 
exploring more open policy or a turn towards international legal (human rights) 
instruments. These are proposed alternatives to what are identified as current 
immigration and labour laws, policies and practices. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
however, argues that we do not need more alternatives; we need alternative thinking 
of alternatives. To contend that IML are a category of immigration is to firstly, 
presuppose a community from the position of the inscribed law and secondly, to 
continue the false contingencies operative beneath categories of labour and 
citizenship. The contingencies of the state, the organisation of a population and 
citizens posit some as ‘worthy’ ‘regular’ citizen workers and others as ‘undeserving’ 
‘irregular’ and ‘precarious’. And these contested borders of worthiness are not clearly 
defined by immigration status or citizenship. The problematic of IML exposes how 
categories of immigration are used in the simultaneous experience of inscription and 
exscription in the nation-state and the labour market.  
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My work places the identification of the phenomenon of IML, discussed in 
labour migration literature and public policy particularly in the United Kingdom, in 
the context of Nancy’s eco-technics, sense of the world, and struction (as amassing 
inscription and exscription). Nancy’s exploration of what is the sense that is the world 
provides insight into an alternative way of exploring the ‘irregular’ ‘migrant’ 
‘labourer’ and a fundamental rethinking of global economic market and nation-state 
categories. Further, in order to understand the purpose that a demographic of 
labourers identified as irregular and as migrant serve in the nation-state and a 
globalised, neoliberalising market economy, it is necessary to revisit how law allows 
categories of citizenship and labour market participation/recognition to maintain legal 
grey areas of persons in sub-citizen, irregular situations. The incommensurability of 
law can be recognised in immigration policy as a tension between deciding how to let 
some people in to fill labour demand in the economy, whilst keeping others ‘out’ 
(those seen as a drain on the economy). There is no definitive answer or resolution or 
fixed conclusion on either side; in fact, there are no ‘sides’. As a consequence, when 
our discourses construct an in-between space, an irregular that needs to become 
regular, then logically academic and policy research is guided by a search for 
resolutions to make the irregular-regular. These resolutions remain part of the same 
configuration of inside versus outside, a ‘logic of boundaries’ that is incapable of 
recognising its foundational false contingencies. Therefore, the underlying 
contingencies that support systems of inequality are not questioned. Currently, in the 
twenty-first century, both immigration and labour discussions bring to light a crisis of 
the social contract that has created demographics considered to be dispensable 
populations. The so-called stability of the global market economic system is built on 
the instability of persons considered irregular migrant labourers. Yet, the stability is 
itself an illusion, as a bodily material analysis makes clear. The market is far from 
stable, the false necessity of the market has been re-written as contingency and has 
subjected everyone to the logic of the market. Thus everyone, citizens, non-citizens, 
subjectum and subjectus are operating within a state of anxiety. Precariousness, as 
above, is the only way that a commonality can be; but even in being, it ex-ists.  
In Nancy’s words, we ‘wish to dress the wound with the usual tatters of worn-
out finery: god or money, petrol or muscle, information or incantation, which always 
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ends up signifying one form or another of all-powerfulness and all-presence.’666 The 
ground that is found or established through immigration law, and belief that 
citizenship provides the avenue of rights for people within fixed territorial boundaries, 
patches the tatters of a nation-state that is built on an idea of proto-political 
community, universality and citizenship as recognition of the subject. The all-
presence and all-powerfulness assumed by the law in immigration and labour 
regulation is contradicted by the presence of precarious labour, or an irregular migrant 
labour force. Meanwhile, IML is created precisely because of the impossibility of all-
presence, the impossibility of universality. It is impossible because it is always 
already limited by the position claimed by its authors. The outsider that is already 
inside, the labourers who are included-as-excluded, allow the global market, and the 
idea of the ‘global’, to exist as if it were something. The inscription of a labour 
demographic as IML, as ‘irregular’ emphasises what is exscribed, but is part of the 
eco-technics that is the sense that is the world. Who are irregular migrant labourers? 
Who, in the UK, are the migrants that are excluded because of their migrant status? 
This is not a cohesive, defined demographic. To refer to ‘them’ as a category, and as a 
category of ‘Failed’ or sub-citizens that, due to their own conduct have transgressed a 
common shared experience of value as Good Citizens, is to dress the wound. The 
wound that needs to be dressed is precisely the gaping wound of law, which purports 
to trace our being singular plural, but to trace the being singular plural is to trace the 
incommensurability of law, legal categories, and experiences that are in circulation, 
happening. The sociability itself may be untraceable, but it carries the imperative to 
be traced. The intrusion, inside, is the market system that encourages precarity and 
irregularity while obscuring the groundlessness that is the function (as precarious and 
irregular in reference to an idea of stability and regularity) of the originary sociality. 
This sociality is constantly unsettling our being in the plural, as the bodies that are in 
the world. Thus, within this production and reproduction of our originary sociality, 
the law is rendered no-thing but the tracing of our being with each other as singular 
plural beings.  
Nancy’s bodily ontology then, does not prescribe or resolve the dilemmas that 
we have observed and are highlighted by the creation of the illusory category of IML. 
Nonetheless, his insights and attention to ecotechnics as the circulation of sense in the 
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world would serve us well in rooting any alternative framework, be it for labour or 
immigration law, not in the steadfast sureties offered by false contingency. Bodily 
ontology accesses a different way of responding to our sociality, which like care, 
happens in spite of ourselves and our categories and subjectivity. Indeed, the body 
intrudes on Western modern-colonial philosophy because it is what we are in the 
world, material weight (physical and mental/thought) beyond false contingency. By 
thinking of IML ontologically, through fundamental ontological questioning, we 
cannot but think alternatively of alternatives. Bodily ontology rests only in the 
paradox of constant movement, where all there is is the encounter of bodies coming 
together as singular plural beings. In the coming together, then we cannot expect law 
to serve as definitive ordering, but rather as a temporary gesture, albeit electric, from 
what is ‘seen’ and ‘said’ to what is still to be ‘seen’ and ‘spoken’. Law then speaks 
not from a position of fixity, but from a position of the (k)not: untying the claims of 
the market, the proto-political and neo-liberal and tying the un-tie-able materiality of 
bodies. Our bodies marked, as they are, by a ‘system of over-signified bodies ... the 
twisting of muscles, bones, nerves’ signified most on the bodies of the ‘salaried, 
soiled bodies, toiling and earning as a closed ring of signification. Everything else is 
literature.’667 
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Chapter 6. States of 
Incommensurability 
 
In an introduction to her book on Judith Butler’s work, Moya Lloyd comments 
on Butler’s writing style: Butler poses questions in the place of normative assertions, 
‘to open a field rather than close it’.668 Butler identifies and questions the normative 
violence where contingent foundations categorise bodies, people, as corporeal 
ontologies in a particular way. The normative categories imposed through this 
violence are the focus of political projects that seek recognition and ‘agency’ for 
persons or groups marginalised by the mainstream. Paradoxically, there is on the one 
hand, a political fight for subjugated identities and persons (bodies) to be recognised 
and not discriminated against within the existing system of categories and norms. On 
the other hand, the norms are based on contingent foundations, founded by a 
particular ontology that has created the system that subjugates difference. Within this 
paradigm, the recognition of persons who do not conform to the established norm will 
always be insufficient and limited. Juridical systems of power assign categories and 
align subjectivities according to normative categories that are assumed to be 
necessary and natural and, moreover, the only possibility for recognition. The norm is 
affirmed constantly through language, discourses and categories of identity, and 
failure to conform to the norm renders persons ab-normal, sub-normal, or in the 
language of this thesis, irregular. Furthermore, the fault of not conforming is 
attributed to the marginalised individual, not to the system allocating recognition. 
Where persons are identified as ‘irregular’ and ‘migrant’, these labels serve a purpose 
in the circulation of political, juridical, economic and technical processes.  
Butler refers to the power authoring categories as normative violence. It is 
normalised violence that is hidden, such that the categories themselves become the 
goal and the political aim for advocacy groups and struggles for recognition. 
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Although the chapters of this thesis have not used Butler’s language and development 
of normative violence, debates concerning labour migration similarly reveal a 
normative violence of unexamined categories proliferating in immigration and labour 
law. Within the chapters of this thesis, I did not wish to undermine or negate the 
importance of political struggles for recognition, where legal categories are 
instrumentalised in order to improve the particular situations of persons living with 
precarious immigration status and/or in bottom-end, precarious employment. 
However, political and legal recognition, where legal categories are expanded in the 
hope of facilitating greater inclusion, is not the research interest of this thesis. The 
question is how and why these normative categories persist, and what their role is in 
prohibiting or preventing change. The project is an on-going challenge to unearth the 
normative violence—enforced through contingencies that are false in what they 
obscure from being a possibility—in order to think of who and what is happening in 
spite of categorisations, or in the spaces where we can resist immediate determination. 
In migration and labour discussions the categories that recognise persons 
migrating for labour fail to encompass all the permutations and diverse experiences of 
labour migrants. This is unsurprising: once one is critical of the universalising attempt 
of modern law, one is aware that no amount of categorisations can ever capture ‘all’ 
experiences. However, the way that the shortcomings of labour migration categories 
create an excessive category of migrant labourers, identified as ‘irregular’, suggests 
that labour migration discourse (academic, policy, political and economic) attempts to 
capture ‘all’ experiences—through the term ‘irregular’.  When the excessive 
experience is precarious (potentially deviant as ‘illegal’) or ‘undesirable’ according to 
labour sector (low-waged, low-skilled), or the race, language or ethnic background of 
persons, they are identified as irregular migrant labour.  
The normative implications of the terms irregular, migrant and labour, have 
compelled this thesis. While seemingly a better or more progressive term, which 
replaced more derogatory phrases such as ‘illegal’ ‘undocumented’, IML triggers 
foundational assumptions of what and who is ‘regular’, ‘non-migrant’ and what is 
valued participation in the labour market. By delving into the contingent foundations 
of labour migration discourse and examining the use and function of the term IML, 
this thesis follows in the spirit of Butler’s work where a field is opened—by 
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theorising labour migration law—rather than closed with claims of new, normative 
assertions.  
 In the first chapter I explained why the category of irregular migrant labour 
needs to be theorised. I discussed the complexities of citizenship—on the one hand, a 
formal legal category and on the other hand, a much more limited membership 
determined by dominant values. Citizenship, and sub-citizenships, play a role in 
maintaining parameters of the nation-state and guiding demands within an obtuse 
globalised market economy. I reviewed literature that has analysed the complications 
within notions of ‘migrant’ versus ‘citizen’, particularly with regard to immigration 
statuses that can be ambiguously in semi-compliance with immigration and/or labour 
laws. Furthermore, I discussed the different issues arising in migration studies versus 
labour law as evidence of the need to examine closely the assumptions and pre-
determined claims characteristic of labour migration debates carried out by policy 
makers, legal practitioners, public media, politicians and academics. 
The idea of the legal subject and the citizen are at the crux of problems 
identified as arising from labour migration. Because of the primacy of the ‘legal 
subject’ and the ‘citizen’ in contemporary political-juridical frameworks, the problem 
identified as IML continues to be under-theorised and largely un-examined. 
Categories, built on false contingency, therefore need to be unearthed. Thus, I explore 
a political-juridical-ecotechnical approach to think differently about labour migration 
and what issues and intersections IML concern and obstruct. A citizen signifies one, 
someone, everyone, numerous unicities that traverse and share exteriority. Citizen 
presents itself as subject at the point of sense, or at the representation of sense.669 
Subject, understood as a self-maintaining, individual essence, is where the ‘self’ is the 
focal point of identificatory unity.670 Through citizenship, the myth of the nation-state 
is substantiated in the figure, name and identity of the citizen. The citizen-subject 
status is pre- or post- supposed as the principle aim to end marginalisation. Yet, the 
citizen becomes the subject at the point where community gives itself (as) an 
interiority, when the nation-state and recognition within a particular legal system is 
the universal, total, recognition. Meanwhile, given the historical specificity of the 
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nation-state, citizenship and measures of deserving participation, recognition is not 
materially universal.  
Chapter two is dedicated to explaining the reason for drawing on Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s work in my methodology. Chapter three and four follow with an explication 
of the political-juridical-ecotechnical methodology as applied to issues concerning 
irregular labour migration in UK immigration law (three) and UK labour law (four). 
Only after tracing the theoretical, and practical political circumstances arising from 
the label, IML, could Chapter five provide a discussion of what it might mean, 
fundamentally, to rethink labour migration through a deconstruction of the 
regular/irregular, migrant/citizen and contingent foundations of labour. In chapter five 
I expanded on Nancy’s bodily ontology to suggest that the embodied experience of 
labour and migration is closer to the experience of eco-technics that make up the 
world, than the legal categories that prescribe participation in a limited framework of 
participation and being/subjectivity.   
 
Why	  Nancy?	  
Jean-Luc Nancy’s work is most suited to my research question because Nancy 
opens up the social.671  In chapter three, I considered the notion of the subject, as split 
between the subjectum and subjectus. Persons who do not conform to the normative 
categories remain in a lesser subjectivity, only ever as subjectus, belonging to the 
state and never with the state belonging to them. The idea of the subject and its 
constitution has long interested philosophers and thinkers. The enactment where one 
is formed as a subject interested John Austin, who argued that the Subject precedes 
speech, such that the performative act of speech brings out the pre-existing subject. 
Louis Althusser’s view of the subject was the opposite: speech inaugurates the subject 
in an interpellation that forms the subject. Judith Butler suggested that while the 
subject is constructed and not pre-existing, the subject does not need to be 
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interpellated as a subject in order to be subjected.672  The subjectification happens not 
necessarily as a conscious event or encounter of the subject with the power or 
authority that it is subjected under, but as a social and historical experience of the 
power and force of juridical norms. Based on the above chapters and discussion of the 
differential subjectivity of persons considered to be irregular migrant labourers, I 
agree with Butler that the subject is formed in a way that is historically specific and 
socially constructed. However, Nancy’s attention to the originary sociability and the 
being singular plural suggests that the need to be recognised as a subject (which 
Althusser, in the example of turning to the call of the policeman, suggests is the 
ideology, normalised even in oneself, of the state apparatus,673 and Butler suggests is 
based on a socially and historically conditioned feeling of guilt), may be determined 
via juridical power, but prior to this determination, the subject is only ever known as a 
being: a singular plural being.  
The turn to the call is therefore not necessarily a submission to power, even 
though I agree with elements of both Althusser and Butler’s understanding of power. 
Nor is the turn a desire to confirm existence. Rather the turn to another’s call, when 
thought of before that call is conditioned by pre-determined categories of who is 
calling and who is answering, is nothing more than the basic originary sociality where 
the singular being is known because of the plural. We exist because someone is 
affected by us. This does not have to be a ‘call’ that is heard; the affect exists because 
there is a plurality. The plurality is not an imposed plurality. This is a politically 
problematic assertion since undeniably, the way that ‘we’ know ourselves (‘I’ and 
others ‘we’) is infused with power enforced through normative categories and the 
practice of making subjects. Intersecting discrimination and marginalisation create a 
historically specific normative idea of who is the ‘normal’ dominant legal subject, the 
citizen and deserving member of a community of value. 
 Nevertheless, the very constitution of the social is re-thought in Nancy’s 
work, such that the coming together of the singular plural is the sociality before the, at 
this point inevitable, force of power determines this relation. The sense that irregular 
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migrants are actually regular, that precarious workers benefit the globalised economic 
system, that citizenship is an aspiration rather than a prescription to remedy 
marginalisation, and that legal categories are not reflective of actual experiences or 
even determinate of case law decisions in the UK, is known. It is what is the world. 
For this reason, Nancy offers an un-explored perspective on labour migration deemed 
irregular. 
Nancy’s writing on the social—as examined through terms such as sense, 
being singular plural, originary sociality—opens up the social in a constant battle 
with (not against) determinacy. A friend of mine commented once that Nancy writes 
like a woman. Over the past few years, I have reflected on what this might mean. And 
at the conclusion of this thesis, there are only textures to explain this sense of what it 
means: Nancy’s work is a repertoire of gestures, all of which open and give birth to 
unknown possibilities. There is no call or assertion to radically change the 
composition of language and philosophy. Instead we have a sense of the need to work 
with what we have, differently. Nancy’s thought is expression: it is sensual and in 
constant movement, not as staccato thoughts that are later contradicted (a style that 
might be used to illustrate Foucault’s work), but as flow, rippling ribbons of thick 
fabric that are without a definite beginning or end, but neither do they form an 
identifiable circle. The sense of the social, based in an originary sociality, is open in 
the sense of an ex-static openness, but one that is ex-static only because it is 
embodied and corporeal. In this sense, the social is ungrounded and precarious. But 
within this ungroundedness comes a sense that the ecotechnics of the world is a more 
honest approach to consider how things circulate and work. In the five chapters of this 
thesis, I suggested that migration and the production and reproduction (economic, 
social, material) of labour are in constant motion—migration and labour are 
characteristics of existence. Labour migration, and the problems arising out of labour 
migration that are identified as ‘irregular’, are symbolic of the constitutive 
groundlessness of our being singular plural against the frameworks of political 
juridical and economic categories. 
Undoubtedly, we confront potential shortcomings of Nancy’s work when we 
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draw it into the conversation of migration and labour. In wider critical legal studies674, 
some of Nancy’s terms and discussions risk being interpreted as nihilistic, abstract or 
in denial of the practice and actual experience of law (the force, or violence, of 
law). Some reactions to Nancy’s work oscillate between unease about the idea of a 
collective being-with, which is sometimes misinterpreted as advocating for 
spontaneous connections that ‘should’ lead to some sort of collective group-hug, and 
frustration with the indeterminacy of terms such as ‘inoperative’ or ‘abandonment’. 
Especially for legal scholars, the terms inoperative and abandon may seem to 
undermine legal normativity and its force. Normative approaches to law are often 
believed to be inherent to the study of law and fundamental to the work of a legal 
scholar, no matter how ‘critical’. Nancy’s work is accused of undermining opposition 
or resistance to law, opposition which would replace the identified problematic law 
with a new normative solution. The claim that we are all ‘abandoned to law’ seems to 
disable critical analyses of the violence enforced through sovereignty and the state, 
and the potential for resistance.675 It is difficult to find the language to speak of what 
escapes language. Consequently, any term or phrase does inevitably reproduce 
signification and conceptual frameworks in precisely the way that Nancy highlights 
and tries to resist.  
However, it is vital to understand that for Nancy, thinking of the singular 
plural, and the originary sociality is not about searching, or striving for, more 
authentic belonging. The coming together, that is what he speaks of as ‘being-with’ or 
community, is a confrontation of ‘separation, difference, sharing and abandonment’676 
that is the very ordinary of everyday life. Nancy’s fundamental ontological 
questioning is mundane in its focus, and is best understood as an intervention at the 
level of how thought is formed and communicated. There is no replacement ontology 
or new norm; rather our reliance on ontological coherence and on normative 
categories underlies the questioning.  Without new normative assertions, this project 
is therefore about unfolding a field of inquiry—one that embarks on the ribbon of 
ecotechnical circulation without definitive end or beginning but nonetheless with 
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vivid and real consequences. We encounter frustration and disappointment when legal 
and political attempts to remedy exploitation and marginalisation continuously fail to 
bring about sustained change. Projects that claim difference and alternatives can 
easily reinforce categories that restrict change and limit recognition. My project 
therefore does not claim change, but suggests a shift in focus at the basis—a shift at 
the level of how we understand our sociality, and consequently what we expect from 
the law, or the categories (allegiance, communities) that we place on ourselves and 
onto others.  
The exigencies that trouble social-political-economic structures, from the local 
to global level, and a pervasive lack of responsibility, accountability and communal 
care or compassion, may render a rethinking of ontology as ‘being-with’ and attention 
to ecotechnics ostensibly impractical, esoteric. However, that is exactly where my 
political-juridical-ecotechnical approach is vital: the lack of responsibility, 
accountability and communal care is a consequence of expectations that existing 
structures built on ideological systems will facilitate sociality. Rather the sociality 
takes place, first. Political and juridical systems, the dominant and regular, are 
founded not as a consequence of a sociality, but as an ideology against an Other, the 
‘irregular’ that is the ideologically less desired, un-deserving or non-public. Thus, my 
approach is not to search for pragmatic results within an operative progress-oriented 
paradigm, but to dismantle that very paradigm.677 Drawing on Nancy’s work, the 
question of this thesis is: what is it, away from categories and operative frameworks, 
which forms, and is, our world. Nancy’s ontological understanding of ‘being with’ 
and the singular plural reorients our thinking about law, justice and legal critique. The 
level of engagement therefore is not about how contested citizenships create 
alternative legal techniques, for example, or how irregular status can be politically 
useful or strategic for labourers. Asking how and why of law at the level of ontology 
and being, propells us beyond false contingency embedded in proposed alternatives. 
Nancy’s re-thinking of community as inoperative/desouvrement has also been 
criticised for being contradictory. This term, community, conjures notions of 
                                                
677 Critics of paradigm: decoloniality and other intersectional (gender, race, class) critiques would argue that 
someone like Nancy is part of the paradigm, the canon, and therefore cannot make a break from this framework. 
Yet, we all speak this language as academics especially those of us involved in critical legal theory. Nancy is 
driven by the imperative to question the canon by questioning fundamental philosophical questions—namely, 
ontology itself.  
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predetermined communitarian programmes or social models.678 Critics accuse Nancy 
of proposing (through the inoperative, or unworking, community) an alternate, more 
‘authentic’ community whilst purportedly subverting the project-oriented normative 
framework.679 However, Nancy’s being singular plural, and the exscription, do not re-
define transcendence.680 The being singular plural opens up to the becoming, the 
process of “common” “being-with” or “being-together”. That is, the ecotechnics even 
more addresses the exchange, the circulation, the processes of market 
neoliberalisation as well as being and ex-istence (the eco and technē) beyond the 
frames provided by these terms and systems. In this way, Nancy’s theory has practical 
application, materially engaging with how ‘we’ form meaning and value. 
Nevertheless, the political-juridical-ecotechnical approach is difficult to 
maintain without slipping into programme oriented or normative critique. It is 
difficult to avoid prescribing a ‘better’ solution or arguing for a way that this theory 
and fundamental ontological questioning can be applied to a legal issue. However, 
specifically and significantly, I maintain that the methodological approach is neither 
meant to be, nor can be, applied as a prescription or solution.681 I aim not to think of 
alternatives but to think alternatives differently.682 I do not propose a pragmatic 
alternative under notions of practicality and pragmatism meaning something 
productive and applicable towards a pre-determined end.683 This work may be 
normative insofar as, with Nancy, a retreat from normative categories and a direct 
critique of their power, can be interpreted as advocating a break from solutions as the 
only realistic measure of value and possibility to access what is happening in the 
world, and the world’s problems. A retreat from conventional discussions creates a 
                                                
678 Pryor “Law in Abandon”, 275. 
679 Along similar lines, Derrida was uncomfortable with Nancy’s use of the term ‘fraternity’ which he uses to 
speak of ‘equality in the freedom and sharing of the incommensurable.’ Fraterity risks, in Morin’s words, sliding 
‘towards a genealogisation and leads us back to autochthony, nation, birth.’ Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 112. 
680 Rather, ‘The exscription of a text is the existence of its inscription, its existence in the world and in the 
community: and it is in existence, and only therein, that the text decides/reaches its decision.’ Nancy, The Birth to 
Presence, 107. 
681 I do not propose a new theory of law according to Nancy. Nancy is not ‘interested in the unifying function of 
theory or the explanation of dispersed events by reference to a homogenizing discourse that might place them or 
render them more sensible for the subject who can see things from a theoretical perspective.’ In fact, ‘to insist 
everywhere on the essencelessness of relation, as Nancy everywhere does, is to rule out the possibility of the 
imposition of a “halo of theory”.’ Pryor, “Law in Abandon”, 262, ft 7. 
682 I borrow this phrase from Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South," 
Africa Development 37, no. 1 (2012): 43-67. 
683 For example that would adhere to a Critical Realist school of thought: Morris Dickstein, ed., The Revival of 
Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law and Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).   
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space to ask what it is that we are ‘after’ through our work—specifically through the 
discourses on migration, labour and irregular, precarious employment. What is it that 
our work, our critique and our drive for pragmatic solutions try to remedy or access? 
 Within the context of IML these questions address the impasse of existing 
immigration law and labour law efforts to recognise and remedy the precarious and 
vulnerable situation of persons considered IML. Fundamentally questioning the false 
necessity and false contingency of legal solutions highlights conceptual frameworks 
that define citizenship and labour participation, and how these frameworks are seen as 
the only possible condition. In the labour market, inequality is ‘“naturalised” ... 
with[in] structures of legally enforced inequality and unequal and excessive risk-
burdening.”’684 When market economic growth is deemed the priority for government 
policies, inequalities produced and sustained by lax labour regulations, for example, 
are justified. Workers who are non-nationals and/or considered to be IML and thus 
excluded from full protection of national laws, may be seen as regrettable casualties 
of economic growth. The ambiguous legal recognition and status of persons 
considered IML exacerbates the vulnerability of all workers. Migrants who are denied 
citizenship status are seen as external to the community and citizenship in the nation-
state. Labour, when carried out in the margins of the employment relationship 
(standard contractual employment), is considered to be external to the legal categories 
that define employment and labour relations ‘desired’ and ‘worthy’ of protection 
from, and by, the community—the sovereign nation-state. Meanwhile, the 
participation and constitutive presence, in fact the very eco-technical circulation, is 
exscribed.   
This study contributes to future research in law, critical legal studies, 
immigration studies and labour law. For law, this work poses a challenge to think of 
what it is that we seek when we ask the law to do something, or improve a given 
situation of exploitation or abuse. What is ‘the law’? This thesis suggests that the law 
is no thing, but is a constituted border, or limit of a sociality. This sociality is 
predetermined, based on elements of society and membership that we take for granted 
as necessary, natural and normal: the nation-state and citizenship. But the sociality 
                                                
684 Charles Woolfson – response to Alain Supiot in Emilios Christodoulidis and Ruth Dukes et al., ‘Dialogue & 
Debate: Labour, Constitution and A Sense of Measure: A Debate with Alain Supiot’ Social Legal Studies 19: 2 
(June 2010) 217-252, 230. 
Chapter 6, States of Incommensurability 
 248 
does not have to be predetermined. It can be an encounter that resists pre-
determination. Therefore, the law traces both what is predetermined, by fitting people 
and experiences into existing categories, and that which sparks from the encounter as 
a originary consequence of the persons forming that sociality. If we think about law in 
this way, then the impasse of what to do with persons who seem to exist in legal grey 
areas, is not an impasse but a situation of law’s movement and volatility. This is not a 
purely abstract or theoretical exercise. Rather, there is no knowing the consequences 
on the legal and political process as we know it now, if law were to take into account 
how persons relating on the ground (producing, interacting, consuming) transcend 
categories of identity or recognition on a daily basis. Because immigration and labour 
studies are fixed in a historically specific paradigm of categories and recognition, it 
induces anxiety to think away from it. Nevertheless, when perhaps the only normative 
claim that we can make is that the current system of abuse and exploitation should 
end, this paradigm shift in thought is essential.  
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Appendix 1. Explanation of Terms 
 
Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy’s	  Terms	  
Nancy challenges the production and signification of meaning. He pursues 
certain terms, contemplating, without resolution, their function, their role. What are 
these words after? What do they capture and omit? Nancy does not create new words, 
but focuses on words that have ostensibly lost their meaning (community, society, 
being, world), ultimately in order to contribute to their continued sense and 
signification. In spite of thinking away from locating an overarching unity or totality, 
Nancy writes with exactitude.685 Nancy speaks to exactly what is unanswerable. He 
‘shows how exact you are’ when what you are ‘isn’t exactly.’686 This ‘isn’t exactly’, 
Derrida argues in his explication of Nancy’s work in On Touching, hits at the heart of 
being and of thought. Nancy enables a meditation on the gaps in our philosophy, at an 
ontological level. 
 
Nancy writes to resist a theoretical discourse that insists on appropriating the 
sense of being and the world into known signifiers. For this reason, I interpret 
Nancy’s writing of sense as motion, as movement that is not in direct contrast or 
opposition to fixed ‘signification’.  Sense differs in texture and quality from any fixity 
and containment. Nancy’s work develops from deconstruction, notably in Jacques 
Derrida’s work, which has been used in critical legal studies to identify paradoxes of 
law and community. Nancy persistently resists remaining in dichotomies or 
frameworks. In doing so, Nancy’s work can itself be sensed as a work of art—a 
dance—that moves, shapes, reshapes and doubles back on itself, tipping off balance 
just as balance is secured: repulsive, frightening, seductive and honest, without beat, 
on beat and off beat.  
 
                                                
685 Derrida, On Touching, 293. 
686 Derrida, On Touching, 294. 
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a. Abandonment: an ontological ‘state’ or recognition of a space where 
what ‘we’ share is the moral or metaphysical abandonment to a sense 
that knows that we are groundless and precarious. In other words, 
abandonment is ‘exhaustion of transcendentals’ (Gilbert Leung, Nancy 
Dictionary).  We are abandoned after deconstructing false 
contingencies and determinate categories. But what remains? Are ‘we’ 
abandoned to our bodies? Our materiality? Our being singular plural? 
Are any of these ‘things’ that we can claim to know, to hold and to 
have? This, for Nancy, is why abandonment is all that we have. 
Meanwhile, we cannot ‘know’ abandonment—where knowing would 
involve conceptual grasping, or at the very least a making present of 
something.  
i. According to Nancy, we are abandoned to law. Being 
abandoned to law is to be abandoned to the exscription, where 
law is open to its violation in an incommensurable relationality. 
Nancy refers to this opening to violation as freedom. We are 
abandoned to law as/because the exscription of law opens to 
freedom: freedom being the lack of determination, the naked 
happening of existence. Here law is nothing, but is also 
potentially everything, as law is the limit or order where 
existence is happening. From this ‘abandonment’ being is 
thrown out into all possibilities of thinking.  
 
b. Aporia: from ἀπορία: without passage. A word most notably used by 
Jacques Derrida to describe the paradox or impasse within notions 
(determinate and indeterminate). Derrida writes of aporias within ideas 
of hospitality, forgiveness, mourning and law. 
 
c. Being singular plural: is Nancy’s ontological understanding that a 
being is only ever known because of the plural—the plurality of 
singular beings that makes up the world. ‘I’ experience my own 
singularity, in the experience of being with others. I am a singular 
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being that knows my singularity because I exist in the plural (amidst 
other singularities). Sharing in a sociality, a multiplicity of bodies, 
makes this experience of ‘my’ singularity an experience of a plural. 
Singularity is not, however, the same thing as individuality. ‘My’ 
being singular is not ‘my own’, but is a shared experience with other 
singularities. Meanwhile an individual is ‘I’ closed upon ‘itself.’ 
Individuality implies a self-fulfilling totality and independence where 
the individual, ‘my’ ‘self,’ is the fulfilment of its own essence. 
Singularity attempts to capture an experience of the materiality of 
bodies, away from the ideologically charged notion of the 
‘individual’.687 In Nancy’s ontological thought, the singular being 
exists at the limit of being: ‘It is neither inside nor outside ... but it is 
essentially ex-posed, turned inside out.’688 Singularities are always 
about exposure; they are never together in one another, nor enclosed in 
and of themselves. Each singularity is a ‘stroke of existence.’689 These 
strokes of existence are what Nancy understands as the configuration 
of the world. The limited recognition allowed through categories of 
subject and citizen implicitly denies the singular plural. Consequently, 
the ‘subject’, the ‘citizen’, as well as the ‘law’ are burdened with a 
demand to be a totality. They are, fundamentally, unable to meet this 
demand because our existence is the incommensurability of being 
with, as an indeterminate relation of singular plural.  
 
d. Bodily ontology: Jean-Luc Nancy’s bodily ontology is his exploration 
of corpus—the matter of bodies, within the body of knowledge that 
has structured Western thought, as well as the weight (matter, body) of 
thought. The corpus of Western modern philosophy pushes Nancy to 
question ontology at the level of our physical, material presence and 
experiences (sense). Nancy writes from within the corpus, not by 
                                                
687 This distinction, and attention to singularities rather than individuals, is applicable to re-thinking of labour and 
migration, where labour can be re-thought of as more than the employment relationship where labour refers as well to 
the work of bodies producing, reproducing and participating in sociability together. 
688 Marie-Eve Morin, "Putting Community under Erasure: The Dialogue between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy 
on the Plurality of Singularities," Culture Machine 8 (2006), 5. 
689 Morin, “Putting Community under Erasure”, 6. 
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suggesting that there is, somewhere somehow, an external or limit-
less/pure, perspective. Yet the bodily ontology690 is exscribed from the 
dominant discourses (political, legal e.g. citizenship, the legal subject) 
that claim to tell ‘us’ what ‘we’ are.691 As exscribed, the body is 
nevertheless very much present and remains present, as categories that 
claim to recognise presence are uprooted. Nancy’s bodily ontology re-
visits ‘being’ by giving attention to the physical, material presence of 
bodies as the basis of originary sociality. Contrary to phenomenology, 
however, a bodily ontology is not a matter of privileging body as 
interior, or interiorising, Being. The notion of Corpus does not 
endeavour to conceptually place the body as the site, or locus, of 
identity. Rather through thinking of the body ontologically, what it 
does and does not do, our thinking is able to touch on the exteriority of 
being; here the being singular plural is an alternative thinking of 
alternatives wherein we know our body only by being externalised 
from anything that ‘it’ may be. The body itself is something outside, 
which is always turned inside out.692 Precisely, bodily ontology is what 
bodies are about, as weight, as presence, as happening, not about what 
they should be or should do. Furthermore, ‘each thought is a body’693 
i. According to Danielle Rugo, it is through Spinoza that Nancy 
finds a model where the body is consigned neither to pure 
materiality nor to the simple extension of the mind, but inhabits 
a space that is incommensurable to one or the other, opening 
both from within and making a clear distinction problematic: 
‘soul and faeces are what the body is and what the body is 
not.’694 The inability for the Cartesian mind and body split to 
be distinct is constituted by the difference of the body to itself, 
                                                
690 Ian James, The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 91. 
691 James, ‘The Just Measure’ in Jean-Luc Nancy: Justice, Legality, World Benjamin Hutchens, ed., (London: Continuum, 
2012), 42.  
692 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 128. 
693 Nancy, Corpus, 113.  
694 Daniele Rugo, Powers of Existence: The Question of Otherness in the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. Doctoral thesis, 
Goldsmiths, University of London, 2013. [Thesis]: Goldsmiths Research Online. Available at: 
http://research.gold.ac.uk/2643/ , 90.  
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‘in and of itself, a body is also its consumption, its degradation, 
even as stinking pus or paralysis.’695 The Cartesian mind-body 
split, and subsequently modern philosophy’s explication of the 
Rational Man, is one of the fundamental tenets of modern 
thought—the corpus of Western, modern-colonial philosophy 
has silenced (exscribed) the irrationality and the materiality of 
the same rational man (plus everything that happens around and 
in him, which exceeds the individual frame). 696 
 
e. Concretization: the making material of sense, coming into matter. 
 
f. Determination: pre-conceived framework defining contingencies and 
possibilities for a given identification, recognition or conceptualisation. 
 
g. Eco-technics: Eco (from οικος) -technics (from τέχνη) refers to the 
eco, home (economic, ecology, also the body, the biology), and technē, 
the technical praxis that orders and makes sense of the interruptive, 
incoherent and incommensurable. It is the ecology of technical 
circulation, understood these days as the circulation of capital; but this 
is both the capital that is the financial monetary system of value, and 
the capital that is beings, relations, social reproduction and non-
material values. Eco-technics works as the technical reduction of 
pluralities to equivalences of capital, but simultaneously exposes the 
intersection of sense, without which there would be no circulation and 
no capital. Capital is not synonymous with capitalism, but capital 
means the bodies at work, in Nancy’s wors, ‘a system of over-signified 
bodies.’697 In order to understand eco-technics, it is important to note 
that sense is a material experience, the materiality is the experience 
tied to the technē or technical processes which then is the 
concretisation in the world (see sense of the world).  
                                                
695 Nancy, Corpus, 105. 
696 Dusserl, 2014.  
697 Nancy, Corpus, 111.  
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h. Experience of freedom: the interruption of form and determination 
where we are abandoned to our groundlessness, and possibilities are 
open and contingencies raw and unknown.  
 
i. Exscription: circulation of meaning, where language has its own force 
and weight, where the material happening that is written out of the 
text—in some sense ‘formally’ unaccounted for—but is irredeemably 
part of the happening. The exscribed forms part of the body of the text, 
but by being placed away from the ‘text’.  
 
j. Freedom: found in indeterminacy; in naked existence. Crucial to 
understanding Nancy’s work is to see that he bases his thinking in the 
absence of the determined condition (ground). This space away from 
determinancy, for Nancy, is freedom; to transgress is freedom, freeing. 
Therefore, law, strictly understood as inscribed laws, is un-freedom. If 
law is tracing the limit of experiences then the freedom within law is 
the infinite possible finite pluralities at this limit. Freedom is without 
contingency; it is not an alternative space or other experience. Freedom 
is the experience, sensed, that jolts what has been inscribed.698  
 
k. Incommensurability: could also be thought of as the aporia. The 
incommensurability of being is a co-appearance of a limit and the 
exscription of that limit, which renders the ‘thing’ unsignifiable or 
inoperative.  For instance, law can be seen as incommensurable with 
justice but moreover, law is incommensurability itself because it is 
nothing that can be definitely determined.  
 
                                                
698 With regard to the IML, freedom is the question of the ‘irregular’ that is in fact a regular presence in the labour 
market. Furthermore, the question asks how the presence of IML, who are not necessarily ‘migrant’ and not ‘irregular’, 
challenge (interrupt) legal categories and notions of citizenship and the nation-state. 
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l. Inoperative/désoeuvrement: unworking, unravelling, untying pre-
determined, programme-oriented categories and frameworks. Writing 
(literature) and thought (communication) as processes are inoperative. 
Nancy’s use of the term ‘inoperative’ has been criticised for being a 
prescription to un-work existing frameworks without providing a 
resolution for real political concerns demanding attention.  
 
m. Indeterminate: without determination.  
 
n. Inscription: written into the text, but is not the complete text—is 
inseparable, and incommensurable, with the exscription.  
 
o. L’intrus: the intruder that is within. L’intrus appears as a chapter 
towards the end of Corpus (2008) and has also been published 
independently (Jean-Luc Nancy, “L’Intrus” trans Susan Hanson 
(Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2002). Nancy wrote this 
piece as a reflection on his own heart transplant. The ‘intruder’ is what 
remains a stranger, strange at the heart (core) of what is most familiar. 
 
p. Law: a technique of tracing at the limit of the sociality, which is the 
coming together of singular plural beings in sociabilities that are 
originary every time. EF 
i. my use of the term: The paradox of law is law’s 
incommensurability. It is both a movement and a fixed limit.  
Incommensurability suggests that although juridical law is 
guided by categories that provide order and definition, these 
categories can only offer a limited order due to an ever-shifting 
existential law, and vice versa. This paradox causes the 
ambiguous legal grey areas where persons are considered IML. 
Nancy’s existential law, on the one hand, mandates that there 
be a law recognising those living and working in a given 
territory. The limited frames of recognition necessary for a 
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limit and definition to exist are instrumentalised by juridical 
law, on the other hand, and bound by citizenship such that 
openness to all bodies living and working in a given territory is 
prevented/impossible. The way that this tension of juridical and 
existential law is played out is not prescribed or predetermined, 
but is seized by neoliberalisation and economic market values. 
Law is instrumentalised in the nation-state system and market 
economy, but importantly, this structure is not inherent to law 
itself. Rather it is a condition of law’s authors. Law itself, 
juridical and existential (juridical law is imposed onto a 
subject, while the existential law is: it imposes itself upon 
itself), is no-thing until it is given value and meaning by those 
who speak it and are subjected to it, including those who resist 
‘it’ (both subjectum and subjectus). Law does not address the 
totality of our existence if it is the trace of sociality, but comes 
from the sociality itself. The sociality gives it form—the 
sociality inscribes the law as law. Law, instead, is a tracing 
movement of the singular plural beings that are relating and 
forming a limit. However, within the current circulation of 
beings (eco-technics), capital production and economic market 
systems operate a limit within a specific ideological paradigm 
that names privileged legal subjects while obscuring the 
participation of others. Yet ‘law’ as a constituting limit and the 
force of this limit is not limited to these particular vocabularies 
and ideology.699 Nancy’s call to ‘do justice to existence’ means 
thinking of ‘Law without law or a right before all rights.’700 
Law has no independent foundation; it is ‘a technē without a 
goal as long as it is not supported by the model of 
                                                
699 In chapters three and four, the indeterminacy of some judicial decisions with regards to ‘irregular’ migration 
and labour/employment, demonstrates that law, by what it ultimately permits, traces the eco-technics more so than 
it firmly re-enforces rigid frameworks of existing legal categories or is consistent in offering the protection 
mandated by legislation. 
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sovereignty.’701 In fact, law and sovereignty are implicated in a 
tautology and Nancy questions their very basis.702 
 
q. Ontology: the overarching framework through which our being is 
explained and understood.703  
 
r. Originary sociality: the raw, naked social that happens every time a 
singularity is reminded of its singularity in the plural. Originary, not as 
‘first’ or ‘pure’, but because every encounter is a repetition of the 
singular plural that has never happened before. The encounter, and 
constitution of the singular plural, is originary every single time. The 
originary sociality is the coming together of singular beings into a 
plurality of singularities.  
 
s. Politics: juridically enforced system (and its contestation) of 
governance (bio-governance) authorship, and power over normative 
categories  Contestation can only be recognised insofar as it conforms 
to the dominant paradigm, and thereby sacrifices the possibility of ever 
being recognised as anything but irregular.  
i. The political: the space of being with, the common that is 
constituted by the amassing of the sociality. The political space 
is a retreat of the political, a withdrawal from politics, where 
the relation cannot be presupposed because it is impossible that 
the plurality (bsp) can be reduced to a single origin or unity. 
Therefore, the political is a (k)not, an absence of totality 
claimed as the name of community.  
ii. Politics of the (k)not: politics understood as an indeterminate 
tying and untying of interests, agendas, reasoning, experiences, 
                                                                                                                                      
700 Devisch, Jean-Luc Nancy, 132. 
701 Devisch, Jean-Luc Nancy, 140.  
702 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, 107. Thus, Nancy is justified in wondering: could sovereignty itself be ‘a revolt of the 
people?’ Jean-Luc Nancy, Creation Of The World Or Globalisation, trans., Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 109. 
703 Nancy’s work has been referred to as a ‘fundamental ontological questioning’ by Ian James (2006) and 
pursuing a ‘bodily/corporeal ontology’. Marie-Eve Morin (2012) refers to Nancy’s work as an ‘ontology of the 
singular plural’. 
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arguments, fixed boundaries and constructions. It is 
determinate and indeterminate, like tying a knot that is always 
already unravelling. This is a politics of the tying, rather than 
setting, or conforming to, pre-determining categories. This is a 
politics of sense, of being singular plural, where the imperative 
of the limit, that is law, and the decision, are constantly in 
process and motion.  
 
t. Sense: the sensed—sensual, felt, experienced, happening—presence in 
the world. Nancy writes of sense as ‘the concept of the concept.’704 
Sense is what escapes signification, but still is part of experience and 
part of what is the world.  Sense is not simply a practice or a technē, 
but it is eco-technē. It is the concept of the concept before the concept, 
but pivotal to what we come to understand as eco-logical and eco-
nomical production and reproduction. Nancy’s notion of sense does 
not make sense, because it resists signification.705 Nevertheless, it is 
what does not signify itself. In other words, sense defers itself and 
‘will differ always from all that you will seize, from all philosophy, 
and yet you will have had a sense of it.’706 We construct categories and 
frames not in opposition to sense, but to try and comprehend the world 
by making it intelligible. Nancy does not say, therefore, that we must 
stop making sense. The critique of sense is not a denial or de-
activating. Nancy acknowledges his subject position, ostensibly self 
mocking as he re-inscribes words and arguments that have already 
been said: ‘There should be some legal restraint aimed against inept 
and useless writers, as there is against vagabonds and idlers. Both I and 
a hundred others would be banished from the hands of our people.’707  
Yet nonetheless he continues writing.  
i. Making sense or signification: Sense is different from 
signification, yet sense is made to make sense when formed 
                                                
704 Jean-Luc Nancy, A Finite Thinking, Simon Sparks ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 5. 
705 Nancy, Sense of the World, 35.  
706 Nancy, Sense of the World, 90. 
707 Jean-Luc Nancy and Katherine Lydon, "Exscription," Yale French Studies 78 (1990): 47-65, 56. 
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into intelligible systems and frames. Signification is what 
makes up determinate meaning, whereas sense is not the 
opposite of determinacy, but is an essence that is always 
deferring and differing.   
ii. Sense of the world: the sense that is concretised in various 
ways such that we know the world is something that cannot be 
fixed or truly known. And yet there is a world. So much 
exceeds the categories and constructs that we rely on to know 
the world; this excess is the sense of the world. Sense and 
world are different, but structure each other.  
 
u. Struction: Resisting destruction and construction, struction calls 
attention to the material reality as it is experienced. The 'naked 
contingency of existence' that is never fully in presence, but is 
present.708 In the word, ‘struction’, Nancy aims to identify what is the 
result of an intellectual paradigm shift away from overconstruction of 
terms, categories and signification. 
 
v. Technē: technique, praxis: from the Greek τέχνη, meaning the craft of 
knowledge that is connected to experience and practice. For Nancy, 
techne is  the technical structure that orders and ‘makes sense of’ the 
interruptive, incoherent and incommensurable. ‘Creation’, and 
subsequent economic, political and social production and reproduction, 
is technē of bodies where bodies are technical objects and withdraw 
from transcendental or immanent signification. For this reason, bodies 
have to be taken into account when considering the need for law to 
trace the limit of persons coming together in an originary sociality. 
And also why ecotechnics touches on processes of neoliberalisation. 
The technē of bodies is the variety of ways by which ‘we’ are exposed 
together.  
 
                                                
708 Jean-Luc Nancy and Aurélien Barrau, What’s These Worlds Coming To? Trans. Travis Holloway and Flor 
Méchain, (Fordham University Press, 2014), 54. 
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w. Touch/touching: touches the untouchable. It is ‘not so much 
proximity as separation’.709 Touch is not only physical, but includes 
writing as well, and exscription is writing touching on the untouchable.  
 
Other	  Commonly	  Used	  Terms	  
a. Citizenship 
i. Formal: recognised through legal membership in a nation-
state, identified through a passport or identity document. 
ii. Good Citizen: reflects values of the nation-state, in the case 
of the UK this involves the liberal values of individual 
strength/entrepreneurship, economic participation, family 
(nuclear) life. Contrasts with the Failed Citizen, who cannot 
‘keep up’, failing in some way—could be health, dependence 
on others, criminalised activities, or otherwise demonstrates 
activities that are not ‘socially acceptable’. 
iii. Sub-citizenship: a position for those persons who are not-
quite-there as Good Citizens and have a limited subjectivity 
because they do not fit into the ideal citizen. This could be 
due to limited economic participation, dependence, care-
needs or responsibilities.  
 
b. Community of value (Bridget Anderson): shared values dictating a 
community limited by a particular ideology, meanwhile ostensibly 
encompassing the collective community of the nation-state. In the UK, 
these values are based on liberal, and neoliberal, ideology of the 
autonomous, economically successful, upwardly mobile individual. 
Many qualities are adapted from traditional Christian (Church of 
England) values of family, work and community. 
 
c. Economic market  
                                                
709 Marie-Eve Morin, ‘Touch’ In The Nancy Dictionary, edited by Paul Gratton and Marie-Eve Morin (Edinburgh: 
University of Edinburgh Press, forthcoming 2015). 
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i. Economic: (eco- from οικος, meaning ‘house’, and used in 
eco-nomic, eco-logy, but connects also the body, the biology; 
nomos- from νοµος, ‘law’ ‘code’) 
ii. Market: system of exchange based on supply and demand. 
iii. Globalized market economic system: based on an 
ostensibly global, universal market where all nations and 
individuals are believed to participate according to neo-
liberal economic market measures and values. 
a. Free-market capitalism: according to Oxford 
English Dictionary is an economic system where 
prices are determined by unrestricted competition 
(amongst privately owned, rather than state, 
businesses).  
 
d. Irregular Migrant Labour: working in low-waged, low-skilled 
labour. Bottom-end, precarious work.  
i. Precarious: lack of security—income, employment, access to 
legal productions, employment tribunal, or questionable 
immigration status at risk of deportation or removal.  
 
e. False contingency (Susan Marks): contingencies that are made to 
seem as if they were the only possible conditions of possibility. 
 
f. False necessity (Susan Marks/Roberto Unger): conditions that are 
historically specific but made to seem as if they were not only 
necessary, but also natural.  
 
g. Neoliberalism  
i. Neoliberalism, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is a 
modified form of liberalism, developed in the 1930s, to favour 
free market capitalism.  
ii. Neoliberalisation, according to Jaime Peck et al., refers to 
neoliberalism as an on-going process that cannot be understood 
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as a monolithic force. It is by definition a regulatory 
transformation that is uneven and chronically unstable. Thus, it 
is difficult to definitively say what neoliberalism and 
neoliberalisation is, because it takes on the economic belief in 
the free-market, but has become a term to refer to concerns of 
how individuals are organised and controlled according to 
amorphous, yet hegemonic, financial markets. 
 
h. Proto-political community (Hans Lindahl): the pre-state community, 
global universal. A proto-political community presupposes the 
bounded political of the nation-state and membership identified 
through citizenship. This proto-political community reflects a tendency 
towards universal thinking embedded within conceptualisations of pre-
determined community belonging. The ostensible existence of a proto-
political community justifies exclusive nation-state membership 
mediated through a shared community of value; those excluded belong 
elsewhere in a broader, proto-political universal. Nevertheless, a lack 
of belonging does not prohibit employment in de-valued, denigrated 
and dangerous labour situations without the protection or regulation 
proffered by national labour legislation and international labour 
regulations. 
 
i. Subject and subjectivity: Subject (Costas Douzinas/Juliette Rogers): 
Regular’ citizens (male, Western) are seen as subjects of the law. They 
are subjectum: state belongs to them. In contrast, marginalised beings 
are subjected to the law. They are subjectus: they belong to the state.   
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